Spinoza's Ethica from manuscript to print

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Tweede promotor: Prof. Dr H. De Dijn
Copromotor: Dr F. Akkerman

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Illustrations

Abbreviations, citation style

AA	*Akademie-Ausgabe* (Leibniz. AA 3:2, 52.11 = 3rd series, vol. 2, p. 52, line 11)
ASD	Amsterdam edition of Erasmus (ASD 1:4, 97 = 1st series, vol. 4, p. 97)
AT	Adam & Tannery edition of Descartes
BCE	Before Common Era
CE	Common Era
CM	*Cogitata metaphysica*
E	*Ethica*
Ep	*Epistola, Epistolae*
EW	*English works* (Hobbes, ed. Molesworth)
G	Gebhardt edition of Spinoza (G 2, 15.19 = vol. 2, p. 15, line 19)
GL	*Grammatici Latini* (Keil)
KV	*Korte verhandeling*
NS	*De nagelate schriften van B.d.S.*
OC	*Œuvres complètes*
OED	*Oxford English dictionary*
OL	*Opera Latina* (Hobbes, ed. Molesworth)
OP	*B.d.S. Opera posthuma*
PhS	*Die philosophischen Schriften* (Leibniz, ed. Gerhardt)
PP	*Principia philosophiæ*
SW	*Sämtliche Werke*
TIE	*Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* (sections according to Bruder)
TP	*Tractatus politicus*
TTP	*Tractatus theologico-politicus*
WNT	*Woordenboek der Nederlandsche taal*

ad	affectuum definitio	app	appendix
c	corollarium	d	demonstratio
def	definitio	e	explicatio
l	lemma	p	propositio
præf	præfatio	s	scholium

E 3ad4e = *Ethica*, part 3, explication of the third definition of the affects
PP 1p7l2 = *Principia philosophiæ*, part 1, second lemma of proposition 7

A note on quotations

Throughout quotations have been given in the languages of the sources quoted. I have added English translations to passages cited in the text, if the quotation is not in English, French or German. Quotations in the notes, as well as the textual examples in chapter four, have remained untranslated, in view of their scholarly function. The English translations of quotations in the text are mine whenever no source is mentioned.

Acknowledgements

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A considerable part of the initial inspiration of this book came from a distinguished student of Spinoza, who did not live to see it realized: Huib Hubbeling. His untimely death put an end to our collaboration before it had properly begun.

The solitary author's name on the cover tends to hide from view the multifarious contributions of others. From its inception to its accomplishment, this book is heavily indebted in many different ways to many different people. Their sheer number defies any representative enumeration. I here express my gratitude to all of them. Among those who (in their capacity of supervisors, members of the committee or otherwise) read and commented upon the texts that follow, I would like to mention Professors Hans Heinz Holz, Herman De Dijn, John North, Chris Heesakkers, Filippo Mignini, K.J. Schuhmann, Michiel Keyzer, Jean-Marie Beyssade; and John Kay, Guido van Suchtelen, Andrew Palmer and Peter Binkley. Their contributions have gone into the text in forms that range from amended formulations and additional notes to entirely rewritten paragraphs, sections or chapters. The book as a whole would have been unthinkable (in a strong sense) without the backing, energy and erudition of Fokke Akkerman. *Numquam accedo quin abs te abeam doctior* – these words (here, as he will

appreciate, devoid of irony) capture my indebtedness to him more adequately than any phrase of my own could do. I am well aware that I have not been able to meet all the wishes expressed by him and my other critical readers; for the results presented here I alone am responsible.

The assistance extended to me was not limited to help with the contents. A number of those already mentioned and quite a few others seconded me in other ways, too. I am grateful to them all. Special thanks are due to Theo van der Werf, Pieter Rijsten and Joukje Nijboer for their practical support, to Piet de Haan for his artistic achievement, and to my loved ones for having put up with this project for so long.

Introduction

Books have their fates. This applies to the present collection of studies no less than to the book that constitutes its prime object, the *Opera posthuma* of Benedictus de Spinoza, published in 1677. Though the chapters that follow are heterogeneous in approach, scope and subject matter, they all derive from a common source: an enquiry into the vicissitudes of Spinoza's *Ethica* (first published in the 1677 posthumous works), with a view to making a new critical edition of that text. The *Groupe de recherches spinozistes*, domiciled in Paris but with an international membership, is establishing a new edition of all Spinoza's works, with facing French translations. I was engaged in 1987 to assist Dr Fokke Akkerman of the Department of Classics, Groningen University, in preparing the Latin text of the *Ethica* for this project. Situated at the intersection of philology and philosophy, the task required affinity with both fields, and a willingness to combine various types of research – in the history of philosophy, as well as in matters philological, bibliographical, palaeographical and historical. The work will result in two mutually related books: the present one and the new critical text of the *Ethica*. The unity of the former, with its polychrome strands, depends upon the latter.

Chapter 1 focuses on the editorial history of the *Opera posthuma*. The *Ethica* had a short but intensive manuscript tradition. After Spinoza embarked on it in the early 1660s, parts of it circulated in transcripts among a selected number of friends. A Dutch translation was begun, but this was interrupted in or before 1665 by the death of the translator, Pieter Balling. Spinoza himself made preparations for publishing the work in 1675, and for this purpose he almost certainly had someone fair-copy the text. He had second thoughts about it, though, and the publication of that transcript was taken care of by others two years later, after his death. Spinoza's autograph of the *Ethica* is explicitly mentioned in Georg Hermann Schuller's correspondence with Leibniz in 1677. After the publication of the *Ethica* text in the *Opera posthuma*, however, all these manuscripts vanished without trace. It is unlikely (though not impossible) that an autograph or a contemporary apograph will come to light yet. As the matter stands, then, our unique source for the Latin text of Spinoza's major work is the one printed in the *Opera posthuma*. A modern editor must therefore establish the connection between that text and Spinoza's lost Latin original as accurately as possible. This entails an enquiry into the circulation and transmission of Spinoza's manuscripts, the circumstances of his death and the subsequent preparations of his works for

posthumous publication by a number of friends. We do have material at our disposal for a tentative reconstruction of their editorial activities, but it is fragmentary and heterogeneous. Inevitably much of the reconstruction will remain conjectural. Even so, the first chapter does not limit itself to a mere *status quaestionis*; some progress has been made. Hitherto a number of people belonging to the circle of Spinoza's friends were considered as being involved in the publication of the posthumous works: Lodewijk Meyer, Jarig Jelles, the translator Jan Hendriksz Glazemaker and the publisher Jan Rieuwertsz. A controversial issue was the part played by a younger friend and correspondent, Georg Hermann Schuller. I think I have now arrived at a fairly adequate assessment of his role. Initially I felt that the information he gave to Leibniz on the subject was so unreliable and contradictory as to deserve no credit whatsoever.[1] Alerted by a cursory remark by Pieter van Gent in a letter to Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, of 1679, however, I finally managed to identify the scribe of transcripts of two letters that formed part to Spinoza's correspondence, copied out after his death – possibly for publication in the *Opera posthuma*, but suppressed in the event. They were in Van Gent's handwriting. As Van Gent says that he copied out works by Spinoza on Schuller's request, this enabled me to get the latter's involvement in the right perspective, too. I had been attempting to ferret out the identity of the scribe of the two transcripts from the beginning of my investigation, but it was not until the beginning of 1994 that I finally discovered it was Van Gent. The discovery prompted me to revise my earlier views on the editorial history of the *Opera posthuma*. To a greater or lesser degree, this affected all the chapters of this book (except chapter 2, whose subject matter stands apart from the rest). I knew that the results of any scholarly investigation are bound to be provisional, but now the point was driven home with unusual force. New research is now possible on a number of questions relating to the extent of Van Gent's involvement. Were his activities as a scribe directly related to the preparation of Spinoza's works for the press, and, if so, was he merely a copyist or did he also participate in editing Spinoza's Latin or translating his Dutch letters? Van Gent's Latinity awaits further analysis; stylometry might be a useful approach here. Although I am planning to delve deeper into the matter myself, I hope that the findings presented here will also spark off investigations by others. The starting-point of this chapter is the fate of the *Ethica*, but other parts of the *Opera posthuma* will be dealt with, too, inasfar as they can teach us something about the editorial history. This implies special attention for Spinoza's correspondence.

Chapter 2 is the sort of article that I had hoped to hit upon when I set to work. It deals with a minor but conspicuous feature of Latin books of the early modern period: the practice of providing them with accent-marks. Somewhat to my surprise, no

1. I argued this point rather emphatically in an unpublished paper I read in Groningen, on a colloquium on Spinoza's texts, in September 1990. The version that will appear in the proceedings of that colloquium (Akkerman & Steenbakkers 1994) will take my new findings into account.

comprehensive account of the system was available, so I started collecting such information as I came across. Over the years, I have presented three papers on the subject.[1] The chapter on diacritics included in the present collection is much more extensive than any of these papers could be. It incorporates the findings reported in them, provides extensive annotation with all the relevant references and contains a number of additions. Although the second chapter aims at being a comprehensive survey of the subject, its outlook is determined (and limited) by the practical incentive that led me investigate this particular field of Latin orthography in the first place. My initial questions were: who put the accent-marks in a text, what is their function, what are we to do with them in a modern critical edition? A more systematic approach would certainly reveal aspects that receive too little attention here and correct some of my findings. When collecting the material for this investigation, it struck me that accentuation is on the one hand conventional, in that it follows sets of common rules, and on the other hand individual, to the extent that the rules vary considerably and are never applied consistently. This seemed to open a path to identify individual contributions to the transmission of a text by charting differences in the accentuation systems. Things were not all that straightforward, though. It turned out that authors would follow different rules in their various works. Moreover, it is hard to determine to what extent authorial and editorial spellings appear in a printed text, after having gone through the compositor's hands. Accent-marks had to be dismissed as a feature that could contribute to outlining the profile of an author or an editor.

Chapter 3 is, by and large, the text of a paper I read in May 1991,[2] but I have seized the opportunity to make a number of revisions and additions. Its theme is Lodewijk Meyer's theory of the passions. Meyer was a close friend of Spinoza's, and he had access to the *Ethica* from the very start. Thus the influence of the Spinozist view of the passions, as set forth in *Ethica*, part 3, can be detected in a text Meyer wrote as early as 1670. The subject is the more interesting because Meyer was also involved in preparing the *Opera posthuma* for the press. It can tell us something about the way Meyer, who was an eclectic thinker, integrated views from other philosophers into a system of his own.

Chapter 4 is a specimen of the sort of research that must be carried out to establish the precise relationship between the Latin text of the *Ethica* in the *Opera posthuma*, and its contemporary Dutch translation, *Zedekunst*, published simultaneously in *De nagelate schriften*. Akkerman's research has revealed that this relationship is a complicated one: the translator, Glazemaker, incorporated an earlier partial translation by Pieter Balling, and he may also have had other manuscripts at his disposal in addition to the transcript

1. Latinistendag, Groningen, 12 January 1990 (unpublished); 8th Congress of the International Association for Neo-Latin Studies, Copenhagen, August 1991 (Steenbakkers 1994b); Groningse Codicologendagen, Groningen, 9 October 1992 (to be published: Steenbakkers 1994c).
2. Spinoza by 2000 – The Jerusalem Conferences, Third Conference: *Ethica*, part 3: Spinoza as psychologist, Jerusalem, 1–6 May 1991. (The paper is to be published in the proceedings.)

from which the compositor of the *Opera posthuma* worked. In chapter 4 it is shown that, as far as part 5 of the *Ethica* is concerned, the Dutch text nowhere overrides the Latin version. The examples given to illustrate this point also serve to corroborate the reconstruction of the editorial history as developed in chapter 1. A French version of the argument of chapter 4 has been presented on a conference in April 1990.[1]

Chapter 5 tackles an issue that continues to exercise Spinoza scholarship: the problematic 'geometrical' layout of the *Ethica*. More than any other aspect of the work this has occasioned polemics on the relationship between form and content of Spinoza's philosophy. In my contribution to this continuing debate, I attempt to move to new ground. As befits an enquiry carried out at the intersection of philosophy and philology, I draw attention to the rhetorical and literary aspects of the *ordo geometricus*. The chapter is a drastic elaboration and transformation of some views I set forth on two previous occasions.[2] The argument developed here differs widely from both these earlier texts. Initially, my line of approach was another one: I was interested primarily in the vicissitudes of the *ordo geometricus* in the transmission of the text of the *Ethica*. This part of the argument has now been incorporated in the first chapter. In chapter 5 the investigation centres on form, method and order.

The unity underlying the variety of tracts presented here is my own involvement in practical editorial work. There is also another common element, on a more theoretical level. The history of philosophy can be construed in a number of divergent ways. What is often overlooked, partly on account of the lofty issues involved, is that thought materializes in history in the shape of an accumulation of texts. For interpretation, commentary, comparative analysis and the like to be possible at all, the historian of philosophy must first be sure to stand on firm ground. The existence of reliable critical texts, and a basic knowledge of how to handle these, is a precondition for the history of philosophy. Empirical research has been viewed with disfavour by many philosophers. Yet texts require patient and accurate philological attention if we are to use them well. In working out the various chapters of the present book, I have not shunned the unassuming empirical chores imposed by textual research. Whether the approach has been relevant and rewarding is now to be judged by its results.

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1. Colloque 'La Cinquième partie de l'*Éthique*', organisé par le Groupe de recherches spinozistes, Paris, 27 April 1990. (The paper has been published in the proceedings: Steenbakkers 1994a.)
2. (i) Studiedag Neolatinistenverband, Leiden, 21 September 1990 (unpublished paper). (ii) Contribution to a Dutch–Belgian collection of essays on Spinoza (Steenbakkers 1993; that publication is now to all intents and purposes supplanted by the final chapter of the present book.)

Chapter 1
The editorial history of the Opera posthuma

1.1 Spinoza's legacy

On the twenty-first of February 1677, Spinoza died in The Hague. Within a matter of days his publisher, the Amsterdam bookseller Jan Rieuwertsz, had received a writing box that contained unpublished writings and correspondence of the philosopher. This is what happened according to Johannes Colerus:

> Dog de nog levende Huisheer van Spinoza, Sr. Hendrik van der Spyk verhaalt my, dat Spinoza verordineert hadde, dat zyn lessenaar[1] met de Schriften en brieven daarin leggende terstond na zyn dood naar Amsterdam aan Jan Rieuwertzen Stadsboekdrukker zouden gezonden worden, gelyk hy dan ook gedaan heeft. En Jan Rieuwertzen in zyn rescriptie aan voornoemde Sr. van der Spyk de dato Amsterdam den 25 Maart 1677. bekent zodanigen lessenaar ontfangen te hebben. Zyn woorden luiden op 't einde van den brief aldus: de vrienden[2] van Spinoza wilden garen weeten, aan wien dat de lessenaar gezonden was, wyl zy oordeelen, dat 'er veel geld in was, en wilden het by de Schippers onderstaan, aan wien dat se bestelt was, zoo men in den Haag niet aantekent de pakjes, die aan de schuit bestelt worden, zoo zie ik niet, hoe zy 't te weeten zullen krygen; 't is 't best dat zy 't niet weeten, hiermede afbrekende &c.[3]
>
> But Spinoza's landlord Mr. Van der Spyck, who is still living, tells me that Spinoza had arranged for his writing box containing the writings and letters to be sent immediately upon his death to Amsterdam, to the city printer Jan Rieuwertsz, which he then took care of. And Jan Rieuwertsz, in his reply to the said Mr. Van der Spyck of 25 March 1677,

---

1. A 'lessenaar' is a writing desk. The piece of furniture referred to here must have been an escritoire – a 'writing-desk constructed to contain stationary and documents; in early use, often one of a portable size' (OED, s.v. *Escritoire*). I have rendered the word with 'writing box' (cf. OED, *Supplement*, s.v. *Writing-box*: 'Also, a small portable writing-desk.')
2. 'Vrienden' here means relatives, viz. Benedictus's half sister Rebecca de Spinoza and his nephew Daniel de Casseres, for they were the ones who claimed the inheritance (Colerus 1880 [1705], 85; Freudenthal 1899, 157: document 67, 2 March 1677; and p. 166: document 70, 30 March, 1677; Vaz Dias & Van der Tak 1932, 35: 7 May 1677; the same document also published by Meijer 1921a, 25; in facsimile on p. 30). For the sense 'relatives' see WNT 23, 545, s.v. *vriend* (I), 2. The word occurs in exactly the same sense elsewhere in Colerus (pp. 30–1): 'zeggende dikwils tot de Huisgenoten: [...] Myn vrienden zullen niets van my erven, zy hebben 't ook niet daarna gemaakt.' Daniel de Casseres (or Caçeres) was the son of Miriam de Spinoza and Samuel de Casseres. After his mother's death, his father remarried with her sister Rebecca. Thus Daniel was not only Rebecca's nephew, but also her stepson. (See Van der Tak 1935.)
3. Colerus 1880 [1705], 52–3.

acknowledges that he had received such a box. At the end of the letter, he expresses himself thus: 'Spinoza's relatives would like to find out to whom the box had been sent, since they reckon that it contained a lot of money. They wanted to find out from the bargees to whom it had been delivered, but since no record is kept in The Hague of parcels that are delivered at the barge dock, I cannot see how they will ever find out. It is best that they do not know. And with this I conclude' etc.

Colerus or Köhler was minister of the Lutheran congregation in The Hague from 1693 to 1707, and Spinoza's landlord Van der Spyck, who was one of his parishioners, was the source for his account of the events.[1] It looks as though Colerus actually had in front of him Rieuwertsz's letter to Van der Spyck, from which he quotes. The story is corroborated by a similar but much more succinct report, by Sebastian Kortholt:

libros sua manu exaratos, hospitis de mortalitate ipsum admonentis curae, pridie quam excessit e vita, commisit, ut cum Jo. Riversenio, librario Amstelaedamensi, communicarentur.[2]

On the day before he passed away, he had entrusted the books he had written to the care of his landlord (who had reminded him of his mortality), to have them forwarded to the Amsterdam bookseller Jan Rieuwertsz.

Kortholt wrote this in his preface to the 1700 reprint of his father Christian Kortholt's book *De tribus impostoribus*. Again, the source for this information must have been Van der Spyck, whom Kortholt the Younger met during a visit to The Hague in 1698 or 1699.[3]

Some nine months after Spinoza's death and burial, in December 1677, the manuscripts in the writing box had already been published, under the title *B.d.S. Opera posthuma*.[4] The Dutch translation, *De nagelate schriften van B.d.S.*, was realized in the

1. Meinsma 1980 [1896], XII–XV.
2. Quoted from Freudenthal 1899, 28.
3. Meinsma 1980 [1896], XI.
4. The progress of the printer's work can be followed neatly in Schuller's correspondence with Leibniz. On 17/27 July 1677, he informs Leibniz that 'Omnia posthuma Domini Spin. opera Typographo tradita sunt, in illorum editione sedulo pergitur, Edentur autem in idiomate Latino et Belgico simul' (AA 3:2, 202.10–1; cf. Freudenthal 1899, 205; not in Stein 1890). A few months later, Schuller optimistically says that the *Opera posthuma* will be on sale within two weeks: 'Spinozae posthuma ad summum intra 14 dies distrahentur, quod tamen interea tibi soli dictum esto, cum certum sit Theologos in ea anxie inquirere, et distractionis interdictum molitos esse' (AA 3:2, 239; date uncertain: 22 September/2 October?). Then that the printing is ready but for the index: 'Spinozae posthuma jam impressa sunt, index solus restat' (AA 3:2, 264; 26 October/5 November). Finally, that all is ready, but distribution will start as from 1678: 'Opera Spinozae jam edita proximo anno novo distribuentur' (AA 3:2, 304; 21/31 December). Cf. Stein 1890, 290–1 and Freudenthal 1899, 205–6. The communication by Stolle and Hallmann that the Amsterdam edition of the *Opera posthuma* was a reprint of an earlier edition published in The Hague, immediately after Spinoza's death (Freudenthal 1899, 224.15–22), must be due to a misunderstanding. No traces of an earlier edition survive, nor does the information square with the story of the transmission of the *Opera posthuma* as we can reconstruct it: there is no reason to doubt the indications that Spinoza's manuscripts were at once shipped to Rieuwertsz. (To be

same period.[1] In less than a year's time, then, the Latin texts of Spinoza's posthumous works had been edited and they had been translated into Dutch as well; moreover both versions had been prepared for the press and printed, making quarto volumes of some 800 and 700 pages respectively.[2] We owe this remarkable achievement to the circle of Spinoza's friends. Their joint efforts in the realization of these publications constitute the editorial history of the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften*. For their involvement clearly exceeded the merely technical task of preparing the manuscripts for the press: both versions show traces of deliberate editing. Their approach is characterized by a familiarity with the philosopher and his works, a command of the languages involved, and a strategy that may conveniently be summarized in the motto *caute* (for example the interventions in the letters). The editors derived their guidelines at least in part from preparations Spinoza himself had made. Not only did he leave instructions what was to be done with his manuscripts, but he also had already been involved in an abortive attempt to get the *Ethica* published, less than two years before he died. The work was finished and brought to Rieuwertsz for publication in the summer of 1675, as Spinoza's Letter 68 to Oldenburg informs us:

> Eo tempore, quo literas tuas 22 Julii accepi, Amstelædamum profectus sum eo consilio, ut librum de quo tibi scripseram, typis mandarem. Quod dum agito; rumor ubique spargebatur librum quendam meum de Deo sub prælo sudare, meque in eo conari ostendere, nullum dari Deum [...]. Hæc cum à Viris quibusdam fide dignis intellexissem [...], editionem, quem parabam, differre statui [...].[3]
>
> Just when I received your letter of 22 July, I went to Amsterdam with the intention to commit to the printing press the book I told you about in my letters. Whilst I was doing this, rumour got around that some book of mine about God was being printed, and that in it I tried to show there was no God [...]. Having learned this from certain reliable people [...], I decided to defer the publication I was preparing [...].

This letter does make clear that Spinoza finished the book and was in the process of getting it published. Many questions remain, though, as to the state of the copy: was it ready to be printed (title page, cross references, captions and so on), or did it still

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sure, an *Opera omnia* did come out in 1677, but this is merely a collection of PP/CM, TTP and OP, with a specially printed general title page: see Gerritsen 1994).

1. That they were published simultaneously is shown by external evidence: see Schuller to Leibniz, 17/27 July 1677 (quoted in the preceding footnote); decree of the Church Council of The Hague, 11 February 1678: 'de nieuw uytgekomen Boeken van Spinosa, soo int Latyn als in duyts' (Freudenthal 1899, 175).

2. The *Opera posthuma* has a total number of 404 leaves; formula: foolscap 4°: *–5*^{4} A–4M^4, ^{2}A–P^4. *De nagelate schriften* has 270 leaves; foolscap 4°: *–6*^{4} A–3R^4 3S^4(–3S4) 3T–4O^4 4P^4(–4P4). For full bibliographical descriptions see Kingma & Offenberg 1985 [1977], nos. 24–5. Note the difference between the number of pages. NS – though a translation from Latin into Dutch – is much thinner, due to the absence of the *Index rerum* and the *Compendium grammatices linguæ Hebrææ*.

3. G 4, 299.7–19

require editorial attention?[1] Any hypothesis concerning this phase in the transmission of Spinoza's works should be formulated with careful attention to such evidence as is available, or it may slip into idle speculation.[2] In the course of this chapter, I will formulate the tentative hypothesis Akkerman and I have arrived at.

1.2 Sources

Louise Thijssen-Schoute has argued that it would be best to consider the publication of the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften* as a collective tribute by Spinoza's friends, and to refrain from conjectures as to their individual parts in the project:

> Wat de verzorging betreft doen wij het beste de uitgave van de *Opera posthuma* en *De nagelate schriften* als een gemeenschappelijke daad van piëteit van de Amsterdamse vrienden van Spinoza te beschouwen en niet te zeer te gissen naar het aandeel van elk hunner.'[3]
>
> As regards the editing, we had better consider the publication of the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften* as a joint act of piety of Spinoza's friends in Amsterdam and forebear guessing at the contribution of every single one of them.

Her warning against unwarranted speculation must be taken to heart. A case in point is the vivid but somewhat light-hearted reconstruction of the editioral meetings as sketched by Meinsma:

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1. See also Akkerman 1980, 77–8, for an enumeration of the questions relating to 'what activities Spinoza was engaged in in preparing his work for print'.
2. This can be observed in Gebhardt's ill-founded but unfortunately influential supposition that throughout his life Spinoza had incessantly been polishing his texts, up to his death: 'Aus alle dem geht hervor, daß Spinoza, gerade wie den Text seiner anderen handschriftlich hinterlassenen Werke, so auch den Text seiner Briefe bis zu seinem Tode unablässig feilte und besserte' (G 4, 369; cf. 'die unablässige Weiterarbeit Spinozas', G 2, 317). Intimately connected with this view is his thesis that Spinoza actually wrote two distinct versions of the *Ethica* (G 2, 340–2), a theory now disproved by Akkerman (1980, 95–101). Nevertheless, Bernard Rousset published several articles in which he claimed he could reconstruct the two different versions and even identify passages that Spinoza inserted afterwards, in the period 1675–77 (Rousset 1985 and 1988). Although Rousset's analysis contains some valuable insights into the chronological development of Spinoza's thought, the argument as a whole is entirely gratuitous. The real problem is that Rousset sees the chores of philology as subservient to what he calls 'l'analyse strictement philosophique' (1988, 92). In his edition and commentary of the TIE, he is even more explicit (Spinoza, ed. Rousset 1992b, 136): 'Pour notre propos, l'argumentation critique, pour être assurée sur la pensée veritable de Spinoza (sans faire d'hypothèses imprudentes en matière de manuscrits supposés et de leurs dates éventuelles), ne peut relever que de la seule réflexion philosophique, c'est-à-dire d'une analyse interne s'efforçant uniquement de comprendre le Spinozisme [...]. C'est pourquoi l'analyse philologique et l'explication philosophique ne pouvaient être séparées dans le Commentaire.' It is also the reason, I would add, that the Latin text of his TIE reaches an all-time low in the history of Spinoza editions.
3. Thijssen-Schoute 1967, 253.

> Spinoza's nagelaten werken zouden alzoo uitgegeven worden. Hoe dat in zijn werk gegaan is, kunnen wij uit hetgeen ons hier [i.e. in Schuller's letters] werd medegedeeld, en wat ons van elders bekend werd, vrij duidelijk afleiden. Lodewijk Meyer nam waarschijnlijk de *Ethica* voor zijne rekening; Schuller hetgeen hier boven gemeld werd, Dr. Bouwmeester misschien de Hebreeuwsche grammatica. Dat alles moest persklaar gemaakt worden, want Spinoza's Latijn liet soms te wenschen over; soms ook liet het duidelijk bespeuren, dat de schrijver in het Spaansch was opgevoed. Ieder bracht de brieven van den wijsgeer ter tafel, die hij nog bezat, en belangrijk oordeelde. Alles wat daarin van meer persoonlijken aard was, of op nog levende, bevriende personen betrekking had, werd geschrapt. Zoo verdween uit die van en aan Simon Joosten de Vries alles wat op Casearius en den Amsterdamschen kring betrekking had, uit die van en aan Schuller al hetgeen van meer intiemen aard was. Namen van overledenen werden voluit geschreven; van nog levenden – indien zij vrienden waren – òf met de voorletters aangeduid, òf verzwegen. Tegenstanders als Blyenbergh of Albert Burgh werden met naam en toenaam genoemd. Terzelfder tijd werd de oude Jan Hendrikse Glazemaker aan den arbeid gezet om alles in het Hollandsch te vertalen.[1]
>
> So Spinoza's posthumous works were to be published. How this took place can be inferred rather clearly from the reports just cited and from what we have learned elsewhere. Lodewijk Meyer probably took upon himself the *Ethica*; Schuller the texts mentioned above, Dr Bouwmeester perhaps the Hebrew grammar. All this had to be prepared for the press, for Spinoza's Latin was sometimes below par; sometimes it clearly disclosed the author's Spanish education. Each produced such letters of the philosopher as he still possessed and considered of importance. Everything in them that was somewhat personal or that involved friends who were still alive was cut out. Thus, from the letters from and to Simon Joosten de Vries, everything concerning Casearius and the Amsterdam circle was removed, and from those from and to Schuller everything of a more intimate character. Names of deceased people were given in full; the names of those still alive – if they were friends – were either indicated by their initials or suppressed. Opponents like Blyenbergh or Albert Burgh were mentioned by name. At the same time the old Jan Hendrikse Glazemaker was hired to translate everything into Dutch.

As far as they go the inferences concerning the editorial interventions in the correspondence are sound enough, but Meinsma's reconstruction of the tasks performed by individual editors is entirely conjectural. Of course, conjecture will always have a part to play if we attempt to relate certain texts in the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften* in whole or in part to individual editors. Yet I think that a careful study of both the external evidence and the texts themselves may lift a corner of the veil. I will now survey the scraps of evidence at our disposal, and try to assess their value for a reconstruction of the editorial history of Spinoza's posthumous works.[2] The sources that I will draw upon in this chapter in order to arrive at such

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1. Meinsma 1980 [1896], 444.
2. The most important collection of sources, despite its flaws and lacunae, remains Freudenthal 1899. A number of the sources mentioned below can also be consulted in a German translation, *Spinoza–Lebensbeschreibungen und Gespräche*, first published by Gebhardt in 1914, edited with additional notes and biblography by Manfred Walther in 1977. It contains Jelles's preface (not the NS version, though, but a translation from the Latin one in OP), Lucas, Kortholt, Bayle, Colerus, Stolle-Hallmann, as well as some notes from conversations and archival documents.

a reconstruction are not of a kind. There are the early biographies of Spinoza (notably the one by Colerus) as well as some biographical elements to be found in other sources (Kortholt's preface, Pierre Bayle's articles, the two Philopater novels); archival records (for example those concerning Spinoza's heritage); correspondence containing information on Spinoza's death and legacy (mainly the letters from Schuller to Leibniz, and from Van Gent to Tschirnhaus), and the palaeographic and editorial evidence supplied by the handful of letters that have come down to us in manuscript. In addition, the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften* themselves offer a wealth of information: not only in the professedly editorial matter (prelims, prefaces, indexes), but also in the different ways in which the two versions handle the texts.

1.2.1 *Biographical information*

There are two early biographies of Spinoza. The one attributed to Jean-Maximilien Lucas, although tentatively dated to the decade after the philosopher's death, contains no information whatsoever about the publication of the *Opera posthuma*.[1] The other early biography was written by Johannes Colerus. It was published in 1705, together with a sermon against Spinoza's philosophy that Colerus delivered on Easter 1704 – apparently, the spectre of Spinozism still haunted his parish then. As we have already seen in the first section, Colerus's life of Spinoza is an important source for facts on the posthumous works. Colerus is generally considered an honest, if sloppy, biographer.[2] In spite of his hostility toward Spinozism, he attempts to be as accurate and comprehensive as he can. This can be observed in the way he handles the information concerning Spinoza's real and spurious works: he makes inquiries about

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1. The reliability, authorship, date and textual history of this early biography still require further investigation. The edition in Freudenthal 1899 (1–25) is unsatisfactory: he conflates the different versions, sometimes without indicating the provenance in an unambiguous manner (e.g. note 3 on pp. 14–5, which identifies Lucas as the author: since Freudenthal generally takes edition N as copy-text and here offers a variant reading from N in the apparatus, we are left to infer that the reading in the text was taken from his other source, edition H). The same can be said for other texts in Freudenthal's collection, notably the inextricable conflation of the reports by Stolle and Hallmann (pp. 221–32; see the critical remarks by Akkerman 1992, 102–3). Meinsma (1980 [1896], XIX) was the first scholar to advance the thesis that Lucas's biography was written before 1688, and (partly on account of this) that it is more reliable than Colerus for the period 1632–71 – that is, before Spinoza moved to The Hague. On the whole, though, the information contained in this biography tends to be uncritical, vague and anecdotic. On Jean Maximilien Lucas (1636 or 1646–1697), see the publications by Willem Meijer (1904, 40–50; 1906; 1918). The case for Lucas's authorship is rather more probable than the rival attribution to Gabriel de Saint-Glen (Saint-Glain or Ceinglen): see Wolf 1992 [1927], 20–4. As regards the textual history, apart from the first printed editions, both from 1719, there are a number of manuscript copies. The status of these manuscripts is still a moot point: do some of them have an independent value, or do they all depend on the printed editions of 1719 (as Freudenthal believed: 1899, 241)? On this point, see Heinemann 1939.
2. Freudenthal 1904, 319–20; Hubbeling 1984.

the Spanish apology Spinoza is said to have written after his break with the Jewish community, tries to assess the evidence for the authorship of *De jure ecclesiasticorum*, asks Van der Spyck for an account of the vicissitudes of the philosopher's manuscripts after his death, and reports testimonies on two lost works: the treatise on the rainbow and an unfinished translation of the Old Testament into Dutch.[1] There is no harm in pointing out that, in almost three centuries, Spinoza scholarship has been unable to advance substantially beyond Colerus's statements in *any* of these issues.[2] Moreover, for his information on Spinoza's final years Colerus relies on a dependable source, Van der Spyck; and he is personally acquainted with several people who were in one way or another involved in the spreading of Spinozism: Christoffel Cunradus, Aart Wolsgryn.[3] And finally, Colerus's report is unique in that he evidently had access to documents that were subsequently lost, such as Spinoza's sketchbook with the Masaniello self-portrait, household bills, Rieuwertsz's letters to Van der Spyck.[4] There is, however, another side to the coin. The biography was written only in 1704–5, twenty-seven years after Spinoza died. Colerus had to rely on hearsay. The value of his information depends on his informants, who may have forgotten or mixed up certain events, constructed stories from hindsight, or thought it wise to resort to diplomacy and discretion. Also, Colerus has been censured as not being all that good at details. For instance, he mangles names (Carceris instead of Casseres, Van Velen instead of Van der Werve), gives wrong dates (December 1633 instead of November 1632 for Spinoza's birth, 1664 instead of 1661 for his moving to Rijnsburg, 22 instead of 20 February).[5] Inaccuracies of that kind and an uncritical appreciation of Schuller's claims (on which

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1. Colerus 1880 [1705], 42 (apology), 42–5 (*De jure ecclesiasticorum*), 52–3 (mss), 61 (rainbow, OT).

2. The one apparent exception being the rainbow treatise (Hubbeling 1984, 71); recent research has shown that this is not the *Stelkonstige reeckening van den regenboog* that has for over a century been identified as such. This anonymous Dutch treatise, as well as the accompanying *Reeckening van kanssen*, was the work of Samuel Dierkens (see De Vet 1994). On Lucius Antistius Constans and *De jure ecclesiasticorum* see the introduction by Hans Blom to the recent facsimile edition with French translation (Blom 1991). The status of the legendary Spanish apology is problematic; see Van der Tak 1933. The source for this story was Salomon van Til, *Het voor-hof der heydenen* of 1694 (p. 6); see E. van der Wal's account of this work (a lecture held for the Vereniging Het Spinozahuis, May 1994; publication forthcoming, in the series 'Mededelingen vanwege Het Spinozahuis').

3. Colerus 1880 [1705], 46, 47.

4. Colerus 1880 [1705], 27 (sketchbook), 30 and 80–8 (bills), 53 and 80 (letters).

5. Colerus 1880 [1705], 2 (Carceris), 29 (Van Velen), 1 (December 1633), 28 (1664), 76 (22 February). For the corrections see Spinoza 1977, 50, note α; Hubbeling 1984, 70; Van der Tak 1932, 477. On the whole, though, I think that Colerus is judged somewhat too severely by his critics: not all the findings brought in to falsify some of the details in his account are uncontroversial (e.g. Van der Tak's insistence that Schuller, not Meyer, was present when Spinoza died), names would show a bewildering variety of spellings in different documents, and his text passed through two phases of transmission (translation and composition), which may have contributed to minor slips like the wrong dates.

see below, § 1.6) led Van der Tak to question the gospel truth of the 'Evangelium Coleri'.[1] An important finding in Van der Tak's analysis is that the Dutch text of Colerus's life as we have it must in fact be a translation into Dutch of a lost German original.

In addition to these biographies, there are other contemporary texts that contain relevant information on Spinoza's life and works. First and foremost among these is the preface to *De nagelate schriften* by Spinoza's friend Jarig Jelles, and its twin, the Latin preface to the *Opera posthuma* by Lodewijk Meyer, based on Jelles's text.[2] Since these prefaces were written by two intimate friends, who were involved in the publication of the posthumous works, the information they contain is of the utmost significance for the present inquiry.

The statement in Sebastian Kortholt's preface to his father Christian's book *De tribus impostoribus* has already been mentioned (p. 6, above). Its value lies in the fact that it quotes Van der Spyck independently from Colerus, and gets the same information from him. This indicates that Spinoza's landlord was at least a consistent witness – a quality that makes his reports more plausible.

Pierre Bayle, whose articles on Spinoza in his *Dictionaire historique et critique* of 1697 (and subsequent editions, with expanded material) made much information on the philosopher's life, works and doctrines accessible to a large audience,[3] has little to say about the publication of the posthumous works. Only one of his letters is of interest, because it corroborates the information provided by Duijkerius about the authors of the prefaces, Jelles and Meyer (see below, p. 19).[4]

Among the most curious and interesting documents of early Spinozism are the two *romans à clef* by Johannes Duijkerius, relating the life and opinions of Philopater. The novels were published anonymously and with a false impressum, purportedly by Siewert van der Brug in Groningen (really Aart Wolsgryn in Amsterdam). The first novel, *Het leven van Philopater*, appeared in 1691, its sequel, *Vervolg van 't leven van Philopater*, in 1697.[5] The theme of these controversial *romans à clef* is the development of its protagonist Philopater from Reformed orthodoxy to Cartesianism and, finally (and most heinously), to Spinozism. Duijkerius endowed Philopater with some autobiographical features and the novel does contain many explicit references to actually existing people. Yet the protagonist is fictional and should not be taken to

1. Van der Tak 1932, 477.
2. A critical edition of both versions is to be found in Akkerman 1980, 205–75.
3. On the influence of Bayle and his *Dictionaire historique et critique* in general, see Thijssen-Schoute 1959, and Rétat 1971, 119–41, 465–73.
4. Bayle's writings on Spinoza can now conveniently be consulted in a single volume: Bayle 1983.
5. They have been edited by Gerardine Maréchal with an historical introduction and annotation (Maréchal 1991). On the *Philopater* novels, see also Hubbeling 1988.

stand for the author.[1] The publisher Wolsgryn was heavily punished for them. On 25 April 1698 he was sentenced to eight years of prison, banishment from Holland and West-Friesland for a period of twenty-five years, and fines totalling four thousand guilders. He may have had remission for good conduct, but there are no indications that he ever set up as a bookseller again.[2]

A document of a somewhat later date that contains biographical information is the preface Johannes Monnikhoff added to his apograph of the *Korte verhandeling*, the manuscript known as B. The preface, which consists of an extensive critique of Spinoza's philosophy and a succinct biography, can only be dated very roughly: between 1743 – a date mentioned by Monnikhoff – and 1787, the year of his death.[3] It is generally considered as having no independent value, being for the most part a summary of Colerus's biography and some other published sources.[4] Freudenthal does not altogether exclude the possibility that Monnikhoff had access to sources unknown to us. Fragments of this biographical notice were published by Freudenthal. Gebhardt edited the biographical part of the preface in full in the fourth volume of *Chronicon Spinozanum*.[5]

1.2.2 *Archival records*

Much archival research was done by Koenraad Oege Meinsma; his classic study *Spinoza en zijn kring* of 1896 is still invaluable. The Dutch text was reprinted in 1980. A French translation, with numerous additional annotations, appeared in 1983. Information from archival records has been published by Freudenthal in *Die Lebensgeschichte Spinoza's* and by Vaz Dias and Van der Tak in *Spinoza mercator et autodidactus*.[6] Additional material is also to be found in the richly documented publications by C. Louise Thijssen-Schoute.[7] For our purpose, it is mainly the notarial records pertaining to Spinoza's death and legacy that are relevant.[8] For the present chapter I have supplemented this material with some unpublished archival information.

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1. Maréchal 1991, 24.
2. Maréchal 1991, 33, 36.
3. Freudenthal 1899, 257–8. On account of the paper and the handwriting, Mignini is inclined to date it much later than 1743 (Spinoza 1986, 47).
4. Cf. Van Vloten 1862, 289: 'Praefationi Hollandicae tractatus de Deo, etc. versioni praefixae, brevis quaedam philosophi vitae narratio inserta est, ipso testante auctore ex Coleri maxime excerpta'.
5. Freudenthal 1899, 105–7; Monnikhoff 1926.
6. Freudenthal 1899, 109–90, Vaz Dias & Van der Tak 1932 (now also available in an English translation: Vaz Dias & Van der Tak 1982).
7. Thijssen-Schoute 1989 [1954], Thijssen-Schoute 1967.
8. Freudenthal 1899, 154–73; Vaz Dias & Van der Tak 1932, 35.

1.2.3 *Correspondence*

A source heavily drawn upon in the present chapter, and to be dealt with at length in § 1.6, is the Schuller–Leibniz correspondence. In 1890, Ludwig Stein published his influential study *Leibniz und Spinoza: ein Beitrag zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Leibnizschen Philosophie*. As the subtitle makes clear, his aim was to advance the knowledge of Leibniz's philosophical development, which Stein thought to have passed through a 'Spinozistic' stage. In this respect, the book has been superseded by later Leibniz scholarship.[1] What makes Stein's study important for Spinoza scholarship is that it published for the first time extracts from the correspondence between Georg Hermann Schuller and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Schuller was a young physician from Amsterdam of German descent, who was in close contact with Spinoza in the last years of the philosopher's life. Before publishing the letters in his 1890 study, Stein already disclosed some of their content and the conclusions he drew from them[2] – conclusions that were, as we shall see presently, rather rash and sweeping. The Schuller–Leibniz correspondence lasted for two years, from 18 January 1677 to 21/31 December 1679. What remains of it is kept in the Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek Hannover. After Stein's edition, the letters have been published again in part in Freudenthal's collection of documents relating to Spinoza and in the second series of the Leibniz *Akademie-Ausgabe*.[3] The correspondence is now available in full in the third series of that edition. It constitutes the most sizeable single group, sixty-six items in all, of the volume covering Leibniz's scientific correspondence from 1676 to 1679.[4] Most of the letters in the Schuller–Leibniz correspondence are very short.

A second corpus of correspondence that is of paramount importance for our purpose consists of the letters written by Pieter van Gent to Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, from 23 March 1679 to 5 August 1690. Only some letters of Van Gent's part have been preserved (now kept in the University Library of Wrocław).[5] Of Tschirnhaus's replies nothing has survived.[6] The importance of Van Gent's letters was

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1. See in particular Friedmann 1975, 345–7.
2. Stein 1888.
3. Freudenthal 1899, 202–7; Leibniz, AA 2:1, nos. 135–7, 159–60, 170. Curt Reinhardt gives a few lines of this correspondence in his 'Beiträge' (Reinhardt 1903, 18), but he mixes up two different letters. Apparently he was unaware of the editions by Stein and Freudenthal.
4. This total is somewhat misleading, though, for by and large only Schuller's part has survived: 35 items 'Schuller an Leibniz', 1 'Schuller für Leibniz' (no. 33), 1 item lost (no. 189), contents reconstructed. All letters dispatched by Leibniz (25 items) are lost; the four that have survived are a fragmentary transcript with an autograph passage (no. 84), two drafts (nos. 230, 238) and a draft of an undispatched letter (198). Yet Leibniz's letters have been entered as separate items, in the shape of editorial summaries – their dates and much of their contents could usually be inferred from other sources, mainly the replies of Schuller.
5. See the catalogue of Tschirnhausiana drawn up by Rudolph Zaunick, in Tschirnhaus 1963, 316–7.
6. There are transcripts of five letters Tschirnhaus wrote in 1675 and 1676; two of them are

first recognized by Curt Reinhardt in 1903, and in 1911 he published them in full. This edition escaped notice by Spinoza scholars until recently. Rienk Vermij drew attention to this rich source in two articles on the Dutch friends of Tschirnhaus.[1] Fragments of Van Gent's letters were thereupon published again by Wim Klever.[2] In one of his

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certainly and the other three probably addressed to Van Gent. They are now in the collection of the Wiskundig Genootschap, which is kept in the University Library in Amsterdam (shelf mark II A 38; this contains transcripts of two letters from Tschirnhaus to Oldenburg, too).

1. Vermij 1988 and 1991a. In one of these articles (1988, 157, n. 14), Vermij takes Dutch Spinoza scholars to task for their neglect of this important source. This is a bit tart, though. Reinhardt's edition of the Van Gent–Tschirnhaus correspondence is hard to find (in Dutch libraries, only Leiden University has a copy, as far as I know), and I have the impression that it was little known anywhere else as well. The letters are of obvious importance for Tschirnhaus research, since they contain unique information on the textual history of the *Medicina mentis* and *Medicina corporis*. Yet only Jean-Paul Wurtz made profitable use of it (Tschirnhaus 1980, 13, 309, 316; Wurtz 1988, 204–9). There is no mention of Reinhardt's publication in the two studies that De Vleeschauwer dedicated to Tschirnaus's correspondence with Huygens and with Spinoza respectively, though he explicitly refers to Van Gent (De Vleeschauwer 1941, 17 – where he erroneously calls him 'Paul van Gent'– and De Vleeschauwer 1942, 378). The Van Gent letters are referred to by Eduard Winter (1960, e.g. p. 6), who seems however to have missed some of the points that can be inferred from them. Winter thinks that Tschirnhaus wrote the *Medicina mentis* in German, and had Van Gent translate it (p. 16). His remark (p. 9) concerning the *Opera posthuma* is perplexing: '*Pieter van Gent* erhielt [...] 1679 bei der geplanten Ausgabe der nachgelassenen Werke von *Spinoza*, die auch *Tschirnhaus* wesentlich förderte, nicht wenig Unterstützung, gerade von *Huygens*.' (The date is, of course, wrong; for Tschirnaus's involvement, Winter refers to Leibniz's letter to Tschirnhaus of May 1678, but that contains nothing that would substantiate this view; and there is no indication whatsoever that Huygens supported the publication of Spinoza's works in any way. Winter is on the whole unreliable. In a later text, he mentions 'der enge Mitarbeiter Spinozas, Schuller' as coming to Germany in 1693; Winter 1977, 9. But Georg Hermann Schuller died in 1679. This must refer to his brother, who had no contacts with Spinoza, as far as we can establish.) In 1963, Johannes Haußleiter issued a German translation of the *Medicina mentis* (Tschirnhaus 1963), with introduction and appendices by Rudolph Zaunick. Reinhardt's edition of the Van Gent–Tschirnhaus correspondence is listed in Anhang VI, p. 343, no. 175, but not taken due advantage of. Zaunick also thought that Van Gent translated the *Medicina mentis* from German into Latin (Tschirnhaus 1963, 13). And finally, Johannes Irmscher purports to study Tschirnhaus's Latin, without being aware of the nature of Van Gent's involvement in the texts at issue: see Irmscher 1991, 387 (on the genesis of the Latin texts), 388 (on Van Gent), 391 (on the Latin and German versions of the *Medicina corporis*).

2. Klever 1991. His publication is to be welcomed for making these important documents accessible again, if only in part. It is therefore unfortunate that this new presentation of Van Gent's texts is below par. The selection of the quotations is not very methodical. Klever has done no independent editorial work, but confined himself to copying parts from Reinhardt's edition: 'Bien entendu, je ne vais pas transcrire les neuf lettres de Van Gent *in extenso*. Je me contenterai d'un choix de citations, en résumant d'autres passages et en intercalant quelques remarques.' (p. 172). There are quite a few inaccuracies in his reproduction of Reinhardt's Latin text, ranging from minor spelling deviations to serious corruptions (e.g. 'Ultima' p. 175, § 5, for 'Utinam'). Although apparently Reinhardt's printed text is his only source, Klever ventures conjectures as to Van Gent's handwriting: 'dans l'écriture de Van Gent, on n'aura pas peine à

letters, Van Gent casually remarks that he copied out part of Spinoza's works (see below, p. 37). This led me to investigate his handwriting. It appeared that Pieter van Gent was the scribe who copied Spinoza's draft of Letter 37 and Oldenburg's last letter to Spinoza (Letter 79). As I will argue in § 1.5, these transcripts played a part in the preliminary preparations for the publication of the *Opera posthuma*.

Apart from these two bodies of letters, there are other collections of seventeenth-century correspondence that will be drawn upon incidentally to elucidate particular points.

1.3 Editing the Opera posthuma and De nagelate schriften

As I will argue throughout this chapter, Spinoza's friends divided the editorial labour between them. Some addressed themselves to the task of preparing the texts for the Latin edition, the *Opera posthuma*. At least four people are to be considered as in some way involved in this: Lodewijk Meyer, Johannes Bouwmeester, Georg Herman Schuller and Pieter van Gent. Others were in charge of its Dutch counterpart, *De nagelate schriften*. Here three names present themselves: Jarig Jelles, Jan Rieuwertsz and Jan Hendriksz Glazemaker.

Meyer, Schuller and Van Gent will each form the subject of a section of their own. Another section will be devoted to the three people presumably involved in producing the Dutch book: Jelles, Rieuwertsz and Glazemaker. For the sake of completeness, a few words are in order about Johannes Bouwmeester, too.[1] He was born 4 November 1630, matriculated in Leiden as a student of philosophy on 30 March 1651, and took his doctoral degree in medicine there on 17 May 1658, with a thesis *De pleuritide*. He was married to a certain Maria van Oortmans (or perhaps Cortmans). Bouwmeester died in October 1680. He is an elusive figure. So far it has been impossible to find any concrete indication of his involvement in the editorial work. In Letter 28, Spinoza asked him to undertake the translation of the *Ethica* from part 3 onwards: 'quod ad 3^{am} partem nostræ philosophiæ attinet, ejus aliquam brevi vel tibi, si translator esse vis, vel

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constater que le "B" n'est pas facile à distinguer du "D". Dans sa troisième lettre, Reinhardt lit "Refutatio Ethices D.D.S." au lieu de "Refutatio Ethices B.D.S."!' (p. 188, n. 21). B and D are, however, neatly discriminated in the handwriting of Van Gent. The reading 'D.D.S' is certainly correct (for 'Domini de Spinoza'; cf. Reinhardt 1911, 15: 'D.B.D.S.'). Reinhardt had suggested a possible confusion of B and D – not in Van Gent's hand but in the transmission of Letters 70 and 72 of Spinoza's correspondence, where a certain Bresserus is mentioned. By postulating a confusion of B and D, this Bresserus is tentatively identified with the Dresscherus mentioned by Van Gent (Reinhardt 1911, 18, n. 58; cf. p. 24). The identification is, however, ill-founded. Bresserus is known to us only from Letters 70 and 72, and these are autographs of Schuller (who knew the man personally) and Spinoza. The B is unmistakable in both sources.

1. For the biographical information provided here I rely on Meinsma (1980 [1896], 150–1, 263–4, 450), Thijssen-Schoute (1989 [1954], 414, 419) and Lindeboom (1984, 240–1).

amico de Vries mittam'[1] ('as regards the third part of my Philosophy, I will shortly send a portion of it either to you, if you want to be the translator, or to our friend De Vries'). In the event Bouwmeester did not translate the work. Meinsma pictures him as a many-sided thinker, a true scholar, but somewhat lazy. He gave a Dutch rendering of Pocock's Latin translation of an Arabian novel by Ibn Tufayl.[2] The poem 'Ad librum', preceding Spinoza's *Renati des Cartes Principia philosophiæ*, is commonly attributed to Bouwmeester. He was an intimate friend of Meyer: they studied together, they were both members of the literary society *Nil volentibus arduum*[3] and of the board of the Amsterdam theatre after 1677, together they were involved in the pamphlet war known as the Amsterdam physicians' quarrel of 1677. It has been suggested that Meyer's *Philosophia S. Scripturæ interpres* of 1666 was in fact a joint production of Meyer and Bouwmeester, and that the latter contributed substantially to other publications as well.[4] Johannes Bouwmeester was a skilled Latinist and it seems only natural to suppose that he was involved in the publication of the *Opera posthuma*, too. There is, however, no proof that this was indeed the case. The only assertion that can be made in this respect is that Bouwmeester was among those who handed in manuscripts of Spinoza for publication. Letter 37 was printed in the *Opera posthuma* from the original letter sent to Bouwmeester by Spinoza, not from the draft that was found among the papers Spinoza had left behind (see below, p. 41).

1.4 Lodewijk Meyer

1.4.1 *The preface of the Opera posthuma*

Among the editors of Spinoza's posthumous works we find the physician, dramatist, lexicographer and philosopher Lodewijk Meyer. Some thirty years ago, Louise Thijssen-Schoute devoted a short monograph to this versatile thinker.[5] He was born in 1629, presumably in Amsterdam, son of Willem Janszoon Meyer from Mülheim and Maria Lodewijksdochter from Groningen. The baptism took place in the Oude Kerk on 18 October of that year. Meyer's denomination was Lutheran. He matriculated in Leiden as a student of philosophy on 19 September 1654, and as a student of medicine on 25 September 1658. In 1654, he edited J. Hofman's purist dictionary, *Nederlandtsche*

1. G 4, 163.19–22.
2. *Het leeven van Hai Ebn Yokdhan* (Ibn Tufayl, tr. Bouwmeester 1672).
3. Thijssen-Schoute 1989 [1954], 414. Cf. Harmsen 1989, 490. The activities of Meyer and Bouwmeester in *Nil volentibus arduum* are also discussed below, in chapter 3.
4. Thijssen-Schoute 1989 [1954], 395, n. 3 and 419, n. 8; Bossers 1986, 381–2.
5. Thijssen-Schoute 1954; reprinted (with minor changes) in Thijssen-Schoute 1967, 173–94. I have drawn on this article and on Meinsma (1980 [1896], 146–9, 450) for the biographical notice given here. See also the sections pertaining to Lodewijk Meyer in Thijssen-Schoute 1989 [1954].

woordenschat of 1650. The work had an enormous success: during Meyer's lifetime three more editions appeared, and after his death it went through another seven editions, the last one in 1805. He obtained a doctorate in philosophy on 19 March 1660, with the thesis *De materia, ejusque affectionibus motu et quiete*, and in medicine a day later, with the thesis *De calido nativo, ejusque morbis.*[1] In October 1661, he married Constantia Caret. His contribution to philosophy consists of a single work, which appeared in 1666: *Philosophia S. Scripturæ interpres*, subtitled *Exercitatio paradoxa*. Meyer was the founder and pivot of the literary society *Nil volentibus arduum*. In that quality he made important contributions to the collective treatises written by that society: on dramatical theory, *Onderwys in de tooneel-poëzy*, and on verse technique, *Verhandelingen: Van der letteren affinitas, Van het gebruik der accentus of toonen in de Nederduytsche vaerzen, en Van de metaplasmus of woordvervorming*. These two works were only published in the eighteenth century. He also adapted a number of plays, under Corneille's influence: *De looghenaar* (1658), *'t Ghulde vlies* (1667), *De verloofde koninksbruidt* (1668), *Het spookend weeuwtje* (1670). Meyer died in 1681. He was buried in the Oude Kerk on 25 November.

His precise role in editing the posthumous works is nowhere directly substantiated, but two witnesses independantly confirm that he was in some way involved. There is a letter from Pierre Bayle to Theodorus Jansonius ab Almeloveen, dated 7 March 1686, which consists of comments upon the third edition (1686) of a book by Johannes Deckherrus, *De scriptis adespotis, pseudepigraphis, et suppositiis conjecturæ*. Bayle's letter was published in the book itself. Among the supplementary material adduced by Bayle, there is a notice about the authorship of the prefaces we find in *De nagelate schriften* and the *Opera posthuma*:

> Pag. 333. dicit Autor [Deckherrus] operibus posthumis Benedicti de Spinoza anno 1678. typis exscripta [*lege* exscriptis] præfixam esse *tersissimam incogniti Authoris præfationem*. Dictum est mihi nuper præfationem illam fuisse primo Belgicè conscriptam ab viro quodam è Menonitarum Secta cui nomen *Jarich Jelles* qui postquam Mercaturam exercuisset Amstelodami, in privato otio & exquæsitis reditibus vixit, vir cæteroquin literis haud ita instructus; Eam vero præfationem creditur postea latinè vertisse prout extat in libro Spinozæ Ludovicus Meyer Medicus Amstel., ante paucos annos vivis exemptus, Autor ut fama est Dissertationis paradoxæ cui titulus *Philosophia sacræ Scripturæ interpres*, quæ non immerito displicuit Theologis, utpote sapiens Hæresim.[2]

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1. Leiden University Library, 236 A 14, nos. 45 and 46. A year before, Meyer featured as author of a preparatory disputation. His was the second of six medical disputations defended for Franciscus de le Boë Sylvius: *De chyli à fœcibus alvinis secretione*, shelf mark 236 A 16, no. 16. The philosophical thesis has been reproduced in facsimile in *Chronicon Spinozanum* 2 (1922), 183–95.

2. Bayle 1686, 387–8. The third edition of Deckherrus's *De scriptis adespotis* contained two supplements: Bayle's letter is preceded by a similar compilation by Paulus Vindingius, in the form of a letter to the author. That supplement had already been included in the second edition of 1681. The letter to Th. Jansonius ab Almeloveen was later included in Bayle's *Œuvres diverses* of 1731 (vol. 4, 162–7). That version scrupulously reproduces the 1686 text, error included, with

> On p. 333 the author says that to Spinoza's *Opera posthuma*, published in 1678, a most sophisticated preface was added by an unknown author. I was told recently that this preface was originally written by a Mennonite, Jarig Jelles, who after having been a merchant in Amsterdam, lived a life of leisure off the proceeds – a man, for that matter, of little education. The preface is believed to have been translated into Latin, as it occurs in Spinoza's book, by the Amsterdam physician Lodewijk Meyer, who died a few years ago; the author, as rumour has it, of the paradoxical tract *Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres*, which displeased the theologians, and rightly so, for its heretic smell.

This very exact information is corroborated by Duijkerius in *Het leven van Philopater*:

> Evenwel om U.E. eenig genoegen te geven wegens dusdaenig een slag van Voorreden, soo weet, dat dese hier ten minste soo wel voeglijck is, als die voor de vermaerde *Sedenkonst* van B.D.S door *Doctor* L.M. en J.J. gesteld is [...].[1]
>
> Still, in order to satisfy you [i.e. the reader] with regard to a preface of this kind, you should know that this one here is at least as decent as that with which the famous *Ethics* of B.D.S was prefaced by Doctor L.M and J.J. [...].

In a contemporary key to this novel, the initials were already explained as referring to Meyer and Jelles.[2] The eighteenth-century biographical notice by Johannes Monnikhoff confirms the attribution, albeit less positively:

> Dat hij [Jarig Jelles] den Maaker der Voorreeden van Spinoza's *Nagelate Schriften* was, is zelf heel duijdelijk af te neemen uijt zijn *Belijdenis des Algemeene en Christelijken Geloofs* [...]: als waar in de zelve stijl en zaaken, hoewel in order en zamenbinding iet verschillende, als in de gedagte Voorreeden ons te vooren komt. En schoon zommigen neevens hem ook Dr. Lodewijk Meijer voor den Schrijver deezer Voorreeden hebben gehouden, zoo zal dit mogelijk daar uijt zijn gesprooten, dat hij misschien dezelve uijt 't Nederduijtsch in 't Latijn heeft overgebragt.[3]
>
> That he [Jarig Jelles] was the author of the preface to Spinoza's *Nagelate schriften* can be inferred very clearly from his *Belijdenisse des algemeenen en christelijken geloofs* [...]: in which we find the same style and matter, though ordered and arranged slightly differently, as in the said preface. Some have regarded not only him but also Dr Lodewijk Meyer as the author of this preface; but that idea may have arisen because the latter perhaps translated it from Dutch into Latin.

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one interesting exception: instead of *tersissimam* ('highly sophisticated') – which Bayle quotes literally from Deckherrus – it reads *tetrissimam* ('most horrid'). Perhaps the editors of the posthumous *Œuvres diverses* found that qualification to be more in line with Bayle's general attitude towards Spinozism.

1. Maréchal 1991, 55.
2. Ibid., n. 2. For this key, discovered by Maréchal in the University Library of Gent, see her edition p. 6 and ill. 10. (Judging from this reproduction, I would say that the key gives Jelles's name as 'Jurige Jillis', not 'Jarige Jillis', as it reads in Maréchal's note 2, p. 55.)
3. Monnikhoff 1926, 216.

Monnikhoff may simply retail the information from Bayle here. In addition to these external testimonies, there are stylistic reasons for crediting Jelles with the Dutch preface and Meyer with the Latin one.[1]

What else can we surmise about Lodewijk Meyer's part in the editorial history of the *Opera posthuma*? At this point it is illuminating to take the correspondence between Meyer and Spinoza into account. Only three letters have come down to us, all written by Spinoza. One of these, the famous Letter 12 on infinity, was published in the *Opera posthuma*, the other two, Letters 12A and 15, have survived in autograph.[2] These autograph letters make it abundantly clear that Meyer edited Spinoza's *Principia philosophiæ* rather heavily: he supplied internal references, proposed textual changes, added a preface of his own, and supervised the printing. This was all done according to Spinoza's explicit instructions.[3] For the *Principia philosophiæ* (and its appendix, the *Cogitata metaphysica*), then, Meyer's contribution is firmly established. Everything concerning the publication of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, on the other hand, has been carefully erased by the philosopher's friends. All we have is the intentionally evasive information in Letter 44.[4] Yet one is inclined to suppose that the publication of this book proceeded along rather similar lines: Spinoza sent instructions to his friends in Amsterdam, who edited the Latin text and had it translated into Dutch, too – though the author subsequently had second thoughts and prevented the publication of the Dutch version. Jelles, the addressee of Letter 44, presumably supervised the translation. Whether Meyer was involved in any way is as yet unclear. But the story of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* is a complicated one, and it requires much more investigation.

1.4.2 *First excursus: Meyer and diacritics*

One of the problems besetting a reconstruction of the editorial history of Spinoza's works is the apparent capriciousness of the accidentals (spelling, accents, capitals, punctuation). The differences between the various works are considerable, even when the same people were involved in preparing a text for the press. Authors need not be consistent from one book to another. Moreover, the accidentals would not depend solely on the author or editor: the compositor would work from a fair copy that might or might not have been prepared by a professional scribe (sometimes the corrector)

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1. See Akkerman 1980, 207–8.
2. On the rationale behind the inclusion of certain letters in the OP and NS, and the exclusion of others, see below, p. 69.
3. A feature of the *Principia philosophiæ* that also seems to point to an active role of Meyer in supervising the printing of the book is the striking similarity between the arrangement and layout of the errata here (2*1^{r}, immediately after Meyer's preface) and in his own *Interpres* (2*2^{v}, after the *prologus*). But the similarity should perhaps be attributed to the printer's house style.
4. See Akkerman 1994.

according to the printer's specifications.[1] A printer's house style – and, occasionally, justification problems[2] – might lead to spellings and punctuation that deviated from the fair copy. Accent-marks, capitals and italics, on the other hand, would generally reflect the fair copy (within the limitations imposed by the printer's material), since they required an understanding of the text. In his long career as a publisher, Jan Rieuwertsz had his books printed by several different printers, so the treatment of the accidentals may show considerable irregularity.

The use of diacritics is a case in point. All Spinoza editions of the seventeenth century – *Renati des Cartes Principia philosophiæ*, *Tractatus theologico-politicus* and *Opera posthuma* – make use of these marks in more or less systematic, but divergent ways. What follows here is only a brief account of the general principles and differences. For a more detailed discussion of diacritics in Neo-Latin I refer to chapter 2.

In the *Principia philosophiæ* accents are generally used in the following situations. (i) 'Indeclinabilia' ending in a vowel, *-am*, *-um*, and *-us* (e.g. *verò*, *ferè*, *putà*, *quàm*, *tantùm*, *minùs*) and the prepositions *à* and *è* are marked with a grave.[3] (ii) A circumflex is used over the *-â* of the ablative ending (but not, as a rule, over the *-us* of genitive singular and nominative and accusative plural), and to indicate contraction (*dubitârit*). (iii) Enclitics are not marked, so the acute is absent.[4] (iv) The diaeresis is used to separate two vowels. Throughout the book, usage is not very consistent (e.g. *cùm*, *quòd*, *hîc*, *hâc* occurring alternately with and without marks), and there are many irregularities and printing errors.

The *Tractatus theologico-politicus* is much more sober in its use of diacritics. Apart from the diaeresis (in many biblical names) and the circumflex for the ablative in *-â*, accents are rare. Indeclinabilia have a grave occasionally, but this is by no means general. Again, no acute is found.

In the *Opera posthuma*, diacritical usage is intensive and consistent. In addition to the grave (indeclinabilia), the circumflex (ablative, contractions) and the diaeresis, we find the acute, placed all but consistently over enclitic *-qúe*, and an expanded application of the circumflex, over the ending *-ûs*.

These divergences do not necessarily reflect different editors. We know that Meyer was in charge of preparing the *Principia philosophiæ* for the press. Moreover, he had outspoken opinions on the correct use of accents and punctuation marks. There is an

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1. Cf. Janssen 1989, 33: 'Terzijde kan erop gewezen worden dat, ook in het geval de auteur met het oog op de druk schreef en zelfs bij de vormgeving betrokken was, niet altijd de autograaf als kopij diende: vaak werd de autograaf door een medewerker (veelal een corrector) van de drukkerij overgeschreven of tenminste redactioneel bewerkt'. Binns 1990, 399: 'A fair copy of the work to be printed was first made by a scribe in the employ of the printer.'
2. Gaskell 1985 [1972], 345.
3. The adverb *hîc*, however, if marked, receives the circumflex, not the grave.
4. The exception being the form *adeóque*, which occurs in this form in Meyer's preface (sig. *3^{v}, 2*1^{r}) besides *adeòque* (*3^{r}, *4^{v}).

interesting section on this in chapter 3 of his *Philosophia S. Scripturæ interpres.* I here give the beginning of that section in full:

> Quæ speciatim *Orationibus scriptô expressis* obveniunt, Ambiguitates ex eô originem ducunt, quòd omnes, quæ in elocutione & pronunciatione auditori observantur diversitates, scripturâ characteribusque repræsentari Lectoribus nequeant. Quamvis enim singula vocabula, spatiolô distinguantur, eorumque syllabarum quantitas accentu notetur; orationes ex iis conflatæ commatis, semicolis, colis & punctis discriminentur: ac earum quædam affectiones signis interrogationis, admirationis, & parenthesios exprimantur: desunt tamen adhuc alia multa, ut sententiæ abruptæ (cui designandæ hodie à quibusdam adhibentur aliquot puncta post se invicem disposita, hoc modo....) sententiæ ironicæ, imperantis, precantis, & similium, quorum defectus lectores sæpissimè dubios reddit, quô sensu literis fuerint consignatæ. Nec tantùm ambiguitatis causa est horum signorum notarumque defectus, sed etiam neglectus, nec non præposterus eorundem usus.[1]

> Such ambiguities as arise specifically in *written texts* result from the fact that all the differences in expression and pronunciation that are observed for the listener's sake cannot be so represented in writing and characters for readers. For although single words may be separated by a space, and the quantity of their syllables may be indicated by an accent-mark, the sentences made by combining them may be differentiated by commas, semicolons, colons and full stops, and some states of these sentences may be expressed by question marks, exclamation marks and parentheses, many other signs are still lacking, such as a sign for an interrupted sentence (some people nowadays designate this by means of several points in a row, thus: ....), and signs for an ironical, imperative, entreating sentence and the like. The absence of these signs very often makes readers doubt in what sense the sentences are meant. And ambiguity is caused not only by the lack of these signs and marks, but also by neglect or improper use.

And with regard to the diacritical marks, Meyer observes:

> *Accentus* nota, quamvis à quibusdam accuratioribus adhibeatur, à plerisque tamen negligitur, ac tum ambiguitas oritur, ut in *pendere* & *pendêre*, *suffocat* & *suffôcat*, *leporem* & *lepôrem*, quæ his versiculis distinguuntur,
>
> *Pendere vult justus, non vult pendêre malignus.*
> *Suffocat extinguit, suffôcat guttura stringit.*
> *In sylvis leporem, ast in verbis quære lepôrem.*
>
> Atque hoc quàm maximè locum habet in Linguâ Græcâ, siquidem accentus & Spiritus magnam in eâ faciunt vocum diversitatem, & discrimen, ut cuilibet, qui illam vel à limine salutavit, notissimum.[2]

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1. Meyer 1666, 25.
2. Meyer 1666, 26. Dr Peter Binkley pointed out to me that the examples Meyer uses to illustrate his point in fact derive from the medieval tradition of differential verses. These were mnemonic devices for establishing correct word stress by differentiating between twins that were easily confused. Binkley, who is preparing a publication on this subject, identified the three verses cited by Meyer as occurring in the following grammatical tracts in verse of the thirteenth century: two works by Henry of Avranches, *Tractatus Henrici Grammatici* (l. 168: *pendere*; l. 212: *suffocat*) and *Comoda gramatice* (f. 8^{v}, l. 11: *suffocat*); John of Garland's *Accentuarium* (Lincoln Cath. MS 132, f. 84^{r}, l. 10: *suffocat*); and Évrard of Béthune's *Graecismus* (9, l. 9: *leporem*). It is likely that these examples found their way into early modern compilations and dictionaries, and

> The *accent-mark*, though observed by some meticulous people, is neglected by the majority. Then ambiguity arises, as in *pendere* 'to weigh' and *pendêre* 'to hang', *suffocat* 'smothers' and *suffôcat* 'chokes', *leporem* 'hare' and *lepôrem* 'charm, wit'. These forms are distinguished in the following verses:
>
> *The just man wants to consider, the wicked man does not want to hang.*
> *He smothers, extinguishes; he chokes, squeezes throats.*
> *Look for a hare in the woods, but in words for wit.*
>
> And this is pre-eminently applicable in Greek, since there accents and breathings may give rise to a huge difference and distinction between words – a fact that is well known to anyone with even an elementary knowledge of the language.

The point Meyer is making here, the use of accent marks to indicate vowel length and thereby to distinguish between homographs, is traditional. It should be noted, though, that this accounts only for part of the accentuation practice, notably the *-â* endings and pairs such as *hic/hîc* or the words given in Meyer's examples. But a general description of the system he actually follows in the *Interpres* shows that it accommodates distinctions other than vowel length, too. (i) The grave is used for the indeclinabilia, including *à* and *è*. In these cases, quantity has no role to play. (ii) The circumflex is used for the ablatives in *-â* (including *hâc*) and in *-ô* (including *hôc*). Now the latter category is very unusual. *Hôc* does occur in other texts (for example in the *Opera posthuma*), and the logic behind this form is that it is thus clearly distinguished from the nominative neuter *hoc*, with a short vowel. This logic is violated when the use of the circumflex is extended to the ablatives in *-ô*. It shows that the form is an ablative, not a dative; but here only a difference in grammatical function is involved, not in vowel length. In addition, Meyer also puts a circumflex over contracted forms (*supplêrunt*), and on *hîc* and *heîc*. He does not use it for *-ûs*, as far as I have been able to ascertain. (iii) Of the enclitics, *-que* often (but by no means always) gives rise to an

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that Meyer got them from such a contemporary source. Thus G.J. Vossius in his *Etymologicon linguæ Latinæ* (which I consulted in an eighteenth-century edition: Vossius 1763, 691) quotes the *suffocat*-verse from the *Catholicon* of John of Genoa (Iohannes de Balbis Ianuensis, thirteenth century). *Suffŏcare*, incidentally, is a medieval creation: Classical Latin only has the verb with *-ō-*.

In the *Opera posthuma*, the infinitive of the verb *pendeo* is indeed spelt with a circumflex (e.g. OP 4.32, 31.9, 32.11, 25–6, 73.17, 81.12). In his Dutch translation of the *Interpres* (Meyer 1667, 30–1), the examples are not Latin but Dutch homographs, to be kept apart by indicating the quality of the vowel *o*. In order to differentiate between 'dull' (close) and 'clear' (open) *o* (and similarly for the vowel *e*), the members of *Nil volentibus arduum* – in particular Andries Pels and Lodewijk Meyer – advocated and practised a reformed spelling of Dutch, employing respectively *o* and *ó*, *e* and *é* (see Schenkeveld-van der Dussen 1973, 36). The practice was ridiculed by their contemporaries. Kronenberg cites an anonymous satirical verse: 'Wat is een vers ook, daar d'akcenten/Niet pieksgewys in zyn gezet,/Meer als een zuster zonder krenten/Of als een beuling zonder vet?' (Kronenberg 1875, 80). And Joannes Antonides van der Goes, who left *Nil volentibus arduum* in 1671 (Dongelmans 1982, 5–6), wrote an obituary poem on Joost van den Vondel, setting off the latter's sober spelling against the fatuous accents of his former companions: 'Hy [Vondel] hoeft zyn letters met geen spietsen te verweeren:/Zy zyn gehart: niets kan zyn regementen deeren' (quoted from Schenkeveld-van der Dussen 1973, 36).

acute accent, either on the preceding syllable (*tótque*, *adeóque* beside *adeòque*), or on the *q́*. (iv) The diaeresis occurs when a vowel follows another vowel without forming a diphthong. It may be placed on the first (*vacüum*) or on the second of them (*coërcendus*).

The system is a good deal more sophisticated than the one we find in the *Principia philosophiæ*, published only three years earlier under Meyer's supervision. But it also differs from his three Latin *Disputationes* of 1659 and 1660. There we see the simple style: grave on indeclinable words (but not consistently), circumflex on *-â*, diaeresis. The peculiar *-ô* is absent, and so is the acute.

Lodewijk Meyer's application of accents to his own Latin writings, then, is unpredictable. The fact that the system in the *Opera posthuma* is different does not preclude his involvement as editor. Some features in the *Opera posthuma*, such as the forms *pendêre* and *hôc*, are reminiscent of Meyer's practice and examples in the *Interpres*. If we focus our attention on the possible influence of the scribe of the *Opera posthuma*, we are faced with similar problems. As will be shown in § 1.5, Pieter van Gent copied two letters from the correspondence after Spinoza's death, and it is possible that he was employed as a scribe of the *Opera posthuma* copy. Now Van Gent also copied and revised the Latin text of Tschirnhaus's *Medicina mentis*, translated the *Medicina corporis* from German into Latin, and prepared the copy of both texts for the compositor. The system of accentuation he employed there is again different from what we find in the *Opera posthuma*. (i) The grave occurs in its usual position, on indeclinable forms. Notable exceptions are *cum*, *quod* and *hic* (featuring occasionally as *hîc* in the *Medicina corporis*, not in the *Medicina mentis*). (ii) The circumflex is used for *-â*, *-ûs*, for contractions (*dubitârint*), and also for the alternate ending of the third person plural in the perfect indicative (*vixêre*, *duxêre*, *concessêre*). (iii) There is no acute. (iv) The diaeresis has its customary function (*aër*). An intriguing feature of the Tschirnhaus book is that the accentuation in sheet A (pages 1–8) of the *Medicina mentis* differs from that in the other sheets. In that quire, only the prepositions *à* and *è* are consistently marked; otherwise, accents are the exception rather than the rule. Finally it is worth noting that Van Gent employs very few accents in his letters to Huygens and to Tschirnhaus.[1] In Van Gent's case, too, steadiness in the application of diacritical marks is not to be expected. When copying out Spinoza's works he strove to provide the texts with a system of accentuation,[2] but not the same he was to employ in his own editorial project of Tschirnhaus.

Summing up, the conventions in accentuation cannot help us to identify individual editors. Lodewijk Meyer's involvement is neither proved nor disproved by a

1. In the case of the Tschirnhaus correspondence, my judgement is based on Reinhardt's edition, not on autopsy. This may give an inaccurate representation of the actual marks in the letters.
2. Accent-marks occur consistently in his transcripts of Letter 79 and the draft of Letter 37. The manuscripts still require attention in this respect, however. There are a number of mistakes, e.g. *cum physicâ* instead of *cùm physica* (cf. G 4, 329.22), *primò* for *primo* (329.25).

comparison between his own works and Spinoza's texts. The same goes for Pieter van Gent.

1.4.3 *Meyer's editorial contributions*

As far as Meyer's contribution to the *Opera posthuma* is concerned, it is a tricky job to try and move beyond the statements by Bayle and Duijkerius about his authorship of the Latin preface. So far all attempts to ascertain Meyer's involvement in particular texts or his influence in certain details have had to remain conjectural. There even is a redoubtable tradition denying him any part in the editing whatsoever. After Ludwig Stein's publication of the correspondence between Schuller and Leibniz on Spinoza, Willem Meijer launched the thesis that the friendship between Lodewijk Meyer and Benedict de Spinoza had cooled:

> In de laatste jaren, na Spinoza's vertrek uit Rijnsburg, komen geene brieven aan Meyer meer voor. Diens rationalistische schriftverklaring was geheel in strijd met de objectieve en historische van Spinoza. Meyers boek: Philosophia Scripturae Interpres (1666) werd openlijk weerlegd door de Tractaten Theologus-Politicus [*sic*] en dit is reeds voldoende om hun verwijdering van elkander te verklaren.[1]

> There are no more letters to Meyer in the final years, after Spinoza left Rijnsburg. Meyer's rationalistic explanation of the Scriptures conflicted squarely with Spinoza's objective and historical explanation. His book *Philosophia S. Scripturæ interpres* was publicly refuted by the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, and this is in itself sufficient to account for their estrangement.

Willem Meijer's main reason for postulating a split between the two friends is the pivotal role purportedly played by Georg Hermann Schuller in the publication of Spinoza's legacy. The argument of the absence of letters after Spinoza's departure from Rijnsburg will not stand. Not only was Letter 15 written after that (3 August 1663, from Voorburg), but the presence or absence of letters cannot in itself be invoked to support inferences about intimacy or estrangement between Spinoza and individual friends. The editors of the posthumous works had their own policy in this (see below, p. 69). The supposed breach between Meyer and Spinoza was taken up and embroidered by Carl Gebhardt, who added the conjecture that Meyer was not involved in the publication of the *Opera posthuma* at all:

> Ich kann mich nicht davon überzeugen, daß Dr. Lodewyk Meyer, nachdem sich Spinozas Weg im *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* von dem der *Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres* getrennt, noch zu den activen Freunden Spinozas gehörte und daß er an der Herausgabe der Opera Posthuma mitgewirkt.[2]

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1. Meijer 1897, 606.
2. G 2, 312, n. 6.

But Thijssen-Schoute rightly insisted that the whole argument is gratuitous: there is not a single document or witness to substantiate it.[1] W.G. van der Tak wrote an interesting defence of Meyer:

> Sed cur tam multa de Ludovico Meyer? Quia nomen eius semper in honore sit oportet apud cultores Benedicti de Spinoza. Fuit amicus illius singularis ac integer et intermissio eorum inter se epistularum, quam fuisse coniicimus, nostra quidem opinione, non tam discrimini inter Tractatum Theologico-Politicum et *Interpretem* attribuenda est quam negotiis scænicis Amstelodamensibus, in quibus Meyer tam occupatus fuit. Post mortem Spinozæ Meyer pro virili parte operam navavit edendis Operibus Posthumis, quorum præfationem cum alio Spinozæ amico, nomine Jarigh Jelles, composuit. Præfationem illam a Meyer ac Jelles scriptam esse satis superque ex argumentis, quæ continet, atque e scribendi ratione patet. Quod ita etiam æqualibus constitit. Hic etiam addendum est editionem principem Operum Posthumorum accentibus ac literis capitalibus abundare, quibus potissimum Ludovicus Meyer uti solebat. Quoniam nec in Tractatu Teologico-Politico [sic], nec in Epistolis manu ipsius Spinozæ, quæ supersunt, scriptis eiusmodi accentus inveniuntur, abunde patet Meyer manuscriptum Ethicæ prelo aptum fecisse. Suspicarine fortasse licet Meyer et alia in manuscripto Spinozæ mutavisse?[2]
>
> But why so much about Lodewijk Meyer? Because his name ought to be held in esteem by the admirers of Spinoza. He was the latter's special and devoted friend; that their correspondence was, as we think, interrupted, is due, in our view, not to the disagreement between the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* and the *Interpres*, but to the fact that Meyer was too busy with the theatre in Amsterdam. After Spinoza's death, Meyer did his utmost to get the *Opera posthuma* published. He wrote the preface, together with another friend of Spinoza's, Jarig Jelles. That the preface was written by Meyer and Jelles is more than sufficiently shown by its contents and by the style of writing. This was also taken for granted by his contemporaries. We should add here that the first edition of the *Opera posthuma* is teeming with accents and capitals, such as Lodewijk Meyer was wont to employ. Since these accents are found neither in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, nor in the autograph letters of Spinoza that are still extant, it is abundantly evident that Meyer prepared the manuscript of the *Ethica* for the printing press. Could Meyer perhaps be suspected of changing other things in Spinoza's manuscript, too?

As I have already argued, the accents cannot be relied upon as indications for Meyer's involvement, and much the same goes for the capitals and other accidentals. Any editor would have supplied them in one way or another. I cannot agree with Van der Tak's supposition that the correspondence between Meyer and Spinoza was interrupted, either; we simply do not know. Even so, the general drift of Van der Tak's argument is, I think, right. Meyer was involved – but what exactly did he do?

An editorial task that Meyer might have carried out, was translating into Latin the letters that were originally written in Dutch, and which are marked as renderings ('versio') in the *Opera posthuma*. Seventeen of these were written by Spinoza.[3] The

1. Thijssen-Schoute 1954, 16, n. 38. See also Akkerman 1980, 207, 212 n. 11.
2. Van der Tak 1921, 100.
3. Ep 17, 19, 21, 23, 27, 34–6, 38–41, 44, 50, 52, 54, 56.

Latin of these letters is a question that has exercised a number of scholars. J.P.N. Land advanced the thesis that Spinoza himself translated them into Latin, with a view to future publication. This opinion was adopted by J.H. Leopold and by Carl Gebhardt. But C. Louise Thijssen-Schoute rightly maintained that there is nothing to support this thesis. Her point of view has been endorsed by Fokke Akkerman, on account of the Latinity of those letters, which seems to be different from Spinoza's.[1] Akkerman advanced the hypothesis that Lodewijk Meyer was responsible for these Latin versions and for polishing the Latin in the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*, notably the first five or six pages.[2] So far, no new arguments have come up to confirm or confute this. The Dutch letters need not necessarily have been translated into Latin by the selfsame person; this task, too, may have been shared.[3]

Wim Klever put forward a number of arguments in favour of either Johannes Bouwmeester or Lodewijk Meyer as the compiler of the *Index rerum* in the *Opera posthuma*.[4] I agree with Klever that whoever compiled it was a competent Latinist and someone thoroughly familiar with Spinoza's thought and works, but this does not limit the choice to Bouwmeester and Meyer. Van Gent should also be included among the candidates.

So far, then, I have only adduced considerations that cast doubt upon Meyer's contribution to the *Opera posthuma*. Are there no arguments to the contrary? If there are, they should in my opinion proceed from another angle. In preparing Spinoza's texts for the printer, the friends obviously aimed at a faithful presentation of his works, with minimum interference on their part. To the extent that amendments were considered harmless, advisable or even necessary, Lodewijk Meyer would have had the authority to implement them, on the basis of his erudition as a philosopher and a Latinist, and his experience as editor (notably of the *Principia philosophiæ/Cogitata metaphysica*). I would suggest that Meyer's influence may be discerned in some details, handled in a systematic manner that I have come to think of as more characteristic for

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1. Land 1880, 148. Leopold 1902, 58–9 (but cf. also Akkerman 1991, 30–1: Leopold's view of the matter was more balanced than Land's). Gebhardt: G 4, 369–70. Thijssen-Schoute 1967, 254. Akkerman 1980, 48–50. As far as I can see, the issue has invariably been the Latin of the seventeen Dutch letters written by Spinoza. That the Dutch letters from his correspondents were translated by the editors is, I think, generally granted, but the Latin of them has received no attention.
2. Akkerman 1987, 25; cf. Akkerman 1980, 263.
3. Pieter van Gent may have been one of the people involved in preparing the publication of the *Opera posthuma*, and a closer analysis of his Latin is called for, to see if it bears resemblance to the Latin of the translated letters. For this comparison we dispose of a body of Latin letters written by Van Gent (to Tschirnhaus and to Huygens), his edition of Tschirnhaus's *Medicina mentis* and his Latin translation of the *Medicina corporis*. It is only recently that I arrived at the hypothesis that he may have contributed to publishing the *Opera posthuma* – too late to incorporate a thorough analysis of his Latin into the present investigation. I hope to say more about this in the near future.
4. Klever 1986, 316–7.

Meyer than for Spinoza. As I will argue in chapter 3, Meyer's originality vis-à-vis the Cartesian doctrine of the passions is precisely his *systematization* of it. I will now discuss two features of the *Ethica* text that are strikingly different in the *Opera posthuma* and in *De nagelate schriften*, precisely on account of a more systematic approach in the Latin version. The first case in point is the way the trimmings of the *ordo geometricus* are presented in the *Ethica*; the second, the different part-title leaves of this work in the Latin and Dutch editions.

1.4.4 *Second excursus: The trimmings of the ordo geometricus*

There are numerous minor divergences between the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften* in their handling of the outer apparel of the *ordo geometricus*: numerals, references, completeness of the concluding part of the demonstrations, and the like.[1] Such details were apparently not treated consistently and unequivocally in Spinoza's manuscript, and this state of affairs forced the editors to find their own solutions. The Latin text prefers Roman numerals in the captions and Arabic numerals in the cross-references, whereas the Dutch version gives words instead of figures throughout.[2] The concluding formula in the *Opera posthuma* almost always reads '*Q.E.D.*', while *De nagelate schriften* never have abbreviations and offer more variation.[3] A tentative

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1. See also § 4.5, on the trimmings of the *ordo geometricus* in the fifth part of the *Ethica*.
2. With the exception of the definitions of the passions at the end of part three, where Roman numerals are used ('Bepalingen der hartstochten', NS 165–80).
3. The differences and concurrences between OP and NS have been investigated in depth by Fokke Akkerman (1980, 79–81, and notes 4–6 on p. 176). He kindly put at my disposal his detailed notes on the subject. In these notes sixteen variant renderings of *Q.E.D.* are recorded. Two of these employ the verb 'bewijzen' (a remnant of the underlying translation of parts 1 and 2 by Pieter Balling; see Akkerman 1980, 171–2), six 'betogen', seven 'voorstellen' or the noun 'voorstelling', one 'voorgeven'. The frequency is two occurrences with 'bewijzen', 195 with 'betogen', 30 with 'voorstellen/-stelling', five with 'voorgeven'. The conclusion of a demonstration can be handled in any of the three following manners: (i) the proposition is repeated and concluded with a formula of the *Q.E.D.*-type; (ii) the proposition is repeated only in part, then followed by '*etc.*' or a similar shortening expression, then concluded with *Q.E.D.*; (iii) no repetition, no concluding formula. OP and NS handle these endings in the same way in 230 cases, and they differ in 32 cases.

The different translations of *Q.E.D.* are linked up by Akkerman with the predilection for variation that the Dutch translator, Glazemaker, shows: 'He has, e.g., no fewer than 16 different translations of the formula *quod erat demonstrandum* ready to hand' (Akkerman 1980, 135). I have some hesitations, though, in interpreting the forms with 'voorstellen' as varying translations of 'demonstrare'. Since 'voorstelling' is the stock translation of 'propositio', and 'voorstellen' of 'proponere', there is also the possibility that Glazemaker had a Latin text in front of him that read 'ut proponebatur' or a similar formula. Cf. 1p8s (G 2, 51.20–1): 'ut proponebatur', NS 8: 'gelijk voorgestelt wierd'; 1p26 (G 2, 68.23): 'quod secundò proponitur', NS 28: 'het tweede, dat wy voorgestelt hebben'. This might indicate that the uniformity in the concluding formulas in the OP, *Q.E.D.*, is not due to the author's consistency in these matters, but to a regularization carried out by the editor of the OP. A comparison with Spinoza's *Principia philosophiæ* cannot

conclusion could be that Spinoza had not in all cases written out in full the conclusion of the demonstration, but contented himself with a truncated indication (of which the partially repeated propositions followed by '&c.' may be remnants). The editors and translator of the *Opera posthuma* each followed their own preferences in completing or omitting such curtailed indications. The Latin edition, with its virtually universal use of '*Q.E.D.*', is on the whole markedly more consistent than the Dutch translation in this respect.

The complicated system of cross-references that the *ordo geometricus* entails must have posed problems for those who prepared Spinoza's philosophical legacy for the press. A case in point is the identification of the part in a reference. Since a deductive concatenation of propositions can only be developed on the basis of what has been proved already, only references backward are permitted. In part 1, a bare reference to 'Definition 3' or 'Proposition 21' is unambiguous: it can only mean a definition or proposition in the first part. From part 2 onward, however, the author must specify the part. If it is the part in hand, the *Ethica* invariably indicates this as '*hujus*' (sc. *partis*). As was to be expected, '*hujus*' is absent from Part 1; but, surprisingly, its Dutch translation '*in dit deel*' or '*van dit deel*' is very frequently employed in *De nagelate schriften*.[1] This is the kind of variance that cannot conveniently be explained as translator's licence. Why should a conscientious translator like Glazemaker haphazardly add redundant information? On the other hand, it would be unwarranted speculation to assume that Glazemaker's specifications in all cases reflect a similar formula in Spinoza's autograph copy. Such an assumption cannot be put to the test.

1.4.5 *Third excursus: The part-title leaves of the Ethica* and the *Zedekunst*

In both the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften*, each of the constituent parts – *Ethica*, *Tractatus politicus*, *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*, *Epistolæ*, and (in the Latin book only) Hebrew grammar – is preceded by a part-title. What is striking about the

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help us here: it was prepared for the press by Spinoza in collaboration with Meyer and there is no telling who edited the concluding formulas in the final stage. Moreover, since the work was translated into Dutch by Balling, not by Glazemaker, the renderings of these formulas in Dutch are not indicative of the relationship between Latin and Dutch terminology in the *Ethica*. Just for the record, though, it may be noted that PP read 'q.e.d.' in 52 cases (thirteen in part 1, 37 in part 2, two in part 3), and a further six variants of the same abbreviation: 'q.er.d.' (1p4), 'quod er. dem.' (1p7l2), 'q.e. demonstr.' (1p9), 'q.e. dem.' (1p16al), 'quod e.d.' (1p21), 'quod erat dem.' (2p34). Two different formulas are 'id, quod secundo loco demonstrandum proponebatur' (1p7l2) and 'ut er. dem.' (1p7d). Of the eight non-q.e.d. forms, then, five occur in the first nine propositions of part 1. As Lodewijk Meyer was certainly involved in preparing the PP for the press, this array of slightly varying formulas seems to plead against rather than for his responsibility for the regularization of the endings in the OP.

1. In the first part of the *Ethica*-translation in NS, we find 47 occurrences of '*van dit deel*' and 28 of '*in dit deel*'; comparable in its redundancy is 'de voorgaande darde en vijfde Bepaling' in E 1p1 (NS 3). In none of these cases do we find tallies in the OP.

part-titles of the *Ethica* and of its Dutch counterpart, *Zedekunst*, is that the former is decidedly more elaborate and ingenious than the latter. This is what they look like in the two different versions:

ETHICA

Ordine Geometrico demonstrata,

ET

In quinque Partes distincta,
in quibus agitur,

I. De DEO.
II. De Naturâ & Origine MENTIS.
III. De Origine & Naturâ AFFECTUUM.
IV. De SERVITUTE Humanâ, seu de AFFECTUUM VIRIBUS.
V. De POTENTIA INTELLECTUS, seu de LIBERTATE Humanâ.

ZEDEKUNST,

In vijf delen onderscheiden;

Daar in gehandelt word

I. Van GOD.
II. Van de Menschelijke ZIEL.
III. Van de Natuur en Oorsprong der HARTSTOCHTEN.
IV. Van de Menschelijke DIENSTBAARHEIT.
V. Van de Menschelijke VRYHEIT.

Alles op een Meetkundige orde geschikt en betoogt.[1]

The two part-titles are obviously based on a common plan, but they have been differently elaborated. The Latin version presents the title in a rhetorical, neatly

1. OP, sig. 5*4^{r}; NS, sig. 6*4^{r}. See the bibliographic description by Kingma & Offenberg 1985, nos. 24–5. (These authors designate the separate title pages of the different parts as half-titles. I prefer the term part-title or part-title leaf, since printers employ the term half-title generally to denote a short-title on an initial leaf, or – in the nineteenth century – the book title used as a heading for the first chapter; see Gaskell 1985, 52.) The divergences between these part-titles have also been commented upon by Akkerman (1980, 262–3; 69). My account differs from his to the effect that I take the Dutch version to be a rendering of Spinoza's original Latin title, and not a creation of Jelles.

coherent fashion: the main title, *Ethica*, is qualified by two coordinate attributive adjuncts ('ordine geometrico demonstrata' and 'in quinque partes distincta, in quibus agitur de Deo' et cetera, right through to the end). The deliberate use of two chiasmi ('de natura & origine mentis'/'de origine & natura affectuum' and 'de servitute humana, seu de affectuum viribus'/'de potentia intellectus, seu de libertate humana') makes for an elegant effect. The titles of the parts given here correspond exactly to the captions found over the text.[1] They differ, though, from the following paraphrase of the contents, which is given in Meyer's preface to the *Opera posthuma*:

> Hanc [sc. *Ethicam*] noster Philosophus in quinque partes distribuit, quarum prima tractat *de Deo*, secunda de *Mente humanâ*, tertia de *Origine & Naturâ Affectuum*, quarta de *Servitute humanâ*, & unà de Regulâ & vivendi Normâ, deque hominum bono & malo, quinta denique de *Potentiâ intellectûs*, seu *de Libertate humanâ*, nec non de Mentis æternitate.[2]
>
> Our philosopher divided it [i.e. the *Ethica*] into five parts, the first of which deals with God; the second with the human mind; the third with the origin and nature of the affects; the fourth with human bondage, as well as the rule and norm for living, and what is good and evil for men; the fifth, finally, with the power of the intellect or human liberty, and with the eternity of the mind.

The Dutch part-title is less intricate than its Latin counterpart. The attributive adjunct 'ordine geometrico demonstrata' – which has established itself in the history of philosophy as an essential part of the Latin title – stands apart from the rest. It is found here as a separate phrase at the end, with a subject of its own: 'alles' ('all'). The expression 'geschikt en betoogt' looks like a double translation of the single Latin term 'demonstrata' – a common device, and one that Glazemaker was rather fond of.[3] The two chiasmi are altogether absent from the Dutch part-title. The wording of the titles of the five parts differs from the captions over the text. Only those of parts 1 and 3 ('van God', 'van de natuur en oorsprong der hartstochten') quote the captions literally.[4] For part 2 the caption reads 'van de natuur en oorsprong der ziel',[5] adding 'de natuur en oorsprong' but leaving out the adjective 'menschelijke'. The caption thus corresponds exactly to the Latin title and caption in the *Opera posthuma*. In the Dutch captions, then, 'natuur en oorsprong' ('nature and origin') appears above both the second and the third part, similar to what we find in the Latin version. Yet, there is no chiasmus here: the word order is identical in both captions. The captions of parts

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1. OP, 1, 40, 93, 161, 233.
2. OP, sig. *3^{v}.
3. Akkerman 1980, 132–4; and cf. § 4.2.1, below. It should be noted that the doublet 'geschikt en betoogt' also occurs in Jelles's preface to NS (sig. *3^{r}; Akkerman 1980, 218), in his designation of the PP-title: '*het eerste en tweede Boek van Renatus Deskartes Beginselen der Wijsbegeerte, volgens een meetkundige Ordening geschikt en betoogt*'. Jelles does not cite the title as it appears on the title-page of Balling's Dutch translation of the work, where we read '*Na de Meetkonstige wijze beweezen*'.
4. NS, 1, 106.
5. NS, 46.

4 and 5, as they appear over the text of *De nagelate schriften*, differ from the titles as given on the Dutch part-title leaf, but correspond exactly to the Latin version: 'Van de menschelijke dienstbaarheid, of van de krachten der hartstochten';[1] 'Van 't vermogen des verstants, of van de menschelijke vryheyt'.[2] These two titles do form a chiasmus.

A comparison of the part-title of the *Zedekunst* with the paraphrase of the contents given in Jelles's preface to *De nagelate schriften* reveals a striking similarity:

> van 't welk [sc. this work: de *Zedekunst*] men alleenlijk dit zal zeggen, dat de Schrijver dit zelfde in vijf delen gedeelt en onderscheiden heeft. In 't eerste handelt hy *van God*; in het tweede *van de menschelijke Ziel*; in het darde *van de natuur en oorsprong der Hartstochten*; in 't vierde *van de menschelijke Dienstbaarheit*, gelijk ook van de Regel en Maat van te leven, en van der menschen goet en quaat; en in 't vijfde eindelijk *van 't vermogen des Verstants*, of *van de menschelijke Vrijheit*, mitsgaders van d'Eeuwigdurentheit der Ziel.[3]

> Of which [work, i.e. the *Ethica*] one can only say that the author divided and distinguished it into five parts. In the first he deals with God; in the second with the human mind; in the third with the nature and origin of the passions; in the fourth with human bondage, as well as the rule and norm for living, and what is good and evil for men; and in the fifth, finally, with the power of the intellect or human liberty, along with the eternity of the mind.

What conclusions can we draw from this examination of the Latin and the Dutch versions of the part-title for the *Ethica*? The first conclusion is that the editors of the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften* did coordinate their activities, but they did not aim at perfect agreement, nor were the results of their editing checked against each other. The second conclusion is that the editor or editors who drew up the Latin part-title leaf took pains to turn it into a well-organized and consistent composition, and to ensure an exact correspondence with the captions as they appear over the parts in the text. The editor of the Dutch version, on the other hand, apparently paid little or no attention to either the organization of the wording, or the actual captions in the text. As regards the paraphrase of the contents in the prefaces to the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften*, Meyer's Latin version follows its Dutch original rather than the Latin part-title. There is one notable exception, namely the characteristic word order 'de *Origine & Naturâ Affectuum*' in the title of the third part, which deviates from the Dutch and follows the Latin part-title and caption instead. The wording in Jelles's Dutch preface, on the contrary, reflects that of the part-title in *De nagelate schriften*. The only point of divergence is that in the Dutch preface the fifth part is quoted with its double instead of its single title.

Why should the Dutch version of the title page deviate from both its Latin twin and from the captions as they occur in the main text of *De nagelate schriften*? It might conceivably be a matter of slapdash editing on the part of those who prepared the

1. NS, 182.
2. NS, 263.
3. NS, sig. *4^{r}.

Dutch copy for the press. The divergences could have arisen as a result of an independent interpretation of a general plan underlying both versions. But there is another possibility. On account of the double rendering of 'demonstrata' by 'geschikt en betoogt', I submit that the Dutch part-title is in fact a translation from a Latin original. Now it is hardly a plausible assumption that the original underlying the Dutch text would have been the Latin version found in the *Opera posthuma*: the divergences are too great to be explained as translator's licence. Thus, transferring the phrase 'ordine geometrico demonstrata' is quite unnecessary from the translator's point of view: the whole could have been accommodated in Dutch in exactly the same coordinate structure we see in Latin. A possible explanation for the idiosyncrasies of the part-title of the *Zedekunst* in *De nagelate schriften* is that at one stage a Latin original existed which served as the basis for the Dutch translation, but which differed from the one found in the *Opera posthuma*. If that is the case, one is of course tempted to speculate about the origins of this other Latin source. Was it drawn up by Spinoza, straightforwardly translated by Glazemaker for *De nagelate schriften* and heavily edited by Meyer for the *Opera posthuma*? Did Jelles have this lost Latin title page at hand when he quoted the titles of the parts in his preface, or is the agreement due to his consulting the copy or proofs of the Dutch book?[1] My hypothesis is that the version found in *De nagelate schriften* corresponds more closely to the philosopher's original wording than its intricate Latin counterpart. The following considerations may be adduced to support this.

Firstly, it can hardly be accidental that the titles of parts 1 and 2 mirror the second and third *Meditationes* of Descartes in a defiantly reversed order.[2] Spinoza emphasizes that the true 'ordo Philosophandi' should take God as its starting point.[3] For Spinoza, 'De Deo' must precede 'De mente humana', whereas Descartes had started with doubt and could only arrive at 'De Deo' after a meditation 'De natura mentis humanæ'. After the second part of the *Ethica*, of course, there is no more mirroring of the *Meditationes*: Cartesian doubt has no role to play in Spinoza's thought.[4]

Secondly, there is something awkward about the captions of *Ethica* parts 2 and 3 as they stand in the Latin version: 'De Naturâ & Origine MENTIS'/'De Origine & Naturâ AFFECTUUM'. Gueroult takes the inversion as a device intentionally introduced by Spinoza:

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1. That Jelles consulted the proofs of *De nagelate schriften* is argued by Akkerman (1980, 210).
2. The captions of Descartes's *Meditationes* run as follows: 1. '*De iis quæ in dubium revocari possunt*' (AT 7, 16), 2. '*De natura mentis humanæ: quòd ipsa sit notior quàm corpus*' (23), 3. '*De Deo, quòd existat*' (34), 4. '*De vero & falso*' (52), 5. '*De essentiâ rerum materialium; & iterum de Deo, quòd existat*' (63), 6. '*De rerum materialium existentiâ, & reali mentis a corpore distinctione*' (71).
3. E 2p10s2 (G 2, 93.29–36).
4. See Mason 1993 for a well-balanced account of Spinoza's way with Cartesian doubt.

> En inversant l'ordre des termes, le mot *origine* précédant ici le mot *nature*, Spinoza veut mettre l'accent sur l'aspect génétique d'une investigation qui n'est point ici simplement descriptive, comme le plus souvent elle l'était jusqu'alors chez la plupart des auteurs.[1]

The argument is resourceful, but not very convincing when related to the actual contents of the second and third parts. The third part deals first with the nature of the passions, and subsequently with the way they come about. The expression also occurs in precisely this order in the text: 'affectuum naturam, & originem'.[2] From a strictly formal point of view, one might admittedly still defend the order 'origo–natura' as found in the *Opera posthuma*, since the *Affectuum definitiones* that conclude this part can be regarded as an exposition of the nature of the passions (*definitio*, *natura* and *essentia* being equivalent terms).[3] But the argument will not do for the second part. Though Spinoza incidentally speaks of 'Mentis origo',[4] it would be difficult to maintain that part 2 deals with the origin of the mind, in a way that is comparable with the explanation of the origin of the passions in part 3.[5]

Thirdly, the titles of parts 2 and 5 in *De nagelate schriften* seem to be more germane to Spinoza's style and idiom than their Latin counterparts. The locution 'mens humana' – to be found in the Dutch title as 'menschelijke ziel', whereas 'humana' is curiously absent from the Latin title – abounds in the text of the second part.[6] It has the added advantage of introducing a direct reference to the second *Meditatio*. The combination 'potentia intellectus', on the other hand, occurs exclusively in the Latin title of the fifth part. There is no instance of it anywhere in the text of the *Ethica*.[7] Spinoza's favourite expression seems to be 'potentia Mentis', but there are also some occurrences of 'potentia rationis' and 'potentia animi'.[8]

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1. Gueroult 1977, 290.
2. E 3p56s (G 2, 186.9); the point was made by Akkerman 1980, 69.
3. 'Deus [...] est substantia [...], ad cujus naturam pertinet existere, sive (quod idem est) ex cujus definitione sequitur ipsum existere' (E 1p19d; G 2, 64.11–4); 'essentia, seu definitio' (E 1p33s1; G 2, 74.9); 'Dei naturam, sive essentiam' (E 1p36d; G 2, 77.15).
4. E 3p57s (G 2, 187.8).
5. The point can be illustrated by referring to the frequency, distribution and context of the forms of the verb *oriri* in parts 3 and 4 (see Gueret, Robinet & Tombeur 1977, 242–4).
6. See the selection of occurrences listed in Giancotti Boscherini 1970, 679–82.
7. It does occur four times, though, in the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*: G 2, 27.2,8; 38.15,21.
8. Occurrences of 'potentia Mentis': G 2, 138.24; 149.20–1; 150.15–6, 28–9; 182.8; 186.1, 5; 144.14; 203.1; 204.24; 280.14–5, 21–2; 284.2; 285.2; 286.25–6; 287.13; 293.6, 17–8, 25; 296.30; 308.14. Cf. also 'in Mentis potestate' 142.23–4; 144.13–4. There are three instances of 'rationis potentia' (221.25; 277.6, 16–7), and three of 'animi potentia' (185.32; 201.9–10; 269.22). It is most instructive to see how Spinoza designates the theme of part 5 in the text: 'de Rationis in affectûs potentiâ separatim agere constitui' (221.25); '*In hâc* [sc. parte] *ergo de potentiâ rationis agam*' (277.6); '*Hîc igitur, ut dixi, de solâ Mentis, seu rationis potentiâ agam*' (277.16-7); 'His omnia, quæ de Mentis in affectûs potentiâ, quæque de Mentis Libertate ostendere volueram, absolvi' (308.14).

In fine, I think there are good reasons to believe that the Dutch part-title of the *Zedekunst* in *De nagelate schriften* reflects Spinoza's original wording, whereas the Latin one in the *Opera posthuma* is a rhetorical embellishment, to be attributed to the editors rather than to the author. It seems to have undergone much more sophisticated editing and systematization. As regards the other part-title leaves in the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften*, those of the *Tractatus politicus* and the letters are virtually the same in both versions; that of the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* shows variation in the subtitle. In Latin, it runs 'Et de viâ, quâ optimè in veram rerum Cognitionem dirigitur'[1] ('and on the way by which it is best directed to the true knowledge of things'),[2] as against 'En te gelijk van de Middel om het zelfde volmaakt te maken'[3] ('and at the same time about the means to bring it to perfection'). The difference here is not exactly a matter of more or less systematic arrangement, as in the *Ethica*, but once again the Latin title conveys an air of studied elegance. In comparison, the Dutch title seems more authentic.[4]

1.4.6 *Back to Lodewijk Meyer*

In the two excursus that went before, I have drawn attention to instances of editorial interference in Spinoza's manuscript of the *Ethica*. In both cases – the smoothing of the trimmings that accompany the geometrical order, and the title of the work itself and its parts – these modifications testify to a systematic disposition. Among those involved in the editing, only Meyer can be shown to have had such a disposition in his other works: the preface to Spinoza's *Renati des Cartes Principia philosophiæ* (see § 5.8), his work as a lexicographer, and his modest but typical contribution to the theory of the passions (see chapter 3). Moreover, the display of elegance, to be noticed in the Latin part-title of the *Ethica*, is characteristic of Meyer, too, as his *Interpres* shows.

1.5 Pieter van Gent

When Pieter van Gent matriculated as a student of medicine in Leiden on 9 October 1668, he was registered as 28 years of age and a native of Nijmegen.[5] Van Gent signed his letters to Huygens as 'M.D.', but it is not known whether, and if so where and when, he got his doctorate. He presumably never practised, but tried to make a living

1. OP, sig. 2Y2^{r}.
2. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 233.
3. NS, sig. 3E3^{r}.
4. That the Dutch subtitle is more authentic has been advanced by Akkerman (1987, 28–9).
5. *Album studiosorum Academiae Lugduno Batavae* 1875, 550. There is no record of his birth or baptism in the municipal archives of Nijmegen. A Peter van Gent was baptized on 10 January 1666, son of Peter van Gent and Anna Mauris (communication of the municipal archives Nijmegen, 6.7.1994); the father may have been our Pieter.

by tutoring instead.[1] Van Gent was close friends with Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, Georg Hermann Schuller, Jarig Jelles, Jan Rieuwertsz and Ameldonk Blok.[2] From Schuller's letter to Spinoza of 25 July 1675 it appears that Van Gent was also personally acquainted with Spinoza: 'D. a. Gent officiosè salutat una cum J.

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1. Reinhardt 1911, 19: 'discipuli 3, quos habeo, meditationes profundas impediunt', and p. 20: 'Tantum tres mihi sunt discipuli, unde familiam alere nullatenus possum.' Winter pictures Van Gent as 'ein lustiger Bruder, der von Gelegenheitsarbeiten in den Tag hinein lebte, hochbegabt, aber unzuverlässig; obwohl er Arzt war, lebte er davon, reicher Leute Kinder zu unterrichten, und von wissenschaftlichen Aufträgen, die ihm *Tschirnhaus* immer wieder zukommen ließ und die er mit Eifer, aber nicht immer im Sinne seines Auftraggebers erledigte. *Pieter van Gent* war mit allen geistig Regsamen im Lande bekannt' (Winter 1960, 6–7). That Van Gent was an irresponsible reveller or that he was in touch with the cream of Dutch intellectual life, can in no way be inferred from his letters; yet these constitute the only source on which Winter drew for his characterization.

2. The lifelong (if not uncomplicated) friendship with Tschirnhaus is attested by their correspondence. It is unknown when and where they got acquainted. They may have met when they were both students in Leiden. Tschirnhaus arrived there in the same year as Van Gent: the winter of 1668, according to Winter (1960, 6) and Wurtz (Tschirnhaus 1980, 8). Tschirnhaus matriculated as a student of law on 8 June 1669 (*Album studiosorum* 1875, 555). Tschirnaus was more than a friend to Van Gent: he also was his patron to the extent that he paid him for his services as a correspondent, editor and translator. This is shown, for instance, in the following remark by Van Gent: 'Miror praeterea D. Blok, quod mihi adversus est in tuo Tract. in Belgicum vertendo. Ipse certe meliorem non faceret versionem, quam Ego, et novit N.V. mihi nummis opus esse' (Reinhardt 1911, 29). Elsewhere we read 'à me flagitasti ut singulis mensibus literas ad te dem' (21). Cf. Tschirnhaus's Letter 2324 to Huygens (Huygens, OC 8, 468), quoted below (in note 1 on pp. 42–3). See on this point also Vermij 1988, 173. In his letters to Tschirnhaus, Van Gent frequently reminds his friend of his destitute financial position.

Schuller matriculated as a student of medicine in Leiden on 5 May 1671. Until their embroilment in 1679 (see § 1.6), Van Gent and Schuller were close friends.

The intimate contacts with Jelles, Rieuwertsz and Blok are apparent from the letters to Tschirnhaus (see Reinhardt 1911, pp. 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 21, 27 for Jelles; pp. 7, 16, 23 for Rieuwertsz; pp. 9, 14, 18 for Blok). Jelles and Rieuwertsz are discussed elsewhere in this chapter, but a few words about Blok may be in order here. Ameldonk Blok or Block (1651/52–1702) was a silk dealer, who joined the literary society *Nil volentibus arduum* when it was re-established in 1682, after the deaths of Bouwmeester and Meyer. (Dongelmans 1982, 9–10, 227). In 1687, it was Blok who translated into Dutch Tschirnhaus's *Medicina mentis* and *Medicina corporis* (to the great annoyance of Van Gent: see the quotation just cited). Blok also translated other works. In 1682 he had rendered *Telluris theoria sacra* of Thomas Burnet, but the translation remained unpublished (Vermij 1988, 173–4). His Dutch version of Nicolaas Hartsoeker's *Essai de dioptrique* was published in 1699 (Thijssen-Schoute 1989 [1954], 207, n. 2; Vermij 1988, 175). Eventually, Van Gent fell out with Blok, too. In his last letter to Tschirnhaus, Van Gent writes: 'Ex D. Makreel audivi D. Blok apud te hactenus agere, nescius interim quamdiu mansurus sit. Quare obnixe rogo teque obtestor, ne hae literae illi vel ostendantur, vel aliquo modo indicetur, quod hanc epistolam à me accepisti. [...] optarem ut D. Blok ante ad suos lares rediret quam ego ad te irem vel ad te scriberem. Vereor enim ne literas intercipiat' (Reinhardt 1911, 32). It would seem that Van Gent was not exactly an easy man to get along with.

Riew.'[1] Pieter van Gent probably never published something of his own. In 1681, he is preparing an edition or translation of Euclid, with commentary, but the book apparently never came out.[2] He had a wife and several children to support, and seems to have suffered chronic financial problems.[3] It was perhaps for that reason too, that we find him at a number of different addresses. His last letter to Tschirnhaus, written on 5 August 1690 from the traditional place of refuge Vianen, is downright dramatic. Apparently, their correspondence had been broken off for a time, and Van Gent addressed himself to his old friend with an urgent plea for money and support. Why Van Gent had fled to Vianen, whether for political or religious reasons, or in order to escape his creditors, is unknown. He seems to have died in 1693 or 1694.[4]

On 23 March 1679, Pieter van Gent wrote a plaintive letter to Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, bemoaning the treacherous conduct and character of his former friend and lodger Georg Hermann Schuller.[5] Van Gent fears that Tschirnhaus attaches credence to Schuller's slanderous reports about him:

> Quoniam vero me non latet nebulonem illum, Schullerum indigito, totum in eo fuisse, quo in me tuum odium excitaret, has ad te dare jam diu stetit, quae me defendent, breves tamen, ne forte tuas occupationes ac studia nimium interpellem. Ego tanta in illum contuli beneficia, invitando ad mensam, Spinosae opera maximam partem describendo et commendando apud amicos nostros, ut videre nequeam, quaenam illum impulerit malitia, ut me apud te tanquam ebriosum traduxerit.[6]
>
> But since I know very well that this good-for-nothing, I mean Schuller, has been trying to arouse your hatred towards me, I had already decided to write you this letter long ago, in order to defend myself; I shall be brief, so as not to disturb you too much in your activities and studies. I conferred so many benefactions upon him, by inviting him to my

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1. Ep 63 (G 4, 276).
2. Reinhardt 1911, 9: 'Doleo interim quod tempus tibi surripiatur conficiendi appendicem quandam post Euclides (!), quod sub manus habeo. Animus certe etiam est excerpere ex Geom. Univers. D. Gr. Scoti propositiones illustriores loco tuae appendicis, et forte etiam ex aliis; sed curabo etiam, ne liber in magnam nimis molem excrescat.' (The parenthetical exclamation mark was inserted by Reinhardt. The reference is to James Gregory's *Geometriae pars universalis* of 1668.)
3. I have found little information on Van Gent and his family in the Municipal Archives in Amsterdam. An anonymous child of his is buried on 17 July 1686 (Funeral register St Anthoniekerkhof, no. 1213, p. 116). His address is given as 'achter de hal Inde witte poort'; that he lived there in that period is confirmed by his letters to Huygens (nos. 2443 and 2448; Huygens, OC 9, 107, 116).
4. Kleerkooper & Van Stockum (1916, 162) record an auction of the library of the late Pieter van Gent, MD, on 18 May 1694. Vermij (1991a, 158) concludes from this that Van Gent died 'probablement vers 1695.'
5. Schuller lived in Van Gent's house in 1677; see Schuller to Leibniz, 29.3.1677: 'D^{us} Jellisius et Hospes meus Dominus de Gent summopere Te resalutant' (AA 3:3, 55.17–8), and cf. Van Gent to Tschirnhaus, 23.3.1679: 'Quamdiu apud nos habitavit, tantum Libertatis habuit, ut ipse majori uti non possim' (Reinhardt 1911, 6).
6. Reinhardt 1911, 4 (emphasis supplied).

table, copying out Spinoza's works for the most part and depositing them with our friends, that I cannot understand what malice led him to deride me as a drunkard before you.

Why Van Gent fell out with Schuller is a curious story and one that need not concern us here; it will be touched upon briefly in the next section, when dealing with Schuller's role. The most revealing statement in the letter is Van Gent's casual remark that Schuller made him *copy Spinoza's works* for the most part. To what end? Reinhardt takes this as evidence that Van Gent was involved in editing the *Opera posthuma*.[1] The letter, however, in no way warrants this conclusion. The wording in fact suggests that the circumstances of Van Gent's scribal activities were rather different. He copied out a major portion of Spinoza's works for Schuller – not for the publisher, Rieuwertsz. Moreover, the resulting copies were not forwarded to the publisher or printer, but deposited with friends. Spinoza's writings circulated in manuscript copies during the philosopher's lifetime, and since we know that Schuller was actively involved in supplying apographs to those who were interested, Van Gent may well have acted as a scribe in that context.[2] I think, however, that Van Gent's statement can be explained

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1. Reinhardt 1903, 14: 'Am wichtigsten scheinen mir die Briefen des *Pieter van Gent*, eines Studiengenosse von *Tschirnhaus* in *Leiden*, zu sein. *Petrus a Gent* siedelte später nach Amsterdam über und gehörte zu dem Freundeskreise um *Spinoza*, dessen Manuskripte er für die Veröffentlichung der *Opera posthuma* abschrieb.' Similarly Reinhardt 1911, 4, n. 5. Vermij adopted this conclusion: 'terwille van een eindoordeel over Van Gent moet wel worden opgemerkt dat hij één van de personen was die in 1677 verantwoordelijk waren voor de uitgave van Spinoza's nagelaten schriften' (Vermij 1988, 174–5); 'Van Gent avait déjà pris part à l'édition des œuvres de Spinoza en 1677' (Vermij 1991a, 160–1).

2. On manuscript circulation of Spinoza's letters, see Tschirnhaus to Spinoza, 2.5.1676 (Ep 80: G 4, 331.9–10) and Akkerman 1980, 42–3. Portions of the *Ethica* circulated in manuscript among Spinoza's friends from the very beginning, as can be seen from a number of letters, e.g. De Vries to Spinoza, 24.2.1663 (Ep 8: G 4, 39.11ff), Spinoza to Schuller, 18.11.1675 (Ep 72: G 4, 305.10: 'in ipsius exemplari'). Jelles explicitly draws attention to this in his 'Voorreeden' to *De nagelate schriften* (quoted from the edition in Akkerman 1980, 252): 'De Lezer gelief daar beneffens aan te merken, dat het hem niet vreemt moet voorkomen, dat in verscheide Brieven de Zedekunst, die door de druk noch niet gemeen was gemaakt, zo wel van de Schrijver, als van d'Antwoorder, aangetrokken, en ook aangewezen word; dewijl de zelfde alrêe over veel jaren van verscheide lieden uitgeschreven, en gemeen geweest is.' From other passages in the 'Voorreeden' it is manifest that apographs of other works, too, had been given to several people. Schuller's involvement in distributing apographs can be inferred from his entreaty to Spinoza to let Leibniz in on his writings (Ep 70: G 4, 303.7–8), and from a remark Tschirnhaus makes in his letter to Leibniz, 10.4.1678 (AA 3:2, 381.22–4): 'nec ad eas [= definitiones] formandas praestantiora praecepta unquam Vidi quam quae habet Dn. Spinoza de Emendatione intellectus; quod manuscriptum a Dn. Schüllero Mihi transmissum penes Me habeo, utinam omnia reliqua ejus opera'. Tschirnhaus writes this more than three months after the publication of Spinoza's posthumous works – still on his cavalier tour through Europe, he was months behind and had not yet received a copy of the *Opera posthuma* (so we can infer from 'utinam... opera'). The letter to Leibniz was sent from Rome, and it answers two letters from Leibniz, one dating from January/February 1678, the other from February/March (nos. 137 and 143 in AA 3:2). Tschirnhaus got the TIE manuscript from Schuller, who had got hold of the autograph after

in even more precise terms. As we shall see in the section on Schuller, the latter claimed that after Spinoza's death the greater part ('potior pars') of the manuscript fragments had devolved upon him, and that it was he who convinced the friends to publish everything, not just the *Ethica* (see below, p. 56). Since Van Gent says he copied the works 'maximam partem', he probably refers to the very same collection of manuscripts: roughly the contents of the *Opera posthuma*, minus the *Ethica* and the *Compendium grammatices linguæ Hebrææ*. If this assumption is correct, the conclusion to be drawn from Van Gent's letter is that initially he was involved not so much in editing the *Opera posthuma*, as in producing copies of the minor works in order to entrust these to the friends, on Schuller's initiative. This must have taken place immediately after the death of Spinoza, for only five weeks later Schuller informs Leibniz that he had brought the other friends round to publish the posthumous writings in their entirety. That Van Gent was indeed employed to copy out manuscripts from Spinoza's legacy can now be demonstrated on the basis of material evidence.

The largest single collection of manuscript letters, both autographs and copies, of Spinoza's correspondence is to be found in the municipal archives of Amsterdam, to which they were given on loan in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. They are the property of the orphanage of the Mennonite Collegiants, 'De Oranjeappel' (formerly in Amsterdam, now domiciled in Hilversum).[1] The collection comprises

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Spinoza's death. (I presume that Schuller sent him a transcript, not the genuine article.) Tschirnhaus's copy is now lost: the manuscript collections at Görlitz and Wrocław do not contain any Spinoza manuscripts (see the catalogue of Tschirnhausiana drawn up by Zaunick, in Tschirnhaus 1963, 316–7). The transcript may well have been one of those executed by Van Gent for Schuller: that would fit in with Van Gent's remark that his apographs were 'deposited with our friends'.

1. Inventarisnummer 169, nos. 453–9. The information on the date of the loan is to be found in the 'Inventarissen der archieven', no. 169, p. 23. The collection was inventoried by J.G. de Hoop Scheffer 1883, vol. 1, 456–6. For the sake of convenience, I here give the various numberings of the letters under consideration:

Ep	*OP/NS*	*Inv.169*	*De Hoop Scheffer*	*Ep*	*OP/NS*	*Inv.169*	*De Hoop Scheffer*
8	XXVI	455	2322a	37	XLII	453	2320
9	XXVII	454	2321	43	XLIX	454	2321
20	XXXIII	456	2322b	45	LI	458	2322g
22	XXXV	456	2322c	63	LXV	459	2322i
24	XXXVII	456	2322d	70	—	459	2322h
28	—	454	2321	79	—	457	2322e
29	—	457	2322f				

The material of this collection was first published and commented upon by Van Vloten 1862, 287–360. He was aware that the Van Gent mentioned in Ep 63 was to be identified as the amanuensis who took care of Tschirnhaus's correspondence with Huygens, too (pp. 314, n. 1, 333, n. 1). In the same *Supplementum*, Van Vloten also edited four letters of the Tschirnhaus–Huygens correspondence, from the Hugenius manuscript collection in Leiden University Library (Van Vloten 1862, 318–57; these are the letters now classified as nos. 2276, 2324, 2452, 2457),

thirteen letters.[1] Among these, we find autograph drafts of three letters written by Spinoza: Letter 9 to Simon de Vries, Letter 28 to Johannes Bouwmeester, and Letter 43 to Jacob Ostens. In addition, there is an apograph of Letter 37: the copy of a draft of a letter from Spinoza to Bouwmeester. The other manuscripts are from correspondents to Spinoza. Eight of them are autographs: Letter 8 from De Vries, Letters 20, 22, 24 from Willem van Blijenbergh, Letter 29 from Oldenburg,[2] Letter 45 from Leibniz, and Letters 63 and 70 from Schuller. The remaining Letter 79 is a copy of Oldenburg's last letter to Spinoza (of 11 February 1676), written by the same hand as the copy of Spinoza's Letter 37. A fourteenth letter that once was part of the collection was a transcript of Letter 53, from Hugo Boxel to Spinoza. It accidentally remained in the archives of the orphanage when the rest was given on loan, and it vanished when the orphanage was hit by a bomb on 29 December 1944.[3] Before that, Gebhardt had published it in his edition of Spinoza's works. According to him, it was copied by the same editorial hand that wrote 'Is van geener waarde' on the verso of Letter 28.[4]

Now there are a number of indications which establish beyond doubt that these thirteen letters constitute the meagre remnants of the manuscript material used by the editors of the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften*. The Blijenbergh autographs have served as printers' copy: they are provided with captions and instructions for the compositor, and they show red marks indicating the endings of type-pages, and inky smudges. Not all of the letters in the collection were regarded as fit for publication: four of them – the Letters 28, 29, 70 and 79 – were rejected. On the verso of Letter 28, an editor wrote: 'Is van geener waarde' ('Has no value'). There are some other signs of editorial interventions or notes: Schuller's signature under Letter 70 has been rendered illegible, and someone wrote 'Oldenburg' on the verso of Letter 29, several letters have been given a number.

Why precisely this bunch of manuscripts survived and how they got into the archives of the orphanage is a puzzle.[5] They belong to a special collection in the

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followed by a commentary of Tschirnhaus's debt to Spinoza. He did not notice, however, that one of these letters (no. 2324) was written by the same hand as that of the scribe of two of the Oranjeappel letters: Van Gent.

1. Ep 8, 9, 20, 22, 24, 28, 29, 37, 43, 45, 63, 70 and 79.

2. Akkerman (1980, 56) by oversight classifies this letter among the 'copies anciennes'. In his commentary to the Dutch translation of Spinoza's correspondence, the letter is rightly described as original (Spinoza 1977, 524).

3. See Spinoza 1977, 529–30. For the bombing see Balk 1975, 133–5. The letter was inventoried around 1875: see Municipal Archives Amsterdam, Inventarisnummer 169, item 407, fol. 19^{r}, entry 161: 'Stukken betreffende brieven van Spinoza (in bruikleen gegeven aan het archief der doopsg. Gem.) Copy van een brief van Boxel aan Spinoza.'

4. G 4, 418 (*Textgestaltung*). The scribe of the words on Ep 28 has not been identified. It is a Dutch, gothic hand. I have seen no specimen of Van Gent's Dutch handwriting.

5. The entry in the inventory cited in note 3, above, makes mention of documents relating to Spinoza's letters. These documents perhaps contained a clue, but they were lost in December 1944 as well.

archives of the orphanage: the Collegiant archives.[1] After the dissolution of that movement its belongings were administered by foundations which were closely associated with it, like the Oranjeappel.[2] Spinoza did have friends among the Collegiants, for example Jacob Ostens,[3] so the link is not all that surprising. It may be significant that eleven of the thirteen letters in it are autographs. Only the original Blijenbergh letters served as printer's copy, for *De nagelate schriften*. To the extent that the others were published in the posthumous works, the compositor must have received fair copies. This may explain the survival of the original texts: as a rule, manuscripts were thrown away after having been printed. The two apographs are interesting exceptions. Letter 37 was eventually published from the autograph letter Bouwmeester had received, rather than from this copy of the draft. (This indicates that Bouwmeester contributed material for the preparation of the *Opera posthuma*.) Letter 79 has a most intriguing history. The editors published the whole of the correspondence under the programmatic title 'Epistolæ doctorum quorundam virorum ad B.d.S. et auctoris responsiones; ad aliorum ejus Operum elucidationem non parùm facientes', that is: 'Letters from certain learned men to B.d.S. along with the author's replies, which contribute highly to an elucidation of his other works'. They did not aim at being exhaustive: the core of the collection is Spinoza's part of the correspondence, in so far as it could serve as a foil to his philosophy. Seen from that angle, his Letter 28 to Bouwmeester, now regarded as important, had no value and was not included. As a matter of principle, letters written by Spinoza's correspondents were included only if they had elicited a reply from the philosopher. Consequently Oldenburg's last letter, to which no reply existed, ought to be excluded. This was something that must have escaped the attention of the editors of the *Opera posthuma* at first, for the Latin letter survives in a copy that shows it was meant to be published. There are no indications that it ever reached the compositor. Those who prepared the Dutch copy for *De nagelate schriften*, however, only found out when the Dutch version of the letter was already printed. Since the letter began on the last leaf of a sheet (NS sig. 3S4), they got rid of it by cancelling that leaf. The following gathering was then composed anew, to erase all traces of the cutting. There are some copies in which the cancellandum has not been cut out: there is one in the library of the Vereniging 'Het Spinozahuis' in Rijnsburg, and in 1988 I saw a copy in the antiquarian bookshop 'Spinoza' in Amsterdam.[4] I have included a photograph of the page at issue (illustration 1, p. 42); the cancellation mark (a snip in the page) is clearly visible.

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1. Verkuijl-van den Berg 1975, 186–9.
2. Meihuizen 1975, 103–5. The Collegiant belongings gradually devolved upon the Oranjeappel and (to a lesser extent) the Rozenhofje. The whole process lasted from 1718 till 1832.
3. See Van Bunge 1990, 33–46, for Ostens and his polemics with Van Blijenbergh.
4. Described in the bookshop's Special List 59, of 1988 (item 25:2). Monnikhoff had also seen an uncancelled copy, for he transcribed the extra text into his own NS copy. This emerges from the description of Monnifhoff's copy by Mark 1975b (where the source is not identified yet).

alle de krachten van 't vernuft inſpannen. Voorts, de hiſtorie van Chriſtus lijden, doot, begraffenis en verrijzenis ſchijnt met zo levendige en naturelijke verwen afgeſchildert, dat ik my op uw geweten zelf zou darren beroepen; of gy gelooft dat de zelfde eerder [m] byſpreukelijk, dan [n] letterlijk genomen moet worden, zo gy flechs van de waarheit der Hiſtorie overreed waart. [o] D' omſtandigheden, die van d' Euangeliſten van die zaak zo klarelijk beſchreven zijn, ſchijnen grondelijk te parſſen, dat deze Hiſtorie naar de letter genomen moet worden. Ik heb dienſtig geacht deze dingen met weinig woorden op deze zaak aan te merken; en ik verzoek ernſtiglijk dat gy dit verſchoont, en, volgens uw oprechtigheit, daar op vriendelijk antwoord.

m Alleguerich. n Litteraliter. o Circumſtantiæ.

Londen 14 Januar. 1676.

VYFENTWINTIGSTE BRIEF.

H. OLDENBURG. *aan* B. D. S.

MYN HEER,

IN uw leſte brief, op de zevende van Februarius aan my geſchreven, zijn enige dingen, die enige beriſping waerdig ſchijnen. Gy zegt dat de menſch niet kan klagen, dat God de ware kennis van hem, en genoechſame krachten om de zonden te mijden aan hem geweigert heeft; dewijl aan de natuur van yder ding niet anders behoort, dan dat nootzakelijk uit des zelfs oorzaak volgt. Maar ik zeg, dat, dewijl God, de Schepper der menſchen, hen naar zijn beelt, 't welk de wijsheit, goetheit en macht in zijn bevatting ſchijnt in te ſluiten, gevormt heeft, gantſchelijk ſchijnt te volgen, dat het meer in de macht van de menſch is een gezonde ziel, dan een gezond lighaam te hebben; dewijl de naturelijke gezontheit des lighaams van [a] werkdadige beginſelen, maar de gezontheit der ziel van verkiezing en raat af hangt. Gy voegt 'er by dat de menſchen verſchonelijk konnen zijn, en echter op veel wijzen konnen lijden. Dit ſchijnt in d' eerſte aanſchouwing hard, gelijk ook het geen, 't welk gy 'er tot bewijs aanknoopt; dat een hont, door de beet van een ander hont dul geworden, wel te veröntſchuldigen is, maar dat hy echter met recht gedoot word. Deze zaak ſchijnt hier neê niet afgedaan te worden, dewijl

a Principia mechanica.

Illustration 1. Part of Ep 79, Oldenburg to Spinoza, 11 February 1676. Dutch translation as printed in *De nagelate schriften*, sig. 3S4^{v} (= cancellandum), uncancelled copy. Het Spinozahuis, Rijnsburg. (Reproduced by permission of the Vereniging Het Spinozahuis.)

After this survey of the manuscript collection of 'De Oranjeappel', let us return to Van Gent. The apographs, Letters 37 and 79, are in his handwriting. This can be seen from a comparison with his autograph letters to Christiaan Huygens, kept in the Leiden University Library.[1] (See the illustrations 2 and 3, pp. 44–5.) The general

1. Ms. Hugenius 45. Van Gent acted as intermediary between Tschirnhaus and Huygens. The Tschirnhaus–Van Gent–Huygens correspondence comprises 29 items in all (including a letter from Tschirnhaus to Makreel), covering the period from August 1682 (no. 2274) to September 1687 (no. 2485). They have been published in vols 8–9 of Huygens's *Œuvres complètes*. The following items in the Huygens correspondence are in Van Gent's handwriting: nos. 2285, 2290,

appearance of the handwriting is very similar, although the Spinoza copies are more carefully written than the items in the Huygens correspondence – to which Van Gent often apologetically added 'Raptim' ('In haste'). A close analysis of the individual letter forms shows that the hands are indeed the same.[1] That the transcripts were produced in view of preparing an edition of Spinoza's works and not for other purposes, is evident from the caption above Letter 79. There Van Gent has written 'Epla 26' (with a contraction stroke).[2] The '6' has been written on top of another number, probably a '5'. This fits in with the numbering in *De nagelate schriften*, where the letter was originally counted as the twenty-fifth. When it was cut out, Spinoza's last letter to Oldenburg (now Letter 78) received that number. This indicates that the editors had some problems in putting the letters in the correct order. From the autograph drafts of Spinoza's letters that are still extant, we can infer that he did not usually put the date and the name of the addressee in them. The editors had to reconstruct this information in order to arrange the letters properly. Van Gent made a note on his transcript of Letter 37 and deleted it afterwards. It is only partly legible, but I conjecture that it should read 'forte D. D^{r} B.' ('perhaps to Dr B[ouwmeester]?'). If that is correct, this shows that when Van Gent began copying the manuscripts, not all the

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2304, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2333, 2443, 2444, 2448, 2453, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2471, 2475, 2485. Most of these are Van Gent's own letters, but some are copies of letters or texts by Tschirnhaus. The letters sometimes contain remarks bearing upon Van Gent's role as (salaried) intermediary. Thus, in Letter 2324, Tschirnhaus tells Huygens: 'vellem quoque correspondere cum extraneis in variis Regionibus: uti Amstelodami habeo D. van Gent, virum talem, quales optarem ut similes corresponsores alijs in locis mihi acquirere possem; id quod soluta aliqua pecunia facile obtinetur, ut hic subito resciamus quid in alijs locis peragatur, et novi ab eruditis inveniatur.' (Huygens, OC 8, 468). These flattering words were conveyed through the good offices of Van Gent himself, who had copied the letter; in an accompanying letter of his own, we read: 'Petijt [Tschirnhaus] à me, ut tibi has literas (negabat enim Cl. virum suam scripturam adeo expedite posse legere) describerem' (p. 459).

1. Characteristic minuscule forms in both the Spinoza copies and the Huygens items (indicated as Sp and Hg respectively) are those of *d* (retroflex, 'uncial' form), *h* (with descender), initial *p*, and the variant shapes of the stroke over the letter *u* (often shifted to the right), as well as the abbreviation for *-que*. Van Gent employs different varieties of the letters *e*, *f*, *r*, *s*, and *t*. These varieties occur in the Sp as well as in Hg, but with some differences in the distribution of the variant forms of *e* (common italic loop and 'gothic' double stroke, in several variants) and in long and short *s* (especially in the sequences *st*, *ss* and terminally). For the most part, though, Van Gent's minuscules are too common to be decisive. The majuscules are more characteristic for his hand. The 17 capitals that occur in Sp as well as in Hg (that is, all capitals except *G, J, K, O, U, W, X, Y* and Z), are the same in both. Some have variant forms: an enlarged minuscule alongside a specific capital (*A* and *M*). These doublets are found in Sp and Hg. The most distinctive majuscules in Van Gent's hand are *B, D, E, H, I, L, N, P, Q, R* and *T*. They can be found in Sp as well as in Hg. Though they are executed in varying degrees of carefulness, the ductus is everywhere identical.

2. Another indication that the Oldenburg letter was copied as part of a series of manuscripts is that the leaf is numbered '115' in the upper right corner.

correspondents were identified. The paper on which the apographs of Letters 37 and 79 have been copied is the same; its watermark is the arms of the Seven Provinces: a lion with sword and seven darts in a crowned shield. Although Letter 37 bears no further traces of being destined for publication (no numbers), it certainly was copied in the same period and, I submit, in the same context as Letter 79.



Illustration 2. Ep 79, Oldenburg to Spinoza, 11 February 1676. Transcript in Pieter van Gent's handwriting. Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, archives of 'De Oranjeappel', Inv. 169, no. 457(1), fol. 1r. (Reproduced by permission of the Gemeentearchief Amsterdam.)

What exactly was this context? It is tempting to assume that the transcripts made by Van Gent were meant to serve as fair copy for the compositor of the *Opera posthuma*. There is, however, no conclusive proof for this. It is certain that he copied out a considerable part of the posthumous papers, at Schuller's request. The apographs were distributed among other friends, and they soon agreed that all the works Spinoza had left behind were to be published. In preparing the copy for the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften*, the editors did make use of the transcripts Van Gent had supplied. This is to be concluded from the presence of two of these in the collection of letters that had been in the editors' hands. Whether Van Gent himself was among those who prepared Spinoza's manuscripts for the press is a question that awaits further research. I think it likely that he was, for two reasons.



Illustration 3. Letter 2285 of the Huygens correspondence, Van Gent to Chr. Huygens, 18 December 1682. Autograph. Leiden University Library, Ms. Hugenius 45, fol. 1r. (Reproduced by permission of Leiden University Library.)

The first is his copy of Letter 79. It is labelled 'Epla 26' in his handwriting. The number is, as I have argued, related to the arrangement of the letters in the two editions, *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften*. There are three possible explanations for this: (i) Van Gent copied out the letter as part of the task he carried out for Schuller, and gave it its number in that arrangement, which was later adopted by the editors. (ii) He added the classification afterwards, with a view to publication in the *Opera posthuma*. (iii) The transcript was made for the *Opera posthuma*. The first explanation is the least satisfactory, in my opinion. It assumes that Van Gent not only copied out and classified Spinoza's own writings for Schuller, but letters of his correspondents to boot. This makes sense only within the framework of a complete and neatly arranged collection of the correspondence as a whole. Now that was indeed what the editors of the *Opera posthuma* were after; it is unlikely that Schuller had already envisaged such a project in the five weeks following upon Spinoza's death. Moreover, the first explanation must also assume that Schuller's pristine arrangement was adopted by the editors, which in turn suggests that Schuller (and perhaps Van Gent, too) was involved in the editing. This may well be true, but then the initial activities of Schuller and Van Gent and the editorial preparations are no longer to be clearly distinguished. The second and third explanation are more acceptable: they mean that Van Gent not only worked as a scribe for Schuller, but for the *Opera posthuma*, too.

There is a subsidiary reason to believe that this was indeed the case. That Van Gent rather than Meyer or anyone else drew up the errata lists of the *Opera posthuma*, emerges, I think, from the peculiar captions: 'Sphalmata in Propositionibus Ethices emendanda' and 'Sphalmata corrigenda'.[1] The Greek word *sphalmata* is rare as a synonym for *errata*. The only other occurrence that I know of is in Tschirnhaus's *Medicina mentis*,[2] which Van Gent edited.

In fine, there are good reasons to suppose Van Gent was involved in preparing Spinoza's legacy for publication. He did not, I think, participate on the same level as Meyer and Jelles. The latter, whatever their other editorial activities, were responsible for the prefaces, thereby contributing to the general presentation of the posthumous works in a distinct and authoritative manner.

Further investigation is needed, for there are also arguments that plead against the hypothesis of Van Gent's editorial involvement. In the end, the two letters he had transcribed were not used for the edition. It is even doubtful whether his transcript of Letter 79, rather than the original, was the manuscript from which Glazemaker translated the letter into Dutch (see illustration 1, p. 42). There is a slip of the pen in

1. OP, sig. $^{2}P3^{v}$.
2. Printed after the *Medicina corporis*, on sig. $H2^{v}$.

the Latin transcript, 'inexcusabiles' for 'excusabiles', which has not influenced the translator.[1]

With these reservations in mind, I will now pursue the hypothesis that Van Gent was indeed among those who prepared the *Opera posthuma* for the press. Van Gent's letters to Tschirnhaus are revealing for the editorial history of the latter's *Medicina mentis* and *Medicina corporis*, and, what is more, for Van Gent in his capacity as editor and translator. For it was Van Gent who edited Tschirnhaus's rather poor Latin text of the *Medicina mentis*, translated the German original of the *Medicina corporis* into Latin, and prepared the copy of both works for the press. They were published together in Amsterdam in 1686 (the *Medicina mentis* postdated 1687) by Albertus Magnus and Jan Rieuwertsz Jr.[2] The letters to Tschirnhaus contain several remarks that illustrate Van Gent's view of his editorial tasks. On 16 October 1683, he writes:

> Latinitatem tuam hic illic in prima Logic. parte corrigam, salva tamen tua venia, et ex tua auctoritate. Quaeso si alicubi aberravero hoc in bonam interpreteris partem.
> [...] quoniam à me flagitas, ut primam partem Tractatus tui de sanitate conservanda in linguam Latinam transferam, et haec translatio longe difficilior evasura sit, utpote qui proprietates linguae Germanicae haud adeo calleam, peto humanissime, si quid in nostram vel latinam linguam aliquando verti cupias, ut latine ea exares.[3]
>
> Here and there I will correct the Latinity in the first part of your *Logic* [i.e. *Medicina mentis*] – with your permission and on your authority, that is. Please do not take it amiss if I go wrong somewhere. [...] Since you asked me to translate the first part of your treatise on the preservation of health [i.e. *Medicina corporis*] into Latin, and since this translation may well turn out to be rather more difficult than expected – as I am not all that well versed in the peculiarities of the German language – I ask you most kindly to write in Latin if you should want to have anything translated into our language or into Latin.

And on 25 November 1685:

> Misisti nuper 1. partem tuae Logicae, quam et legi et hic illic emendavi paucissimis, retentis tamen, quantum potuit, tuis verbis. Solum illud quod, Germanismum sapiens, per infinitiva correxi. Insuper in eo loco, quo de facillimis demonstrationibus in difficillimas mutandis loqueris addidi 'ope calculi et demonstrationum'. Hanc autem tuam esse sententiam praesens intellexi. Praeterea illud 'reflectere' et 'reflectar' emendavi. Eo enim sensu, quo D. ponit, non sunt Latina. Substitui ergo 'advertere, attendere' aut 'animadvertere'. Sed hoc melius ex impreso folio perspicies. Caeterum peterem, ut Amanuensis ille tuus tua ita describeret, ut nulla prorsus emendatione opus esset. Haec non mei sed tui causa scribo. Praevideo enim impossibile fore, ut tuus Tractatus in Nundinis paschalibus Francofurtensibus jam impressus sit. Tua certe spe frustraberis.[4]

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1. That it should be 'excusabiles' is obvious from the context, and from Spinoza's Letter 78 (G 4, 327.10). See Leopold 1902, 43, n.1 (but note that Leopold takes the manuscript to be an autograph of Oldenburg).
2. Wurtz in his ed. of Tschirnhaus 1980, 11–7; Wurtz 1988, 204–9; Vermij 1988, 170–2.
3. Reinhardt 1911, 21 and 22.
4. Reinhardt 1911, 29.

You just sent me the first part of your *Logic* [i.e. *Medicina mentis*], which I read and corrected in a very few points here and there, while retaining your words as far as possible. I only made infinitives of that 'quod', which has such a German ring. Besides I have added 'ope calculi et demonstrationum' in that place where you speak of turning easy demonstrations into more difficult ones. When we met, I understood that that was your intention. Moreover I corrected that 'reflectere' and 'reflectar', for it is no Latin in the sense in which you employ it. I therefore replaced it with 'advertere, attendere' or 'animadvertere'. But you will see this better in the printed sheet. For the rest, I beseech you to have that secretary of yours copy it out in such a way, that no further emendation is required. I write this not for my sake but for yours. For I expect that it will be impossible to have your treatise printed before the Frankfurt Easter fair. Your hopes will certainly be deceived.

And finally on 14 May 1686:

Mittimus tibi 4 impressa folia, nimirum O, P, Q, R et indicamus simul vestra nobis ritè suo tempore reddita esse, una cum querelis et mendis, sed mihi crede non sunt omnia illa quae Cl. Vir pro erratis habet errata. Latinitatem tuam, quae subinde press[iss]ima est, emendare nobis fuit animus, quare haud mirum, cum Cl. V. non adeò in Latinis sit versatus, ut ipse saepe fassus fuisti, te pro mendis habere, quae non tales sunt. Defendam ergo proximâ vice, quae ego commiserim [...]. Hoc tamen mihi mirum quod in ultimum petis, te velle ut nostra tibi emendatio transmittatur. Quorsum?
[...] rogo iterum obnixe ut posterior Tract. ita ab aliquo describatur, ut nulla opus sit descriptione, nam tua describere molestum est et typothetae scripturam tuam legere non possunt.[1]

We send you 4 printed sheets: O, P, Q and R, and affirm at the same time that your letter arrived in due time, with your complaints and corrections. You should believe me, though, when I say that not everything you regard as a mistake is a mistake. We have seen fit to improve your Latinity, which is sometimes very constricted. This is not to be wondered at, for your familiarity with Latin is such that you yourself have often confessed that you spot mistakes where there are none. So I will defend the mistakes I have committed in the next instalment [...]. But as for now, it surprises me that you ask towards the end that we should transmit our emendations to you. What for?
[...] I ask you once more emphatically to have the last part of your treatise copied out by someone so that no more copying is needed, for it is unpleasant to copy your work and the compositors cannot read your handwriting.

Tschirnhaus, though self-conscious about his Latinity,[2] eventually got annoyed by Van Gent's high-handed interferences and took action to curb him:

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1. Reinhardt 1911, 30 and 31. The reading 'pressima', as given by Reinhardt, is incorrect. Van Gent probably wrote 'press^{ma}', with abbreviated superlative ending. It is at any rate unlikely that he wrote 'pessima': that would have been quite insulting.
2. Tschirnhaus to Huygens, 11.9.1682 (Huygens, OC 8, 388): 'De reliquo latinitatem meam excuset; cum hoc rarum sit, inter nostrates in Nobili Viro, cum essem in Academijs ea utcunque tinctus eram, sed tot annorum itinera et negotia effecêre, ut jam non omnia tam congruenter hujus linguae genio exprimam.'

> Alß Ich Meine Medicinam Mentis stückweise nach holland schickte, gab Ich dabey nach meiner gewohnheit die freyheit, daß dafern etwa iemand Ihres orthes einiges darinnen *Quoad Stylum zuverbeßern wüste*, Mir solches nicht entgegen sein solte, wen nur ratione sensus seu Textus nichts geändert würde. Indem man es nun an ettlichen stellen zuverbeßern gedachte, *aber Meine meinung nicht recht assequirte* geschachs das hierüber gar der sensus geändert, und Ich hierdurch veranlaßet wurde zuerrinnern, das man meinen Text ungeändert laßen, oder sich wiedrigenfals, keines bogens mehr von Mir zuversehen habe solte.[1]

From these quotations we can see that Van Gent took a rather peremptory view of his editorial responsibility. There is, of course, a difference between his (hypothetical) involvement in the *Opera posthuma* and in Tschirnhaus's works. Tschirnhaus himself instructed him and they kept in touch as the work progressed; from the letters one can infer that Van Gent felt free to interfere with the texts he had at his disposal. For Spinoza's works, the margins were of course much narrower. The author himself was dead, and the generally respectful atmosphere of the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften* seems to indicate that the editors as a group were reluctant to tinker with the texts he had left behind. Besides, Spinoza's Latin – being far superior to Tschirnhaus's – required much less editing.

Of the manuscripts that were to be prepared for the printer, the letters obviously required most editing. They were written in different hands, in different languages (Latin and Dutch), and in very diverging styles. They were not fit for publication as the editors found them: they contained passages that were of personal interest only and information that might imperil or embarrass people. Akkerman summarized the editorial interventions in the letters thus:

> De Latijnse brieven maakten zij [viz. the editors] persklaar: (1) door een briefhoofd toe te voegen, waarin het nummer van de brief en de namen en titels van de schrijver en de ontvanger werden vermeld (vaak zijn de namen afgekort tot initialen of leest men alleen sterretjes; Spinoza's naam verschijnt altijd in de vorm B.D.S.); (2) door de aanhef te formaliseren, bijv. *amice* te vervangen door *doctissime vir* (br. 43); door de interpunctie te wijzigen en hoofdletters aan te brengen; (4) door de spelling te verbeteren en hier en daar de stijl enigszins bij te schaven; (5) door mededelingen van persoonlijke aard weg te laten, vooral aan het begin en aan het eind; (6) door soms namen van derden in de brief weg te laten en te vervangen door sterretjes of initialen.[2]

> They [the editors] prepared the Latin letters for the press: (1) by adding a head, in which the number of the letter and the names and titles of sender and recipient were mentioned (often the names are abbreviated to initials or replaced with asterisks; Spinoza's name always appears as B.D.S.); (2) by formalizing the greeting, e.g. changing *amice* to *doctissime vir* (Ep 43); (3) by changing the punctuation and introducing capitals; (4) by correcting the spelling and occasionally polishing the style; (5) by leaving out personal communications,

1. The quotation is from Tschirnhaus's *Anhang An Mein so genantes Eilfertiges bedencken* (Wurtz 1983, 196).
2. Akkerman's introduction to Spinoza 1977 (p. 11).

notably in the beginning and at the end; (6) by sometimes leaving out names of third parties in the letters, substituting initials or asterisks instead.

If Van Gent's transcripts of Letters 37 and 79 were made in order to serve as fair copy for the *Opera posthuma*, he contributed to the fair-copying and presumably also the editing of at least the correspondence. Since he wrote to Tschirnhaus that he had copied Spinoza's works 'for the most part', his proficiency in writing may also have been called upon to copy out those other works Spinoza had left unfinished, and which were in Schuller's possession: the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* and *Tractatus politicus*. Schuller does not mention the Hebrew grammar. Whether Van Gent could read and write Hebrew is an open question.[1]

How about the *Ethica*? From the wording 'Spinosae opera maximam partem describendo' we learn that he did not transcribe *all* the manuscripts. In view of the fact that Spinoza himself had already made preparations for publishing it, and that the manuscript was not in Schuller's possession, it is tempting to assume that Van Gent did not copy the *Ethica*. However this may be, the final copies of all the works must have undergone a similar stylistic treatment, judging by the homogeneous punctuation, spelling, accentuation and capitalization throughout the *Opera posthuma*. This can have been done by adding or correcting such accidentals in the various apographs and autographs.[2]

1.6 Georg Hermann Schuller

The physician and alchemist Georg Hermann Schuller is the most controversial figure in the group of Spinoza's friends and admirers. He was a correspondent of Spinoza and of Leibniz. Much in the letters to Leibniz is cryptic, secretive and contradictory. When he is mentioned in other people's correspondence, the tone is often downright hostile. Apart from his own epistolary legacy, and the references to him in other people's letters, Schuller left hardly a trace. He did not write any books, as far as we know, and he died young. It is therefore not to be wondered at that assessments of his role in the

1. Vermij (1988, 157) suggested that Van Gent perhaps was a theologian by training, for in one of his letters to Tschirnhaus he discusses the Syriac text of *Philippians* 3: 20. But the passage in fact refers to Tremellius's *Latin* translation of it: 'Confer etiam ad Philipp. 3: 20 ubi ait apostolus "nostrum opus esse in caelis". Syrus textus (quem ego pro authentico habeo) hoc verbo utitur, quod meditationem et occupationem operosam de rebus caelestibus indicat' (Reinhardt 1911, 25). Franciscus Junius edited the New Testament renderings by Theodorus Beza and Immanuel Tremellius, so popular among Protestants. The latter translates the verse at issue thus: 'Nostrum autem opus in cælis est', and Junius adds this gloss to 'opus': 'id est, conversationis & occupationis operosæ in cultu Dei & ministerio nostro, præmium, metonymicè' (*Testamentum novum* 1603, 346).

2. Traces of this can be seen in Van Gent's copy of Ep 79, where capitals have been written on top of initial minuscules: 'Mentem' (G 4, 329.21), 'Corporis' (l. 22), 'Mentis' (l. 23), 'Subjungis' (ibid.).

transmission of Spinoza's posthumous works are very divergent indeed. Initially I was inclined to deny him any contribution whatsoever in the editorial history of the *Opera posthuma*. His mediocre command of Latin makes him an unlikely editor, and his letters to Leibniz are so contradictory and conceited, that on the face of it none of his claims merit being taken seriously. It was only after I read Van Gent's testimony that Schuller had employed him to copy Spinoza's works, that a very different picture began to present itself. I shall now try to outline Schuller's contribution and to offer plausible solutions to some of the puzzles that beset the evidence.

Schuller was born in Wesel in 1651.[1] He matriculated in the University of Leiden on 5 May 1671 as a student of medicine. On 22 July 1679, the banns were taken out for Georgius Schuller, MD, then 27 years old and living in the Kalverstraat, and Catharina van der Poll, 28 years old, living in the Nieuwendijk. The marriage must have taken place somewhere in the middle of August, but the honeymoon was soon over. For some two weeks after the marriage, on 2 September 1679, Giorgius Harmannus Schuller, of the Nieuwendijk on the corner of the St. Nicolaasstraat, was buried in the Oude Kerk,[2] leaving his widow nothing but huge debts. *De mortuis nil nisi bene*. Yet those who had known Schuller were reserved in their comments. In a letter from Christoff Adolphi to Johann Daniel Crafft, dated 22 December 1679, we read:

> ofte U.E. verstaen heeft weet niet, hoe doctor Schuller voor ontrent drij maenden, maer dat ontrent 14 daegen getrout was, is overleden, hebbende mij en de andere seer gequelt met sijn valsche processen, laet een verleegen weduwe nae ende veel schuld, bij hem gemaecht.[3]
>
> I do not know whether you have heard that Dr Schuller died some three months ago, after having been married for just about a fortnight. He was quite a nuisance to me and to others, with his false processes. He leaves behind a destitute widow, and many debts incurred by him.

The 'false processes' mentioned by Adolphi refer to Schuller's dubious alchemistic recipes. There were enormous amounts of money involved in the sale of recipes to make gold, and it seems that this is how Schuller incurred his debts.[4] In order to meet these, Schuller's father tried to recover money from his son's debtors, among them Crafft.[5] The world of alchemy, governed as it was by deception, credulity and the

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1. The year and place of his birth can be inferred from his matriculation and marriage banns. *Album studiosorum* 1875, 568; Municipal Archives Amsterdam, banns, no. 691, p. 247.
2. Municipal Archives Amsterdam, Funeral register Oude Kerk, 1047, p. 266.
3. In Leibniz, AA 3:3, 66–7; cf. also Crafft to Leibniz, 28.12.1679/7.1.1680, AA 3:3, 46.10–4. According to the 'Korrespondentenverzeichnis' of AA 3:3, Adolphi was a medallist in Amsterdam, who died in 1684. On Schuller's involvement with medals, see also Meijer 1900. Leibniz's correspondent Johann Daniel Crafft (1624–97) was a physician, silk manufacturer and alchemist with many contacts in the Netherlands. He died in Amsterdam.
4. Van Gent to Tschirnhaus, 23.3.1679 (Reinhardt 1911, 5).
5. AA 3:2, 906.23–4; 913.18–22; 3:3, 63.1–6; 512.19–21; 628.7–8. Tschirnhaus acted as mediator

promise of easy profit, often gave rise to mistrust and enmity. Other people's judgement of Schuller seems to reflect this. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz set up his correspondence with Schuller to be kept informed about publications and events in the Netherlands, particularly (but not exclusively) in relation with Benedictus de Spinoza, and also to order books.[1] Leibniz's attitude toward alchemy was one of sceptic curiosity. Their correspondence foundered in February 1679, because Schuller failed to come up with a satisfactory alchemistic recipe, in spite of his promises and Leibniz's financial support. Crafft, with whom Leibniz also exchanged many letters on alchemistic topics, deeply mistrusted Schuller. Now this was motivated at least in part by jealousy: Crafft was afraid that Leibniz would pay more attention to Schuller than to him.[2] Yet his judgement is worth quoting, since it concerns an aspect of Schuller's character which is also prominent in other people's opinion of him:

> Waß ich hier schreibe hatt Er [Leibniz] mit kein menschen [...] zue communiciren: vor allen nichtß an D^{r} Schuller zue gedencken, von welchen mit Schmertzen klagen muß, *daß Er sein Maul nicht hallten könne*, vnd hette Er mich mit sein plaudern beÿ nahe in das höchste vnglück gebracht.[3]

Exactly the same reproach is formulated by Pieter van Gent. In the letter to Tschirnhaus of 23 March 1679, already discussed in the preceding section, he refers to a scandal caused by Schuller. The latter indiscretely communicated Spinozistic doctrines to the alchemist Jakob Vierort.[4] Alarmed, Van Gent wrote a letter to Spinoza, imploring him to bring Schuller to heel, which Spinoza appears to have done in a letter to Schuller. This is Van Gent's report of the affair to Tschirnhaus:

> Audivisti, credo, aliquando de quodam Alchymista D. Vieroort, cui tam foeda, quaeque revera non capit, narravit [Schuller], ut in odium patris sui pervenisset, nisi ego illas defendissem positiones, unde factum, ut cum patre in gratiam redierit. Admonitus ego ab amicis scripsi ad amicum nostrum [i.e. Spinoza], ut ipsi scriberet, et prudentiâ utendum

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between Crafft and the old Schuller in this affair. After the latter's death in 1681 (AA 3:3, 512.21), Tschirnhaus informs Leibniz: 'M^{r} Krafft hatt Mich perfect contentirt ob debitum Schülleri' (27 May 1682; AA 3:3, 628). He then continues with a remark on his relationship with Schuller: 'Maxime inter me et Schullerum viguit semper disputatio, quod Ego statuerem, quod ante omnia primum Regnum Dei seu Veritatis quaerendum, et quod nobis reliqua tunc adjiciantur, cujus ille contrarium ore et re defendebat quod ipsum perdidit.' The wording suggests that Tschirnhaus here means the son, George Hermann Schuller, and that would constitute another negative posthumous judgement of the man. But in view of the context (Crafft's debt), the remark might admittedly refer to the father.

1. Reconstruction of letter 6, 18 January 1677 (AA 3:2, 35–6).
2. AA 3:2, 182.19; 208.7; 268.17; 280.24; 281.7.
3. Crafft to Leibniz, 26 November 1677 (AA 3:2, 281). Emphasis supplied.
4. Reinhardt 1911, 5. For Vierort (Vieroort, Viereck) see the entry in AA 3:3, 862; he and his experiments are recurring topics of discussion in the correspondence between Leibniz and Johann Daniel Crafft. In the autumn of 1681, Leibniz had invited Vierort for a demonstration of his transmutation experiment in Hannover. In the event, the alchemist refused, probably because of Leibniz's condition that the experiment should take place in Vierort's absence (AA 3:3, LI ff.).

esse suaderet. Scripsit, sed ille semper negavit se id fecisse. [...] En Vieroort sive potius Schulleri verba. Mundum ab aeterno sine initio fuisse et aeternum mansurum. 2° nullam exspectandam esse resurrectionem ultimumque judicium. 3° nullam esse condemnationem, nullum Diabolum: haec enim esse inventa sacrificorum etc. 4° impios, Deum ignorantes, non instar bestiarum mori. 5° Christum non Dei sed Josephi filium fuisse etc. 6° se rejicere Prophetas et Apostolos, qui non nisi Enthusiastae, ut Jacobus Bohemus aliique fuerint. Addit 7°. Nescio quo fricato pallio ambules quia (juxta dicta tua) Catholicam Ecclesiam in templis, et S. Caenae communionem aliis ad apparentiam, et ut honores et bonam famam retineas, frequentas. Jam volve, amice mi, animo tuo, num haec sint hominis philosophi, num prudentis? Mecum credo haec negabis. Et licet sano sensu illa sint vera, num convenit, ut ea homini alchymistae narremus et in omnium odium incidamus?[1]

You will have heard, I think, about a certain alchemist, Mr Vieroort. He [Schuller] told him such horrible things – things he in fact does not understand himself – that he would have incurred his father's disgrace, if I had not defended those positions. Thanks to that, his father restored him to favour. Warned by friends I wrote to our friend [Spinoza] that he should write to him and urge him to observe wisdom. So he wrote, but that man always denied hat he had done such a thing. [...] These are Vieroort's, or rather Schuller's words. [1] That the world has been there from eternity, without beginning, and will remain in eternity. (2) That one should expect neither resurrection nor Last Judgment. (3) That there is no damnation, no devil; for that these are only inventions of the priests, etc. (4) That the impious, who do not know God, will not die like beasts. (5) That Christ was not the son of God, but of Joseph, etc. (6) That he rejected the prophets and apostles, who had been no more than Enthusiasts, like Jacob Böhme and others. He added (7) that you walk about in some slick mantle or other, because (as you say yourself) you attend the Roman Catholic church and go to Holy Communion for the sake of the appearance to others, and in order to retain your honours and good name. Now consider, my friend, whether these are the words of a philosopher, of a wise man. I believe your answer will be negative, like mine. And whether, even if they are in a sound sense true, it befits us to tell them to an alchemist and so deliver us to the hatred of all.

I have quoted Schuller's challenged statements in extenso, since they read like a half digested and radicalistic variety of Spinozistic doctrines. It is not the contents that alarmed Van Gent, but their irresponsible disclosure to a third party, and an alchemist at that. Although Van Gent's embroilment with Schuller does not make him a reliable witness, there may be some truth in the story. There is an enigmatic passage in Schuller's letter to Spinoza of 25 July 1675, which seems to echo just this sort of conflict:

[Tschirnhaus] refert D^um^ Boyle & Oldenburgh mirum de Tua persona formâsse conceptum, quem ipse eisdem non solum ademit, sed rationes addidit, quarum inductione, iterum non solum dignissimè et faventissimè de eadem sentiant, sed & T. Theol. Politicum summè æstiment, cujus *pro regimine Tuo Te certiorem facere non fui ausus.*[2]

[Tschirnhaus] reports that Boyle and Oldenburg have formed an amazing image of your person. He not only talked them out of this, but also provided them with reasons that

1. Reinhardt 1911, 5–6.
2. Ep 63 (G 2, 276.11-2). Emphasis supplied.

have prompted them not only to hold you in very high and favourable esteem again, but also to think highly of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*. According to your instructions, I did not dare inform you about this.

Spinoza, then, had given strict instructions to Schuller – even if the confused wording of Schuller makes it impossible to establish what exactly these instructions were.

In all fairness it should be added that Schuller can hardly be blamed for the episode that sparked off his quarrel with Van Gent. The latter imposed himself as a match-maker. He had planned to marry Schuller off to one of his nieces, but the project fell through because the intended bridegroom was engaged already. The precise events are irretrievable. According to Van Gent, Schuller was engaged to a seamstress, but deceived the girl ignominiously:

> Utinam [...] amicam suam, quae erat pontificia et ancilla talis, quales apud nos vocantur naaijsters, cum quâ foedus matrimonii inierat et sua manu et sigillo munierat, quam ego Schedulam ipsus vidi et legi, non tam turpiter decepisset.[1]
>
> If only [...] he had not deceived his girlfriend so shamefully! She is a Roman Catholic and a servant of the sort we call 'naaisters' [seamstresses], and he was betrothed to her, which he confirmed with his signature and seal: I myself have seen and read the contract.

One wonders whether the seamstress was Catharina van der Poll, the woman Schuller married in August 1679, or a rival – which would explain the deception that Van Gent accuses him of.

So much for the gossip. I have incorporated these reports not (at least not primarily) for reasons of human interest. They are relevant to the extent that they bear upon the important and not uncontroversial question of Schuller's reliability. Some crucial information on the editing and publishing of the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften* has come down to us only in his communications to Leibniz. From this correspondence, Schuller emerges as the pivot of the publication of Spinoza's posthumous works. On that account, Stein thought that Schuller had been the true and only editor of the *Opera posthuma*.[2] Although this view was never entirely adopted

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1. Van Gent to Tschirnhaus, 23 March 1679 (Reinhardt 1911, 4–5). Klever (1991, 175) mistakenly glosses 'naaijster' as 'putain'. Although 'naaien' has for centuries been a very common Dutch vulgarism for 'to copulate', no instances of 'naaister' in the sense of 'whore' have been recorded (cf. WNT, s.vv. *naaien*, *naaister*; *Erotisch woordenboek*, s.v. *naaien*). There is no reason to assume that Van Gent here means anything else than that Schuller's fiancée was a seamstress by profession. He resorts to the Dutch word because there is no good Latin equivalent for seamstress – Latin does not lack words for 'whore'. Similar Dutch insertions are to be found elsewhere in his letters: 'canem ingentem ex eo genere quod nostri een patrijs hondje nominant' (Reinhardt 1911, 11), 'mutuli vulgo nostratibus een mossel' (p. 21), 'instrumenti ejus quo incendium exstinguitur (vulgo een Brandspuit)', 'epistomium seu, ut nostri dicunt, de klap van de pomp' (p. 27). Schuller's conduct may not, in general, have been very meritorious, but it is unnecessary to impute to him a sleazy life with a whore, as Klever does (1991, 179).
2. Stein 1888, 558; Stein 1890, 263.

by students of Spinoza, some echoes of it can be discerned in the literature.[1] Yet it is important to keep in mind that Schuller himself nowhere claims that he actually *edited* Spinoza's posthumous works, let alone that he was the *only* editor. What his letters convey is that he was involved in getting them published, and we shall now have to determine the scope and nature of this involvement. There can be no doubt that Schuller's correspondence is a unique and extremely valuable source of information, but it has to be examined critically. The information is sometimes contradictory or difficult to fit in with other data, and Schuller's account is not altogether exempt from boasting.

His letter of 16/26 February 1677, written on the day after the burial of Spinoza, contains an important testimony on Spinoza's death and manuscript legacy:

> Cæterum te minimè celare debui Clariss^{m} et acutiss^{m} Virum Spinozam maxima atrophia conflictatum 21/11 Februar. vitam suam cum morte commutasse; Videtur autem quod inexpectata mortis debilitate præventus sit, quoniam sine testamento, ultimæ voluntatis indice, à nobis discessit; Ethica, quam penes ipsum vidisti, in autograφω penes amicum asservatur, venalisque habetur, si pretio (credo 150 florenor.) opere tanto condigno persolvatur, id quod nulli melius, quàm Tibi significandum censui, utpote qui operis conscius principis animum dirigere poteris, ut suis sumtibus coematur.[2]
>
> Furthermore I had to tell you that the excellent and acute Mr Spinoza passed away on 21/11 February, after having suffered from extreme atrophy. It seems, though, that death's unexpected debilitation took him by surprise, since he passed away without a testament to indicate his last will. Of the *Ethica*, which you saw at his house, the autograph is being kept by a friend, and it is for sale, if one pays the price (150 guilders, I believe) that the work is worth. I thought I should let you know rather than anyone else, for since you are aware of the importance of the work, you might convince your prince to buy it at his cost.

The letter presents several problems. From the point of view of the present enquiry the information on Spinoza's autograph copy of the *Ethica* is by far the most important element. In order to deal with that, I will also take into account Schuller's next letter. After that I will return to the other problems raised by the letter of 16/26 February.

Ever since Stein's disclosure of this correspondence, the story that Spinoza's autograph copy[3] of the *Ethica* was up for sale has pulled a red herring across the track. Schuller's communication has been construed to mean (i) that the autograph copy was the manuscript in the writing box, which Van der Spyck had shipped to Jan

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1. For example Meijer 1897, Meinsma 1980 [1896], 442–7, Van der Tak 1932, 477. As far as I know, the only one to embrace Stein's conclusions without reservation was De Vleeschauwer (1942, 346, n. 2): '*Opera posthuma* [...] (uitgegeven door H. Schuller)'.
2. AA 2:1, 304. Cf. AA 3:2, 46; Stein 1890, 286; Freudenthal 1899, 202.
3. Lacking an article, the Latin formulation permits two different readings: *the* autograph copy, or *an* autograph copy. Spinoza may have produced more than one manuscript of the *Ethica* text. As I will argue presently, it is more likely that Schuller means the author's unique autograph.

Rieuwertsz immediately after the philosopher's death, (ii) that the friend who kept the autograph should consequently be identified as Jan Rieuwertsz, and (iii) that the latter wanted to sell rather than publish it.[1] Schuller's formulations admittedly seem to invite this line of interpretation. The offer of the manuscript seems to be related to the immediately preceding phrase 'sine testamento, ultimæ voluntatis indice, à nobis discessit'. (This part of the information is not necessarily incompatible with Colerus's account that Spinoza gave instructions to Van der Spyck on the day before he died. For all we know Schuller was right in stating that there was no *written* testament.) Schuller does not say that Spinoza made no arrangements for his manuscript legacy. Still, one is easily put on the wrong track by the ensuing offer of the manuscript: it might be thought that this could be for sale only if Spinoza had failed to give instructions for its publication. At first sight, this interpretation seems to be confirmed by Schuller's next letter to Leibniz, of 29 March 1677:

> Gaudeo sane quod de coëmenda Ethica nihil adhuc Principi Tuo dixeris, nam plane animo mutatus sum, ut (licet possessor pretium adauxerit) de illo commercio instituendo jam tibi author esse nolim. Ratio est, quod amicorum animos plane dissentientes ita ad consensum disposuerim, ut non solum hanc Ethicam, verum etiam omnia MS^{ta} Fragmenta (quorum potior pars, nimir. 1. de Emendatione Intellectus 2. de Nitro 3. de Politia 4. Epistolæ variæ, in autograφφ ad meas manus devoluta est) in commune bonum typis publicare constituerim, quod Tibi confidenter communico, cum nullus dubitem, Te id, quominus propositum hoc impediatur, omnes, etiam Amicos, celaturum.[2]
>
> I am most relieved that you have said nothing yet to your prince about buying the *Ethica*, for I changed my mind so completely that I would not even want to be responsible for such a bargain – even if the owner raised the price. The reason is that I have accomodated the vast differences of opinion among his friends, to the effect that I got them to publish for the public good not only the *Ethica*, but also all the manuscript fragments (the greater part of which – viz. on the improvement of the understanding 2. on nitre, 3. on politics, 4. several letters – has fallen into my hands, in autograph). I am telling you this confidentially, and I am certain that you will not reveal this to anyone, not even the friends, lest the proposal fall through.

Continuing our earlier line of interpretation, this letter seems to convey that Schuller had to go back on his rash offer because the autograph copy was now needed for publication.[3] Such an interpretation, however, will not stand up. It does not square

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1. Stein 1890, 265 (see especially his prim note on Rieuwertsz: 'dieses pietätlose Anerbieten [sieht] einem Buchhändler ähnlicher, als den wissenschaftlichen Freunden Spinoza's'); Meinsma 1980 [1896], 442–3; Freudenthal 1904, 307. The first and second points were subscribed to by Gebhardt (G 2, 312, *Textgestaltung*), but – unlike Meinsma and Freudenthal – he firmly rejected the third: 'So ist sicherlich auch seine [Schuller's] Angabe über die Absicht eines Verkaufs des *Ethica*-Manuscripts mit großer Vorsicht aufzunehmen, denn es ist sicherlich nichts anderes als eitle Großsprecherei, wenn er dann in einem Briefe vom 29. März an Leibniz schreibt: *Gaudeo sane* [etc.; cf. below]' (G 2, 313).

2. AA 2:1, 304–5; cf. AA 3:2, 52–3; Stein 1890, 287; Freudenthal 1899, 203.

3. Stein 1890, 265–6: 'Gegen eine solche unehrerbietige und geschäftsmässige Ausbeutung der

with the facts. What can have been the objective of the arrangements Spinoza made with Van der Spyck and Rieuwertsz, if not the publication of the *Ethica*? We know Spinoza was engaged in an attempt to publish the work himself in 1675 (see above, p. 7) and we know he asked Van der Spyck to send the manuscript to his publisher in the event of his death. The blind spot here is the unwarranted conviction that the copy Spinoza's friends used for their edition in the *Opera posthuma* must have been the autograph that Schuller offered to Leibniz. If that was the case, Schuller's correspondence implies that he was either wholly ignorant of Spinoza's intention to have the *Ethica* published posthumously, or that he was engaged in some fishy stratagem to try and coax the autograph from Rieuwertsz and sell it to Leibniz. Schuller may have been a scheming fellow, but such a project is highly implausible. As Fokke Akkerman pointed out to me, there is another explanation – one that not only fits the facts as we know them, but also takes into account the precise wording of Schuller's communications. The hypothesis we have now arrived at is the following. When Spinoza went to Amsterdam in 1675 to get his *Ethica* published, he had someone fair-copy the text, according to his instructions and under his supervision. After he decided to abandon his plans, he took the fair copy back to The Hague with him, and put it away for future publication. This was the copy sent to Rieuwertsz immediately after Spinoza's death. His autograph copy, which he showed to Leibniz in 1676, may have been in the writing box as well. Rieuwertsz could begin preparations for the edition on the basis of the fair copy, and so the autograph could come up for sale, without putting the publication at risk. Naturally Schuller, who was instructed by Leibniz to keep him informed about Spinoza's works and provide him with texts, was interested. The anonymous friend who had the autograph in trust – presumably not Rieuwertsz, but someone else[1] – knew it was precious: the number of transcripts was limited, no edition had appeared yet, and the fact that it was the author's own exemplar certainly added to its special value. The owner felt so confident that he priced himself out of the market. He raised the original price of 150 guilders, but Schuller delightedly wrote to Leibniz that it was unnecessary for his prince to come up with that kind of money: shortly not only the *Ethica* – whose publication had been planned from the very start – but the rest of Spinoza's legacy, too, would be available in a printed edition. The undertaking was hazardous, however, and Leibniz was implored to observe the utmost discretion. If this is indeed what happened, it would also account for the speed with

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litterarischen Hinterlassenschaft Spinoza's müssen die edler veranlagten Jünger des Meisters [Stein means: nobler than the bookseller], an ihrer Spitze wol Ludwig Meyer, entschiedene Einsprache erhoben haben. Denn im folgenden Briefe widerruft Schuller in ängstlichem Tone sein unpassendes Angebot, und man merkt es den Zeilen an, dass die heftige Erregung, die über die Nachlass im Amsterdamer Schülerkreise Spinoza's entstanden war und zu ernsten Auseinandersetzungen Anlass gegeben hatte, noch in der Feder Schullers lebhaft nachzittert.'

1. Rieuwertsz already had a copy at his disposal, viz. the fair copy. Moreover, one would expect Schuller to refer to him as *bibliopola*, *editor*, or a similar designation, not merely as a friend.

which the friends managed to bring out both the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften*. The hypothesis is the most economical one: there is no need to resort to tortuous explanations, question Schuller's reliability and Rieuwertsz's integrity, or suppose a sinister plot.

This is not to say that Schuller's letters are wholly clear and unequivocal. As I said, some problems remain. For one thing, the story of the autograph of the *Ethica* is rather enigmatic. Who was the friend that had the manuscript in his possession, how did he come by it, why should he want to sell it, and why did Schuller offer it to Leibniz in the first place, when he knew all the time that an edition was forthcoming? And, even more interesting, what happened afterwards: was the manuscript sold eventually, or did it remain in the hands of the unknown friend? In the latter case, those who prepared the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften* for the press may still have had access to it. As I shall argue in chapter 4 (see p. 134), Glazemaker probably translated the *Ethica* into Dutch from another copy than the one used by the compositor. There is as yet no proof that this other copy was the author's autograph, but it is just possible.

There is also the casual statement that the greater part of Spinoza's manuscript legacy had fallen into the hands of Schuller. How did he get these manuscripts? As we shall see below (p. 61), a clue may be found in his communications about searching Spinoza's belongings both before and after the philosopher died, but the matter is far from clear.

Schuller's account of the death of Spinoza is an important but somewhat problematic chapter in his correspondence. He must have written a letter to Tschirnhaus about the event on the very same day he wrote to Leibniz, on 26 February 1677. For a few months later, on 17 April 1677, Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus wrote to Leibniz from Rome:

> Wie ich nuhmero also nur ein wenig wieder zu ruhe kommen, und mich appliciren wolte gutten freünden zu avisiren, wie Mir es bieshero gegangen so Erhielt schreiben von H.D. Schuller, und wie gleich in der beantwortung hierauff innerhalb 6 tagen andere von ihm dadurch verständiget worden, daß Unser freund im Haag presente D. Schullero bey gutten verstande, und nachdem Er disponiret wie es mitt hinterlaßenen Manuscriptis solte gehalten werden; verstorben; worbey ingleichen ein schreiben von H. [i.e. Leibniz].[1]

It is hard to avoid the impression that Schuller purposely gave his two correspondents if not incongruous then at least dissimilar accounts of the circumstances of Spinoza's

1. AA 3:2, 64. The editor of this volume, Heinz-Jürgen Hess, dates the first of Schuller's two letters to Tschirnhaus to the middle of February, the second one to 26 February 1677. This concurs with Tschirnhaus's wording in his letter to Leibniz. He was on a grand tour in Italy and received two letters in Rome, with a six day interval, the second one (which contained a letter from Leibniz to Tschirnhaus as an enclosure) informing him of Spinoza's death. This implies that the first letter was sent before 21 February, the second one shortly afterwards. Neither of these letters has survived.

death. There has been some scholarly controversy about the identity of the physician who stood at his deathbed: Colerus refers to an Amsterdam physician 'Docter L.M.',[1] and it is only natural that these initials are usually expanded to 'Lodewijk Meyer'. But it has been suggested that the Amsterdam physician was in fact Schuller, not Meyer.[2] If Schuller was indeed present when Spinoza died, as he told Tschirnhaus, one wonders why he should refrain from intimating such a significant fact to Leibniz. Now there is an external indication that Schuller was in fact present on the day – not necessarily the moment – that Spinoza died. In the first inventory of the philosopher's legacy, drawn up by the notary Van den Hoven on the same day, 21 February 1677, the name of one of the witnesses, 'd'heer Georgius Hermanus', has been struck out.[3] There can be no doubt, I think, that these forenames refer to Georg Hermann Schuller. Why was the entry cancelled? Had Schuller already left? Did he refuse to sign? Was his name mentioned by mistake? Or had there been an incident of some sort? Van der Spyck, who was one of the witnesses who did sign,[4] told Colerus that the physician in question suddenly took to his heels, appropriating some money and a silver-handled knife from Spinoza's table.[5] And in his letter to Tschirnhaus of 23 March 1679, Pieter van Gent hints at some misbehaviour on Schuller's part:

> Quid actum sit in morte amici [i.e. Spinoza] coram si Deus voluerit disseremus, et tunc plura narrabimus, quae tibi mira videbuntur, et te attonitum reddent.[6]
>
> God willing, I shall give you an account in person of what happened when our friend died, and then I shall tell you more that will seem astonishing to you and that will dumbfound you.

The petty embezzlement of the money and the knife has disconcerted Spinoza students, as it seemed to incriminate Lodewijk Meyer – hardly the sort of man to do such a thing. One honourable way out was suggested by Johannes Monnikhoff: the money and the knife must have been given to Meyer by Spinoza before he died, as a keepsake and in recompense for travelling expenses.[7] Another way out presented itself after

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1. Colerus 1880 [1705], 76–7.
2. Meijer 1897, 607; cf. Freudenthal 1899, 296; Reinardt 1911, 5, n. 8.
3. Freudenthal 1899, 156.
4. The other two witnesses were Johannes van Kempe and Hendrick Soudael (or Henrich zum Dahl, Van Dahl, Van Dale). I assume that they accompanied the notary; Zum Dahl probably was the notary's clerk, since his name also appears in other documents drawn up by Van den Hove: Freudenthal 1899, 158.9,12; 167.16,19.
5. Colerus 1880 [1705], 77.
6. Reinhardt 1911, 5. Klever (1991, 182) connects this with another passage in Colerus (1880 [1705]), 77: 'Daar is veel Schryvens en wryvens aangaande eenige omstandigheden, die in zyn ziekte en by zyn overlyden zouden voorgevallen wezen.' However, Colerus then continues to discuss in detail the alleged circumstances of Spinoza's illness and death which occasioned so much writing and controversy. They concern the philosopher's attitude towards religion and the fear of death.
7. Monnikhoff 1916, 213, n.

Stein's publications. Willem Meijer was convinced – and greatly relieved – that the physician must have been Schuller, not Meyer.[1] What are we to make of all this? On the basis of the evidence available to us, the case for Schuller's presence at the deathbed of Spinoza is certainly stronger than that for Meyer's. The only indication for Meyer is the mention of his initials by Colerus – twenty-eight years after the event. For Schuller, we have the cancelled name in the notarial inventory, his own communication to Tschirnhaus, and the enigmatic remark of Van Gent. In addition there are his intimations to Leibniz in the subsequent correspondence that he went through Spinoza's possessions shortly before and after the latter's death.[2] It should be noted, though, that the evidence is somewhat shaky. In the event, Schuller did not sign the inventory, so he presumably was not present at the moment of signing. The other indications are open to the objection that Schuller himself is their unique source.

An interesting minor difference in approach between the two accounts is that, in the Tschirnhaus version, Spinoza died *compos mentis*, leaving instructions regarding his manuscripts, whereas the emphasis in the letter to Leibniz is on the sudden debilitation that prevented Spinoza from drawing up a last will. This need not be interpreted as an inconsistency. Even if Spinoza was too weak to be able to write, or read and sign a document, he may still have been of sound mind and capable of conveying his final requests orally.

For the transmission of the texts contained in the *Opera posthuma*, Schuller's letter to Leibniz of 29 March 1677 is again most revealing. Apparently Schuller possessed the autograph copies[3] of the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*, Letter 6,[4] the *Tractatus politicus* and a number of letters. This is, indeed, the bulk ('potior pars') of the writings eventually published in the *Opera posthuma*: only the *Ethica* and the Hebrew grammar are missing. It should be added that we do not know how many of the letters Schuller had, so it is hard to determine exactly how much of the writings he had in his possession. Even so, the enumeration is impressive enough. Now it is conceivable that Spinoza gave no explicit instructions what was to be done with his correspondence and with the unfinished treatises. We know he was dissatisfied with the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* as it stood.[5] Some of the friends may have felt uneasy about publishing texts the author had not intended for publication – not yet or not at all. In

1. Meijer 1897; Meijer 1921b, 345.
2. Schuller to Leibniz, 29.3.1677 (AA 3:2, 53.11–2); 19.11.1677 (267.1–2).
3. Meinsma (1980 [1895], 443) gives a somewhat different interpretation of the passage: as he renders it, only the letters are autographs. I take Schuller to mean here that the whole lot are autograph copies: TIE, TP and letters.
4. He had at least the first part of it, here identified as a short treatise in its own right, not as part of a letter. But it is likely that he had the whole manuscript, and labelled it 'De nitro' after its main subject.
5. Ep 60, Spinoza to Tschirnhaus, January 1675 (G 4, 271.8–10): 'Cæterùm de reliquis, nimirùm de motu, quæque ad Methodum spectant, quia nondum ordine conscripta sunt, in aliam occasionem reservo.'

the final section (§ 1.8) of this chapter I will analyse the relevant passages in the prefaces to *De nagelate schriften* and the *Opera posthuma*, in order to show that Schuller's claim here, viz. that he made the others assent to a comprehensive edition, is quite plausible.

Another curious passage in the letter of 29 March 1677 is the list of thirteen titles Schuller says he had dug up from between Spinoza's papers after his death:

> Pervelim ex Te discere num ex sequentibus libris, (quorum catalogum (:cum hac inscriptione libri rarissimi:) inter posthuma reperi) unquam aliquos videris.[1]
>
> I would like to hear from you whether you have ever seen any of the following books, a list of which – captioned 'very rare books' – I found among the posthumous papers.

Schuller's assignment was to look for interesting books and manuscripts on Leibniz's behalf. The unearthing of a mere list of titles – not the books themselves – seems hardly helpful. None of the works mentioned on the list occur in the inventory of Spinoza's library. One of the titles, *Homo politicus*, is mentioned by Spinoza in Letter 44.[2]

Towards the end of the same letter, Schuller asks Leibniz to employ him as an intermediary for his contacts with Hudde, 'cum Viri hujus notitia familiarior mihi in commodum vergere possit' ('since a better acquaintance with that man could be of advantage to me').[3] The request reveals Schuller's eagerness to impose himself on famous or influential people – a feature that will have contributed to his fascination with Spinoza.

The ensuing correspondence between Schuller and Leibniz has already been referred to (p. 6, n. 4), for the light it throws on the progress of the printing of the *Opera posthuma*. In May 1677, Leibniz even considered travelling to Amsterdam in order to have a look at the manuscripts in Spinoza's legacy,[4] but nothing came of this.

In his letter of 19 September 1677, Schuller makes the following secretive remark:

> Inter Spinosiana praeter manuscripta praelo commissa nihil rari fuisse scias, nam Ego ante et post ejus obitum (Tibi in aurem) cuncta singulatim sum perscrutatus, et quaecunque Eruditionem aut raritatem redolebant, amicorum et ejusmet, (dum adhuc viveret) jussu, transsumpsi, nihil autem praeter librorum rariorum nuper memoratorum titulos in schedula consignatos reperi, ita ut ex ipsius haereditate nil emtione dignum judicare possim.[5]
>
> You should know that there was nothing uncommon among Spinoza's things, apart from the manuscripts committed to the press, for I myself have searched all things thoroughly one by one before and after his death (I tell you this confidentially). I put aside whatever had a hint of erudition or rarity in it, according to the judgement of the friends or of

1. AA 3:2, 53.10–2.
2. To Jarig Jelles, 17 February 1671 (G 4, 227.19).
3. AA 3:2, 55.8.
4. AA 3:2, no. 40 (p. 118).
5. AA 3:2, 267.1–6.

himself (when he was still alive), but I found nothing except the titles of the rare books just mentioned, written on a slip of paper. I can therefore declare that there was nothing worth buying in his heritage.

The parenthetical remark 'Tibi in aurem' ('Mum's the word') is altogether characteristic for Schuller. One can imagine that he wants to silence Leibniz about his searching Spinoza's belongings. Yet I am not convinced that he actually did so – at least not in any thorough way. If he was present when Spinoza died, and had gone through Spinoza's books and manuscripts before and after his death, it is odd that he came up with nothing more than the puny list of thirteen titles of rare books. Or is this in fact how he acquired the greater part of Spinoza's manuscripts – ordinary theft? (Which would explain Pieter van Gent's dismal remark about Schuller's involvement in some incident that took place when Spinoza died: see above, p. 59.) The question cannot be solved on the basis of the information we have at our disposal. The wording 'quorum potior pars [...] ad meas manus devoluta est' also leaves room for the interpretation that he somehow inherited them,[1] though I admit to finding it improbable that Spinoza should have singled out Schuller in particular.

Finally there is another curious episode in Schuller's letters. The letter Leibniz wrote to Spinoza, Letter 45, was included in the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften* with the sender's name in full. Leibniz was much displeased with the incident. Schuller only noticed this when it was too late, and from his letters we can surmise that Leibniz was quite annoyed. On 6 February 1678, Schuller wrote:

> Misi Tibi nuper Exemplar Spinozae posthumorum per Judaei Filium, quibus literas festinationis ipsius causa jungere nequivi, eum in finem destinatas, quo Tibi notum facerem ne aegre ferre mihive imputare libeat, contineri in annexis Epistolis unam cum expresso nomine Tuo; certe me inscium hoc factum, utpote quem hoc tamdiu latuit donec in hoc ipso exemplare viderim; Veniam autem eo facilius dabis, siquidem nil praeter Mathematica contineat.[2]
>
> I recently sent you a copy of Spinoza's posthumous works through the son of the Jew, but he was in such a hurry that I could not include a letter, with the purpose of letting you know that you should not take it ill nor impute it to me that among the letters included there is one with your name in full; and that this certainly happened without my knowledge: it even remained unknown to me until I saw it in that very copy. But you will make allowances for this all the easier, inasmuch as the letter contains nothing but mathematics.

Schuller therefore had noticed his faux pas before the book reached Leibniz. Yet he had kept silent about it in the letter of 15/25 January, in which he announces to Leibniz that he had handed over a copy of the book to the son of Abraham Arendt (an acquaintance of Leibniz's), who would convey it to Hannover.[3] Leibniz was not

1. Cf. *Oxford Latin dictionary*, s.v. *deuoluo* 2: 'to fall (to), devolve (upon an heir, etc.)'.
2. Leibniz AA 3:2, 342.2–7.
3. AA 3:2, no. 133; p. 314.2–3: 'nunc hoc addo me Judaei filio post 3 a 4 dies Hanoveram

satisfied with the explanations of 6 February, as emerges from Schuller's next letter, of 19/29 March:

> Editorem ob Tuum in posthumis Spinosae sine meo rogatu expressum nomen acriter reprehendi, quamvis id periculi expers credam, cum praeter Mathematica nil contineant literae tuae.[1]
>
> I have severely reprehended the publisher for giving your name in full in Spinoza's posthumous works without consulting me, although I believe there is no danger in it, as your letter contains nothing but mathematics.

Schuller, then, clearly did not have a part in the editorial work itself, but behaved like a patron (or wanted to make Leibniz believe that). The 'editor' taken to task by him must have been Jan Rieuwertsz, who was the responsible publisher after all.[2] But in view of the relationships between the people involved, it is hard to believe that Rieuwertsz would have been impressed.

Summing up, Schuller's communications to Leibniz are rather cryptic. His exact part in editing the *Opera posthuma* remains in the dark. That he was in touch with the project is beyond doubt, but his position certainly was marginal: his role seems to have been organizational at most. There are no indications that he actually contributed to any concrete editorial task. Still, in the final section I will argue that the final composition of the *Opera posthuma* owes a great deal to Schuller's commitment.

1.7 De nagelate schriften

The subject of the present inquiry is Spinoza's texts – that is, the Latin versions. For the sake of completeness, a few words are in order about those who prepared the Dutch companion volume: *De nagelate schriften*. Three people are to be considered in this context: Jarig Jelles, Mennonite grocer and – in a modest way – Spinoza's patron; Jan Hendriksz Glazemaker, professional translator; and Jan Rieuwertsz the Elder, publisher and life-long friend of Spinoza.

Of Jelles's life little is known, not even the year of his birth. He never married, and was buried on 22 February 1683.[3] There is a short biographical notice in the anonymous epilogue to his *Belydenisse des algemeenen en christelyken geloofs*, published in 1684 by Rieuwertsz.[4] The *Belydenisse* is a pious tract of Christian spiritualism, and

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migraturo tradidisse scripta omnia Spinozae posthuma jam edita.'

1. AA 3:2, 359.17–9.
2. 'Publisher' would be the most likely meaning of the word *editor*. I know no instances of its being used for 'one who prepares an edition' in Neo-Latin. The earliest occurrence of the word in that sense in English dates from the eighteenth century (OED, s.v. *editor*).
3. Meinsma 1980 [1896], 451.
4. Rieuwertsz is also thought to be responsible for the biographical information in the epilogue

Jelles dedicated it to his friend Benedict de Spinoza.[1] We learn from Letter 44 that Jarig Jelles was in some way involved in the plan to publish a Dutch translation of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, for it is to him that Spinoza turns in order to prevent the publication.[2] His involvement in editing *De nagelate schriften* is documented in the same sources that describe Meyer's part in editing the *Opera posthuma*: Bayle and Duijkerius. Jelles is beyond doubt the author of the 'Voorreeden', but for the rest it is difficult to establish his contribution to the editorial history of *De nagelate schriften*.

At any rate it is certain that Jelles did not translate Spinoza's posthumous works into Dutch: that task was consigned to Jan Hendriksz Glazemaker. We owe this intelligence to Johannes Duijkerius: in the second of his *Philopater* novels, he identifies Glazemaker as the translator of both the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* and the posthumous works.[3] Glazemaker was born in 1619 or 1620, got married in 1651, and was buried on 5 December 1682.[4] He worked as a glazier first, but gradually abandoned his trade to become a professional translator. He made Dutch renderings of an awe-inspiring number of books in the fields of philosophy, religious matters, politics, literature and travel. For Glazemaker's rendering of the *Ethica* and its relation to a lost partial translation by Pieter Balling I refer to the thorough investigation by Fokke Akkerman.[5]

Jelles and Meyer probably worked out the idea of publishing the two parallel versions. Jelles wrote the Dutch preface, Meyer translated it into Latin. Perhaps Jelles supervised Glazemaker's translating, but not being a Latinist himself, he did not check or correct the results. Nevertheless, the list of errata in *De nagelate schriften* corrects not only printing errors, but also genuine mistakes in the translation. A case in point is proposition 70 of part 4, where the translator misread *ignarus*, 'ignorant', four times in succession as *ignavus*, 'slow, sluggish'. This is corrected in the errata. But we can only guess who was responsible for this correction: was it Glazemaker himself, or one of the editors?

There are other aspects of the text of *De nagelate schriften* that are difficult to assign to a specific person. Thus the layout of the references and the numbers of the propositions differs from the style in the *Opera posthuma*: in *De nagelate schriften* figures are avoided; instead, ordinal numbers are written out in full. Since this practice has been carried out in a systematic fashion, it would seem to indicate conscious

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(Meinsma 1980 [1896], 104–5, n. 3; Hylkema 1902, 214).

1. Letter 48A is Jelles's dedicatory letter, 48B several testimonies on Spinoza's reaction (see Spinoza 1977, 303–7; annotation pp. 488–90). A study of the *Belydenisse* is to be found in Kolakowski 1987 [1969], 217–25.
2. G 4, 227.6–17.
3. Maréchal 1991, 195.
4. For biographical, bibliographical and historical information see *Glazemaker* 1982; Thijssen-Schoute 1967, 206–61; Akkerman 1984.
5. Akkerman 1980, 101–76.

editing, rather than the translator's preference. Glazemaker was a professional, hired by Spinoza's friends to translate as quickly as possible a batch of texts. One would expect the finishing to be their responsibility rather than his.

Similar considerations have led me to re-examine the nearly unanimous consensus that Glazemaker provided his own translations with glosses in the form of Latin words in the margin. (On the marginal glosses, see also § 4.6, below) This was a well-established practice since the days of Simon Stevin. We find these glosses in a great number of writings translated by Glazemaker, and both Thijssen-Schoute and Crapulli – the only one to have analysed the phenomenon critically – attributed them to the translator himself.[1] Yet the principle is put into practice in widely different forms in the various works where these marginal terms occur. The Dutch translation Glazemaker made of Descartes's *Regulæ ad directionem ingenii*, which was investigated in detail by Crapulli, shows a system that is markedly different from the one encountered in his renderings of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* and the posthumous works; and these two are not identical either. The three books show considerable divergences in the frequency, distribution and accuracy of the marginal terms. A straightforward explanation for this could be that in each case someone else was responsible. That would also account for the fact that the glosses sometimes betray an unfamiliarity with the Dutch text next to it. Here is an example cited by Crapulli:[2] the phrase 'ideam istam a Deo accepi' is correctly translated by Glazemaker as 'ik dit denkbeelt van God ontvangen heb'; but 'denkbeelt van God' is then wrongly translated back into Latin in the marginal gloss as '*Idea Dei*'. That a translator should not understand his own translation is perhaps not altogether inconceivable, but a simpler explanation is that someone else provided the Latin glosses in the margin. Duijkerius attributed the marginal terms in the Dutch translation of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* to a Doctor of Medicine and renowned philosopher – to be identified as Lodewijk Meyer.[3]

For purposes of textual criticism, the marginal glosses are inconsequential. As Crapulli and Akkerman have noted, the glosses have been put in the margin without always consulting the Latin text that served as the basis for the Dutch translation.[4] I came to the same conclusion after having investigated the practice in *De nagelate schriften*. The marginal terms will have to be discarded as a source for variant readings.

Was *De nagelate schriften* edited by a single person, Jarig Jelles, or were other people involved as well? It would seem that Jan Rieuwertsz is a likely candidate. Rieuwertsz was born in 1616 or 1617, and probably died in 1685. He married twice.[5] Rieuwertsz

1. Thijssen-Schoute 1967, 239; Crapulli 1969a.
2. Crapulli 1969a, 28.
3. Maréchal 1991, 195.
4. Crapulli 1969a, 107–8; Akkerman 1980, 48–9, 163, 169.
5. For biographical information see Van Eeghen 1967, 63–4; Kleerkooper & Van Stockum 1916, 622–6; Meinsma 1980 [1896], 105, 452. His activities as a publisher and the prefaces and epilogues

was a bookbinder, publisher and bookseller, but it is uncertain, perhaps even unlikely, that he also printed books.[1] He published all Spinoza's works and he apparently has been close to the philosopher right up to the end. He was present when the notary Willem van den Hove made an inventory of Spinoza's possessions on 2 March 1677, and it was he who drew up the list of books in Spinoza's library.[2] But that is as much as we can say of 'the old philosophizing bookseller', as Duijkerius calls him.[3] We have no concrete indications that he was involved in the editorial work.

1.8 Conclusion

Schuller claimed he had persuaded the other friends to publish all Spinoza's works – that is, as I interpret him, not just the *Ethica*. Even after the others had been brought round, their initial hesitation seems to transpire in the wording of prefaces to *De nagelate schriften* and the *Opera posthuma*. The very first sentence reads:

> Schoon de Geschriften, in dit boek begrepen, ten meestendeel onvolmaakt, veel minder van de Schrijver overgezien, beschaaft en verbetert zijn, zo heeft men echter niet ondienstig geoordeelt de zelfden in 't licht te geven [...].
>
> Licet scripta, Lector benevole, hoc libro contenta, maximam partem imperfecta, multò minùs ab ipso Auctore examinata, polita, ac emendata sint; ea tamen luci exponere non abs re visum fuit [...].[4]

As for the completeness of the posthumous works, the editors remark:

> Dit is 't alles, dat, van enige waarde zijnde, wy uit zijn nagelate papieren, en uit enige afschriften, onder zijn vrienden en bekenden berustende, te zamen hebben konnen rapen. 't Is gelooffelijk dat 'er by d'een, of by d'ander noch wel iets van onze Schrijver berust, 't welk hier niet gevonden zal worden: maar men vertrout ook dat daar in niets bevat zal wezen, 't welk de Lezer hier niet meermalen gezegt zal vinden [...].
>
> [...] sunt verò hæc omnia, quæ ex adversariis, & quibusdam apographis inter amicos, ac familiares delitescentibus colligere licuit. Et quanquam credibile est apud hunc, aut illum aliquid, à nostro Philosopho elaboratum, absconditum esse, quod hîc non invenietur; existimatur tamen, nil in eo inventum iri, quod sæpius in his Scriptis dictum non sit [...].[5]

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attributed to him are the subject of a study by Clasina Manusov-Verhage (1994).

1. See Gerritsen 1994.
2. Servaas van Rooijen 1888, 30; Offenberg 1973, 309.
3. Maréchal 1991, 137.
4. NS, sig. *2^{r}; OP, sig. *2^{r} (pp. 216 and 217 respectively in the edition in Akkerman 1980; NS text on even, OP on odd pages). Translation of the NS text: 'Though the writings contained in this book, are for the most part not completed, let alone revised, polished and corrected by the author, one has seen fit to publish them.'
5. NS, *3^{v}; OP, *3^{r} (Akkerman 1980, 218, 219). Translation of the NS text: 'This is all we have been able to gather together from the papers he left behind, and from some transcripts held by his friends and acquaintances. It may be believed that one person or another still has something of our author that will not be found here, but one is confident that this will contain nothing that

Only the *Ethica* is printed at the author's request: 'zijn Zedekunst, die hy beval te doen drukken'; '[Ethica], cujus impressionem mandabat'.[1] This was his most important work by far, and the only one among these writings that he finished:

> Wat deze zijn Geschriften aangaat, de Zedekunst alleen, die verre het voornaamste van alle d'anderen is, kan voor een voltooit en voltrokke werk geacht worden, hoewel 'er echter de Voorreeden van 't eerste deel ontbreekt [...].
>
> Quantum verò ad hæc ejus scripta, quamvis ad primam Ethices partem præfatio requiratur, ea tamen alia longis parasangis superat, proque absoluto, & perfecto opere haberi potest.[2]

About the *Tractatus politicus*, the editors have relatively little to say:

> Onze Schrijver heeft de verhandeling van *de Staatkunde* weinig tijts voor zijn doot gemaakt, die ook belet heeft dat zy volmaakt is geworden. De zelfde is dieshalven net van gedachten, en klaar van stijl.
>
> *Tractatum Politicum* Auctor noster paulò ante obitum composuit. Sunt in eo & accuratæ cogitationes, & stylus clarus.[3]

The *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*, however, is more problematic, what with its long history and Spinoza's persistent intention to revise the work. It is here that the editors' hesitation is most palpable:

> De Handeling van *de Verbetering van 't Verstant* enz. is een van des Schrijvers eerste werken geweest, gelijk zijn stijl en gedachten zelfs getuigen. De waerdigheit van de zaak, die hy daar in verhandelt, en het nut einde, 't welk hy in 't zelfde beoogt heeft, dat is de weg te banen, langs de welk het verstant op het beste tot de ware kennis der dingen zou konnen geleid worden, hebben hem geduriglijk doen overwegen de zelfde op te maken, en te voltojen. Maar het gewicht van de zaak, de diepe bespiegelingen, en de wijtüitgestrekte kennis, die daar toe verëischt wierden, hebben een zeer trage voortgang aan 't werk gegeven; 't welk veröorzaakt heeft dat het ook onvolmaakt is gebleven, niet alleenlijk ten opzicht van dat het niet ten einde is gebracht, maar zelfs ten opzicht van 't geen, dat hier en daar gebreekt: dewijl de Schrijver in d'Aanteekeningen, die alle van hem zelf zijn, meermaals vermaant, dat het geen, 't welk hy schrijft, naaukeuriglijker bewezen, of wijtlopiglijker verklaart moet worden, of in zijn Wijsbegeerte, of ergens anders alreede van hem gezegt is, of noch gezegt zal worden. Doch dewijl het zeer veel voortreffelijke en nutte dingen begrijpt, die aan een oprecht onderzoeker der waarheit grote lust zullen

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the reader will not find expressed several times here.'

1. Ibid.
2. NS, *4^{r}; OP, *3^{v} (Akkerman 1980, 218, 219; 'opere' is his correction for the erroneous form 'operæ' in OP). Translation NS: 'As regards these writings of his, only the *Ethica*, which is by far the most important of all, can be considered a completed and finished work, though it lacks a preface to its first part.' That Spinoza had envisaged to have part 1 preceded by a preface is not very likely; the abrupt opening – incomplete though it may appear to a reader – is entirely in keeping with his model, Euclid's *Elements* (see chapter 5, p. 177 below).
3. NS, 5*4^{v}; OP, 4*4^{v} (Akkerman 1980, 248, 249). Translation NS: 'Our author wrote the *Tractatus politicus* shortly before his death, which also prevented him from finishing it. Consequently its thoughts are precise, and its style clear.'

verschaffen, en hem niet weinig hulp in zijn navorssching toebrengen; zo heeft men niet ondienstig gevonden het zelfde meê in 't licht te geven, gelijk alrêe in het Bericht aan de Lezer, voor dit geschrift gestelt, gezegt is.

Tractatus de *Emendatione Intellectûs* est ex prioribus nostri Philosophi operibus, testibus & stylo, & conceptibus. Rei, quam in eo tractat, dignitas, & magna, quam in eo sibi scopum præfixit, utilitas, nempe intellectui viam sternere facillimam, atque planissimam ad veram rerum cognitionem, calcar ipsi semper eum ad umbilicum perducendi fuere. At operis pondus, profundæque meditationes, & vasta rerum Scientia, quæ ad ejus perfectionem requirebantur, lento gradu eum promoverunt, ut & in causâ fuerunt, quòd non fuerit absolutus, quódque hîc illîc aliquid desideretur: nam Auctor in Annotationibus, quas ipse addidit, sæpius monet id, quod tractat, accuratiùs demonstrandum, vel latiùs explicandum, sive in suâ Philosophiâ, sive alibi. Quia verò Res præstantissimas, nec non utilissimas continet, in Veritatis studioso studium excitabunt summum, nec parùm adjuvabunt in eâ indagandâ, ideo eum simul cum aliis edere visum fuit, uti jam in Admonitione, huic Tractatui præfixâ, dictum fuit.[1]

In their account of the Hebrew grammar, the prefaces of *De nagelate schriften* and the *Opera posthuma* part company, for it is included in the Latin volume only. The inclusion is justified as follows: 'Cùm verò omnia nostri Philosophi *Opera Posthuma* tibi, Benevole Lector, dare animus fuerit, Grammatices Hebrææ Compendium minimè erat omittendum.'[2] ('But as it was the intention to offer you, gentle reader, all the posthumous works of our philosopher, the concise Hebrew grammar was in no way to be left out.') As J.M. Hillesum noted, one can almost read between the lines that the friends at one time did entertain the idea of not including the work at all – as in the Dutch edition.[3] In the 'Voorreeden', Jelles explains why the Hebrew grammar had not been translated for *De nagelate schriften*:

Onze Schrijver heeft noch, boven 't geen, dat wy hier voor gedacht hebben, in de Latijnsche taal een Hebreeusche Grammatika, of Letterkunst, in geschrift, doch onvolmaakt, nagelaten; en hoewel de zelfde van verscheide geleerde lieden, onder de welken verscheide afschriften berusten, grotelijks geprezen word; zo hebben wy echter niet

1. NS, 6^{*r-v}; OP, $4^{*}4^{v}$–$5^{*}1^{r}$ (Akkerman 1980, 250, 251). Translation NS: 'The *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* was one of the author's first writings, as its style and thoughts testify. Because of the eminence of the issue dealt with, and the useful purpose he aimed at – namely to clear the way along which the understanding can best be directed to the true knowledge of things – he incessantly considered finishing and completing it. But the weight of the issue, the profound meditations and the vast knowledge this required, made the work progress very slowly. As a result it remained incomplete, not only in that it is unfinished, but also in that things are lacking here and there. For in the notes, which are all his own, the author repeatedly reminds one that what he writes is to be proven more precisely or explained more fully, or that it has been said already or will be said later either in his Philosophy or elsewhere. Still, since it contains very many excellent and useful things, which will greatly please him who sincerely searches the truth and will do much to support him in his investigation, it has been thought fit to publish it with the rest, as has been said already in the Foreword to the Reader that is prefixed to this treatise.'
2. OP, $5^{*}2^{r}$ (Akkerman 1980, 253).
3. Hillesum 1921, 162, n. 1.

dienstig geacht, haar in de Nederlantsche Taal door de druk gemeen te maken, maar geraden gevonden de zelfde voor de Latijnen in de Latijnsche taal in druk te laten: dewijl men zelden tot het leren van 't Hebreeus toetreed, voor dat men de Latijnsche taal machtig is geworden.[1]

In addition to the works aforementioned, our author also left behind an unfinished Hebrew grammar, written in Latin. And although it is highly praised by several scholars, with whom transcripts were deposited, we have not seen fit to divulge it in print in the Dutch language, but thought it advisable to leave the printed Latin text to those who have Latin, since one seldom applies oneself to Hebrew before one has mastered the Latin language.

The editors remain silent about the completeness of the collection of letters they publish; there is only a remark on their arrangement (by correspondent and, within that framework, chronological).[2] We should be wary as to the completeness or even representativeness of Spinoza's correspondence as published in the *Opera posthuma*. There may have been many more letters in the possession of the Amsterdam circle of friends, which were however deemed unfit for inclusion. This can be seen in the case of the Meyer correspondence, of which Letters 12A and 15 have come down to us only accidentally. Similar cases are Letter 28 to Bouwmeester, Letters 70 and 72 from and to Schuller. Nor is there any trace of correspondence with Pieter van Gent, though the latter tells Tschirnhaus that he wrote to Spinoza at least once, imploring him to read Schuller a lesson (see above, p. 53). According to Van Gent, this resulted in a letter from Spinoza to Schuller, which we do not know either. The criterion for the selection of letters, it should be recalled, was their relevance for illustrating Spinoza's thought: 'Epistolæ doctorum quorundam virorum ad B.d.S et auctoris responsiones, *ad aliorum ejus operum elucidationem non parùm facientes*'.[3] Precious though the other letters are for our knowledge of the history of Spinozism, they did not qualify. Measured by the editors' criterion, their subject matter was trivial, irrelevant and perhaps sometimes embarrassing.

Towards the end the imperfection of the works is emphasized once more:

Het zal zonder twijffel alle de genen, die de waarheit oprechtelijk liefhebben, en naar een vaste en ontwijffelbare kennis der dingen trachten, hartelijk smarten, dat deze Geschriften van onze Schrijver ten meestendeel niet gantschelijk volmaakt zijn.

Omnes, qui Veritatem sincerè amant, & solidam, ac indubitatam rerum Notitiam affectant, procul omni dubio summo afficientur dolore, quòd hæc Scripta nostri Philosophi magnâ ex parte imperfecta sint.[4]

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1. NS, 6*2^{v} (Akkerman 1980, 252). Cf. also Spinoza's own restrictions as to his intended audience: 'iis tantùm, qui in aliis linguis versati sunt, scribo' ('I write only for those who are versed in other languages'). *Compendium grammatices linguæ Hebrææ*, cap. 13 (G 1, 343.7-8). Hillesum (1921, 161) called attention to this argument.
2. Akkerman 1980, 252, 253 (§ 74).
3. OP 355, half-title, sig. 3D1^{r}. Emphasis supplied.
4. NS, 6*2^{v}; OP, 5*2^{v} (Akkerman 1980, 252, 255). Translation NS: 'Doubtless it will be a bitter

The prefaces conclude on the same note they had opened with. This is the last sentence but one:

> Men verhoopt nochtans dat men aan de geletterde werrelt geen ondienst gedaan zal hebben, maar dat de zelfde in dank zal aannemen dat men deze Geschriften, *hoe onvolmaakt zy ook mogen wezen*, in 't licht geeft.
>
> Spes tamen non exigua affulget, Erudito Orbi non exiguum præstitum fuisse officium in hisce, *licet imperfectis*, Scriptis edendis, eumque hæc animo grato accepturum.[1]

Taking my cue from these passages written by Jelles and Meyer, I am convinced that there were indeed qualms about publishing everything. When Georg Hermann Schuller claimed that he persuaded the others into bringing out all that Spinoza had left behind, this is not to be dismissed as sheer vanity. Surely there cannot have been any hesitations about the *Ethica*: the friends knew Spinoza wanted them to publish it. The political treatise did not present real problems either. It was a mature and well-balanced work, and Letter 84 clearly showed that Spinoza himself would have published it – if only he had had the time to finish it. Some of the letters had already been divulged in manuscript form, with the author's consent and support. The correspondence did create practical problems, though: the items to be included had to be collected, selected and edited, correspondents had to be protected. These matters had to be agreed upon by the editors. But the real moot points between the friends were the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* and the *Compendium grammatices linguæ Hebrææ*. Schuller and his friend Tschirnhaus had a particular interest in the unsatisfactory but (in their view) key treatise on method.[2] Schuller's turn of phrase 'amicorum animos plane dissentientes ita ad consensum disposuerim, ut [...] omnia MS^{ta} Fragmenta [...] in commune bonum typis publicare constituerim' reflects the deliberations among the friends involved in preparing Spinoza's legacy for the printing press. If there is truth in his claim, as I think there is, his genuine commitment should induce us to make allowances for the more unpleasant sides of his conduct and character.

With regard to the *Opera posthuma*, this is as much as I am willing to vouch for now. This chapter will have a sequel – not only in the form of the chapters that follow, but also in the projected new edition of the *Ethica*. It is there that the conjectures and hypotheses advanced here can to some extent be put to the test.

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grief to all those who sincerely love the truth and aspire to solid and indubitable knowledge of things, that these writings of our author have for the most part not been quite completed.'

1. NS, 6*3^{r}; OP, 5*3^{r} (Akkerman 1980, 254, 257). Translation NS: 'It is hoped, though, that it has not been inexpedient to offer this to the learned world, but that it will gratefully accept the publication of these writings, however imperfect.'

2. Tschirnhaus was keenly interested in the TIE, of which Schuller sent him a manuscript copy before the *Opera posthuma* was published (AA 3:2, 381.22–4). The influence of Spinoza's treatise on method is tangible in his own *Medicina mentis* – a work he himself designated as 'tractatum quem conscripsi de Emendatione Intellectus' (letter to Huygens, 11.9.1682; Huygens, OC 8, 386).

Chapter 2
Towards a history of accent-marks in Neo-Latin

2.1 Introductory

Accent-marks, now usually associated with Greek or with French, were once thought of as a feature proper to Latin. An English printing manual of 1683–4, *Mechanick exercises on the whole art of printing* by Joseph Moxon, calls the accented letters the 'Latin sorts'.[1] Evidently, they were considered to be an integral part of Latin orthography. It is only as such that they could serve as a model for French. Those who shaped the spelling of French were bent on emphasizing its affinity with Latin.[2] Thus the scholar and printer Robert Estienne (Robertus Stephanus) did use the grave, acute and circumflex, but he rejected the cedilla, since it was not of Latin origin.[3] It was primarily in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the practice of putting accent-marks in Latin texts was in vogue. In spite of its ubiquity in that period, the phenomenon has so far received little scholarly attention.

Some preliminary remarks are in order. First, as regards terminology: we shall be dealing with diacritical *marks*, i.e. 'accents' as part of Latin orthography. I will not, as a rule, discuss 'accent' in the sense of stress or pitch, i.e. accent as belonging to the field of phonology.[4] Although the two meanings are historically closely related, I will go into matters of pronunciation only when the subject requires it. It is writing, not speech, that we are concerned with now. My second remark regards the *catalogue* of diacritics. I will discuss the vicissitudes of four marks: acute, grave, circumflex and diaeresis. These are the ones regularly found in sixteenth and seventeenth century texts. It is significant that Moxon – who, as a printer, is decidedly practical – also enumerates

1. Moxon 1978 [1683–4], 204.
2. On the spelling of French as influenced by the relationship between Latin and French in the sixteenth century, see Beaulieux 1927, Kukenheim 1932 (11–85, esp. 73), Catach 1968, Citton & Wyss 1989.
3. Beaulieux 1927, vol. 2, 36 (and pp. 24–5 on the introduction of the cedilla by Geoffroy Tory, after Spanish examples).
4. The problem of the nature of phonological accent in Latin has elicited numerous publications. The matter is conveniently summed up in Allen's *Vox Latina* and *Accent and rhythm* (Allen 1989, 83–9; Allen 1973, 151–4). Cf. also Cousin's bibliography of Latin 1880–1948, which contains over four pages on accentuation: chiefly publications on the stress/pitch question, none on diacritical marks (Cousin 1951, 61–5).

these four marks.[1] Other authors, of a more theoretical bent, offer the canonical list of ten accents, which in this form is now thought to derive from the Byzantine scholar Theodosius of Alexandria (fl. c. 400): acute, grave, circumflex, macron, breve, rough and smooth breathings, apostrophe, hyphen, disjunction.[2] The link between these seemingly disparate items is provided by their function in the Greek *scriptura continua* of the Byzantine period: they serve to help a pupil recognize the distinct words of a sentence. Although irrelevant for Latin, this canon was adopted by Latin grammarians from Donatus onwards.[3] The list is merely theoretical and quite useless for the present purpose, since it contains seven signs that were hardly ever used,[4] whereas the diaeresis is conspicuously absent. My third preliminary remark is that I will not go into diacritical devices that are not directly related to the phenomenon now under consideration, such as the ę (*e caudata*: 'e with a tail', equivalent to *ae*) and the cedilla.

It may be useful to point out that the present study is a spin-off of editorial work in Neo-Latin, rather than the result of a systematic investigation. The picture outlined here is bound to undergo alterations and refinements after further research.

2.2 A description of the system

I will now give an overall description of the system as it existed in its fully fledged stage. What follows is a generalization; the actual forms may show a good deal of variation in individual cases.

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1. Moxon 1978 [1683–4], 333.
2. See Laum 1928, 21–30, for the genesis of the Byzantine list. In Epiphanius's Περὶ μέτρων καὶ σταθμῶν (392 CE) we find for the first time four rather different categories of diacritical signs grouped together under the general heading of προσῳδίαι ('accents'): τόνοι or accents proper, χρόνοι or quantity marks, πνεύματα or breathings, πάθη or marks of juncture and disjuncture. The canon is definitively fixed in the fragment Περὶ προσῳδιῶν, now attributed to Theodosius (Laum 1928, 28; cf. Lentz in his ed. of Herodian 1867, XXXXIV). It is especially the inclusion of the πάθη that is sometimes disputed by later grammarians, both Greek and Latin. The number of accents may therefore vary from author to author.
3. Donatus, 'De tonis,' *Ars maior* 1.5 (ed. Holtz 1981, 609–11; ed. Keil 1864, *Grammatici Latini* [henceforth GL] 4, 371–2); cf. Diomedes (ed. Keil 1857, GL 1, 434–5), Pompeius (ed. Keil 1868, GL 5, 132–3); Pseudo-Priscian (ed. Keil 1859, GL 3, 520); Maximus Victorinus (ed. Keil 1874, GL 6, 193–4); Isidore, *Etymologiae* 1.19 (ed. Lindsay 1911). The same list is discussed by many authors of the modern period, e.g. Manutius the Elder (1508, sig. 2a6^{v}), Ch. Estienne (1538, sig. 4^{r-v}), Lipsius (1628 [1586], 52–3).
4. Macron and breve occur only in special contexts, e.g. grammatical or lexical works. Breathings are altogether absent from Latin, although Erasmus (*De recta pronuntiatione*, ASD 1:4, 97) mentions an erratic attempt to introduce them at the expense of the letter *h*. Of the juncture- and disjuncture-marks only the apostrophe is sometimes to be found. Its use is virtually limited to poetry, to indicate elision. (This restricted use is also explicitly recommended by the grammarian Pompeius: ed. Keil, GL 5, 132.15ff.)

2.2.1 *Grave*

The most frequent mark is the grave accent. It generally occurs on the last syllable of many adverbs and on some conjunctions. In this way these forms are distinguished from homonyms or homographs.[1] Thus, adverbs ending in *-e* (*longè*), *-o* (*verò, modò*), *-a* (*unà*), *-um* (*verùm, multùm*) and adverbial comparatives ending in *-ius* are marked as differing from the inflected forms that have the same ending. The same goes for the conjunction *quòd* and the adverb *quàm*, which are distinguished from their pronominal twins by the grave. In addition, the grave accent is to be found on the single-letter prepositions *à* and *è*. As a general rule, we might say that *the grave is the mark of the indeclinable forms*. An explicit statement to this effect is to be found in a sixteenth-century textbook by Mathurin Cordier: 'Accentus grauis [...] Signari solet in fine dictionum indeclinabilium, quae declinatae álibi reperiuntur [...]. Praeterea in quibusdam praepositionibus.'[2] The function of distinguishing between different words or forms is denoted by various Latin terms: *differentia*,[3] *discretio* (or related words: *discernere, discrimen*),[4] or *distinctio* (also *distinctus, distinguere, distinguendi ratio*).[5] I prefer *differentia* as the general term, since both *discretio* and *distinctio* are sometimes used to indicate correct word division.[6]

Taking a closer look at the arguments adduced for the convention of putting the grave mark *differentiae causa*, we find that they fall into two groups: there are those who think of it as a merely orthographical phenomenon, and those who think that it implies a different pronunciation as well. The difference between the two points of view is that the former offers a rigid and the latter a lenient interpretation of the

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1. By 'homonyms' I shall understand words (or forms of the same word) *spelt and pronounced* in the same way but differing in meaning or function (e.g. *quod* pronoun and conjunction, *fructūs* genitive singular and nominative/accusative plural); by 'homographs' words (or forms of the same word) *spelt* in the same way but differing in pronunciation and in meaning or function (e.g. *hĭc* pronoun and *hīc* adverb; *causă* nominative and *causā* ablative).

2. Cordier 1530, sig. A7^{r}.

3. Manutius the Elder 1508, sig. 2a7^{v}; Estienne 1538, sig. 4^{v}; for its sources cf. Priscian, *Inst. gramm.* (ed. Hertz 1855–9, GL 2–3), 4.4.22 (GL 2, 130.6–8), 8.1.5 (GL 2, 372.15–6), 9.1.5 (GL 2, 454.9–13), 14.1.2 (GL 3, 24.18–22); Pseudo-Priscian, *De acc.* 3.14 (ed. Keil, GL 3, 521.35).

4. E.g. Cellarius 1700, 64. These terms are very frequent in the older grammars: cf. Quintilian, *Inst. or.* 1.5.25 (ed. Winterbottom 1970, 33); Diomedes (ed. Keil 1857, GL 1, 433.6); Dositheus (ed. Keil 1880, GL 7, 379.4–5); Priscian, *Inst. gramm.* 14.4.41 (ed. Hertz 1859, GL 3, 47.4–9); Pompeius (ed. Keil 1868, GL 5, 131.1–15); Cledonius (ed. Keil 1868, GL 5, 33.28); Isidore, 1.18.6 (ed. Lindsay 1911, unpaged, l. 17).

5. E.g. Ramus 1970 [1569], 68; Dausquius 1677, vol. 1, 143. For the sources, cf. Donatus, *Ars maior* 1.5 (ed. Holtz 1981, 610.11); Pseudo-Priscian (ed. Keil 1859, GL 3, 520.26).

6. E.g. Sergius (ed. Keil 1864, GL 4, 483–4): 'Accentuum autem saepe dissipat legem [...] distinctio, ut, cum debeat dici sub hyphen malesanus, male quis distinguendo dicat separans male sanus'; Isidore (ed. Lindsay) 1.19.7: 'Diastole, id est distinctio.' For the use of *discretio* and its cognates in this context see e.g. Donatus (ed. Holtz 1981, 611.5): 'hac nota [i.e. diastole] male cohaerentia discernuntur'.

Penultimate Law, as it is called nowadays. This law states that the position of the accent in a Latin word depends on the quantity of the penultimate syllable: if it is long the accent falls on the penult, if short on the antepenult.[1] According to the lenient interpretation, then, there were a number of exceptions to this law. An illuminating example is the chapter on accents in Aldus Manutius's grammar. He goes to great lengths to specify those cases where the law does not apply: 'Non seruatur autem accentus [i.e. the general law of accentuation] modis septem.'[2] First and foremost among the seven conditions that necessitate exceptions is *differentia*, the need to distinguish between words that would otherwise be identical, such as a number of adverbs and their pronominal or nominal twins. Manutius apparently derives these ideas from the traditional grammatical authorities: Donatus, Priscian and Pseudo-Priscian.[3] According to this view, a Latin polysyllabic word could and should be accented on the final syllable, when there is a risk of confusing it with a homonym. It might seem odd that the ultima is accented with a *grave*. This is because the influential Latin grammarians simply applied the rules of Greek accentuation to Latin.[4] According to Greek practice, an oxytone word – i.e. with an acute on the ultima – kept the acute only when standing by itself or when followed by a short

1. Allen 1989, 83: 'the accent in polysyllables falls on the penultimate if this is of heavy quantity, and on the antepenultimate (regardless of quantity) if the penultimate is light.'
2. Manutius the Elder 1508, sig. 2a7^{v}.
3. Aldus's seven factors infringing upon the general law are possibly an elaboration of three such causes mentioned by Pseudo-Priscian: 'tres quidem res accentuum regulas conturbant, distinguendi ratio, pronuntiandi ambiguitas atque necessitas' (ed. Keil 1859, GL 2, 520). The whole passage deals with pronunciations that deviate from the general law. Explicit statements to the same effect are to be found in Donatus's *Ars maior* 2.13 (ed. Holtz 1981, 610.11–2) and Priscian's *Inst. gram.* (ed. Hertz 1855–9, GL 2–3), e.g.: 'differentiae quoque causa multa solent vel taceri vel contra regulam proferri' (GL 2, 372); other examples: GL 3, 27.4–10; GL 3, 47.4–9. There is a hint of this in Quintilian, too, when he discusses (and rejects) the notion that the need to distinguish between words sometimes requires a shift of accent: 'Ceterum scio quosdam eruditos, nonnullos etiam grammaticos sic docere ac loqui ut propter quaedam uocum discrimina uerbum interim acuto sono finiant [...]; quod tamen in aduerbiis fere solis ac pronominibus uindicant, in ceteris ueterem legem secuntur' (*Inst. or.* 1.5.25; ed. Winterbottom 1970, 32–3). Statements to the effect that the laws of accentuation have exceptions for the sake of distinction can also be found in other grammarians. See, for example, Pompeius, *Commentum Artis Donati* (ed. Keil 1868, GL 5, 131): 'nam quando dicimus poné [...], non ideo dicimus, quia sic debet dici, sed ut sit discretio. [...] ideo in ultima syllaba inveniuntur accentus.'
4. Donatus (ed. Holtz 1981), 651.5–6; Priscian: e.g. *Inst.* (ed. Hertz 1855–9), GL 3, 9.20–5, 24.18–22, 27.16–25 (with reference to Donatus and Censorinus), and 132.24–133.2; *Partitiones* XII *versuum Aen.* ed. Keil 1859, GL 3, 467.28–31, 469.8. Priscian's imitation of Greek here is surprising, in view of the criticism with which he opens the introductory letter to the *Institutiones grammaticae* (GL 2, 1.1–6), where he states that Latin scholars consider the Greeks as the source of all linguistic knowledge, and will even imitate their errors.

pause, before punctuation. In the flow of the sentence, however, the acute of the final syllable would be subsituted by a grave.[1]

We find an unorthodox variant of the lenient view in the *Scholae in liberales artes* by Petrus Ramus. He endorses the idea of shift of accent to the final syllable in order to avoid confusion:

> Commutari veró accentus acutus loco potest, ijsdem de caussis quibus veterum accentus mutabantur, metri, interrogationis, distinctionis gratia.[2]
>
> The acute accent may change its place, for the same reasons the accents of the ancients changed: because of metre, an interrogative sentence, or distinction.

Yet Ramus is opposed to putting a grave. Taking his cue from the grammarian Servius,[3] he argues that Latin has only one type of accent, namely the acute. He also draws the practical consequence: in his *Scholae* of 1569 he only uses acute accent marks, no graves or circumflexes.[4]

Justus Lipsius may be cited as an advocate of the rigid interpretation of the Penultimate Law. In his *De recta pronunciatione Latinae linguae dialogus* of 1586, the French humanist Marc Antoine Muret is represented as elaborating his opinions on pronunciation and spelling to Lipsius during their meeting at Rome in 1570. (The designation as a dialogue is hardly appropriate, since Muret's long *sermo* – which takes up the chapters III–XXIII – is only occasionally interrupted by a remark or question from Lipsius.) At one point in his lecture Muret sneers at the (apparently quite popular) assumption that the Latin accent can occasionally shift to the ultimate syllable. He criticizes Latin as pronounced in his days:

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1. In the sentence, the oxytone word was said to change into an ἐγκλινόμενον: see Herodian, ed. Lentz 1867, 551. The question of whether this was indeed true for Greek or not has been the subject of heated controversy. The central thesis of Laum (1928) is that no such change of pitch was implied. According to him, the grave was to be explained as the result of slapdash scribal habits. His theory has not found general acceptance (see the reviews by Hermann 1930 and Debrunner 1929–30; cf. Allen 1988, 125–7; Garde 1968, 93–4). For our purpose, however, the point is immaterial: what matters is that the Byzantine grammarians (and their Latin imitators) took an actual lowering of pitch in ἐγκλινόμενα for granted. Aldus explicitly applies this Greek rule to Latin in his preface to the Θησαυρός, a collection of Greek grammatical works he published in 1496: 'nam ἐγκλινόμενα quae inclinata latine placet dicere [...] ea dicuntur, quae admittunt in fine tonum acutum, conuertúntque in grauem in contextu orationis' (here quoted from the British Library copy G 7630, sig. *3^{r}; also in Orlandi 1975, 12).
2. Ramus 1970 [1569], 68.
3. Ramus calls him Sergius, but the work he is referring to, the *Commentarius in Donatum*, is now generally attributed to Marius Servius (fl. c. 400). The identity of Sergius is uncertain and his name is often confused with that of Servius. Cf. Keil's introduction to his edition of works by Servius and/or Sergius (GL 4, LII–LIV).
4. For his justification, see Ramus 1970 [1569], 67–8. In spite of the traditional terminology, Ramus's point is in fact a novel one, for his argument seems to imply the view that Latin did not have a pitch accent but a stress accent: 'nec enim videtur in nostra voce accentus ullus esse, sed mora tantúm temporis & pausa' (67).

> Cùm enim *Serò, Palàm, Doctè* efferunt, sic efferunt quasi esset *Seró, Palám, Docté*. [...] idque necessarium, vt effatu discernas à *Séro, Dócte*.[1]
>
> For when they pronounce 'sero', 'palam', 'docte', they pronounce it as though it should be 'seró', 'palám', 'docté'. [...] And you must do that, if you want to distinguish them in speech from 'séro' and 'dócte'.

Such a pronunciation is absurd in view of the unambiguous statements by ancient grammarians (e.g. Quintilian) that the ultima of a Latin word is never accented.[2] If, on the other hand, the grave denotes absence of stress, then *séro* and *serò* etc. are simply variant spellings for identically pronounced words. Summing up, Muret thinks the habit of putting a grave on the ultima is misguided. (In § 2.3.2 we shall have occasion to return to Lipsius, who – in spite of this criticism – scrupulously complies with the conventional practice of accentuation.)

2.2.2 *Acute*

The acute accent occurs quite frequently, although it is applied for a single purpose only,[3] viz. to mark words compounded with the enclitics *-que, -ne, -ve*. The idea behind this is that the enclitic suffix supposedly causes the word stress to be shifted to the last syllable of the main word.[4] The acute accent has nothing to do with the quality or quantity of the vowel over which it is placed. Yet it does provide a cue for pronunciation, by indicating the place of the word accent.

When it comes to distinguishing homographs, the acute accent on words compounded with enclitic particles has a modest part to play. In fact, only very few forms are involved, notably those of *quisque* and the common pair *ítaque/itáque*, and certain compounds with *-ne*, which might be mistaken for an ablative singular ending of the third declension. In general, though, there is hardly any danger of confusing such compound words with other forms.

The acute has no fixed position: it is placed either on the accented final syllable of the main word, or on the enclitic itself. A popular notation for the suffix *-que* and its abbreviated form (*-q;*) is to put the acute accent on the letter *q*.

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1. Lipsius 1628 [1586], 60.
2. Quintilian, *Inst. or.* 12.10.33 (ed. Winterbottom 1970, 730): 'ultima syllaba nec acuta umquam excitatur nec flexa circumducitur, sed in grauem uel duas grauis cadit semper.' Quoted by Lipsius 1628 [1586], 57–8.
3. There are, however, types of publications that make a more general use of the acute. Texts printed for didactic or liturgical purposes often use the acute and the circumflex to show the accent on each individual word. Examples are textbooks (such as Cordier 1530, Despauterius 1551), or the countless hymnals, missals and the like printed in the Antwerp Plantin shop.
4. This shift of stress caused by enclitics (and proclitics) is nowadays generally thought of as the only deviation from the otherwise absolute Penultimate Law; e.g. Garde 1968, 103–4. See, however, the note of caution in Allen 1989, 87–8 and Allen 1973, 159–61: the alleged exception may be an erroneous generalization, once again borrowed from the Greek by Latin grammarians.

2.2.3 *Circumflex*

The third diacritic, the circumflex, is found exclusively over long vowels. (There is one possible exception, to which I will presently return.) Its use is independent of the position of the word accent: it occurs on stressed and unstressed syllables. The circumflex has, in the main, a twofold function: the first is to create *differentia* between certain homographs, the second to denote contraction. In addition there is a minor third use, on the interjection *ô*.

(i) The circumflex distinguishes between homographs that differ in pronunciation by the length of the vowel. It is most frequently found over the endings of certain cases: ablative singular of the first declension (*curâ*, against *cura*, nominative); genitive singular (and, less systematically, nominative and accusative plural) of the fourth declension (*fructûs*, against *fructus*, nominative singular). Similarly, among the pronouns we find *eâ, ipsâ, hôc* against *ea, ipsa, hoc*, and by analogy also *hâc*, even though this has no corresponding form with a short vowel. An expansion of this differentiating function is the circumflex found in some texts on the ablative ending in *-ô* of the second declension (*verbô*, as opposed to *verbo*, dative; and by analogy also *eô*, though there is no dative in *-o*). Yet only few authors do this, presumably because the expansion is felt to be illegitimate: the ablative and dative both end in a long vowel. The application of the circumflex to mark case endings is a relatively late phenomenon, surfacing only in the latter half of the sixteenth century. This function also persisted longest: the circumflexed ablative in *-â* even pops up occasionally in fairly recent editions and dictionaries (e.g. in Lewis and Short).[1] Though in many texts the presence of the circumflex is most notable on case endings, this is not its only application. A number of other words that differ from one another in vowel length are also kept apart by means of the circumflex, e.g. the adverb *hîc* against the pronoun *hic*,[2] verb pairs such as *pendêre* and *pendere*, and other homograph forms, e.g. *quôque*, ablative of the pronoun, against *quoque*, adverb.[3] Usage differs considerably from author to author and from printer to printer.

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1. This popular dictionary first appeared in 1879 and later issues are mere reprints of this edition. But the 1879 edition is not an original work: it is a revision of an older lexicon by E.A. Andrews (1850), which in turn is a translation of W. Freund's German–Latin dictionary of 1834–40. This ancestry may account for its tendency to preserve remnants of an otherwise extinct practice.
2. The adverbs *aliâs* and *quî* are in fact instances of sloppy use, since their pronominal counterparts also have a long vowel in their endings. The distinction here is between homonyms, not homographs. This may also explain the occurrence of the alternative spelling *aliàs*, with the grave.
3. Lodewijk Meyer explicitly mentions *pendere* (see chapter 1, above, p. 22). Lorenzo Valla deals with *quoque*: 'Dicimus itaq; primo quôq; tempore, primo quôq; die, quod imperitiores putant esse coniunctionem quoq;, quae habet primam breuem, quum hic sit longa' (Valla 1962 [1540], 19).

A practice that may or may not be related to the first, differentiating function of the circumflex is its occurrence on the alternative forms of the third person plural of the perfect indicative: *incidêre* (alternative form of *inciderunt*) as against *incidĕre*, present infinitive. In the example given here the function is indeed distinguishing.[1] But we often find it on these alternative forms when there is no homograph with a short vowel: *vixêre*, *exstitêre*. The same notation has been attested in medieval and humanistic manuscripts.[2] This indicates that we have before us a remnant of a much older system of accentuation, designed to guide the reader with regard to word stress. The *differentia* in cases like *incidêre* is a fortunate side effect and not, I think, the original reason for the use of the circumflex.

(ii) The second function of the circumflex, and one that has been attested since the beginning of the period under consideration, is to indicate syncope, especially in the contracted variants of the perfect tense: *nôrunt* for *noverunt*; *creâsse*, *judicâsse* for *creavisse*, *judicavisse*, and so forth. Under this heading the archaic brief forms of the genitive plural of the second declension are to be subsumed as well, e.g. *deûm*, beside *deorum*. Formerly, the briefer endings were assumed to have resulted from contraction.[3] According to the present state of knowledge of Latin prosody, the vowel of this archaic ending was short.[4] This particular category, then, would constitute the single exception to the rule that the circumflex marks long vowels. But notwithstanding Priscian's categorical statement that all vowels before final *-m* are short,[5] Latinists in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries probably thought of the quantity of this particular ending as long. We can infer this from Erasmus's dialogue on pronunciation, where he lists the genitives *diuûm*, *deûm*, *numûm* and the accusatives *díuum*, *déum*,

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1. The example is given by Koyré and Cohen in their critical edition of Isaac Newton's *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica* (1972, vol. 1, XXVII), in the 'Guide to the apparatus criticus' (one section of which is devoted to accents – a rare phenomenon in editions). The confusion between the alternative third person plural form of the perfect and the present infinitive arises only in a limited number of verbs: those whose present and perfect stems are identical (e.g. *accendere*, *prehendere* and its composites, *solvere*) and those composites that lose the perfect reduplication of their simple verbs (like *tendere*, *pendere*, *cadere*, *currere*). Several of these verbs are very common.

2. Dell'Era (1983, 3) cites *interseruérunt* from a twelfth-century manuscript (with acute instead of the circumflex earlier manuscripts employed for a long penult before a short ultima). Ullman (1974 [1960], 30) mentions *ruére* (perfect) and *consequére* (future) from a manuscript written by Poggio Bracciolini in 1408. In Pietro Bembo's *De Aetna*, printed by Aldus in 1496, we find the form *constituêre* (sig. B6^{v}). All these forms fit in with the medieval custom to denote word stress (see below, p. 90–1), rather than with the practice to differentiate between homographs, so dear to Neo-Latin authors, scribes and printers.

3. On Cicero's authority: *Orator* 155.

4. Leumann 1977, vol. 1, 428; Allen 1989, 74.

5. *Inst. gramm.* 1.30 (ed. Hertz, GL 2, 23.13–5): 'et numquam tamen eadem m ante se natura longam [vocalem] patitur in eadem syllaba esse, [...] cum aliae omnes semivocales hoc habent.'

núnum among the examples of forms distinguished by quantity.[1] The spelling *-ûm* seems to confirm this: it is difficult to imagine a 'circumflexed' pronunciation of a short vowel. As the circumflex was invariably thought of as consisting of a rising and a falling pitch, it would require two *morae* or 'units of time': one for the rise and one for the fall. With a short vowel, this is unfeasible. Moreover, Greek – *the* model of Latin accentuation – allows its equivalent of the circumflex, the περισπωμένη, only on long vowels and diphthongs. So much for grammatical and phonological theory. As regards prosodic practice, an analysis of the use of this archaic ending in Neo-Latin poetry (where it is frequently used) will not help us to determine the poet's idea of its quantity. Before a vowel, final *-m* will be elided, before a consonant the syllable will be 'long by position', and at the end of the line the ending will be *anceps*, i.e. indifferently long or short.

From the point of view of the system of diacritics, however, the question of quantity is not of overriding importance. Once again, *differentia* is decisive: marked with the circumflex, the ending would be recognized immediately as genitive plural, not accusative singular. The supposed analogy with forms that did arise from contraction (like the compressed forms of the perfect) will have smoothed the path for this spelling.

Finally, the circumflex is also used very generally to mark the interjection *ô*. This usage has already been attested in medieval manuscripts.[2] It may be noted in passing that we have already encountered three single-letter words with an accent: *à*, *è* and *ô*. Now Latin has a fourth word consisting of a single letter: *i*, the imperative singular of *ire*. I have never seen this as *î*, though. There was another way of making it stand out, namely by printing it as a capital. The background of this practice is obviously the Roman *I-longa*, which was used in epigraphy to denote double or long *i*.[3]

2.2.4 *Diaeresis*

The fourth mark to be considered, the diaeresis, is something of an outsider. It does not figure in the Byzantine canon of the ten accents and it is hardly ever discussed by grammarians or writers on orthography. It is sometimes referred to in dealing with metrical issues, but only where syllable division is concerned, not the diacritical mark.[4] Yet the diaeresis is to be treated on an equal footing with the three other signs: it is applied in the same period and in the same texts as the acute, grave and circumflex. We find it when two adjacent vowels are to be pronounced with a hiatus. Examples

1. ASD 1:4, 98.842–3. Cf. also his cursory remark on p. 91 that circumflexes only occur on long syllables.
2. Lowe 1980 [1914], 275.
3. On the *I-longa* see Oliver 1966, 158–70. Interestingly, similar uses of this device are to be seen in Neo-Latin, particularly on title-pages (which generally show a marked influence from classical epigraphy), in the genitive of the author's name, e.g. 'IVSTI LIPSI', 'ERYCI PVTEANI'.
4. E.g. Quintilian 1.5.17–8; Servius, *Ad Aen.* 7.464 (ed. Thilo, vol. 2, 160.5–9); Isidore 1.35.4.

are *aër*, *vacuüm* and *coëgi*.[1] The sign, also known as *puncta diaereseos*, is a syllabic accent (i.e. it separates syllables),[2] reaching back in form and function to the ancient Greek τρῆμα.[3] The position of the diaeresis is unfixed: most authors (scribes, compositors) have a preference for placing it over the second vowel, but occurrences on the first vowel (*vacüum*) are not uncommon either.

2.2.5 *Rationale of the system*

The system of diacritics as we find it in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in full bloom, is heterogeneous with regard to its principles. It distinguishes between homographs, but it does not do so comprehensively and systematically. It distinguishes between homonyms and therefore also often between parts of speech, especially by marking adverbs, but this function is not applied in a consistent fashion and it is far from being comprehensive. The diacritical system sometimes offers a cue for pronunciation, by signalizing shift of stress or by marking a long vowel, but it certainly is no general guide to pronunciation. Nor does the system seem designed to be comprehensive in these respects.

What, then, *is* the purpose of this system? I would suggest that it serves *to offer the reader clues to grasp the overall structure of a Latin period on sight*. In order to achieve this, the system need neither be comprehensive nor consistent. All it must do is follow certain conventions with which the reader is familiar and which provide, scattered over the sentence, information about stereotypic grammatical and syntactical particulars. That will suffice, even if this information is inconsistent and incomplete.

The system of diacritics, then, is primarily a reading aid – and, we might add, one that presupposes a specific audience. The first and foremost characteristic of that audience is a fair proficiency in reading Latin. Without that, the diacritics will be of no use. On the other hand, those who had a thorough command of the language could easily have read it without such aids. Scholars often regarded the diacritics, somewhat condescendingly, as props for amateurs and schoolchildren.[4]

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1. Without a hiatus, combinations of two different vowels would result in 'diphthongs' – although they would have been *pronounced* as diphthongs only in classical times. In late Latin, *ae* and *oe* became monophthongized, and in Medieval Latin the distinctions between *e*, *ae* and *oe* were blurred. Neo-Latin restored the difference in writing, but continued to pronounce an identical monophthong. It may be remarked in passing that the diaeresis on *ae* and *oe* is usually redundant in printed texts up to the nineteenth century. In view of the almost general use of ligatures (*æ*, *œ*), printing the letters separately would suffice when a hiatus was intended.
2. As against diacritical and tonic accents. For this distinction see Catach 1968, 38 n. 20.
3. Schwyzer 1968, 149.
4. Cf. Erasmus on the difference between parts of speech, which ought to be familiar to anyone with a little schooling (ASD 1:4, 98): 'Sit hoc sane perspicuum mediocriter eruditis; at frequenter sic incidunt vt semidocti labantur, docti nonnihil haesitent. An non rectum fuerit illorum errorem, horum conatiunculam exiguo redimere?' If we are to believe the critics of accentuation, the schools were particularly bent on inculcating the system of diacritics in the pupils: 'Videmus

A second aspect to be considered with regard to the Latinity of the period is that texts were still often read aloud. This was an activity that required a sound knowledge of vowel quantity and the word accent depending on it. In late antiquity, quantitative differences in Latin broke down. Consequently, the position of the word accent had to be learned. This gave rise to the medieval *artes lectoriae* and related writings.[1] Accent-marks also gave readers something to hold on to in a number of dubious cases.

Thirdly, the output of Latin books in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is most impressive. Perhaps more Latin was read than ever before or after that period. Neo-Latin readers generally wanted to gain information from their reading, rather than aesthetic pleasure; their reading would therefore be fast and cursory. The point may be illustrated with a quote from Justus Lipsius:

> Qui aberrauit ab itinere, quærit *com*pendio ad viam duci, no*n* per amæna loca circumagi: idem in hoc scribendi genere est, necessario potius, quàm pulcro.[2]
>
> He who goes astray wants to be led to the road by a short cut, and not be taken round charming places. The same goes for this sort of writing, which is essential rather than beautiful.

For this specific audience, then, reading aids such as accent-marks must have been very useful. That the diacritics were meant to enable a reader to grasp the structure of a period on sight is confirmed by witnesses who were keenly interested in them by virtue of their profession: the correctors of the press. I shall quote two instructive examples. The first is a poem, *Orthographiae Latinae querimonia*, by Cornelius Kilianus, lexicographer and corrector in Plantin's shop. Kilianus urges that diacritics are to be used only when required by the matter itself, or in doubtful cases, as well as to prevent the reader from getting stuck:

> Accentus, apices, diphthongos, denique quidquid
> Esse superuacuum, paruiq́ue putabitur vsus;
> Hebræis, Græcis, quorum hæc inuenta, relinquant:
> Hisce nec vtantur, nisi cùm res postulat, aut cùm
> Tollendi causa dubij, haerentemq́ue iuuandi
> Lectorem, in primis censebitur esse necessum.[3]
>
> Accents, *apices*, diphthongs, in fine whatever is considered redundant and not very customary, should be left to the Hebrews and the Greeks, whose inventions they are. They

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enim ita pueros adsuefieri, vt ablatiuos casus & aduerbia & alias voculas, coniunctiones præsertim, apicibus obliquis, aut in acutum angulum concrescentibus, quasi summa Latinitas in iis consistat, imponant' (Cellarius 1700, 62).

1. Kneepkens & Reijnders, in their edition of Siguinus 1979, XXVII. On the *artes lectoriae* see below, p. 90.

2. Lipsius 1585, *Epist. quaest.*, 192.

3. Kilianus 1972 [1599], 765. Why the diphthongs figure here is unclear to me. Perhaps the poet needed the word for the metre, for the concept is only vaguely related to the issue at hand.

are not to be used, unless the matter requires it, or when one feels especially obliged to remove something that may cause doubt, and to help the reader who gets stuck.

My second example is a remarkable booklet, published in Leipzig in 1608. It is the first manual for correctors professionally employed by the printing houses, and at the same time the first stylebook for authors, telling them how best to prepare their copy for printing. The work is written by Hieronymus Hornschuch, himself a corrector, and it bears the title 'Ορθοτυπογραφία, *hoc est instructio operas typographicas correcturis et admonitio scripta sua in lucem edituris utilis et necessaria* ('Orthotypography, that is: an instruction for those who correct printed works and a useful and essential guidance for those who want to publish their writings'). He is very much in favour of using accents, 'ut primo statim intuitu sensus ex parte deprehendatur' ('to ensure that immediately on first sight the sense can to some extent be grasped'). For, he continues, 'I do not think there is anyone who at times in his reading has not had trouble with the word *eadem* (usually found at the beginning of a sentence), or has not noticed that others have difficulty when listening; because it could not be grasped instantly whether the middle vowel was to be pronounced long or short.'[1]

2.3 Sources of the diacritical system

I will now give a concise (and therefore necessarily simplified) account of the historical origins of the component parts that make up the system described above. The survey will deal with three sources on which scholars and printers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries drew in constructing their own system: Greek accentuation, the Roman *apex*-system, and medieval conventions. Of these three, the first had the largest impact: Greek accentuation was the constant model for Latin from the days of Varro onwards. The influence of the other two sources consists in modifications to this basically Greek heritage.

2.3.1 *Greek accentuation*

Aristophanes of Byzantium, an Alexandrian librarian of the early second century BCE, is generally credited with the introduction of diacritical marks in Greek. Originally the system was applied on a limited scale only: in editions of Homer and other classical poets, it offered visual guidance where the reader might conceivably be led astray.[2] It distinguished between homographs and marked word-boundaries – Greek texts were written in *scriptura continua* at that date. Aristophanes's system is said to have been developed further by his successor Aristarchos of Samothrace, the teacher of the

1. Hornschuch 1972 [1608], 33. The English quotations are from the facing translation by Gaskell and Bradford.
2. Laum 1928, esp. 99–118 (part 3) on the invention of the system, and p. 451 on its function.

grammarian Dionysius Thrax. The latter's Τέχνη γραμματική, which is the first Greek grammar, also contains a section on accents.[1] The principal work on Greek accents was written in Rome under Marcus Aurelius (and reputedly at his request[2]) by Herodian, the son of Apollonius Dyscolus. Of Herodian's comprehensive work Περὶ καθολικῆς προσῳδίας only fragments have come down to us.[3] By the time of Herodian, the original system had already been expanded to include quantity marks and breathings as well.[4] The addition of the πάθη (signs of juncture and disjuncture: hyphen, apostrophe and 'diastole') is a fourth-century development. The system originally initiated by Aristophanes was applied less and less consistently and it was finally replaced by another system, using the same diacritical marks in a different manner. The new accentuation system was shaped by Byzantine scholars, notably Theodosius of Alexandria. It is the method of Greek accentuation we still use. Early Byzantine practice differed from ours only in frequency. Initially, Greek texts were but sparsely supplied with accent marks. Full and systematic accentuation is found only centuries later.[5]

The Romans were well acquainted with the Greek accents. Their terminology concerning accentuation consists entirely of calques from the Greek: *accentus* from προσῳδία, *acutus* from ὀξεῖα, *gravis* from βαρεῖα, *flexus* or *inflexus* or *circumflexus* from περισπωμένη.[6] But it should be noted that the passages in classical Latin literature where these terms are used in treating Latin accentuation deal with pronunciation, not with orthography.[7] According to W. Sidney Allen, it 'is inconceivable that Latin should have developed a system of melodic accentuation that agreed in such minor detail with Greek, and we can only assume that the grammarians have slavishly misapplied the Greek system to the description of Latin.'[8] However this may be, the classical Latin authors have no inclination to imitate the Greek accents in writing. There are only some vestiges of them to be found in Latin texts, and these are extremely rare.[9]

The treatment of accents in the Latin grammatical tradition depends entirely on Greek models. The beginning of this tradition has come down to us only in a piecemeal fashion. There are some damaged fragments of Varro, some cursory remarks

1. Vendryes 1938, 8–9.
2. Schwyzer 1968, 7.
3. The fragments have been edited by Lentz in 1867.
4. Laum 1928, 23.
5. In the ninth and tenth centuries according to Laum 1928, 18; in the seventh century according to Vendryes 1938, 6.
6. See Allen 1973, 86; Perini 1964, 5–8.
7. Varro, ed. Funaioli 1907, 300–6; Cicero, *Orator*, 173 and 57–8. (Cf. Perini 1964, 11–5.)
8. Allen 1973, 151.
9. Oliver (1966, 142) mentions fifth-century fragments of Vergil and Juvenal (intended for school children in Egypt) that were accented in the Greek fashion. The Juvenal fragment is dealt with by Wingo (1972, 25–7).

in Quintilian and Gellius; and we know that accents were also treated by Palaemon, Censorinus and Charisius.[1] The tradition as we know it may therefore be said to begin with Aelius Donatus, whose chapter 'De tonis' had a considerable impact on the further history of accentuation in Latin.[2] From Donatus onwards, the accents are dealt with by many grammarians: Diomedes, Dositheus, Servius, Sergius, Martianus Capella, Pompeius, Cledonius, Priscian, Audax, Maximus Victorinus, Isidore.[3] The most elaborate treatment is to be found in the *De accentibus liber*, a work traditionally attributed to Priscian. We know neither the author nor the date of composition of this influential text. Some scholars believe it goes back to Priscian himself or to an even earlier author, while others are convinced that the work is of a very late date.[4] From

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1. The fragments on accent by M. Terentius Varro (116–27 BCE) have been reconstructed and published by Funaioli 1907, 300–6. The contents of the *Ars grammatica* by Q. Remmius Palaemon (first half of the first century CE) have been described by Barwick, who supposes that the work contained a section on accent as well (Barwick 1922, 156, 268). For Quintilian (c. 35–95) see *Inst. or.* 1.5.22–33, 12.10.33 (ed. Winterbottom 1970, 32–4, 730). The scholars and grammarians taken to task by Quintilian in 1.5.25ff. for distinguishing between homonyms by means of different accents are thought to include Palaemon: see Barwick 1922, 268. Aulus Gellius (first half of the second century) has a remark on accents in *Noct. att.* 13.6.1: ed. Marshall 1968, 388. Of the treatise *De accentibus* by Censorinus (third century), mentioned by later authors (e.g. Priscian, *Inst. gramm.* 14.1.6, ed. Hertz, GL 3, 27.23–4), nothing has survived. Charisius's *Ars* (middle of the fourth century) is still extant, but it has been transmitted with some lacunae. One of the gaps is the section 'de accentu et posituris' (see GL 1, 5.9). On its presumed contents see Barwick 1922, 48–50.

2. In the edition by Holtz 1981 the chapter 'De tonis' is on pp. 609–11. (Also in GL 4, 371–2.)

3. Diomedes grammaticus (fourth century), ed. Keil 1857, GL 1, 430–61. Dositheus (end of fourth century?), ed. Keil 1880, GL 7, 377–80. Fragment from *Codex Bobiensis*, ed. Keil 1874, GL 6, 274–5. Servius (fl. c. 400), ed. Keil 1864, GL 4, 426–7. Sergius (fifth century?), ed. Keil 1864, GL 4, 482–4, and presumably also the so-called *Sergii fragmenta Bobiensia* (cf. Holtz 1981, 429), ed. Keil 1880, GL 7, 539–40. Martianus Capella (fifth century), *De nuptiis* 3.268–73, ed. Willis 1983, 71–4. Pompeius (fl. c. 500), ed. Keil 1868, GL 5, 125–33. Cledonius (fl. c. fifth century), ed. Keil 1868, GL 5, 31–3. Priscian (fl. c. 500): his treatise *De accentibus* (referred to in *Inst. gramm.* 17.6.40, ed. Hertz, GL 3, 133.1–2) is lost. Pseudo-Priscian (date unknown), *De accentibus liber*, ed. Keil 1859, GL 3, 519–28. Audax (fl. sixth century?), ed. Keil 1880, GL 7, 329–31 and 357–61. Maximus Victorinus (fl. sixth century?), ed. Keil 1874, GL 6, 192–4. Isidore of Seville (c. 570–636), *Etym.* 1.18–9, ed. Lindsay 1911. The passages cited here, and the complex relationships between them deserve a detailed analysis, but that falls outside the scope of the present inquiry. Let me just add two remarks on the selection and order of the grammarians listed. (i) For Neo-Latin authors, Isidore represents something like the outpost of Latin grammatical theory. As a rule, they cite no later authorities. (And when Isidore is referred to at all, the tone is often slighting, after Lorenzo Valla called him 'Hisidorus indoctorum arrogantissimus' in his *Elegantiae* of c. 1440: quoted in Padley 1976, 17). I have so far made no systematic study of the reception of classical accentuation theory in later medieval grammars. For a complete picture of the continuity of the tradition, however, such an investigation is certainly required. (ii) When applicable, I have adopted the chronology proposed by Holtz (in his 1981 edition of Donatus, pp. 427ff.), but there are many uncertainties.

4. Keil, who edited the text in 1859, categorically rejected the attribution to Priscian. He judged

the eleventh century onwards, Priscian slowly began to supplant Donatus as the primary grammatical authority. Thanks to its spurious attribution, the *De accentibus liber* shared in the rising popularity of this grammarian from Constantinople, a trend brought out also in the sharp increase in the number of manuscripts after 1100.[1] Its authenticity was called into doubt as early as c. 1200, by Hugh of Pisa.[2] Still the work was included, as a matter of course, in the editio princeps (1470) and in the further twelve or so incunabula containing Priscian's works,[3] and it has retained a place in the corpus of that author up to the present day.

2.3.2 *The Roman apex*-system

A second source for the Neo-Latin practice of accentuation is the classical Latin *apex*-system. The Latin alphabet has relatively few letters and must therefore be used efficiently. This frugality is one of its strengths: it accounts at least in part for the unrivalled dissemination of this alphabet. On the other hand, it necessitates the introduction of diacritical marks, when distinctions are to be represented for which the existing letters do not suffice. Already in classical Latin the limited supply of letters, more particularly of vowel signs, made itself felt.[4] Crucial in this respect is the fact that *vowel length* is phonemically significant in Latin, i.e. it serves to distinguish between different words. The earliest notation of long vowels in Latin was *gemination*

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the style to be characteristic of a much later date (GL 3, 400–1). Passalacqua calls it (in her 1987 edition of Priscian's *Opuscula*, p. VIII) 'Questa operetta sicuramente non priscianea'. No manuscript evidence of it predates the eleventh century (La Conte 1981). The *communis opinio* now seems to be that the work is spurious. Not all scholars, however, preclude the possibility that Priscian had a hand in it – after all, he did write something on accents: 'de quibus in libro, qui est de accentibus, latius tractavimus' (GL 3, 133.1–2). It has even been suggested that it may be older than Priscian. Holtz suggests (in his 1981 edition of Donatus, p. 243): 'Aussi est-il vraisemblable que nous avons entre les mains soit l'ouvrage de Priscien lui-même (peut-être remanié?), soit l'œuvre d'un de ses élèves, soit une œuvre antérieure à Priscien.' Cf. Helm 1954, 2342: 'die ursprüngliche Arbeit Priscians sei von einem andern exzerpiert und durch Überarbeitung entstellt worden'. If Fontaine (1959, 70-1) is right in postulating that Isidore used the text, that would fix the *terminus ante quem* as early as the beginning of the seventh century. In the face of this bewildering incongruity of scholarly opinion, I will refrain from a conclusion. Perhaps fresh material will be brought to light in the new critical edition announced by Passalacqua, as an additional part of her edition of Priscian's minor works (cf. the first volume: Priscianus, ed. Passalacqua 1987, IX).

1. La Conte 1981, 109; Passalacqua, ed. of Priscian 1978, p. VIII.
2. 'Preterea si in libro De accentibus inveniatur quod videatur nostre assertioni contrarium, dicimus illum librum non esse authenticum, nec credimus eum compositum esse a Prisciano, vel si a Prisciano compositus est, ibi secutus est opinionem aliorum circa predicta' (Hugh of Pisa, ed. Cremascoli 1978, 71.63–77). Hugh of Pisa died in 1210.
3. Hain 2:2, nos. 13353–65; Flodr 1973, 257–9 (who mentions fourteen incunabula of Priscian's *Opera* and two more editions of the *De accentibus* together with Donatus); Gibson 1977.
4. Cf. Niedermann 1908.

of the letter.[1] Around 100 BCE, a new device was introduced: a graphic symbol over the letter, to indicate that it was to be read twice. This sign, *geminationis nota* or *signum geminandi*, was later called *apex*. Its form varied: a slanted line, sometimes straight, but more often curved. This compact way of denoting gemination had obvious advantages, especially for inscriptions, and the *apex* was very generally used during well over two hundred and fifty years.[2]

Neither the origins nor the disappearance of the *apex*-system have been explained satisfactorily. It was not until the nineteenth century that its function was properly understood. After its disappearance there were no attempts to revive it, despite its obvious advantages.[3] Being extinct and little known, the system cannot have contributed directly to shaping the Neo-Latin diacritical system we are examining now. There is, however, an important indirect link, and that is Quintilian. In a renowned passage on how to use the *apex* he argues that it is nonsense to put it over every long syllable, since most cases are self-evident. Only where homographs are involved, the *apex* has a role to play:

> longis syllabis omnibus adponere apicem ineptissimum est, quia plurimae natura ipsa uerbi quod scribitur patent, sed interim necessarium, cum eadem littera alium atque alium intellectum, prout correpta uel producta est, facit: ut 'malus' arborem significet an hominem non bonum apice distinguitur, 'palus' aliud priore syllaba longa, aliud sequenti significat, et cum eadem littera nominatiuo casu breuis, ablatiuo longa est, utrum sequamur plerumque hac nota monendi sumus.[4]
>
> It is very foolish to put an *apex* on every long syllable, since the majority of them are obvious by the very nature of the word that is written. But sometimes it is necessary, viz. when the same letter gives rise to different senses, according to whether it is short or long. Thus, whether 'malus' means a tree or a bad man is distinguished with an *apex*; 'palus' has different meanings depending on whether the first or the second syllable is long; and when the same letter is short in the nominative and long in the ablative, this sign should generally prompt us which of the two cases to adopt.

Quintilian's recommendations, for that matter, were never implemented in his own days.[5] The *apex* was a sign used to indicate gemination of the letter, not to mark homographs. It is likely that Quintilian got the idea from Greek practice. The Alexandrian accentuation system (then still current) did indeed serve to distinguish

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1. Oliver 1966, 152–5. The invention of this device is often attributed to Accius (170–c. 85 BCE), but Oliver thinks it is much older. He also notes that gemination remains in vogue for a long period, citing examples from the third century CE.
2. The basic literature on the subject is Oliver 1966. According to him (p. 131), 'The apex is found in thousands of inscriptions, and also in the few surviving papyri and wax tablets, of the last six decades of the Republic and the first two centuries of the Principate, after which it becomes increasingly rare.'
3. Martin L. West (1973, 82, n. 8) is an isolated counter-example.
4. *Inst. or.* 1.7.2-3 (ed. Winterbottom 1970, 49–50).
5. Oliver 1966, 132–4.

between forms that were identically written, and Quintilian must have seen Greek papyri accentuated according to this system. His own attempt, however, to reform the native Roman *apex*-system along these lines foundered.

Let us have a closer look at the passage just quoted. The three examples mentioned by Quintilian are noteworthy: *mālus* 'apple tree' against *mălus* 'bad man',[1] *pālus* 'stake' against *pălūs* 'marsh', and the *distinction between nominative and ablative.* This last distinction is precisely the favourite use of the circumflex from the last quarter of the sixteenth century onwards. It is evident that scholars of that period interpreted Quintilian's remarks in terms of the diacritical system then current and that they saw fit to develop their system accordingly. They did so by introducing the circumflex to denote the ablative ending of the first declension, and, by analogy, to the genitive singular and nominative and accusative plural of the fourth declension.

Can we pinpoint the beginning of this practice? The earliest occurrence that I am aware of – but please note that this reflects my personal reading rather than any systematic research – is in a collection of Lipsius's critical works of 1585: *Opera omnia quae ad criticam proprie spectant.* The book was published by Plantin and it contained some new material – prelims and end-pages, introductory matter, laudatory poems, and book two of the *Electa* – besides reprints of five treatises previously published.[2] An intriguing detail in this collection is that it consistently prints the ablative in *-â* with the circumflex in all the new material, whereas this accented ending is just as consistently absent throughout the material that had already been published earlier. We may witness here, within this single book, a change in Plantin's house style. The compositor presumably had in front of him two different sorts of copy: older, printed material, with unaccented ablative endings, and new, handwritten copy, with *-â*. In view of the close collaboration between Lipsius and the *Officina Plantiniana*, it is not inconceivable that this change in house style was inspired by Lipsius himself.

Lipsius's interest in this particular aspect of orthography is confirmed by a passage in his *De recta pronunciatione Latinae linguae dialogus*, published only a year later. There his interlocutor (or rather mouthpiece) Muret enumerates ten rules that together make up the universal law of Latin accentuation, ostensibly taken from Quintilian, whose influence is pervasive in this text.[3] The ninth of these rules states that a Latin word can never have an acute or circumflex on its ultimate syllable.

> Caput IX. firmat, Latinis Tenorem primarium in vltimâ dici aut scribi numquam. Hoc Capella, hoc Priscianus, hoc omnes tradiderunt. vt iure mirer tam vulgò peccare nos hoc peccatum. Egoipse nónne in eâ naui? etiam hîc, vbi damno. sed non tam inscitiâ quam comitate, qui do me & permitto siue Typographis siue vulgo. *Metâ, Castâ,* & similia scribo

1. Quintilian's lasting influence can be seen from the recurrence of these examples, e.g. Lodewijk Meyer 1666, 16: '*Malum*, pomi genus, & infortunium'.
2. Voet 1980–3, vol. 3, nos. 1550A–B; cf. Breugelmans 1975, nos. 81–2.
3. Lipsius 1628 [1586], 58: 'paucis omnino verbis vniversam Accentuum legem complexus sit idem ille doctor [viz. Quintilian],' after which the ten rules are listed.

discriminandi caussâ, quoniam Apicum vsus diu perijt, nec restituo primus ego. At pro Apice mihi (semel testor) nota illa flexa seruit.[1]

The ninth point establishes that the Latins never put the primary stress on the last syllable, neither in speech nor in writing. This point has been taught by [Martianus] Capella, Priscianus and all the rest. Hence I am rightly surprised that we violate it so collectively. But am I not in the same boat myself, even here where I censure? I do this, however, not out of ignorance but only to oblige, as a favour and a service to the printers or the common people. I write 'metâ', 'castâ' and the like, for the sake of distinction, seeing that *apices* have fallen into disuse long ago – nor am I the first to revive them. But I declare once and for all that I use the circumflex sign for the *apex*.

The passage is illuminating for several reasons. Firstly, Muret acknowledges that the accent-mark on the final syllable is a discriminating graphic device only, not reflecting the position of the accent in pronunciation. Secondly, he explicitly states that the ancient Roman *apex*-system lies behind this diacritic mark (in spite of its circumflex form). Finally, Muret himself did not introduce this spelling. My suggestion, then, is that the practice of denoting certain case endings (first and foremost the ablative singular of the first declension) with a circumflex began at some date after the middle of the sixteenth century[2] and that it became an established feature of Latin spelling by the turn of the century. Its acceptance will have been greatly advanced by the example of influential printing houses like Plantin and the approval of scholars like Lipsius.

2.3.3 *Medieval conventions*

From its earliest appearance, the diacritical system included accents on three single-letter words: a grave on the short forms *à, è* of the prepositions *ab* and *ex*, and a circumflex on the interjection *ô*. This practice derives from medieval writing conventions. Manuscripts from the ninth century onward sometimes mark the prepositions *a* and *e*, as well as the interjection *o*, with an oblique stroke, much like the acute.[3] These three single-letter words could easily be misread as prefixes. Even after the so-called Carolingian reform of writing, which reintroduced the systematic

1. Lipsius 1628 [1586], 60. The passage continues with the interesting attack on the disgraceful practice of putting *graves* on ultimate syllables of adverbs and conjunctions, already referred to above (p. 76).

2. Oratio Lombardelli (1566, 30–2) complains about the use of the circumflex in his days. According to him, it should serve to indicate vowel length in otherwise identical forms. From this, and from the examples he quotes, one would be tempted to infer that the use of the circumflex to denote the ablative had not yet come into fashion at that date. Unfortunately, Lombardelli's treatment of accents is not reliable in its details, so this information should perhaps not be accepted without qualification either.

3. Beaulieux 1927, vol. 2, 6. Beaulieux does mention the dates (ninth to eleventh centuries) and the shelf marks, but he is not explicit about the provenance of the manuscripts. They seem to be mainly of French origin.

division of words after centuries of *scriptura continua*,[1] the practice with regard to prefixes and prepositions remained unsettled. They were either separated from or linked to the following word; the latter being the more common option.[2] The oblique stroke to denote a preposition was in that case still a useful device. Humanistic writing continued this tradition. So did the early printers, but with a difference. Influenced by the Greek system, the prepositions receive the diacritic that marks them as indeclinable, the grave; and the interjection is spelt with the circumflex.

2.4 Accent-marks before the advent of printing

Perhaps the most difficult question about the system of accentuation we are considering is the problem of continuity or discontinuity. Does it derive from an earlier system, like the ones found occasionally in medieval or humanistic manuscripts, or was it a reinvention, prompted by the advent of printing? There are indications that the custom of placing accent-marks in Latin texts, though unclassical, is of venerable old age. As early as the fourth century, the Latin grammarian Diomedes described accentuation in terms that show familiarity with diacritical marks in writing:

> accentus quidam fastigia vocaverunt, quod *in* capitibus litterarum ponerentur; alii tenores vel sonos appellant; non nulli cacumina retinere maluerunt.[3]
>
> Some people have called the accents 'peaks', because they are put on top of the letters; others call them 'stress' or 'pitch'; some others again have preferred to adhere to 'pinnacle'.

An unbroken continuity, from Roman times to the Middle Ages, was postulated by Charles-François Toustain and René-Prosper Tassin. In their monumental *Nouveau traité de diplomatique* of 1750–1765 they remark that Roman inscriptions offer various examples of accents, and they comment: 'Les mss. n'ont presque jamais cessé d'en faire plus ou moins d'usage.'[4] Their treatment of accents, however, is disappointing. They

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1. 'It was evidently during the Second Century that there took place in Latin *Buchwesen* one of the most astonishing cultural regressions of ancient history. Within that century *interpuncta* [= points indicating word division] and regular punctuation disappear, *apices* become rare and sporadic, and lines become solid blocks of *scriptura continua*. For this amazing and deplorable regression one can conjecture no reason other than an inept desire to imitate even the worst characteristic of Greek books.' R.P. Oliver, 'The first Medicean MS. of Tacitus and the titulature of ancient books', in *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 82 (1951), 232–61; this quotation p. 242. (Here quoted from Wingo 1972, 16.) For the emergence of *scriptio continua* towards the end of the first century CE, see also Parkes 1992, 10. Parkes, for that matter, has pointed out that word division had already been reintroduced by Irish scribes long before the Carolingian reform of writing (p. 23; and more extensively: Parkes 1987 – an article that is also published in Parkes 1991, 1–18).
2. Ullman 1980, 211–2.
3. *Ars gramm.* lib. 2, ed. Keil 1857, GL 1, 431.3–5.
4. *Nouveau traité* 1750–65, quotation vol. 2, 209; treatment of accents vol. 3, 479–82.

fail to distinguish between Greek accents, Roman *apex* and a variety of diacritical and punctuation marks in medieval manuscripts, as well as between practical application and grammatical theory. Unfortunately, Toustain and Tassin do not always specify where they got their examples from either.

There was a lively interest in matters relating to pronunciation, stress and accentuation in the Middle Ages. The main reason for this was the custom of reciting Latin texts aloud, in liturgical and monastic settings. Stressing Latin words correctly requires some knowledge and training, and this gave rise to the medieval genre of the *ars lectoria*.[1] Pseudo-Priscian's treatise *De accentibus* – drawn upon by Alexander de Villa Dei for the chapter on accents in his *Doctrinale* – enjoyed a great popularity. Did all these precepts encourage scribes to employ the corresponding signs when copying out Latin texts? The passages Isidore of Seville devoted to accents and punctuation in the first book of his *Etymologiae* have been explained as explicit instructions for apprentice scribes.[2] Several scholars have observed that in the Middle Ages Latin texts were sometimes provided with accent-marks. In 1914 Elias Avery Lowe (or Loew) described the accent-marks he had seen in a great number of Beneventan manuscripts.[3] According to Lowe, accents are current in Beneventan manuscripts from about 900. He distinguishes two main periods. In the first, during the tenth and part of the eleventh century, we find two marks: the acute and the circumflex. They are placed in accordance with the rules for pronunciation laid down by the Latin grammarians. The circumflex is placed over long monosyllables (*mê, hîs, ô*) and over a long penult followed by a short ultima (*pertinêre, istîus, filiôque*); the acute over short monosyllables (*án*) and over the antepenult (*spirítibus*). In the second period, from the middle of the eleventh century onwards, only one accent-mark remains: the acute, placed over any stressed syllable, whatever its quantity. Lowe enumerates six categories of the use of the acute. Among these is the stressed syllable before enclitic *-que* – a convention that persisted into the eighteenth century, as we have noted.[4]

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1. Such as Aimericus, *Ars lectoria* (ed. Reijnders 1971–2), Siguinus, *Ars lectoria* (ed. Kneepkens & Reijnders 1979), John of Garland, *Accentuarium sive Ars accentuandi* or *Ars lectoria* (no complete edition available), Hugh of Pisa, *De dubio accentu* (ed. Cremascoli 1978). Cf. also Thurot 1868, especially pp. 392–407. For John of Garland, see Kukenheim 1951, 46 (but note that his information (p. 136) on the manuscript is incorrect); Glorieux 1971, 211, no. 235, item *e*; and cf. above, chapter 1, p. 22, n. 2.

2. *Etym.* 1.18–20. See Fontaine 1959, 59–60: 'La formation des copistes le [= Isidore] préoccupe assez pour qu'il n'ait pas négligé de donner un exposé de différents types des signes encore en usage'.

3. Lowe 1980 [1914], 274–7.

4. Another spelling cited by Lowe which seems akin to the later ('humanistic') accentuation system is the ablative *eádem*. The resemblance is, however, accidental. It is only late in the sixteenth century that the custom establishes itself to distinguish between nominative and ablative by means of an accent-mark, viz. a circumflex. The eleventh-century Beneventan *eádem* is an unrelated instance, like the only other occurrence before the late sixteenth century that I have seen: *eâdem*, in Benedetti's *Diaria de bello Carolino*, published in Venice by Aldus Manutius in

Lowe's findings have been supplemented with similar results for the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.[1] Accent-marks have been uncovered outside the Beneventan tradition, too. In a recent history of punctuation, M.B. Parkes reproduces a page from a South German manuscript, dating from the end of the eleventh century, which shows a fully fledged system of diacritics. It looks like a cognate of the Beneventan system.[2] W. Wattenbach mentions instances of medieval accentuation in his *Anleitung zur lateinischen Paläographie*, but unfortunately without information about provenance and dates.[3] Accent-marks have also been observed by Franz Steffens. According to him, insular manuscripts frequently make use of them.[4] These manuscripts only have one diacritical mark, shaped like an acute. Steffens notes that the mark initially behaves like a descendant of the old Roman *apex*: it is placed over long vowels only. Later its application is expanded to monosyllables, short words and prefixes, irrespective of vowel quantity. One of its applications is over the preposition *á*, when joined to the ensuing word: *áme, ásuis*. (This usage is not specifically insular, though: see § 2.3.3.)

In *The origin and development of humanistic script*, Berthold Ullman describes the gradually increasing use of accent-marks by humanistic scribes. The spellings he quotes are reminiscent of the medieval instances, but they also bear resemblance to the system employed by Aldus Manutius in what I think is the first appearance of the marks in print (see the next section). Ullmann only mentions one type of accent: the acute.[5] Gilbert Ouy has drawn attention to the use of the acute by the French humanist Nicolas de Clamanges in the early fifteenth century.[6] An interesting development later in that century is the differentiation between acute and grave. The first instance of this

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1496 (sig. e8^{r}).

1. Dell'Era 1983, 1–7.

2. Parkes 1992, plate 66. The manuscript (Schaffhausen, Stadtbibliothek, Ministerialbibl. 19) was produced for the monastery of Allerheiligen at Schaffhausen (now in Switzerland) between 1080 and 1096. On the page reproduced by Parkes (fol. 171) we can spot the forms *cóniuge, núribus, inuenîmus, íntuens, próvidens, nominátius, cállidus, rémanens, feruêre*. This corresponds with early Beneventan usage as described by Lowe 1980 [1914], 275. (There is also a sign on the names *sem, iaphet, chanaan, cham*, which looks like a circumflex. I surmise that this is a *diple*, used to mark quotations and other notable items in a text. Lowe does, however, list foreign words among the categories marked with an acute in the later Beneventan system: p. 276, no. 4.)

3. Wattenbach 1886, 96: 'Accente zur Anleitung des Lesers finden sich schon im IX., vorzüglich in Büchern welche zum Vorlesen bestimmt waren wie Legendarien, ´ und ^. Namentlich wurden auch die Praepositionen á und é, gewöhnlich mit dem folgenden Wort zusammengeschrieben, zur Unterscheidung so bezeichnet.' The symbols given by Wattenbach in his – partly handwritten – book can only be approximated in print.

4. Steffens 1964 [1929], XV. Examples can be found in the plates 50 and 71a. As regards insular practices, see also Lowe 1980 [1914], 276, n. 1; and Parkes 1987, 19.

5. Ullman 1974 [1960]. Accented words, as mentioned on pp. 30, 31, 34, 36, 40, 41, 45, 48, 73, 81, 96, 108, 117: *á, abutére, ádhuc, consequére* (fut.), *é, éadem* (nom.), *eó, illó, illó, impendére, itáque, ó, palám, patére, pené, stabiliréque, quó, ruére, uná, argentóve*.

6. Ouy 1987, 171–2. See also the second appendix to this article, on the orthographical theory of Oswald, a Carthusian monk of the first half of the fifteenth century (accents: pp. 191, 200).

was pointed out to me by Jean-Louis Charlet, who is working on a critical edition of Niccolò Perotti's *Cornu copiae*. The manuscript of this work was written in 1467–9 by Perotti's secretary. It contains additional notes in the handwriting of Perotti himself. Both hands fairly consistently put accents on the following words: *á, é, ó, unà, eò, ergò, ferè, planè, ponè*.[1] This is already close to the system found in printed texts at the turn of the century.

The material presented here suggests that the accent-marks may well have a continuous tradition. There are, however, many lacunae and uncertainties. It is also conceivable that the practice was reinvented from time to time, on the authority of the same Latin grammarians. One of the problems in this context is the symbiosis of manuscripts and printed books in the fifteenth century. In the words of Curt F. Bühler, with regard to book-production the fifteenth century 'was one of the most curious and confused periods in recorded history, containing within it elements of both the old and the new'.[2] Scholars and printers may have introduced the system in printing after having seen instances of accentuation in medieval manuscript sources, assuming that the practice was of ancient lineage. Renaissance scholars who went hunting for manuscripts tended to overrate their age, sometimes dating them to Roman times – the notorious *codices vetustissimi* invoked by early editors of classical texts.[3] Even if the system can be shown to derive from manuscript practice, it should still be emphasized that its introduction in printing was a deliberate act. It required the casting of special letters, that were unknown in the early stage of the development of the printing press. Diacritics interfere with the many abbreviation signs that characterize early printing. Even after the system is firmly established, it is never applied in texts printed in black letter. Its appearance seems to be closely linked to the roman and italic printing types. As the first real roman type was introduced by Sweynheim and Pannartz in 1467,[4] I would suggest that this year is the *terminus post quem* for the introduction of diacritics in printed texts.

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1. Private communication from J.L. Charlet, 22 June 1990. The manuscript of *Cornu copiae* is kept in the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome, shelf mark Urb. lat. 301. So far, one volume of the edition has been published (Perotti, ed. Charlet & Furno 1989).
2. Bühler 1960, 15. On the relationship between manuscripts and printing, see also Reeve 1983 and Hirsch 1978, no. XV.
3. For the humanist assessment of the age of manuscripts and the appurtenant terminology, see the fascinating discussion in Rizzo 1973, 147–67 (as well as the entries 'codex' and 'exemplar' in the 'Indice delle parole'). Among the adjectives employed we find *mire vetus, vetustus, vetustissimus, pervetus, antiquus, antiquissimus*. The terms were not used wholly indiscriminately: there were classifications assigning terms to more or less specific periods.
4. Clair 1976, 37–8, 111.

2.5 The introduction of accents in printing: the case for Aldus

Aldus Pius Manutius (c. 1450–1515) is renowned as a creative genius in typography. It is therefore hardly surprising that the first use of accents in printed Latin texts has been attributed to him. I have lighted upon two apparently independent traditions both of which credit him with the introduction of diacritics in printing. In 1700 Christophorus Cellarius published an *Orthographia Latina*, in which he declared apodictically: 'Aldus Manutius auus sensim apices admisit: eiecit rursus nepos eiusdem nominis, Paulli filius'.[1] ('Aldus Manutius the Elder gradually let the accents in; his grandson and namesake, the son of Paulus, threw them out again.') Cellarius does not explain how he came by this information. Secondly, the accents are attributed to Aldus by Charles Beaulieux.[2] In his *Histoire de l'orthographe française* of 1927, he maintains that Aldus inspired French humanists like Geoffroy Tory and Robert Estienne to place accent-marks in their Latin and French writings. The influence was twofold: there was the example of the Aldine editions, and the theoretical legitimation they found in Aldus's Latin grammar. Presumably, Beaulieux arrived at this attribution after having studied a vast number of early printed books, but no arguments are given.

These attributions, then, are to be treated with reservation. There is, however, circumstantial evidence that Aldus was indeed the first printer to have experimented with diacritics in Latin texts. The evidence comprises three elements. (i) The earliest printed book in Latin with accent-marks, as far as I have been able to establish, is Pietro Bembo's *De Aetna*, published by Aldus in 1496.[3] (ii) Aldus certainly experimented with diacritics and punctuation in the final five years of the fifteenth century. (iii) There is ample proof for his preoccupation with accents.

(i) *De Aetna* by Pietro Bembo is a dialogue between 'Petrus Bembus filius' and 'Bernardus Bembus pater' (indicated as B.F. and B.P.). Aldus Manutius published it in February 1496; the colophon gives 1495, Venetian style. In this book, Aldus for the first time uses the roman type cut for him by Francesco Griffo.[4] It is generally considered a landmark in the history of typography. *De Aetna* is also Aldus's first publication that is entirely in Latin. He had set up as a printer and publisher since the

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1. Cellarius 1700, 69. Why Aldus the Younger is mentioned here, too, will become apparent in the next section.
2. Beaulieux 1927, vol. 2, 19–20.
3. This finding differs from earlier publications on the subject. Beaulieux (1927, vol. 2, 19–20) says that he found accents in Aldine impressions from 1505 onwards and that Aldus gave the rules for this accentuation in his grammar, whose first edition Beaulieux wrongly dates in 1508. Catach 1968, in many ways an attempt to update Beaulieux's study, does not go beyond the latter's account of the origins of Latin accentuation, although she moves back the date of its introduction: 'l'impression du *Virgile* d'Alde en 1501 [...] inaugure l'usage des accents en Latin' (Catach 1968, 73; cf. also 31–5).
4. Type 114 R, as described in the British Museum *Catalogue of books printed in the* XVth *century* vol. 5, pp. 551, 554.

beginning of 1495, but so far he had only issued Greek books. These sometimes contained one or two pages in Latin, but those passages are unaccented. (There is an undated bilingual edition, in Greek and Latin, of Musaeus's poem *Hero et Leander*, which complicates the chronology. The Greek sheets are from November 1495, but the Latin parts – which do have accents – were probably printed later than the Bembo book, possibly as late as 1497.[1])


contrahatur. B. P. Magnum
exordium inceptas fili; ac iam planè uix
credenda ſunt iſta, quae dicis: uerum,
qui ita fiat, explana id etiam mihi.
B. F. Faciam, ut iubes: ſed opus
eſt ante, q illò ueniam; ut aliqua te prae
doceam déq; inſulae, déq; montis natu
ra; quibus cognitis ad ea, quae poſtu-
las, recta pergemus uia. B. P.
Age, ut libet; modo ad illa etiam alí-
quando ueniamus: quin etiam mihi fe
ceris gratiſſimum; ſi ea lege inceperis,
ut nequod pulchrum praetereatur; ſiue
uidiſti aliquid, ſiue audiuiſti, ſiue quid
es ipſe commentatus. B. F. Ego
uero (ſi placet) iter tibi noſtrum omne
ordine ipſo, quo factum eſt, recenſebo;
téq; a Meſſanae menibus uſq; in Aetnae
cacumen perducam. B. P.
Placet, et cupio: incipe igitur; uiámq; ip
ſam omnem reminiſcere, et tanq recur-
re, ſi potes. B. F. Agam ſe

Illustration 4. Petrus Bembus, *De Aetna ad Angelum Chabrielem liber*. Venice: Aldus, 1495 [= 1496]. Cambridge University Library, Inc. 4.B.3.134 [4580], sig. A6^{r}. (Reproduced by permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library.)

Accent-marks are used throughout his edition of *De Aetna* (see illustration 4). There are acutes over the syllables before enclitic particles like *-que* and *-ne*,[2] graves on

1. British Museum *Catalogue*, vol. 5, 552–3.

2. Examples in the illustration: *déque* l. 7, *téque* l. 18, *uiámque* l. 20. Elsewhere occasionally over the abbreviated enclitic itself: *neq;* (A4^{r}), *scholasq;* (A8^{v}). The enclitics are treated explicitly in the preface Aldus wrote for his Greek *Thesaurus* of 1496, and there (sig. *3^{r}) he enumerates five of

certain adverbs (*planè* l. 2, *illò* l. 6). The circumflex is scarcely used: it occurs mainly on the inflected forms of *crater*. These features recur in the accentuation system that comes into fashion in the sixteenth century. But Aldus also has spellings that were to go out, like *ánte* (l. 6) and *alíquando* (ll. 10–1).[1] The prepositions *a* and *e* occur occasionally in *De Aetna*, but they do not carry accents.

In the Latin texts printed by Aldus after *De Aetna* accent-marks receive a somewhat different treatment. In the case of enclitic *-que*, the acute more frequently moves to the right, to end up above the letter *q*.[2] Similarly, enclitic *-ue* sometimes becomes *-úe*. (I have seen no instances of an acute on the *n* of the particle *-ne*, though.) This tendency to move to the right looks like an imitation of manuscript practice: in writing from left to right, accents and dots do tend to end up to the right of the letter they belong to.[3] The prepositions *a* and *e* are systematically provided with a grave from August 1496 onward – at least in those texts that are accented. For in 1499 Aldus publishes also some books that have no or hardly any accent-marks. Among these we find his celebrated edition of Francesco Colonna's *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili*, and the *Cornu copiae* of Perotti.[4] Another diacritic employed in the early Aldines (but not in *De*

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them: *-que*, *-ue*, *-ne*, postpositive *-cum* and *-uersus*. He himself uses accents in all these cases.

1. The form *alíquando* is problematic, since by grammatical standards the accent is wrong here: the penult is long by position and carries the word stress. Yet Aldus intentionally put an accent on the antepenult. He explicitly vindicates this in his Latin grammar, when dealing with the categories that necessitate an exception to the general rules. The shift to the antepenult comes in under the heading 'ambiguitas': 'ad euitandam amphibologiam, ut intereáloci, alíquando, síquando, néquando, Déinde, éxinde, périnde, próinde, súbinde, dúntaxat, quae antepenultimam acuunt, ne duae partes esse putentur' (Aldus Manutius 1508, sig. 2a7^{v}). His point is that without an accent on the antepenult a reader would run the risk of detaching the component parts of these words. Unclassical though this may be, Aldus merely expands the notion of *ambiguitas* as explained in Donatus (1.5; ed. Holtz 1981, 610.8–10) and Pseudo-Priscian. The latter comments (ed. Keil 1859, GL 3, 520.32–6): 'ambiguitas vero pronuntiandi legem accentuum saepe conturbat, siquis dicat interealoci: qui nescit, alteram partem dicat interea, alteram loci, quod non separatim sed sub uno accentu pronuntiandum est, ne ambiguitatem in sermone faciat.' The spelling *alíquando* does occur in medieval manuscripts, but there its function is different: the alleged acute here is the ancestor of the dot over the letter *i*. See Dell'Era (1983, 4), who cites the same form and comments: 'La strada tuttavia comincia ad aprirsi all'uso indifferenziato dell'acuto su qualsiasi *i*'. In expanding the notion of *ambiguitas*, Aldus may have been inspired by such medieval spellings.

2. This is also a very common position in the accentuation system of the sixteenth and seventeenth century. I have seen instances that went even one step further: e.g. *easq;́* (in Benedetti's *Diaria*, published by Aldus in 1496, sig. h6^{r}); *fortesué* (Ficino's translation of Iamblichus, published by Aldus in 1497, sig. d1^{r}), *Præcipuæqúe* (Christianus Furnius, *Carmina scholastica*, probably published in Maastricht by J. Bathen, 1553, sig. F2^{v}, l. 7 from bottom; reproduced in Van Boheemen, Van der Lof & Van Meurs 1986, 43, pl. 22).

3. In printing, this shifted position has the fortuitous advantage of allowing the combined use of grave and acute (e.g. *verèq́;*) or abbreviation signs and acute (e.g. *eãq́;* = *eamque*). Both phenomena do occur, but they are very rare indeed.

4. Surprisingly, for the manuscript written by Perotti's secretary, with authorial additions, did

Aetna) is an experimental hyphen, whose shape – not unlike an inverted capital omega – corresponds to the description Aldus himself gives of it in his chapter on accents.[1] This in turn draws on antique grammatical sources; the hyphen belonged to the canonical list of ten accents.

The realization of the accents is divergent in the various Aldine editions. It looks as if the marks were sometimes cast together with the letter on one piece of type, and at other times they were separate pieces, joined to the letter by kerning. In some texts, for example *De Aetna*, most marks are placed right above the appropriate letter, and the acute and grave are distinctly diagonal. In other books, like *Hero et Leander*, the 1500 Lucretius and the *Rudimenta grammatices Latinae linguae* of 1501, the accents are placed more to the right, and acute and grave are almost vertical and thereby indistinguishable. Griffo cut several different versions of his roman type, and he apparently also tried different techniques to get the accents right – that is, versatile and applicable wherever needed, but at the same time smoothly integrated into the general appearance of the printed page.

After 1500 Aldus's system seems to have taken its final shape. His renowned series of classical Latin texts in octavo, the *libelli forma enchiridii*, is provided with diacritics. The series was immensely successful: the books were easy to handle, beautifully printed and issued in a large number of copies. Their influence on the subsequent history of the typographical presentation of Latin can hardly be overestimated.[2]

(ii) Aldus's most prominent contributions to the renewal of printing and typography are his Greek books, the introduction of italic type and the use of the portable octavo format for literary texts. But he worked out new solutions on other levels, too. In the period 1495–1500, Aldus is experimenting with the typographical possibilities and limits of various diacritical and punctuation signs, in both Greek and Latin. As regards his achievements in Greek printing, Nicolas Barker comments: 'it is hard to think of a comparable display of combined artistry and technical ingenuity since the triumphant conclusions of the first experiments of Gutenberg.'[3] His success in solving the problem of neatly fitting the accents on the Greek letters earned him a laudatory poem by Marcus Musurus.[4]

In *De Aetna* several signs are tried out. There is a tiny sign that looks like a globule with a tail; for example above *fili* (illustration, l. 2). Its function is unmistakably to mark the vocative – a case which occurs profusely in this dialogue. I found it also in three other Aldines: two from 1496 (the *Thesaurus* of Greek grammarians, and

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have accents, and so did Aldus's second edition of the work in 1513.

1. This chapter is included for the first time in the third edition, called *Institutionum grammaticorum libri quatuor*, of 1508. On sig. 2a6^{v} the hyphen is labelled 'subunio' and depicted as the lower half of a circle; on sig. 2a8^{r} 'hyphen', described as 'uirgula subincurua'.
2. Lowry 1979, 142–3.
3. Barker 1985, 89–90.
4. Quoted by Firmin-Didot 1875, 549–50.

Benedetti's *Diaria de bello Carolino*) and one from 1497 (Maiolus's *Epiphyllides*). After that, the sign vanishes, as far as I have been able to find out. A sign reported by Wattenbach may be an instance of the same phenomenon.[1] Taking its form and its function into account, a connection with the exclamation mark seems a reasonable guess at first sight.[2] Perhaps the vocative sign of Aldus is an intermediate stage in the development of the exclamation mark, which reaches its final form only when it is introduced into printing in 1529. An argument against this hypothesis is that Aldus himself deals with the exclamation mark in his Latin grammar, without any allusion to the vocative. Other tentative interpretations of the caudate globule are a neume or a stylized letter *o*. The latter explanation is the most attractive one, sinces a small *o* to indicate a vocative apparently was a normal practice in thirteenth-century manuscripts.[3] That Aldus went to the trouble of having Griffo supply such a sign, only to drop it after a year, is an indication that he was experimenting with diacritics.

The experimental character of *De Aetna* also emerges from such novel features as the semicolon, apostrophe and parentheses. The semicolon originated in the circle around Bernardo and Pietro Bembo. Not surprisingly, it makes its debut here. In the Greek system of accentuation, the apostrophe was one of the ten received marks; it here appears in print for the first time. Coluccio Salutati was among the first to employ parentheses. In their rounded shape they appear in 1470 in printed texts.[4]

(iii) Why should anyone spend so much energy in experiments of this kind? In a fine study of Aldus in his capacities of both scholar and entrepreneur, Lowry describes him as 'almost morbidly sensitive about grammatical accuracy and correct pronunciation.'[5] Before setting up as a publisher, he had been tutor in the service of

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1. Wattenbach (1886, 91): 'Hartmann Schedel s.XV ex. setzt ein ähnliches Zeichen als Ausrufungszeichen über das betr. Wort: *Angeline,* u. aehnlich ein humanist. cod. Goth. c.a. 1500.' The sign at issue, above the letters *-ge-* in *Angeline*, cannot be reproduced typographically.

2. The exclamation mark (*punctus exclamativus* or *admirativus*) is thought to have originated in humanistic circles in the latter half of the fourteenth century. According to Parkes (1992, 49), its invention has been claimed by Iacopo Alpoleio da Urbisaglia. It is, however, unclear who was the author of an *Ars punctandi* in which the exclamation mark was first proposed; see Ullman 1963, 35, 111. It has been attributed, wrongly, to Petrarca; Ullman takes Coluccio Salutati to be its author. The earliest instance of the exclamation mark is to be found in a manuscript by Salutati from 1399; Parkes 1992, pl. 30, reproduces a page from this manuscript. For references to this new sign by some grammarians (including Aldus), see Greidanus 1926, 212, 216–8, 222. For the introduction in printing by Lefèvre d'Étaples, see Catach 1968, 75–6 and Vezin 1990, 443–5.

3. Private communication from Peter Binkley, 9 October 1994.

4. For semicolon and parentheses, see Parkes 1992, 49–50 and plates 30–1; for the apostrophe p. 138, note 75 (where the introduction in printing is wrongly dated 1501; it already occurs in *De Aetna*, sig. $A8^{v}$).

5. Lowry 1979, 62. Aldus was 'fascinated by language' (61, 65), 'meticulous to a fault' (62) and wholly obsessed by problems of correct usage (63); always 'crouched in an attitude of intense concentration over some minute problem of linguistic usage' and concerned 'with microscopic

the Pio family (hence his honorary second name). In that quality he composed a Latin grammar and a short treatise on accentuation for his pupils. The grammar was first published in 1493, by Andrea Torresani, who was to be his business partner and father in law later on, and Aldus published the work himself in 1501. The third, expanded edition contained for the first time an important chapter 'de accentibus', in all likelihood the treatise he had written for his pupils. This text does not teach us a great deal about the placing of accent-marks: it is a motley collection of precepts, borrowed for the most part from Donatus and Priscian, for Latin pronunciation. During Aldus's lifetime, the grammar went through a fourth edition, in 1514. His Greek grammar appeared posthumously.

It would be a mistake to interpret this preoccupation solely as a personal quirk. Wholly devoted to the humanistic ideal of a restoration of classical letters, Aldus was well aware of the challenge posed by the printing press. The literature of antiquity was to be restored to life in a medium that had only come into existence half a century before, and that was still eagerly looking for standards. The distribution of huge numbers of identical copies of a text also burdened printers with all sorts of problems as to design and form. Rules and models were urgently needed; the invention of printing may well have been the incentive to put into practice (again) the old precepts given by grammarians. Conversely, the products issued by the printing press themselves established new standards for orthography, punctuation and other aspects of the presentation of Latin texts. It seems that Aldus had precisely the sort of character to which such challenges would appeal.

In establishing these standards, the humanists would of course try to draw as much as possible on classical sources: inscriptions, coins, purported *codices vetustissimi*, as well as the precepts of the ancient grammarians. These sources were not always assessed correctly, and as a result the humanists dovetailed elements from divergent periods into a system of their own. This can be seen for example in their renewal of writing: a roman letter inspired by Carolingian handwriting, an italic that is a class of its own, capitals borrowed from Roman inscriptions. The accents fit this picture. Aldus's direct examples may have been humanistic and medieval manuscripts. Yet he would not have followed these unless he thought that he stood in a venerable, classical tradition. For this idea, he could draw on Greek practice and the tendency of Latin grammarians to describe their own language in Greek terms. He can also have seen old manuscripts and interpreted their spellings as authentically classical.

My conclusion is that the accent-marks were either introduced by Aldus himself, or at any rate were ensured wide diffusion and acceptance in the following centuries by his example and authority.

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questions of language and antiquity' (64). Cf. also Ferrigni 1925, 53–61.

2.6 Obsolescence

It is a curious fact that from the second quarter of the eighteenth century diacritics rapidly vanish from printed Latin texts. The process is very uneven, but by the end of the century accents appear to be the exception rather than the rule. With hindsight we can perceive that it was humanistic research into classical Latin that brought about the downfall of this unhistorical orthography. The movement *ad fontes* and the scrutiny of ancient inscriptions made humanists keenly aware of the examples they had to follow in reforming their spelling and pronunciation of Latin. The first to raise objections of principle to the use of accents (as Cellarius also stated) was Aldus Manutius the Younger, grandson of Aldus Pius Manutius and son of Paulus Manutius. In 1561, at the age of fourteen, he published his *Orthographiae ratio*. This is the very first entry:

> A, PRO AB, *sine accentu scriberem, tum ex antiqua consuetudine, tum etiam, quia Graecae linguae potius, quàm Latinae uidentur accentus conuenire. quòd si quando recipiendi, tunc uidelicet, cum sententiam patefaciunt. ideoque doctis quibusdam uiris assentior, qui quòd, & quàm, ne pronomina uiderentur, interdum, apice suprascripto, notabant. at in a, pro ab; et in e, pro ex; & in o, si accentum addas, nihilo magis, quid significet, ostendes. confirmant nostram opinionem Quinctilianus, libri, lapides omnes.*[1]
>
> I would write 'a' (for 'ab') without an accent, not only because this is in accordance with ancient practice, but also because accents seem to be suitable to Greek rather than to Latin. If they are to be admitted at all, it is only when they reveal the sense. I therefore agree with some scholars who occasionally marked 'quòd' and 'quàm' with a superscript *apex*, lest they are taken for pronouns. But if you add an accent in 'a' (for 'ab'), in 'e' (for 'ex') and in 'o', you do not reveal anything more of the meaning. This opinion of mine is confirmed by Quintilian and all the books and stones.

This guide to spelling was very influential, especially in the shortened version entitled *Epitome orthographiae*, which was first published in 1575.[2] Yet the accents proved to be tenacious.

The next serious attack came from Claudius Dausquius (or Dausqueius), whose *Orthographia antiqui novique Latii* first appeared in Tournai in 1632. The book was hardly noticed until a monumental reprint was issued in Paris in 1677, under the title *Orthographia Latini sermonis vetus et nova*. It contained several chapters on the accents, arguing that the practice was unclassical, for both Greek and Latin; that the system was insufficient and incoherent, since it discriminated only between a very limited number

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1. Manutius 1561, sig. 4^{r}. Cf. also sig. 55^{r} for a general remark on accents, and 36^{v} for an attack on the spellings *paenè, ferè, sanè, fermè, profectò*.
2. Renouard 1825, vol. 3, 178–9, 184. The *Epitome* was often reprinted and re-edited. Plantin, too, published the work several times, and it is interesting to see that in the 1579 *Epitome*, edited by Petrus Hegelundus, the entry 'A, pro ab' is neutralized by an editorial note pleading for the use of accents (Manutius 1579, 9). For the Plantin editions of the work, see Voet 1980–3, vol. 4, nos. 1629–31.

of words and forms in an inconsistent fashion; and that the context offers enough guidance in ambiguous cases.[1]

Despite the pertinent criticisms launched by Manutius the Younger and Dausquius, the practice of printing and writing diacritics in Latin continued throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Apparently, schoolmasters and printers were influential enough to perpetuate the habit, notwithstanding scholarly resistance. The arguments put forth by Dausquius against the diacritical system – falsification of historical spelling, inconsistency, insufficiency, redundancy – were repeated by Christophorus Cellarius, in his *Orthographia Latina* of 1700, and by Johann Georg Walch in his *Historia critica Latinae linguae* of 1729.[2] They intensified the attack in a polemical vein, adding many new examples and quotations. In the eighteenth century, the diehard practitioners of the diacritical system finally began to give way, cornered, as it were, by these repeated attacks.

Another factor that may have contributed to the decline is the gradually decreasing importance of Latin as the common language of scholarly communication. As Latin became more and more the province of specialists, there was a growing aversion to the convention of placing accents. Classical scholars deemed it schoolmasterly and amateurish. One paradigm of Latinity was replaced by another: the baroque image of Latin was ousted by a more austere successor, one that banished accents, capitals and other superfluous ornaments from the texts.

2.7 Who put the accent-marks in the text?

Since the presence or absence of an accent may from time to time resolve an ambiguity or lead to a variant reading, it is important to know who was responsible for putting these signs in a particular text: author, scribe, compositor or corrector? As a rule of thumb, we might say that accents, like other 'accidental' features of a text,[3] are the

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1. Dausquius 1677, vol. 1, pp. 141–5 and 147–[9] (149 misnumbered as 146); vol. 2, p. 1.
2. Cellarius 1700, 62–70; Walch 1729, 300–6. This is the *editio nova* of Walch's book; there is nothing on the subject in the first edition, which appeared in 1716.
3. The distinction between 'substantives' and 'accidental readings' is important from the point of view of transmission: W.W. Greg, who introduced the terms, rightly stressed that a scribe or a compositor will generally endeavour to reproduce an author's words (or substantive readings) faithfully, but will tend to adapt spelling, punctuation and other accidentals to the conventions then prevailing (see Greg 1966, 376–7). The distinction has been criticized from a theoretical point of view (Vonhoff 1990, especially 73–5, 83), but the issue is eminently practical. Gaskell (1984, 3) states the case admirably: 'In matters of textual detail and typographical presentation an author may or may not have had intentions for his work so much as expectations. The printers and publishers of works of literature have always acknowledged a duty to set the words of their copy in type as exactly as possible, without change, omission, or addition; but at the same time they have considered it equally their duty to ensure that the spelling, capitalization, italicization, and contraction of the printed transcript should accord with the standards and

domain of the scribe or typographer rather than of the author. There are subtle distinctions, though, even between the various categories of accidentals. Thus, a compositor would use acceptable spelling variants as an aid to justification.[1] In a Latin text, he would in a certain period have the liberty of choice between, say, *æ* and *ę*, or between *-que* and *-q;*. Accent-marks were of no use in justification, and interfering with them required knowledge of both Latin grammar and the contents of the text at hand. Such editing as was needed with regard to the accentuation would therefore usually be carried out before the copy reached the compositor. In the case of the printing of Latin, the usual procedure seems to have been that a scribe in the employ of the printer made a fair copy.[2] The corrector would also be involved in preparing the text for the compositor, as Hornschuch informs us. I have the impression that, as a result of this, the accents eventually found in the printed text are in the majority of cases due to the printer's house style, and do not reflect authorial spellings. On the other hand an articulate minority of authors were particularly bent on getting their own spellings into the printed text and some publishers were willing to oblige them. One example is offered by Plantin's instructions to his correctors in 1608, which contain an unusual stipulation:

> Orthographia vniuscuiusque lingue serio obseruetur, illa vero que a Doctis et peritis Authoribus in manuscriptis est exarata non negligatur [...].[3]
>
> The spelling of each language is to be strictly observed, taking into account, however, what learned and experienced authors write in their manuscripts.

The conclusion must be, then, that the author's part in providing a text with accent-marks differs from case to case and will have to be assessed for each author apart, if not for every single text.

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conventions of their own time.' This will hold true if we widen the notion of printers and publishers to include scribes and keyboard operators (cf. Gaskell 1985 [1972], 344) as well. If we are to understand what happens when an author's text is committed to another party for its transmission, we cannot afford to neglect the distinction between substantives and accidentals. This does not in any way imply that accidentals should matter less to the modern editor than substantives, as Vonhoff seems to think.

1. Gaskell 1985 [1972], 345.
2. Binns 1990, 399; Janssen 1989, 33 (and cf. above, chapter 1, p. 21).
3. Vervliet 1959, 100.

Chapter 3
Lodewijk Meyer's catalogue of the passions (1670): between Descartes and Spinoza

3.1 Introductory

In the ancient struggle between poetry and philosophy – already depicted by Plato[1] – the human emotions constitute one of the major bones of contention. From times immemorial, passions are the stuff that dramatists have shaped their plays from. In the history of philosophy, on the other hand, they seem generally to have been viewed with disfavour[2]. Although not all philosophers squarely rejected the passions, the preponderant philosophical attitude may with some fairness be summed up thus: since the passions may be detrimental to reason, they constitute a problem and should accordingly be overcome or even eradicated. In early modern times some philosophers begin to realize that a wholesale rejection of the passions is an embarrassment rather than an asset to them in their attempt to account for human conduct. Juan Luis Vives's *De anima et vita* (1538) may serve to illustrate this changing attitude. He regards the passions as resulting from faculties that Nature has bestowed on us for the pursuit of good and for the avoidance of evil:

> Ergo istarum facultatum, quibus animi nostri præditi a natura sunt ad sequendum bonum, vel vitandum malum, actus dicuntur affectus sive affectiones, quibus ad bonum ferimur, vel contra malum, vel a malo recedimus.[3]
>
> So the actions of those faculties with which nature has provided our souls in order to follow good or avoid evil, are called affects or affections, and they lead us towards good or against evil, or make us retreat from evil.

And in the seventeenth century, Francis Bacon frankly acknowledges that, when it comes to describing and analysing the passions, poets and historians have a good deal more to teach us than philosophers.[4]

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1. *Republic* 10, 607b. On this topic, see Gould 1990.
2. Cf. Michel Meyer (1991) for a general sketch of the philosophers' troublesome relationship with the passions. Spinoza stated the case thus (TP 1, § 1; G 4, 267): 'Affectûs, quibus conflictamur, concipiunt Philosophi veluti vitia, in quæ homines suâ culpâ labuntur; quos propterea ridere, flere, carpere, vel (qui sanctiores videri volunt) detestari solent.'
3. Vives, ed. Sancipriano 1974, 456.
4. *De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum* 7.3 (Bacon, *Works* 1, 733–4). The passage can also be found in Bacon's earlier English version, *The advancement of learning* (*Works* 5, 21).

Such a conciliatory attitude was not only to be found in the philosophers' camp: among literary authors, too, we find some cautious attempts to turn the new philosophy to their advantage.[1] This is exemplified by the text which I would like to consider here: a chapter entitled 'Vande Hartstoghten' ('On the passions') in a Dutch work on poetics, written around 1670. The book in question, *Onderwys in de tooneel-poëzy*, i.e. 'Instruction in the poetics of drama,' was a work of collective authorship by members of the society *Nil volentibus arduum*. There were several personal unions between this society or 'kunstgenootschap' and the circle around Spinoza.[2] *Onderwys in de tooneel-poëzy* has recently been re-edited by Ton Harmsen, with a very useful and thorough commentary. It consists of forty chapters written by ten different authors, among whom were two of Spinoza's best friends: Lodewijk Meyer and Johannes Bouwmeester. The authors were apparently dissatisfied with their manuscript. At any rate, the idea of publishing it was abandoned; it was only in 1765 that it was printed for the first time.[3]

Chapter 30 of this book is a catalogue of the passions, written by Lodewijk Meyer. The manuscript contains no information about the authorship of the different chapters, but the authors have been identified on the basis of the minutes of the society. The original minutes are no longer extant, but excerpts of them, which have survived, have been published by B.P.M. Dongelmans in 1982. Meyer's chapter on the passions was discussed in the 53d meeting of the society, on Tuesday, 16 December 1670.[4]

The chapter on the catalogue of the passions is a document of outstanding interest for students of Spinoza: although written around 1670, seven years before the publication of the *Opera posthuma*, it indubitably contains some borrowings from the theory of the passions set forth by Spinoza in the *Ethica*. Evidently, Meyer had access to the *Ethica* in manuscript form at an early stage and did not hesitate to turn this to his own advantage. I will first give a survey of Meyer's theory of the passions, as set forth in chapter 30 of *Onderwys in de tooneel-poëzy*. It contains a good deal of obvious yet unacknowledged borrowings from Descartes, as well as from Spinoza. The scope of the present inquiry is a restricted one. I have not attempted to chart all the influences that contributed to Meyer's eclectic theory: my focus of interest is primarily his relationship with Spinoza. For a balanced account further investigation of the literature of the period is called for. There are elements in Meyer's thought that seem to point to sources he had in common with other sixteenth- and seventeenth philosophers, and they merit closer attention than they can receive here. The general background of any theory about the passions has through the centuries been the second book of

1. On the interaction between philosophical and literary views of the passions in the seventeenth century, see Rotermund 1968.
2. See Meinsma 1980 [1896], 439–42; Thijssen-Schoute 1954; 1989 [1954], 355 ff. and 410 ff.; Van Suchtelen 1987.
3. See Harmsen's introduction to his 1989 edition of *Onderwys*, pp. 1–4.
4. Dongelmans 1982, 52.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. It dominates the classification, arrangement and approach of vastly divergent currents of thought. Lodewijk Meyer himself rarely borrows directly from Aristotle: he is more interested in what the new philosophers have to say. Yet on a more general level Aristotelian influences are unmistakable in Meyer's writings.[1] They are mediated by his training in academic, scholastic philosophy, and by the common textbooks of rhetoric. That Meyer's thought is rooted in scholasticism can be seen from the avalanche of quotations in his *Philosophia S. Scripturæ interpres*, and from the spirit of taxonomy pervasive in his writings. Within the framework of the present inquiry, these influences will only be touched upon incidentally.

3.2 The general definition of the passions

Meyer begins with a general definition of the passions: '*De Hartstoghten zyn ongewoone beweegingen van't Hart, door de begrippen van goedt of kwaad veroorzaakt, en vande Ziel gewaar geworden*'[2] ('the passions are extraordinary motions of the heart, caused by the notions of good or evil, and perceived by the soul). In other words: the soul senses in the heart an abnormal motion, induced by its own previous conception of a thing as either good or bad. Perhaps Meyer drew up this general definition himself; so far, I have not found a direct source for it, neither in the handbooks of rhetoric and of poetics (through which classical theories of the passions were widely disseminated in the seventeenth century),[3] nor in the philosophical literature of the period. It does, however, demonstrate an affinity with formulations that appear to have been current in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. These are discussed briefly by Jean Deprun in an article on the originality of the Cartesian definition of the 'passions of the soul'.[4] According to Deprun, Descartes's predecessors were almost unanimous in their definitions of the concept of passion. He suggests (without elaborating the point) that this consensus is due to a common scholastic background. Fairly close to the general definition given by Meyer is the one formulated by Guillaume du Vair in *La Philosophie morale des Stoïques*, which is thought to have been written in or shortly after 1585: 'Nous appellons passions un mouvement violent de l'âme en sa partie sensitive, qu'elle faict ou pour suivre ce qui luy semble bon, ou fuir ce qui luy semble mauvais.'[5] Du Vair is generally labelled a Neo-Stoic,[6] but in this particular context

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1. As regards *Onderwys in de tooneel-poëzy*, Harmsen comments in his introduction (p. 9) that the structure of the book is scrupulously based on Aristotle's *Poetics*.
2. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 359.
3. Particularly influential were the commentaries on Aristotle by G.J. Vossius and D. Heinsius. See Vossius 1630 [1605], especially the second book, *De inventione* παθῶν καὶ ἠθῶν; and Heinsius (tr. Sellin & McManmon 1971), especially chapter 9.
4. Deprun 1988.
5. Quoted from the appendix to the edition of Descartes's *Passions de l'âme* by G. Rodis-Lewis 1988 [1970], 219.
6. Cf. Zanta 1914.

it is worth quoting the comment given by Anthony Levi on Du Vair's theory of the passions:

> The doctrine of the passions in the *Philosophie morale* is largely derived from the scholastics, but the stoic overtones are preserved because the passions are linked to false judgements in the mind and the 'sensible good' of the scholastic definition is replaced by a merely apparent good. [...] [Du Vair's theory is] a deliberate attempt to adapt a basically scholastic doctrine to harmonize with Epictetan stoicism. The substitution of an apparent good for a sensible one in the definition of passion is characteristic of just such an adaptation.[1]

It is, however, not in Du Vair's own formulation that this definition gained currency, but in the form given by Pierre Charron in *De la sagesse* of 1601, who follows Du Vair very closely: 'Passion est un mouvement violent de l'ame en sa partie sensitive, lequel se fait ou pour, suyvre ce que l'ame pense luy estre bon, ou pour fuir ce qu'elle pense luy estre mauvais.'[2] Charron's book was very influential.[3] In spite of its being placed on the Index in 1606, it was often reprinted.

Meyer's definition, then, appears to have its roots in this pre-Cartesian tradition. But there are differences: neither Du Vair nor Charron mention the heart, and the movement is described by them as 'violent',[4] whereas Meyer characterizes it as 'ongewoon': extraordinary, uncommon, abnormal.[5] This qualification does occur in Malebranche's general definition of the passions, too: 'j'appelle ici *passions* toutes les émotions que l'âme ressent naturellement à l'occasion des mouvemens extraordinaires des esprits animaux.'[6] Since Meyer and Malebranche developed their theories simultaneously but independently (see below, p. 122), this parallel may be indicative of a common source, which I have not yet been able to identify.

Meyer's formulation is quite different from those of Descartes and Spinoza. The former defines the passions in general as 'Des perceptions, ou des sentimens, ou des émotions de l'ame, qu'on raporte particulierement à elle, & qui sont causées, entretenuës & fortifiées par quelque mouvement des esprits.'[7] Spinoza's general definition runs as follows:

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1. Levi 1964, 87–8.
2. Charron, *De la sagesse* 1.18, ed. De Negroni 1986, 155.
3. E.g. on Gassendi and Pascal: see Levi 1964, 95–6.
4. Deprun (1988, 408, n. 6) comments: '*Violent* a évidemment ici le sens aristotélicien de "contre-nature".'
5. The motions are extraordinary, according to Meyer, because they originate in the understanding (*Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 359): '*Het verstandt is zo zeer wel geen oorzaak van de beweeging zelfs, als vande hoedaanicheidt derzelve, namelijk der ongewoonheidt.*' Normal motions are caused by the senses or the will (ibid.).
6. Malebranche, OC 2, 127. Malebranche's theory of the passions is set forth in the fifth book of the *Recherche*, which was published in 1675, in the second volume of this work.
7. Descartes, *Les Passions de l'âme*, art. 27 (ed. Rodis-Lewis 1988 [1970], 86).

Affectus, qui animi Pathema dicitur, est confusa idea, quâ Mens majorem, vel minorem sui Corporis, vel alicujus ejus partis existendi vim, quàm antea, affirmat, & quâ datâ ipsa Mens ad hoc potiùs, quàm ad illud cogitandum determinatur.[1]

The emotion called a passive experience is a confused idea whereby the mind affirms a greater or less force of existence of its body, or part of its body, than was previously the case, and by the occurrence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another.[2]

One of the parallels between Meyer and the pre-Cartesian definitions is the introduction of the *notions of good and evil*. Meyer specifies that good and evil are to be taken in the largest sense, i.e. *useful and harmful*. This equation is also to be found in the first two definitions in Spinoza's *Ethica*, part 4. It is true that Spinoza need not have been Meyer's source for this equation; it can be found in other authors as well. The point has been made by Stanislaus von Dunin Borkowski in a discussion of two seemingly Spinozist 'paradoxes' (i.e. theses, propositions for a debate) that accompanied Meyer's philosophical dissertation of 1660.[3] Both paradoxes are concerned with virtue, not with the definition of good and evil:

9. *Primum Ethices principium est, cuique suum utile esse quærendum.*
10. *Virtus est constans animi voluntas ex vero intellectu suum utile quærendi. Vitium vero ex opinione.*[4]

9. The first principle of ethics is that everyone pursues his own advantage.
10. Virtue is the resolute intention of the mind to pursue one's own advantage on the basis of true knowledge; vice, conversely, on the basis of opinion.

These paradoxes fail to prove influence from Spinoza on Meyer at that early date, since they may have been inspired by more general ethical reading. Von Dunin Borkowski gives Gassendi and Charron as examples. The case of the chapter on the passions in *Onderwys* is, however, somewhat different. Influences from Spinoza are unmistakable in several places. Moreover, Meyer not only repeats his earlier definition of virtue (the firm will to pursue that which is useful); he goes further than that. He equates the notions of good and evil in general with those of useful and harmful:

En by dit goedt en kwaadt verstaan wy alle de soorten van goedt en kwaadt, daar van by de Philosofen gewag gemaakt wordt, als het eerlijk nut en vermaaklijk goedt, of het oneerlijk, onnut en onvermaaklijk kwaat; of liever maar een goedt en kwaadt, naamelijk het nut of onnut, alzo wy oordeelen dat'er geen ander goedt is als dat voordeelig, en geen ander kwaadt als dat naadeelig is, en dat niet in acht behoorde genoomen te worden, of het eerlijk of

1. *Ethica* 3, Aff. gen. def. (G 2, 203.29–33).
2. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 150.
3. Von Dunin Borkowski 1935, vol. 3, 159.
4. Meyer 1660a, sig. A6^{r}. Meyer's dissertation, *Disputatio philosophica inauguralis de materia ejusque affectionibus motu et quiete*, has been reproduced photomechanically in *Chronicon Spinozanum* 2 (1922), 185–95; quotation 195.

oneerlijk, of vermaakelijk of onvermaakelijk was. Dewijl de waare Deught niet anders is, als een volstandige wil om zyn eigen waar voordeel geduurig te betrachten.[1]

By this good and evil we understand all the kinds of good and evil mentioned by the philosophers, such as the honourable, useful and pleasant good, or the dishonourable, harmful and unpleasant evil; or rather, only one kind of good and evil, viz. useful and harmful. For we are of the opinion that there is no other good than that which is useful and no other evil than that which is harmful, irrespective of whether it be honourable or dishonourable, pleasant or unpleasant.

This, then, was not received wisdom in the seventeenth century. We only come across it in the writings of the more unconventional philosophers, e.g. in Hobbes's *Leviathan*, chapter 6 (which is, incidentally, his catalogue of the passions). For Hobbes, useful and harmful are one of three possible varieties of good and evil:

So that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is *pulchrum*; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called *jucundum*, *delightful*; and good as the means, which is called *utile*, *profitable*; and as many of evil: for *evil* in promise, is that they call *turpe*; evil in effect, and end, is *molestum*, *unpleasant*, *troublesome*; and evil in the means, *inutile*, *unprofitable*, *hurtful*.[2]

The comment given on Meyer's definitions of good and evil by C. Louise Thijssen-Schoute (and retailed by Harmsen) is therefore rather too superficial.[3] She refers only to Meyer's dissertation of 1660, and to Von Dunin Borkowski's note of caution.

For Meyer, it is essential that the soul should *perceive* something as good or evil. Whether a thing actually *is* good or evil, is of no importance; for the passions, it is the mind's perception of it that counts:

Maar als wy dus spreeken van goedt en kwaadt, verstaan wy niet dat de zaak waarlijk goedt of kwaadt moet weezen, om een hartstoght te verwekken; maar wy meenen dat het genoeg is, dat zy zoodaanig schyne, alzo niet de waarheid vande zaak; maar het begrip van 't goedt en kwaadt de ongewoone beweeging veroorzaakt, gelijk wy in onze uitbeelding gezeid hebben; en dit begrip behoeft niet vande waarheid; maar alleen van de schyn te zyn.[4]

But if we speak like that about good and evil, we do not mean that in order to arouse a passion something should actually be good or evil. We believe that it suffices for a thing to appear thus; in other words, that it is not the actuality but the conception of a thing

1. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 360.
2. Hobbes, EW 3, 41–2. The tripartition rather resembles Meyer's. One of the meanings of *pulchrum* (as Hobbes explicitly states in the same context) can be 'honourable', and of *turpe* 'dishonourable'. See also *De homine*, chapter 11, sections 5–6 (LW 2, 97–8). The parallels with Meyer are not, it would seem, accidental. There was a lively interest in Hobbes's works in the Netherlands in the 1660s. Abraham van Berkel had translated *Leviathan* into Dutch in 1667. He was in touch with Spinoza's circle, more particularly with Adriaan Koerbagh, and probably also with Spinoza himself. On Van Berkel's translation of *Leviathan* see Schoneveld 1983, especially 46–62; on his friendship with Koerbagh: p. 9; on the contacts with Spinoza: p. 40. A more detailed study of possible Hobbesian influences on Meyer would probably be rewarding.
3. Thijssen-Schoute 1989 [1954], 425 and 384. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 366.
4. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 360.

which causes the extraordinary motion, as we said in our description. And this conception need not concern the truth, but only the appearance.

Meyer formulates his notions of good and evil in the context of the origin of the passions;[1] no general ethical theory is intended here. Yet it may be noted that this stress on the subject is characteristic for early modern ethics. Thus in Hobbes's *De homine* (published in 1658) we read: 'Bonum ergo relative dicitur ad personam, ad locum, et ad tempus.'[2] ('So "good" is said to be so in relation to person, time and place.') Spinoza also stresses the relativity of good and evil, especially in his critique of finalism and anthropocentrism.[3]

In a lengthy elucidation of his definition Meyer duly acknowledges the ancient Galenist concept of the animal spirits as the basis for his own theory of the passions:

Het is bekent dat alle de beweegingen des lichchaams door de invloeyingen vande dierlijke of zielelijke geesten inde spieren geschieden: en dewijl nu voor eenige jaaren gevonden is, dat het hart een deel des lichchaams is dat uit spieren bestaat, zal het zelve meede door de invloeying der voornoemde geesten bewoogen werden; en alzo de ongewoone invloeying derzelve, de naaste oorzaak der hartstogten zyn.[4]

It is a well-known fact that all the motions of the body occur through the infusion of the animal spirits into the muscles. And since it was discovered some years ago that the heart is a part of the body that consists of muscles, it too will receive an impetus from the infusion of the aforesaid spirits. Consequently the extraordinary infusion of these will be the proximate cause of the passions.

Although the doctrine of the animal spirits gradually came under attack after Harvey's *De motu cordis* of 1628, Descartes still based his description of the human body, including his theory of the passions, on it.[5] Meyer's reference to the doctrine of spirits

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1. Similarly in the definitions of the passions by Du Vair and Charron, quoted above, and in Vives's *De anima et vita* (ed. Sancipriano 1974, 456): 'Bonum et malum in praesentia id voco, non tam quod revera tale est, quam quod quisque sibi esse iudicat'.
2. Chapter 11, section 4 (LW 2, 97).
3. E.g. E 1app (G 2, 81.25–36; 83.1); E 3p9s (G 2, 148.4–8). For the relativity of good and evil cf. also KV 1§10 (ed. Mignini 1986, 192–4). Subjectivity plays an important role in Spinoza's theory of the passions, too, viz. in insistence on the *imaginatio*. Note, for example, that the verb *imaginari* occurs in the formulation of the vast majority of the propositions in part 3 of the *Ethica*. That Spinoza's theory of the affects is deeply rooted in his doctrine of *imaginatio* is also cogently argued by Michael Schrijvers (1989). The element of *imaginatio* as such is absent from Meyer's exposition.
4. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 359. 'Dierlijk' and 'zielelijk' are two possible renderings of *animalis*.
5. Spink 1960, 122; Lindeboom 1979 (esp. 48–9, 75–7). Cf. Descartes, *L'Homme*, AT 11, 129; and letter to Vorstius, 19.6.1643 (AT 3, 686–9). Although Harvey himself never wholly abandoned the doctrine of the animal spirits, his discoveries led others to attack it – notably the Rotterdam physician Jacob de Back, in his *Dissertatio de corde in qua agitur de nullitate spirituum*, published in 1648 as an appendix to an edition of Harvey's *Exercitatio anatomica de cordis et sanguinis motu* (De Back 1648). On this treatise, see Israëls & Daniëls 1883, 71–87.

does not imply an indebtedness to Descartes: it still had many adherents of great authority, among them the Leiden professor Franciscus de le Boë Sylvius, of whom Meyer was a student.[1] The general drift of the passage is, at any rate, defiantly anti-Cartesian. For one thing, Meyer insists that the *heart* is the seat of the passions. Descartes is very explicit: the seat of the passions is *not* in the heart but in the pineal gland, even though the passions do bring about some noticeable change in the heart.[2] Moreover, Meyer states that *the human soul is united with all parts of the body* ('De menschelijke Ziele is vereent met alle de deelen de lichchaams')[3] – a phrase he may have taken from Descartes;[4] but he goes on to say that this precludes the existence of any specific point of contact between the body and the soul,[5] by which he intends, without naming Descartes, to refute him. For this squarely opposes Descartes's tenet that the pineal gland has the privileged function of communicating the motions of the animal spirits to the soul and vice versa – it is, to use an irreverent but evocative modern image, a 'fax machine to the soul'.[6] In fact, Meyer is making a direct attack on the relevant sections in *Les Passions de l'âme*, where the theory of the pineal gland is set forth.[7] It would be interesting to know whether he owes this criticism to Spinoza. The text contains no reference whatsoever to the devastating analysis Spinoza gives of the pineal gland thesis in the preface to the *Ethica*, part 5. Meyer may independently have come to the conclusion that it was inconsistent to say that body and soul are everywhere united, while at the same time designating a specific organ as the interface between them. Or again, Spinoza's and Meyer's critique may derive from a common source. It has been argued that the major influence behind Spinoza's polemic against the pineal gland, and more generally behind his medical views, was the great Danish anatomist and scientist Stensen, who called him 'virum mihi quondam

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1. Israëls & Daniëls (1883, 77) mention De le Boë Sylvius – together with other reputed physicians like Vesalius, Paracelsus, Van Helmont and Harvey – as still adhering to the spirits doctrine. De le Boë Sylvius acted as praeses at a medical disputation defended by Meyer on 26 November 1659, and supervised his doctorate in medicine on 20 March 1660.
2. *Passions*, art. 32–3.
3. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 359.
4. *Passions*, art. 30: '*Que l'ame est unie à toutes les parties du corps conjointement*' (ed. Rodis-Lewis 1988 [1970], 88). Cf. letter to Regius, January 1642 (AT 3, 493).
5. According to Meyer, the union of body and soul implies that the soul immediately perceives any uncommon motion in the heart. He concludes (*Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 360): '*En deze gewaarwording of bewustheidt zal zy niet behoeven te ontfangen in eenigh byzonder deel van 't lichchaam als by voorbeeldt inde herssenen, of het Pijnappelkleerken, by de latynen* Glaudula Pincalis *genoemt, maar in dat deel daar de verandering in voorvalt, alzo zy daar meede zo wel vereenigt is, als met eenige van alle de andere.*' (The mangled spelling of *glandula pinealis* is to be attributed to the copyist – probably Ysbrand Vincent – and not to Meyer; see Harmsen's introduction, p. 13.)
6. D. Dennett, *Consciousness explained*, quoted in Cottingham 1993, 146.
7. *Passions*, art. 31–2.

admodum familiarem'[1] ('a man I once was on very friendly terms with'). Niels Stensen (or Nicolaus Steno) had studied medicine in Leiden from 1660 to 1663, and in 1665 he gave a lecture in Paris on the anatomy of the brain, in which he attacked the pineal gland thesis in terms not unlike Spinoza's critique in the preface to *Ethica* 5.[2]

Locating the passions in the heart is such an overwhelmingly general tradition that it is useless to look for specific sources of this particular aspect of Meyer's definition. (See, for example, the list of authorities – Peripatetic, Stoic and Galenist – cited for the heart as the seat of the passions in a Coimbra commentary of Aristotle, the *Commentarii in libros Ethicorum*, published in 1594.)[3] It might, however, be of some importance that the Dutch word Meyer employs to render the foreign idiom *passions* is *hartstochten*. This word, coined in the sixteenth century and still in general use today, literally means 'urges or stirrings of the heart',[4] so that its very etymology suggests the heart as the seat of the passions. In this context, Meyer's activities as a lexicographer may be called to mind. Meyer edited a thesaurus with Dutch alternatives for foreign loan words, originally written by Johan Hofman. In 1654 Meyer was already in charge of the second edition of this work, but it was not until the fifth, published in 1669, that his name appeared on its title-page.[5] By this time, the thesaurus had been considerably expanded: part one was still basically Hofman's old thesaurus of foreign words, but Meyer had added a part with technical terms in the sciences and arts, and one with archaic words. This dual authorship may account for some discrepancies between the first part and the rest of the book. In *L. Meijers Woordenschat* of 1669 we find 'hartstocht' as one of the synonyms listed under *Affectie* and *Passie*, which are both entries belonging to Hofman's part one; and under *Affectus* and *Passio*, in Meyer's part two. Surprisingly, 'hartstocht' does not occur in Meyer's entry *Affectio*.[6]

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1. Ep 67A (G 4, 292.24). The 1675 edition of Steno's letter is reproduced in facsimile in *Chronicon Spinozanum* 1 (1921), 31–40. Spinoza mentions Steno in his letter to Burgh, Ep 76 (G 4, 317.3, 20). The argument for Steno's influence on Spinoza has been set forth by Cohen (1920, 59–67). Cf. his second thesis: 'De onmiskenbare invloed der geneeskunde op SPINOZA is allermeest uitgegaan van STENO.'
2. Cohen 1920, 62–3.
3. Quoted in Gilson 1979 [1913], 220 (quote number 343): 'Galenus [...] existimat appetitum concupiscibilem residere in hepate [...]; appetitum vero irascibilem ponit in corde [...]. Sit tamen nostra conclusio: utrumque appetitum in corde sedem habere. Ita statuit Hippocrates, Zeno, Posidonius, Chrysippus, caeterique ejusdem familiae alumni. Item Aristoteles, Theophrastus et alii Peripatetici, quos refert Vesalius et alii.' A detailed enumeration of a vast number of references to biblical and classical sources in which the heart is depicted as the seat of emotions and passions can be found in Bauer 1988.
4. My double rendering of 'tocht' here as 'urge' and 'stirring' is intentional, since the word in fact has both semantic connotations (see WNT 6, 88, s.v. *Hartstocht*).
5. Thijssen-Schoute 1954, 5–7.
6. Meyer 1669: *Affectie* p. 17, *Passie* p. 241, *Affectus* (in ethical terminology) p. 354, *Passio* p. 621, *Affectio* p. 353.

3.3 The particular passions

So much for the general definition; we now come to the particular passions. Good and evil being opposites, they give rise to two opposite passions, *joy and sadness*:

> *En dit begrip hebben wy gezeidt te zyn van goedt of kwaadt, welk twee verscheide opzichten, en wel elkanderen teegen strydig zyn, en derhalven ook twee verscheidene soorten van hartstoghten zullen maaken, namelijk het goedt, Blydschap en het kwaadt Droefheidt.*[1]
>
> As we said, this conception concerns good and evil. Since these two aspects are different in that they are conflicting, they will give rise to two different kinds of passion: good will yield joy, evil sadness.

In order to find the principal passions, Meyer now introduces *time* as a distinctive feature. This passage is entirely in keeping with Descartes (*Passions*, art. 57): not only the element of time, but also its use in defining *desire* as pertaining to the future, are thoroughly Cartesian. So is the wording:

> *want niet alleen wanneer men begeert te verkrijgen een goedt datmen niet heeft, of the myden een kwaadt dat ons over kan koomen; maar ook zelfs wanneer men wenscht te behouden het goedt datmen heeft, of ontslaagen te zyn van't kwaadt dat ons kwelt, is het blijkelijk dat de* Begeerte *op het toekomstige ziet.*[2]
>
> For not only when we desire to acquire a good that we do not have or avoid an evil that may befall us, but also even when we want to keep a good that we have, or be rid of an evil that afflicts us, it is evident that desire is concerned with the future.

Meyer obviously had a copy of *Les Passions de l'âme* or its Latin translation at hand.[3] This is the relevant passage in Descartes's French text:

> Car non seulement lors qu'on desire acquerir un bien qu'on n'a pas encore, ou bien eviter un mal qu'on juge pouvoir arriver; mais aussi lors qu'on ne souhaite que la conservation d'un bien, ou l'absence d'un mal, qui est tout à ce quoy se peut estendre cette passion, il est evident qu'elle regarde tousjours l'avenir.[4]

The Cartesian background makes Meyer's next step all the more surprising: he proclaims these three – joy, sadness, desire – to be the *primary passions*, from which all the others derive. In the Cartesian system, there are six primary passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness.[5] The tripartition joy, sadness and desire is fundamental to Spinoza's classification: 'Tres igitur [...] tantùm affectûs primitivos, seu primarios agnosco; nempe, Lætitiæ, Tristitiæ, & Cupiditatis'.[6] ('Therefore [...] I acknowledge

1. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 360.
2. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 360.
3. Meyer presumably preferred the Latin text. The Latin version of Descartes's treatise, translated by Henri Desmarets, was published in 1650 (cf. Dibon 1979).
4. *Passions*, art. 57 (ed. Rodis-Lewis 1988 [1970], 110).
5. *Passions*, art. 69.
6. E 3ad4e (G 2, 192.6–8).

only three basic or primary emotions, pleasure, pain, and desire.'[1]) Meyer may be following Spinoza here, or both may depend on a common source. For it should be noted that this reduction, though characteristic, is not unique for Spinoza: it occurs in Malebranche, too. But – as we shall see – the latter cannot have been a source for Meyer.

Meyer then proceeds to enumerate the *derivative passions*, and this is his catalogue in the narrow sense. I will forbear a detailed treatment of all his definitions and limit myself to an outline of Meyer's catalogue (summarized in the diagram on p. 128, below), and comments on parallels with or departures from Descartes and Spinoza.

The criterion of time produces a threefold division: past, present and future. With respect to the *past*, Meyer mentions only two passions, regret and relief:

> *Het voorleeden goedt baart in ons een droefheidt, dat wy 't missen, die de franschen regret noemen, en by ons myns wetens geen naam heeft: Het kwaadt verwekt een Blydschap van daar van verlost te zyn, diemen vreugdt zoude moogen noemen.*[2]
>
> A past good produces in us the sadness of missing it, which the French call 'regret'; as far as I know, we have no name for it. A past evil gives rise to the joy of having been rid of it, which may be called relief.

A curious detail is his remark that he knows of no good Dutch equivalent for the sadness that the French call *regret*, whereas *Regret* is glossed as 'berouw' in *L. Meijers Woordenschat*.[3] The entry may be due to his predecessor Hofman, or Meyer may have felt that 'berouw' (remorse) did not exactly correspond to the semantic range of *regret* in this specific context.

The largest group is constituted by the passions aroused by *present* good and evil. They are divisible into two categories: those aroused by good or evil *in ourselves*, and those aroused by good or evil *in others* ('Het teegenwoordig goedt of kwaat is in ons, of in anderen').[4] The first category is subdivided into three types: (i) absolutely and of itself good or evil ('volstrektelijk, en in zich'); (ii) accompanied by a cause ('met zyn oorzaak'); (iii) good or evil with regard to the opinion others have of us ('ten opzicht van de achting van anderen').[5]

(i) *Joy*, in the proper sense of the word, is then defined as the enjoyment of something good in us; *sadness* as the perception of something evil in us: '*De Blydschap dan is een hartstoght, spruitende uit het genot van't goedt. De Droefheidt is een hartstogt, spruitende uit het gewaar worden van't kwaadt dat in ons is.*'[6] ('Joy is a passion that arises from the enjoyment of the good. Sadness is a passion that arises from the

1. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 142.
2. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 361.
3. Meyer 1669, 281.
4. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 361.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

perception of the evil within us.') These definitions, though summary, correspond closely to those formulated by Descartes.[1]

(ii) When good and evil are accompanied by a cause, this cause may be either within or outside us. In the former case they give rise to either satisfaction or remorse.[2] In the latter case, there is another subdivision, which I will omit here. The passions which come under this heading are gratitude, anger, love, hatred, enjoyment and aversion (respectively: dankbaarheidt, Toorn of gramschap, Liefde, haat, behaagen, afkeerigheidt).[3]

Lodewijk Meyer defines *love* and *hatred* thus: '*De Liefde dan is een blydschap en de haat een droefheidt verzelt met het denkbeelt van deszelfs oorzaak. En deze wordt men gezegt lief te hebben of te haaten.*'[4] ('Love is a joy and hatred a sadness, accompanied by the idea of its cause, which is then called the object of love or hatred.') The phrase 'verzelt met het denkbeelt van deszelfs oorzaak' is close to Spinoza's wording in part 3 of the *Ethica*: 'Amor est Lætitia, concomitante ideâ causæ externæ' ('Love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause'), and 'Odium est Tristitia, concomitante ideâ causæ externæ' ('Hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause').[5] Meyer only leaves out the adjective 'externus'. As far as I know, the expression is to be found only in Spinoza's theory. Meyer then supplements this Spinozist definition with a Cartesian subdivision of love into affection, friendship and devotion:

> *De Liefde kan onderscheiden worden na de achting diemen heeft voor't geen men bemint, in vergelijking van zich zelfs. Wanneer men het beminde minder acht dan zich zelfs, heeftmen daar maar toe eene enkele geneegentheidt. Wanneer men het zelve zo hoog acht als zich zelfs, noemtmen het vriendschap; en wanneer men het meerder acht, zoudemen het Devotie moogen noemen.*[6]
>
> Love can be distinguished according to the esteem we have for the object of our love in comparison with ourselves. If we esteem the object less than ourselves, then we only have simple affection for it. If we esteem it as highly as ourselves, it is called friendship. And if we esteem it more, one might call it devotion.

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1. *Passions*, art. 91: 'La Joye est une agreable emotion de l'ame, en laquelle consiste la jouïssance qu'elle a du bien, que les impressions du cerveau luy representent comme sien.' Art. 92: 'La Tristesse est une langueur desagreable, en laquelle consiste l'incommodité que l'ame reçoit du mal, ou du defaut, que les impressions du cerveau luy representent comme luy appartenant.' (Ed. Rodis-Lewis 1988 [1970], 131, 132.)
2. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 361: '*De vergenoeging dan is een blydschap, spruitende uit het bezit van't goedt dat wy ons zelfs hebben doen bekoomen. Het leetweezen is een droefheidt, spruitende uit het kwaadt, dat wy ons zelfs op den hals gehaalt hebben.*' The general drift remains close to the Cartesian definitions (*Passions*, art. 190–1).
3. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 362.
4. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 361.
5. E 3ad6–7 (G 2, 192.19–20, 193.6–7); translations taken from Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 142–3. As far as I have been able to ascertain, this formula is characteristic for Spinoza.
6. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 362.

The passage is quoted practically verbatim from *Les Passions de l'âme*:

> On peut ce me semble, avec meilleure raison distinguer l'amour, par l'estime qu'on fait de ce qu'on aime à comparaison de soy-mesme. Car lors qu'on estime l'objet de son Amour moins que soy, on n'a pour luy qu'une simple Affection; lors qu'on l'estime à l'esgal de soy, cela se nomme Amitié, & lors qu'on l'estime davantage, la passion qu'on a peut estre nommée Devotion.[1]

In the next article Descartes, and Meyer with him, then states that hatred cannot be so subdivided.[2] That love and hate in aesthetic matters may be called enjoyment and aversion is another borrowing from Descartes.[3] The word here rendered with enjoyment is 'Agréement'; Meyer uses 'behaagen'.[4]

(iii) Taking into account the opinion others have of us, Meyer distinguishes two more passions arising from the good or evil within us, viz. pride and shame. In defining pride, he remains close to Descartes.[5] The definition of shame is lacking in Meyer's exposition.

The second major category of passions aroused by present good or evil is that of the good and evil *in others*. These occur in two forms: (i) absolutely and of itself good or evil; and (ii) good or evil with a cause. In the latter case, either we ourselves, or someone else can be this cause. These distinctions entail the following passions: (i) a nameless one, covering the sense of joy we feel when others deservedly enjoy something good or suffer something evil; and the two opposites of this, envy and pity

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1. *Passions*, art. 83 (ed. Rodis-Lewis 1988 [1970], 124–5).
2. *Passions*, art. 84 (ed. Rodis-Lewis 1988 [1970], 126): '*Qu'il n'y a pas tant d'especes de Haine que d'Amour*'. Meyer (*Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 362): '*Maar de haat kan zo niet onderscheiden worden*'.
3. Meyer (*Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 362): '*Eevenwel is'er een ander onderscheidt, dat in beide plaats heeft, namelijk hier in dat het goedt of kwaadt, dat ons toegebracht is, of geoordeelt word van't verstandt door middel van de reeden, of door de uitterlijke zinnen en wel voornamelijk door't Gezicht: het eerste noemt men gewoonlyk goedt of kwaadt; en het tweede schoon of laelijk. En hier uit spruiten twee soorten van Liefde en van haat naamelijk die men heeft vande goede of voor de schoone dingen, en voor de kwade of voor de laelijke dingen: De liefde voor de mooye dingen kan men behaagen noemen, ende Haat voor de laelijke, afkeerigheidt: En deeze als door de zinnen koomende, treffen veel dieper als de anderen.*' The whole passage is a paraphrase of article 85 of Descartes's *Passions*.
4. In the lexicon, his synonym for *Aggreëren* is 'behaagen' (Meyer 1669, 18).
5. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 362: '*De Glorie dan is een Blydschap, spruitende uit het gevoelen datmen heeft van anderen gepreezen te worden.*' *Passions*, art. 204 (ed. Rodis-Lewis 1988 [1970], 211–2): 'Ce que j'appele icy du nom de Gloire, est une espece de Joye [...] qui vient de l'opinion ou de l'esperance qu'on a d'estre loüé par quelques autres.'

('wangunst', 'meedelijden');[1] (ii) peace of mind and uneasiness ('vergenoeging', 'moeyelijkheidt'); favour and indignation ('gonst', 'verontwaardigingh').

The nameless passion is something of a curiosity. It has no parallel in Descartes. At the end of *Les Passions de l'âme*, Descartes claims to have dealt with *all* the passions worth considering: he appears to have names for them all.[2] This is in keeping with the fourth and last of the rules laid down in the *Discours de la méthode*, the so-called 'règle du dénombrement': 'de faire partout des denombremens si entiers, & des reueuës si generales, que ie fusse assuré de ne rien omettre.'[3] Spinoza is quite outspoken when dealing with the innumerability of the passions: 'atque adeò plures Affectûs deducere poterimus, quàm qui receptis vocabulis indicari solent' ('and thus we can deduce more emotions than can be signified by accepted terms').[4] We find similar statements elsewhere in *Ethica* 3, for example:

> Imò unicuique ex jam dictis clarè constare credo, affectûs tot modis alii cum aliis posse componi, indeque tot variationes oriri, ut nullo numero definiri queant.[5]
>
> Indeed, from what has been said I think everyone is quite convinced that emotions can be combined with one another in so many ways and give rise to so many variations that they cannot be numbered.[6]

What is more, Spinoza seems to have had in mind the very same passion as Meyer's nameless one when commenting upon his definition of compassion:

> Invidiæ opponitur communiter Misericordia, quæ proinde, invitâ vocabuli significatione, sic definiri potest. [...] Misericordia est Amor, quatenus hominem ità afficit, ut ex bono alterius gaudeat, & contrà ut ex alterius malo contristetur.[7]

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1. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 362: 'Als zy [= anderen] 't waardig zyn, het zy goedt het zy kwaadt, dat verwekt in ons Blydschap, ten opzicht dat het voor ons eenigsins goedt is dat het gaat zo't behoordt, en deeze hartstoght heeft geen byzondre naam. Zo zy't onwaardig zyn, en wel het goedt, ontstaat'er wangunst; en het kwaadt meedelijden.'
2. *Passions*, art. 210–1. Elsewhere in *Les Passions de l'âme*, Descartes formally qualifies the exhaustiveness of his enumeration: 'Je parle seulement des principales [passions], à cause qu'on en pourroit encore distinguer plusieurs autres plus particulieres, & leur nombre est indefini' (art. 68). Yet the claim to completeness in art. 210–1 is very explicit.
3. AT 6, 19.3–5.
4. E 3p52s (G 2, 180.28–30); translation from Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 134.
5. E 3p59s (G 2, 189.10–3). Cf. also E 3ad48e, on the vacillations of the mind, most of which do not have names (G 2, 203.16–20), and E 3p52s, on the combination of a vast range of affects with wonder: 'atque adeò plures Affectûs deducere poterimus, quàm qui receptis vocabulis indicari solent. Unde apparet, *Affectuum nomina inventa esse magis ex eorum vulgari usu, quàm ex eorundem accuratâ cognitione*' (G 2, 180.28–32; emphasis supplied). The same argument is applied to the opposite of wonder, contempt (G 2, 181.16–7): 'atque inde alios præterea Affectûs deducere [possumus], quos etiam nullo singulari vocabulo ab aliis distinguere solemus.'
6. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 140.
7. E 3ad23e–24 (G 2, 196.12–6).

> The opposite of envy is commonly said to be compassion which therefore, with some distortion of its usual meaning, can be defined thus: [...] Compassion is love, in so far as it so affects a man that he rejoices at another's good and feels pain at another's hurt.[1]

Both Meyer and Spinoza were apparently feeling for a term to designate a passion which, according to their systematic exposition, did exist, but had as yet no name.[2]

There is a possible parallel in Thomas Hobbes. In *Human nature* we read:

> Divers other passions there be, but they want names; whereof some nevertheless have been by most men observed: for example; from what passion proceedeth it, that men take *pleasure* to *behold* from the shore the *danger* of them that are at sea in a tempest, or in fight, or from a safe castle to behold two armies charge one another in the field? It is certainly, in the whole sum, *joy*, else men would never flock to such a spectacle. Nevertheless there is in it both *joy* and *grief*: for as there is novelty and remembrance of own security present, which is *delight*; so is there also *pity*, which is grief.[3]

Hobbes's nameless passions are in general to be subsumed under the heading *Schadenfreude* (English indeed has no name for it: 'malicious pleasure' is not quite the same), which is absent from Meyer and Spinoza. Yet the parallel is interesting in that Hobbes also takes compassion into account here.

That Descartes should claim to give a catalogue of the passions that is, in principle at least, exhaustive, whereas Spinoza emphasizes their innumerability, reflects their different approach in describing the passions:

> Spinoza geht es nämlich nicht um den entwickelten und als solchen im Bewusstsein anwesenden Affekt, sondern um die systematische Rekonstruktion seiner Entwicklung. Im Gegensatz zu Descartes, der von der Erfahrung ausgeht, geht Spinoza genetisch-deduktiv vor, um von hier aus die Erfahrung aufzuklären.[4]

The two opposites of the nameless passion, envy and pity, are defined by Meyer in terms that may reflect their Cartesian counterparts:[5]

> *By wangunst verstaan wy dan hier een Droefheidt verwekt in ons uit het zien, dat iemant goedt overkomt, dat wy hem niet waardigh oordeelen. Meedelyden is een droefheidt in ons*

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1. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 145.
2. See also the pertinent remarks by Moreau (1994, 327–31), who deals with this point in relation to Spinoza's critique of language. He emphasizes the fact that for Spinoza, the problem is twofold: there are more passions than names, but on the other hand some passions have several names. 'Qui aborde en latin la description des passions se trouve donc face à une langue qui, tantôt par excès, tantôt par défaut, ne coïncide pas exactement avec la nature des objets dont elle parle.'
3. Hobbes, *Human nature* chapter 9, section 19 (EW 4, 51–2).
4. Schrijvers 1989, 70
5. Though in the case of pity the definition is a traditional one, so Descartes need not have been Meyer's source here. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.8 (1385b): 'Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain at an apparent evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it' (quoted from the translation by Jonathan Barnes 1985, 2207).

ontstaan uit het kwaadt, dat iemand overkomt, het welk wy hem oordeelen niet verdiendt te hebben.[1]

By envy we understand a sadness produced in us by seeing something good happen to someone we deem unworthy of it. Pity is a sadness that arises in us on account of the evil that befalls someone who has not deserved it, according to us.

These definitions are markedly different from those we find in Spinoza:

Invidia est Odium, quatenus hominem ità afficit, ut ex alterius felicitate contristetur, & contrà, ut ex alterius malo gaudeat.

Envy is hatred, in so far as it so affects a man that he is pained at another's good fortune and rejoices at another's ill-fortune

Commiseratio est Tristitia, concomitante ideâ mali, quod alteri, quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit.

Pity is a pain accompanied by the idea of ill that has happened to another whom we think of as like ourselves

Misericordia est Amor, quatenus hominem ità afficit, ut ex bono alterius gaudeat, & contrà ut ex alterius malo contristetur.[2]

Compassion is love, in so far as it so affects a man that he rejoices at another's good and feels pain at another's hurt.[3]

Peace of mind and uneasiness (which Meyer calls 'vergenoeging' and 'moeyelijkheidt' respectively), arising from the good or evil which we know we have caused to others, have (in this precise and limited sense) no equivalents in either Descartes or Spinoza. Compare the more general descriptions of 'Satisfaction de soy mesme' and 'Repentir' by Descartes, and Spinoza's definitions of self-esteem and repentance.[4]

Meyer defines indignation as a sort of anger against those who cause good or evil to people who do not deserve it: '*Verontwaardiging is een soorte van gramschap teegen die geene die goedt of kwaadt doen aan die welke dat niet verdient hebben.*'[5] 'Favour' is defined by Meyer as the exact opposite: it is a favourable disposition towards those who cause good *or evil* to people who deserve it: '*Gonst dan is een Blydschap, met goedt te willen aan die geene, die goedt of kwaad doet, aan die gene die het waardig zyn.*' We find a similar treatment in Descartes,[6] albeit not so neatly balanced: in the case of favour, Descartes only takes into account deserved good deeds, whereas indignation can

1. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 362. Cf. Descartes, *Passions*, art. 182, 185.
2. Invidia: E 3ad23 (G 2, 196.8–10), Commiseratio: ad18 (195.7–9), Misericordia: ad24 (196.14–6).
3. All three translations taken from Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 144–5.
4. Descartes, *Passions*, art. 190–1; Spinoza, E 3ad25, ad27.
5. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 363.
6. *Passions*, art. 195. Again, a comparable definition of indignation is to be found in Aristotle as well: 'Pain at unmerited good fortune is, in one sense, opposite to pain at unmerited bad fortune' (*Rhet.* 2.9, 1386b; Barnes translation p. 2209).

be caused by undeserved good *and* evil deeds.[1] In Spinoza's definitions, the two passions are perfect opposites, but their range has been considerably restricted: 'Favor est Amor erga aliquem, qui alteri benefecit' ('Approbation is love towards one who has benefited another'); 'Indignatio est Odium erga aliquem, qui alteri malefecit' ('Indignation is hatred towards one who has injured another').[2] The notion of deservedness has disappeared, and favour is only related to good deeds, indignation to evil deeds.

So much for the passions that are related to the present. Now we come to the third and last major branch, consisting of all the varieties of *desire*, the principal passion which pertains to the *future*. Meyer, like Descartes (and Spinoza), regards desire as a passion without an opposite.[3] Again, agreeing with Descartes,[4] he holds that the various sorts of desire differ only according to their objects. Nonetheless, he introduces some subdivisions, which rather tend to complicate his treatment. For the sake of brevity I will skip these subdivisions here.

The passions that come under the heading of desire in Meyer's system are the following: curiosity, ambition, vindictiveness, and the like; the different forms of desire arising from aversion and enjoyment (among which we find the strong passion of erotic desire); confidence, hope, fear, desperation and jealousy; indecision, compunction, courage, audacity, cowardice and consternation. Although his way of grouping these passions differs from what we find in Descartes, his definitions are basically the same. None of these contains indications that Meyer consulted Spinoza's formulations. The similarities with the Cartesian definitions range from vague resemblance (in the case of hope, fear, and desperation) to literal quotations from *Les Passions de l'âme* (in the case of confidence, jealousy, indecision, compunction, courage, audacity, cowardice and consternation).[5] For his treatment of the desire for sexual intercourse, commonly referred to as love, he quotes Descartes at length, adding that the French playwright Corneille considered this passion to be the soul of tragedy.[6] This is, incidentally, the

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1. *Passions*, art. 192.
2. E 3ad19–20 (G 2, 195.14–17); translations from Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 144.
3. *Passions*, art. 86.
4. *Passions*, art. 88.
5. All definitions on p. 364 of *Onderwys*. For 'hoop', 'vrees' and 'wanhoop' cf. Descartes, *Passions*, art. 165–6 (esperance, crainte, desespoir); for 'vertrouwen' art. 166 (securiré), 'jalouzy' art. 167 (jalousie), 'angst' art. 170 (irresolution), 'wroeging' art. 191 (repentir), 'moedt' en 'stoutheidt' alias 'onverzaagdheidt' art. 171 (courage, hardiesse), 'blooheidt' and 'vertzaagtheidt' art. 174 (lascheté, peur).
6. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 363: *'En dit genieten is verscheiden na de voorwerpen daar men behaagen in heeft. De schoonheidt vande bloemen, trekt ons alleen om ze te zien, die vande vruchten om ze te eeten enz. En onder alle is de voornaamste en heevigste de Begeerte van byslaapen, welke gelijk in alle de Dieren de Natuur ook inde Menschen ingeprent heeft. En gelijk men behagen heeft in de schoonheidt, en de zinlijkheidt verscheiden zyn, heeft men meer begeerte om by de eene als by de andere te slaapen. En deeze begeerte die dus uit het behaagen spruit, wordt meer benoemt met de naam van Liefde als die hartstoght, waarvan wy hier vooren gesprooken hebben. Ook heeft zy veel*

only reference to a source in this chapter of *Onderwys in de tooneel-poëzy*, for the other authorities drawn upon by Lodewijk Meyer – Descartes and Spinoza – are nowhere mentioned explicitly. The propriety of this reference to Corneille is called in doubt by Harmsen,[1] probably rightly so. At any rate, I have been unable to trace such a statement in Corneille's theoretical works on theatre – the closest approximation being this quotation from the 'Examen' of *Nicomède:* 'La tendresse et les passions [...] doivent être l'âme des tragédies'.[2] And in a letter to Saint-Évremond (hypothetically dated April 1668) Corneille writes: 'J'ai cru jusques ici que l'amour était une passion trop chargée de foiblesse pour être la dominante dans une pièce héroïque; j'aime qu'elle y serve d'ornement et non pas de corps'.[3] The implications of this statement are debatable,[4] but it cannot, in my opinion, be interpreted to mean that erotic love is the soul of tragedy.

3.4 An empty place: wonder

We have now enumerated all the passions dealt with in Lodewijk Meyer's catalogue. Before rounding off this survey, there is one passion whose conspicuous absence from the list requires further explanation, viz. *wonder.*[5] That this particular affect should be passed over in silence is the more astonishing, since Descartes considered wonder (*admiration*) to be the first and foremost of all passions. It has pride of place among the primary passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness.[6] As we have seen, Meyer follows Spinoza rather than Descartes in his identification of the primary passions. Is the absence of wonder another example of Spinoza's influence? In the *Explicatio* to the fourth definition of the affects, Spinoza ranks wonder as imagination and he does not, for that reason, number it among the affects.[7] This looks like an afterthought, for he has just included it in his definitions of the affects. In the *Scholium* to proposition 52, he seems to regard it as a protean component of a vast range of affects – though perhaps not as an affect in its own right.[8] Turning to the Cartesian

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vreemder uitwerkselen en het is zy die de voornaamste stof verstrekt aande Romanschryvers en Dichters, en daar van de Heer Korneille *zegt dat het is de ziel der Treurspeelen.*' Cf. Descartes, *Passions*, art. 90.

1. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 368.
2. Corneille, OC 2, 641.
3. Corneille, OC 3, 726.
4. Cf. Nadal 1948, 162.
5. For this discussion of the absence of wonder from Meyer's system, I am indebted to critical remarks from Prof. Jean-Marie Beyssade, and to correspondence with Dr Jan Konst. Cf. also the various publications by Konst (1991, 1992, and 1993, 218–9).
6. *Passions*, art. 53, 69.
7. E 3ad4e (G 2, 191.32–192.5).
8. E 3p52s (G 2, 180.15–28): Consternatio, Veneratio, Horror, Devotio, and many (nameless) others, resulting from combinations of sundry affects with wonder.

theory of the passions, we find that there the status of wonder is not unequivocal either. In a recent monograph on 'wonder', Stefan Matuschek pointed out that wonder is admitted among the important passions only in Descartes's last work, *Les Passions de l'âme*.[1] In his earlier texts, wonder is not (as in Plato and Aristotle) the point of departure for all philosophy,[2] but an impediment. There is still an echo of this in *Les Passions*, when Descartes defines astonishment (*Estonnement*) as a detrimental excess of wonder, whereas wonder itself is the *sine qua non* of all knowledge.[3] We find a similar critique of astonishment, or rather bewilderment, in Spinoza's *Ethica*: 'qui miraculorum causas veras quærit, quiq́ue res naturales, ut doctus, intelligere, non autem, *ut stultus, admirari* studet' ('he who seeks the true causes of miracles and is eager to understand the works of Nature as a scholar, and not just *to gape* at them *like a fool*').[4] Even when finally admitted as a salutary passion in *Les Passions de l'âme*, Cartesian wonder is an oddity among the passions. It is the only one that is not in any way linked to the heart or the blood.[5] We may infer that Descartes's reluctance to locate the passions in the heart is due precisely to the prominent position of this rather cerebral affect.

The members of the literary society *Nil volentibus arduum* were evidently divided on this subject. At first, wonder is passed over in silence in Meyer's catalogue. Then Antonius van Koppenol hesitatingly introduces it (as 'Verwondering') in chapter 32: '*om dat zy hoewelze geen hartstocht is, dewyl het hart geene ongewoone beweeging door haar ontfangt, zeer dienstig is om ons gemoedt van ondeuchden te zuiveren*'[6] ('because – though it is no passion, since it causes no unusual motion in the heart – it is most serviceable to purge the mind from vices'). Van Koppenol clearly refers to Corneille's idea of catharsis, as set forth in the 'Examen' to *Nicomède*, where he states that wonder (*admiration*), although not mentioned as such by Aristotle, is a means of purging the passions.[7] Meyer responds to Van Koppenol in chapter 34: if Corneille considers wonder to be a more reliable means for catharsis than Aristotle's compassion and fear, the group ought to make its position plain when the occasion arises.[8] Johannes Bouwmeester, who is then saddled with the problem,[9] tries to solve it diplomatically in chapter 35. He gives an orthodox Cartesian definition of wonder and declares himself in favour of the Aristotelian catharsis, while at the same time leaving room for Corneille's view:

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1. Matuschek 1991, 124–32 (on Descartes), 133–6 (on Spinoza).
2. Plato, *Theaitetos* 155d; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 982b.
3. *Passions*, art. 73, 76, 75.
4. E 1ap (G 2, 81.15–17); English quote: Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 60. Emphasis supplied.
5. *Passions*, art. 71.
6. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 378.
7. Corneille, OC 2, 643: 'Dans l'admiration qu'on a pour sa vertu, je trouve une manière de purger les passions, dont n'a point parlé Aristote'.
8. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 378.
9. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 393, n. 1.

En voor eerst van de Verwondering zeggen dat dezelve is een schielijke bevanging des gemoeds waar door de ziel bewoogen wordt tot een aandachtige overdenking der voorwerpen die haar vreemt of ongewoon voorkomen.[1]

To begin with, we must say of wonder that it is a sudden seizure of the mind, which moves the soul to attentive consideration of objects that seem strange or extraordinary to it.

Summing up, we may conclude that the status and position of wonder in the theory of the passions was one of the moot points in the group. It may have been unresolved questions of this kind that caused *Nil volentibus arduum* to abandon the idea of publishing their collective work.

Discussions like the one outlined here were no isolated phenomena: in fact, the issues at stake were being debated at the same time by Cartesians elsewhere – more or less independently, so it seems. An illustrative example is Nicolas Malebranche, whose *De la recherche de la vérité* was begun in 1668 and published in 1674–8,[2] too late to have been a possible source for *Onderwys in de tooneel-poëzy*. It is out of the question that the Dutch group should have exercised any influence on Malebranche: he was not even aware of their existence. In France, Cartesianism thrived in oral debates, of which only few traces have come down to us. Malebranche often very closely follows contemporary French Cartesians like Cordemoy, La Forge, Rohault and the Port-Royal logic.[3]. Malebranche's general definition of the passions ('les émotions que l'âme ressent naturellement à l'occasion des mouvemens extraordinaires des esprits animaux') is reminiscent of both the Cartesian formula and the pre-Cartesian tradition upon which Meyer also seems to have drawn. The reduction of the primitive or primary passions to *desire, joy and sadness* is also found in Malebranche, and so is the idea that there are more passions than terms to label them with.[4] Wonder ranks as a passion, but an imperfect one;[5] in the ensuing treatment it is depicted as a component of a range of other passions, rather than as a passion in its own right – not unlike Spinoza's view (whose theory of the passions is otherwise very different from Malebranche's). Such parallels between Malebranche and the group around Meyer, then, are to be explained in terms of a common background and general tendencies in debates among Cartesians, rather than in terms of direct influences.

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1. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 391. Descartes, *Passions*, art. 70; cf. 53. Bouwmeester on Aristotle (p. 392): '*uit welke reedenen myns oordeels schynt dat de persoonen van* Aristoteles *en haar staat allerbest voegen om een Treurspel te maaken*'; and on Corneille's position: '*doch wy willen ook niet ontkennen dat de verwondering mede niet een van de voornaamste en nutste hartstochten kan zyn, waar op een Treurdichtschryver heeft te letten*' (ibid.).
2. See the introduction by Geneviève Rodis-Lewis to her edition of Malebranche's *Recherche de la vérité*, OC 1, V–XXXVIII. For the chronological data see pp. V, XIV, XXIII.
3. Rodis-Lewis, in Malebranche, OC 1, XXIV.
4. Malebranche, OC 2, 223.
5. Malebranche, OC 2, 188.

3.5 Passions and the theatre

After this digression on the delicate topic of wonder, I now resume the thread of Lodewijk Meyer's catalogue. Having completed his enumeration of the most important passions, Meyer gives some recommendations for their use in the theatre. The Ancients limited themselves to pity and indignation, but Meyer argues in favour of a more varied palette. Modern theatre, he claims, has introduced the reward of the virtuous and the punishment of the wicked, thus allowing the audience to depart in joy instead of in sadness. This has been frowned upon as narrow-minded moralism by C. Louise Thijssen-Schoute.[1] According to her severe judgement, Meyer's conclusion only demonstrates his poor understanding of Descartes and Spinoza. For did not Spinoza assert the very opposite, in the ultimate proposition of the *Ethica*: *'Beatitudo non est virtutis præmium, sed ipsa virtus'*?[2]

It seems to me that Thijssen-Schoute's censure misses the point. For one thing, the fact that Meyer adheres to other principles than Spinoza does not logically entail that he did not *understand* the latter's philosophy. He may simply have disagreed with him. Furthermore, this allegedly moralistic point of view is entirely in keeping with the main influence behind this Dutch work on poetics: the three *Discours* on drama, published by Pierre Corneille in 1660.[3] I freely grant that Corneille is a sophisticated writer, who expresses himself in a much more subtle manner than Lodewijk Meyer. Yet his message in the second *Discours* is basically the same as the one formulated above: one of the major useful functions of theatre is to send people home satisfied, after having witnessed the triumph of the virtuous and the discomfiture of the wicked:

> cette [...] manière de finir le poème dramatique par la punition des mauvaises actions et la récompense des bonnes [...] n'est pas un précepte de l'art, mais un usage que nous avons embrassé, dont chacun peut se départir à ses perils. [...] quand l'événement remplit nos souhaits et que la vertu y est couronnée, nous sortons avec pleine joie, et remportons une entière satisfaction, et de l'ouvrage, et de ceux qui l'ont représenté. Le succès heureux de la vertu, en dépit des traverses et des périls, nous excite à l'embrasser, et le succès funeste du crime ou de l'injustice est capable de nous en augmenter l'horreur naturelle, par l'appréhension d'un pareil malheur. C'est en cela que consiste la troisième utilité du théâtre [...].[4]

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1. Thijssen-Schoute 1989 [1954], 427.
2. E 5p42 (G 2, 307.27). It may be noted in passing that this apophthegm, though presumably best known in its Spinozist formulation, has classical, Stoic forerunners: 'sapientibus conscientia ipsa factorum egregiorum amplissimum virtutis est praemium' (Cicero, *De Republica* 6.8); 'virtutum omnium pretium in ipsis est' (Seneca, *Epistula* 81.19). A similar idea is expressed in Ovid's *Epistulae ex Ponto* (2.3.11–12): 'nec facile invenias multis in milibus unum/virtutem pretium qui putet esse sui.'
3. Corneille, OC 3, 115–90.
4. Corneille, OC 3, 122.

Although Corneille does not claim that modern theatre is therefore superior to the Classics, his own preference is clear. For Meyer as well as for Corneille this predilection is based upon dramaturgical rather than moral arguments. Meyer's argument runs as follows: '*En dewyl het inde Menschen de vermaaklijkste verandering is over te gaan vande droefheidt tot de blyschap Oordelen wy dat de hedendaagsche Dichters de Ouden daar in overtreffen*'[1] ('since the most delightful change in men is the passage from sadness to joy, we are of the opinion that modern poets surpass the ancient authors in this respect'). The notion of transition in this context bears some resemblance to Spinoza's definitions of joy and sadness: 'Lætitia est hominis transitio à minore ad majorem perfectionem', ('Pleasure is a man's transition from a state of less perfection to a state of greater perfection'), 'Tristitia est hominis transitio à majore ad minorem perfectionem' ('Pain is a man's transition from a state of greater perfection to a state of less perfection').[2] But the parallel is not specific enough to assume an influence from Spinoza here.

3.6 Conclusions

Some evaluative conclusions present themselves.

(i) For the early reception of Spinoza's thought, it is important to note that Meyer evidently had access to the manuscript of the *Ethica* at least as early as 1670. From his borrowings it appears that he was acquainted with part 3. The casual reference to the pineal gland is insufficient evidence for the hypothesis that the preface to part 5 was its source; it may well reflect Meyer's own medical ideas (or an influence from a common source, possibly Niels Stensen). We know that the *Ethica* circulated in manuscript within the circle of Spinoza's friends long before its publication. In a letter of June 1665, addressed to Johannes Bouwmeester, Spinoza refers to a part of his philosophy, which he will send to Bouwmeester or De Vries, as the third part up to about the eightieth proposition, 'usque ad 80. propositionem circiter'.[3] This proves that at that date the work was still meant to consist of three parts; the division of part 3 into the parts 3, 4 and 5 as we now know them belongs to a later stage.

(ii) There is nothing in Meyer's chapter on the passions that would indicate his acquaintance with the work we now refer to as the *Korte verhandeling van God, de mensch en deszelvs welstand.* The absence of any clear indication to that effect is not necessarily significant. The *Short treatise* deals with the passions in terms that are quite

1. *Onderwys*, ed. Harmsen 1989, 365.
2. E 3ad2–3 (G 2, 191.1–4); translation from Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 141.
3. Ep 28 (G 4, 163.24). Fur further evidence as to the (uncontrolled) circulation of manuscript copies of the *Ethica* prior to publication, see e.g. Spinoza's Letters 8 and 72. The matter of manuscript distribution of Spinoza's works has been dealt with in note 2 of p. 38, chapter 1, of the present study.

close to Descartes's *Passions de l'âme*, and if Meyer knew this early treatise by Spinoza, he may well have thought it had been superseded by the *Ethica*.[1] Although it is likely that Meyer was among the friends for whom the *Korte verhandeling* had been written,[2] we have no concrete indications of its circulation in manuscript, except that it was known to Spinoza's publisher, Jan Rieuwertsz, whose son appears to have inherited his father's copy.[3] In 1666, Meyer announced in the epilogue to his *Philosophia Sacrae Scripturae interpres* the publication of a work by someone who would follow in Descartes's footsteps. It would deal with God, the rational soul, man's supreme happiness and the way to eternal life: 'de Deô, Animâ rationali, summâ hominis felicitate'.[4] This passage is commonly thought to refer to the *Short treatise*. But Spinoza had abandoned the idea of publishing this text as early as 1661.[5] It is hardly likely, then, that Meyer would still be announcing its imminent publication in 1666. If the date is sufficient reason to exclude the *Short treatise*, this announcement most probably refers to its successor, the *Ethica*, which at that time was still divided into three parts, and which deals with the very subjects specified by Meyer.

(iii) Meyer was not a philosopher of the stature of Descartes and Spinoza. But it should be borne in mind that we are not doing him full justice by comparing his exposition of the passions with the fully fledged theories developed by these two masters. Although students of Descartes are divided as to the merits of *Les Passions de l'âme*, and its position within the oeuvre as a whole, it was at any rate a mature work and one which Descartes himself had published.[6] Part 3 of the *Ethica* was the fruit of a long process; Spinoza intended it to form a bridge between his metaphysics and his ethics proper. Meyer only contributed a very succinct chapter on the passions to a book on poetics – a book which its authors eventually deemed unfit for publication.

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1. For the development of Spinoza's theory of the passions from the *Short treatise* to the *Ethica*, see Cristofolini 1990.
2. KV, Besluyt (Spinoza, ed. Mignini 1986, 348.3–4): 'de vrunden tot de welke ik dit schryve'.
3. Cf. Mignini in his 1986 edition of the *Korte verhandeling*, 22–3, 71–80.
4. Meyer 1666, sig. P2^{v}. (Note that the received title of the KV has no equivalent for 'anima rationalis'. This fits the second part of the *Ethica*, 'De mente', better.) The whole final paragraph is interesting for Meyer's position: 'Et quamvis admodùm brevi angustôque conclusa adhic sit ambitu, adeóque non multa huc facientia sufficere queat, cùm apud veteres, si Mathematicos excipias, Philosophos nihil ferè solidi evidenterque demonstrati occurrat; & à recentioribus id genus pauca tantùm excogitata atque reperta sint: Satius tamen meliusque censemus, pauca vera certò cognoscere, quàm multa falsa atque dubia, tanquam vera atque certa, & sibi persuadere, & aliis obtrudere. Quibus adde, quòd non levis arrideat spes, Philosophiæ pomœria his temporibus, quibus maximus ille ejus instaurator atque propa[ga]tor Renatus Des Cartes orbi literario facem præluxit, suôque præivit exemplô, ab aliis, qui ipsius vestigiis insistere volent, longè lateque extentum iri;' then follows the reference to Spinoza's *Ethica*.
5. So at least Mignini argues (KV, ed. Mignini 1986, 98–9).
6. See for instance *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger*, 113 (1988), no 4, which is devoted entirely to *Les Passions de l'âme;* and especially the introduction by Jean-Marie Beyssade, pp. 403–5.

If we take this into account, the comparison between Meyer on the one hand and Descartes and Spinoza on the other does not reflect too badly on him.

(iv) Meyer is an interesting and original representative of a current that has been designated as 'Cartesio-Spinozism'.[1] The text in question, chapter 30 of the collective work *Onderwys in de tooneel-poëzy*, exemplifies both his originality and his remarkable blend of Cartesianism and Spinozism. From the preface Meyer wrote for Spinoza's *Renati des Cartes Principiorum philosophiæ pars I, & II*,[2] we gain the impression of a man deeply committed to the new philosophy that had started with Descartes and that was now being developed by Spinoza. A similar note is struck in the epilogue to his *Philosophia Sacrae Scripturae interpres* of 1666.[3] His expectations are such that he will not settle for anything less than a complete restructuring of all the sciences on the principles laid down by Descartes. In this programme there is no longer room for authorities, ancient or modern. Even Descartes himself is judged by the standards of the new method and supplemented and corrected by insights developed by others, notably Spinoza. All these elements are also to be found in the chapter on the passions: his indebtedness to Descartes, his unorthodox and unabashed criticisms of Cartesianism, his willingness to adopt elements of Spinoza's thought wherever this seems appropriate.

His *originality* emerges from two points in particular. The first is the elaborate classification he imposes on what is basically a Cartesian theory of the passions. Meyer has gone to some trouble to establish the logical arrangement in which *Les Passions de l'âme* is so deficient. The second and perhaps most important point is the application of a theory of the passions which was developed within the new philosophy of the period to the field of poetics. This was traditionally the area in which authors were content to repeat *ad nauseam* Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*. If the new philosophers – so Meyer must have argued – contribute something of substance to our understanding of human emotion then their theories should be our starting point in reflecting on the passions in literature.[4]

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1. This term was coined by H.G. Hubbeling 1983 to denote a current in Dutch Cartesianism. In that article, he applies the concept specifically to Arnold Geulincx, but on p. 70 the current is explicitly said to include Jelles, Balling and Meyer. Hubbeling uses the label quite freely (also including De Raey: p. 80, n. 2; on the latter's attitude towards Spinoza, however, see Verbeek 1994). In the case of Meyer, the term is certainly appropriate. Cf. also Lagrée & Moreau, in the introduction to their 1988 translation of Meyer's *Interpres*, p. 10, and Lagrée 1987. Lagrée qualifies the *Interpres* as 'un chaînon important entre Descartes et Spinoza' (p. 32) and states that 'Louis Meyer n'est, à strictement parler ni cartésien, ni spinoziste rigoureux' (p. 42). She regards him with endearment as a 'mousquetaire maladroit de la nouvelle philosophie' (p. 43).
2. G 1, 127–33.
3. Cf. Meyer 1666, sig. P2^{v}.
4. Apropos the effect of the new philosophy on drama, the attempts (notably by Gustave Lanson, 1979 [1895], 1929 [1896]) to point out strong influences from Descartes in Corneille's drama deserve special mention. This thesis is now no longer considered to be valid (Cassirer 1939, 71–117; Stegmann 1968, 260–8).

(v) We owe the publication of Spinoza's posthumous works, including the *Ethica*, to the devotion of his closest friends, among them especially the unflinching Lodewijk Meyer. In his 68th Letter Spinoza describes for his correspondent Oldenburg the abortive attempt to get the *Ethica* published in 1675. One of the reasons for his abandoning the project was the denunciation of his ideas and writings by 'stupid Cartesians' (*stolidi Cartesiani*), who were afraid of being suspected of sympathizing with him.[1] Had Lodewijk Meyer been equally spineless, he would not have contributed to editing the *Opera posthuma* in 1677. We have every reason to pay tribute to this unorthodox representative of Dutch Cartesio-Spinozism.

1. G 4, 299.14–7: 'stolidi præterea Cartesiani, quia mihi favere creduntur, ut à se hanc amoverent suspicionem, meas ubique opiniones, & scripta detestari non cessabant, nec etiamnum cessant.' As Theo Verbeek (1992, 77) has pointed out, the Cartesians felt obliged to dissociate themselves from Meyer's *Philosophia Sacrae Scripturae interpres* and Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, because 'To most people, and especially the Orthodox, these books confirmed the apprehensions they had always had with respect to the inherent dangers of Cartesian method.' See also Verbeek 1994, in particular pp. 2–3.

Diagram: a summary of Meyer's catalogue of the passions
(The Dutch terms are given in parentheses)

<table>
<tr><td colspan="4">past</td><td>· regret (een droefheit die de franschen regret noemen)
· relief (vreugdt)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="6">present</td><td rowspan="4">in ourselves</td><td colspan="2">absolutely good or evil</td><td>· joy (blydschap)
· sadness (droefheidt)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">with a cause</td><td>within us</td><td>· satisfaction (vergenoeging)
· remorse (berouw, leetwezen)</td></tr>
<tr><td>outside us</td><td>· gratitude (dankbaarheidt, erkentenis)
· anger (toorn, gramschap)
· love (liefde) { · affection (geneegentheidt) · friendship (vriendschap) · devotion (devotie)
· hatred (haat)
· enjoyment (behaagen)
· aversion (afkeerigheidt)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">with regard to the opinion others have of us</td><td>· pride (glorie)
· shame (schaamte)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">in others</td><td colspan="2">absolutely good or evil</td><td>· a nameless passion [approx.: compassion, sympathy] (deez hartstoght heeft geen byzondre naam)
· envy (wangunst)
· pity (meedelyden)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">with a cause</td><td>we are the cause</td><td>· peace of mind (vergenoeging)
· uneasiness (moeyelijkheidt)</td></tr>
<tr><td>someone else is the cause</td><td>· favour (gonst)
· indignation (verontwaardiging)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4" rowspan="4">future: desire and its varieties</td><td>· curiosity (nieuwsgierigheidt)
· ambition (roemzucht)
· vindictiveness, (wraakzucht)
etc.</td></tr>
<tr><td>desires arising from enjoyment and aversion (soorten van de begeerte welke spruiten uit het behaagen en de afkeerigheidt), the most important of which is the desire for sexual intercourse (de begeerte van byslaapen), commonly designated as love (liefde)</td></tr>
<tr><td>· confidence (vertrouwen)
· hope (hoop)
· fear (vrees)
· desperation (wanhoop)
· jealousy (jalouzy)</td></tr>
<tr><td>· indecision (angst)
· compunction (wroeging)
· courage (moedt)
· audacity (stoutheidt, onverzaagdheidt)
· cowardice (blooheidt)
· consternation (vertzaagtheidt)</td></tr>
</table>

Chapter 4
The text of Ethica part five

4.1 The Latin text and the seventeenth-century Dutch translation

The following remarks on the text of *Ethica* 5 have their origin in the preparations Fokke Akkerman and I are making for a new edition of the Latin text. The key question for an editor is that of the copy-text: which text should serve as the basis for the edition? In the case of Spinoza's *Ethica*, we dispose of a single Latin text, on which all subsequent editions and translations depend. The only problem to be solved in that respect is the status of the contemporary Dutch translation in *De nagelate schriften*. Spinoza's friends commissioned it to the professional translator Jan Hendriksz Glazemaker. Its problematic status has occupied many editors, translators and commentators of the *Ethica*. Did Glazemaker work from the Latin manuscript that also served as the basis of the edition in the *Opera posthuma*? Was this Spinoza's autograph copy, or a transcript? To what degree had Glazemaker's exemplar been revised by an editor: was it an unsullied manuscript, or a copy already edited for the press, or even a printed text, for example proofs, or a combination of all these possibilities? Are there cases in which Glazemaker rendered Spinoza's text more faithfully than the compositor of the *Opera posthuma*? We know he had at his disposal an earlier Dutch translation of parts 1 and 2 of the *Ethica*, produced by Pieter Balling before June 1665.[1] Did Glazemaker have access to any other manuscripts or witnesses of the *Ethica* text? As Akkerman has shown, the relationship between Latin text and translation is different for parts 1 and 2 on the one hand, and parts 3 to 5 on the other.[2] Since we are here faced with what is sometimes called horizontal transmission,[3] perhaps even further differentiations are needed: the situation may be different not only for whole parts of the *Ethica*, but even for single passages. In the new critical edition Akkerman and I will try to answer such questions for the work as a whole. The present chapter may serve as a specimen of the sort of investigation this involves. Its purpose is to examine the

1. See Akkerman 1980, 152 ff.
2. Akkerman 1980, 145–61.
3. A text is said to have been transmitted horizontally if it derives from more than one earlier version or stage, all of which served simultaneously as its exemplar and whose traces it still bears (cross-contamination). In the opposite case, that of vertical transmission, text A is a transcript of an older text B, which in turn was copied from a still older text C, etcetera. The terms were coined by Pasquali (1962, 140).

relationship of translation and Latin text in a single part: part 5, captioned 'De Potentia Intellectus, seu de Libertate Humanâ'.[1] For that part, the *Opera posthuma* can be shown to be the only independent source of the text available to us. Its authority is nowhere overridden by Glazemaker's translation of the text in *De nagelate schriften*.

In the following sections I will present a survey of the readings in the Dutch translation that depart from the Latin text of the *Opera posthuma*. It should be noted, though, that a comparison between a source text and a translation can never yield an indisputable inventory of all the variants. Strictly speaking, a translation consists of nothing but variants in relation to its source. If there were perfect agreement, it would no longer be translation, that is: a rendering in another language. In deciding whether a particular reading constitutes a deviation from the source text rather than a passable equivalent, a certain margin must be allowed for. Such decisions are to some extent bound to be subjective and in a few cases even arbitrary. With that reservation I will now present an analysis of four types of variants: (i) translator's licences, (ii) translation errors, (iii) variants in the cross-references of the *Ethica*, or – more generally – in the apparel of the *ordo geometricus*, and (iv) the Latin terms in the margin of *De nagelate schriften*.

4.2 Translator's licences

Under the heading of translator's licences we can distinguish various branches: double renderings (doublets); licences in grammatical categories (mood, tense, number); terminological variation; minor omissions and additions; and sundry free renderings. I will illustrate each of these phenomena with some examples (consecutively numbered).

4.2.1 *Doublets*

Glazemaker often rendered a single Latin word with two Dutch terms, for various reasons, for example to clarify its semantic range, or because he was carried away by the philosopher's argument.[2] Some specimen doublets:[3]

(1) *referri* OP 247.8, 254.3, 259.6,8–9, 261.8,32 : *betrokken en toegepast worden* NS.
(2) *habitum* OP 235.2 : *gewoonte en gebruik* NS.
(3) *opera* OP 239.11 : *vlijt en naerstigheit* NS.

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1. As I have argued in chapter 1 (§ 1.4.5), the Dutch titles of the parts as given on the part-title of *De nagelate schriften* are probably closer to Spinoza's intention than their rhetorically elaborated Latin versions in the *Opera posthuma*. The caption of part five as it occurs over the text in *De nagelate schriften* (p. 263), however, corresponds exactly to that of the *Opera posthuma*: '*Van 't vermogen des Verstants*, of *Van de menschelijke* VRYHEYT.'
2. Akkerman 1980, 132–5.
3. For a complete inventory, see Akkerman 1980, 197.

(4) *coërceri* OP 241.25 : *bedwongen en ingetoomt worden* NS.

It must be emphasized that the occurrence of such a double rendering in no way warrants the conclusion that the Dutch translation has preserved terms omitted by the compositor of the *Opera posthuma*. The use of doublets is simply a way of translating, one that was very common at that time and whose roots reach back into Antiquity.[1]

The phenomenon of the double rendering merits a closer analysis in a special case, viz. the Dutch version of proposition 24. Carl Gebhardt has given an ingenious interpretation of the Dutch reading, which, if valid, would vitiate my argument that the readings of *De nagelate schriften* nowhere override the text of the *Opera posthuma*. This is the proposition at issue:

(5) *Quò magis res singulares intelligimus, eò magis Deum intelligimus* OP 252.17–8: *Hoe wy de bezondere dingen meer verstaan, hoe wy ook God meer verstaan, of meer verstant van God hebben* NS 286.

In his edition of Spinoza's works, Gebhardt interpolates the text of the proposition as it occurs in the *Opera posthuma* with a clause adapted from *De nagelate schriften*: '*of wy ook meer verstant van God hebben*'. In his annotation he remarks:

> Die Nagelate Schriften haben für *eo magis Deum intelligimus: hoe wy ook God meer verstaan, of meer verstant van God hebben.* Dem muß wohl als lateinischer Text entsprochen haben: *eo magis Deum intelligimus sive eo magis Dei intellectum habemus.* Durch diese Ergänzung liefern uns die Nagelate Schriften den Schlüssel zum Verständnis des vielumstrittenen und dunklen Lehrsatzes: je mehr wir von den Dingen erkennen, desto größer ist unser Anteil am Intellectus infinitus.[2]

This interpretation, however, overestimates the semantic import of the Dutch idiom 'verstand hebben van'. This very common verb phrase means 'to understand, to know about'. It has been attested in that sense since the sixteenth century.[3] If one must translate this expression into Latin, the equivalent would be something like 'intelligere aliquam rem' or 'intelligere in aliqua re', or even – if need be – 'intelligentiam alicuius rei habere'.[4] The alleged key to proposition 24 turns out to be one of those double renderings that come so naturally to Glazemaker.[5] Doublets are not, to be sure, evenly distributed throughout the *Ethica*: as it happens, there is a relative paucity of

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1. Cf. Marti 1974, 54, 125; Akkerman 1980, 132; Rener 1989, 110, 142, 222, 250; Schoneveld 1983, 24, 47.
2. G 2, Textgestaltung, p. 391.
3. Cf. WNT 20, s.v. *verstand* II8 *a*, II8 *cα*; Plantin, s.v. *Verstaen, verstandt hebben* (sig. 2O1^{r}). For the not so common German equivalent, 'Verstand von etwas haben', cf. Grimm, s.v. *Verstand* B4c, 1540–1.
4. The expression *intellegentiam iuris habere* has been attested in Cicero, *Philippica* 9.10: 'omnes [...] qui [...] intellegentiam iuris habuerunt'. Cf. Édon, s.v. *(s')entendre* 9°, and Mehler, s.v. *verstand*.
5. Cf. Akkerman 1980, 100; Curley (in Spinoza, tr. Curley 1985), 608, n. 15. The same analysis had already been suggested by Parkinson 1954, 179, n. 2.

them in part 5. Evidently this proposition appealed to the pious translator. His enthusiasm manifests itself by an increase in doublets, for example towards the end of the second part and in the appendix of the fourth.[1]

What about the obscurity of the proposition, then? As Emilia Giancotti pointed out, the theorem is to be understood by referring to the corollary to proposition 25 of part 1: 'Res particulares nihil sunt, nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi, quibus Dei attributa certo, & determinato modo exprimuntur'[2] ('Particular things are nothing but affections of the attributes of God; that is, modes wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and determinate way').[3]

Summing up, the purported counterexample is in fact to be subsumed under our first heading – translator's licences. It therefore cannot be used to underpin the hypothesis that the Latin text of this proposition in the *Opera posthuma* is corrupt.

4.2.2 *Mood, tense, number*

The following examples may serve to illustrate licences that affect grammatical categories:

(6) *sequeretur* (imperfect subjunctive) OP 236.9 : *volgt* (present indicative) NS.
(7) *statuit* (perfect) OP 234.9,10,19,29 : *stelt* (present) NS.
(8) *erit* (future) OP 244.1 : *is* (present) NS.
(9) *commotionem/affectum* (singular) OP 237.24 : *bewegingen/hartstochten* (plural) NS.

This type of variant (*mutatio qualitatis*) is very common in all translations.[4] Often the syntax or idiom of the object language requires the use of particular forms, which may deviate from those of the source language. It should be noted, though, that this is not the case in the examples cited here. Glazemaker did have equivalent Dutch forms at his disposal. Apparently, such details did not matter all that much to him.

4.2.3 *Terminological variation*

The third branch of translator's licences to be dealt with is terminological variation. By this I mean the unnecessary, 'gratuitous' variation of rhetorical *ornatus*,[5] not the inevitably different renderings of a single word whose sense differs with the context (e.g. *ratio*, 'reason', as against *ratio*, 'way, manner'). Variation has been a customary

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1. Akkerman 1980, 134. As for Glazemaker's denomination, see Thijssen-Schoute 1967, 206–17. He belonged to the so-called 'Vlamingen', a Mennonite sect that set great store by individual piety.
2. E 1p25c (OP 24; G 2, 68.10–2). For Giancotti's comment, see her 1988 translation of the *Ethica*, 421–2, n. 27.
3. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 49.
4. Cf. Rener 1989, 81, 139–42.
5. Cf. Lausberg 1973, 142.

stylistic feature in translating throughout the ages: flourishing his *copia verborum*, the translator avoids repetition and so prevents tedium.[1] Although Glazemaker did attempt to be systematic in rendering terms he considered technical, he made ample use of variation, too - for aesthetic reasons as well as out of laxity. Some examples:

(10) *ratio* OP 244.8 : *wijze en middel* NS — OP 243.26 : *middel en wijze* NS.
(11) *in promptu* OP 243.29 : *gereet* NS — OP 244.1 : *in handen* NS — OP 244.5 : *vaerdig* NS — OP 244.6 : *vaerdig en bij der hant* (doublet) NS — OP 308.26 : *zo naby* NS.
(12) *conscia* OP 261.26 : *bewust* NS — OP 261.28 : *meêwustig* NS.
(13) *foveri* OP 248.16 : *aangevoed worden* NS — OP 248.25-6 : *gevoed worden* NS — OP 249.14 : *gevoed en gesterkt worden* NS.

4.2.4 *Omissions and additions*

Minor omissions and additions consciously intended by the translator are sometimes hard to distinguish from real errors, caused by oversight and analogy. I will give some examples that I think belong under the heading of licences, rather than under that of translation errors.

(14) *usu* OP 234.2 : om. NS.
(15) *contrà* OP 234.3 : om. NS.
(16) *affectuum* OP 249.1 : om. NS.
(17) *hominibus* OP 263.16 : om. NS.
(18) *zeg ik* (tag added to permit the construction of the long-winded sentence in Dutch) NS 265.6, 266.28.
(19) *hoc cognitionis genere* OP 256.2 : *van deze darde slach van kennis* (adding *darde*) NS.
(20) *tertio cognitionis genere* OP 256.13 : *door deze darde slach van kennis* (adding *deze*) NS.

4.2.5 *Sundry free renderings*

To conclude this survey of translator's licences I would like to point out some other free renderings.

(21) *vir Philosophus* OP 235.19 : *zulk een groot Wijsbegerige* NS.
(22) *procedit ab... ad* OP 252.25-6 : *spruit uit... en gaat voort tot* NS.
(23) *affectibus, qui ad passiones referuntur* OP 257.15-6: *hartstochten, die lijdingen zijn* NS.

1. Rener 1989, 158-9, 233-4.

4.3 Translation errors

When dealing with the deviant readings that come under the second heading, the errors in translation, it must once more be emphasized that it is impossible to draw up an exhaustive inventory. Glazemaker had to work fast and we need not be surprised to find that his reading of the *Ethica* was on occasion superficial. Here are some specimen faulty translations:

(24) *arctè* OP 236.8 (for *artè*) : *met kunst* NS (taking *arte* as a noun instead of an adverb).
(25) *per gen*[*eralem*] *Affect*[*uum*] *Defin*[*itionem*] OP 239.1 : *volgens de Bepaling der algemene hartstochten* NS (reading *per generalium Affectuum Definitionem*).
(26) *tamdiu* OP 243.14 : *lange tijt* NS (reading *diu*).
(27) *Mentis* OP 258.12 : om. NS.
(28) *quantacunque* OP 262.11, 17 : *hoedanig ook* NS (reading *qualiscunque*).

Item no. 24 may well be a revealing case. The adverb *arctè* derives from the adjective *arctus*, whose preferred spelling is *artus*. The spelling *arctus* is even deemed incorrect.[1] The translation error shows that Glazemaker was working from a Latin text in which the word featured in its form *arte*: without *c* and without the grave accent. Written thus, it permitted in theory two different translations: 'closely' and 'with art, artfully'. The context conclusively shows that the latter translation is wrong.[2] The spelling *arctè* in the *Opera posthuma* is an indication that the copy from which the compositor worked was carefully edited; see chapter 1 for a conjecture about the status of this copy. The Latin manuscript that Glazemaker had in front of him apparently differed from that copy in some of its details. At this stage I would be reluctant to formulate an hypothesis as to the provenance of that second manuscript. As we have seen in chapter 1, it is not impossible that Spinoza's autograph was among the documents available to those who prepared the posthumous works for the press. But seeing that more manuscripts of the *Ethica* circulated among those who were in touch with Spinoza, we need not automatically assume that Glazemaker worked from the author's autograph rather than from one of the latter transcripts.

4.4 Variants in the cross-references

A third class of variant readings between the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften* are those pertaining to the geometrical order. The Euclidean exposition requires an intricate and therefore vulnerable system of cross-references, more liable to lapses and literal errors than a plain text. Irregularities in these references are interesting as they sometimes still bear the marks of authorial revision. Now it is conceivable that a

1. *Thesaurus linguae Latinae*, s.v. *artus*.
2. Cf. also *arctissimè unitæ*, somewhat earlier in E 5præf (OP 235.26).

reference that features in the *Opera posthuma* in a corrupted form makes a pristine appearance in *De nagelate schriften* (and vice versa, to be sure). In the fifth part of the *Ethica*, though, this situation nowhere presents itself. *De nagelate schriften* offer only two variant readings in the cross-references. In one case the reference is wrong in both versions, and in the other the mistake is in the Dutch text and the correct reading in the Latin:

(29) *per Prop. 22. p. 2. cum ejusdem Schol.* OP 238.13–4 : *volgens de tweeëntwintigste Voorstelling van het tweede deel* NS (om. *cum ejusdem Schol.*; E 2p22 has no scholium) : *per Prop. 21. p. 2. cum ejusdem Schol.* coni. Schmidt.
(30) *p. 4.* OP 244.9 : *van het tweede deel* NS (misreading *p. 2.*).

I think that item no. 29 is an indication that someone checked and revised the system of cross-references in *De nagelate schriften* after the *Ethica* had been translated. The reference to a nonexistent scholium must have been an embarrassment to this editor (Jelles, Rieuwertsz?), so he simply suppressed it.

4.5 The trimmings of the geometrical order in Ethica part five

This brings us to the more general observation that the apparel of the geometrical order – like the cross-references, the stock phrases, the layout of the numbers, the abbreviations etc. – in the *Opera posthuma* is strikingly different from that in *De nagelate schriften*. With regard to the fifth part I would like to comment upon the standard formula concluding the demonstrations. In the *Opera posthuma* we find almost without exception the abbreviated formula *Q.E.D.*, 'which was to be proved', preceded by a recapitulation of the proposition, in varying degrees of accuracy and completeness. On a total number of forty-two propositions, the formula occurs forty-one times. It is lacking in the demonstrations of theorems 24 and 35, whereas the corollary of proposition 40 is closed with *Q.E.D.* as well. In *De nagelate schriften*, on the other hand, there is more variation. The favourite formula, featuring twenty-five times (also in the corollary to proposition 40), is the impeccable rendering of *quod erat demonstrandum* in Dutch: *'t welk te betogen stond.* An alternative wording, *gelijk te betogen stond*, occurs ten times.[1] The demonstration of proposition 4 is concluded in *De nagelate schriften* by *gelijk wy voorstelden*, and that of proposition 28 by *gelijk voorgestelt is* – phrases that recall the formula *ut proponebatur*, which occurs elsewhere in the *Ethica*.[2] In *De nagelate schriften*, the concluding formula is missing in six instances,[3] two of which are the same as in the *Opera posthuma*. The demonstrations of propositions 19 and 37 are noteworthy: in both cases, the Latin text offers an incomplete recapitulation of the theorem, breaking off with '&c. *Q.E.D.*' In the Dutch

1. Viz. in the demonstrations of propositions 1, 2, 3, 6, 30, 33, 36, 38, 40 and 41.
2. E 1p8s, *in fine*, = OP 7.20–1. (NS 8.26: *gelijk voorgestelt wierd.*)
3. Demonstrations of propositions 12, 13, 19, 24, 35, 37.

translation the incomplete recapitulations as well as the concluding formula are lacking. This again raises the question of the provenance of the exemplar that Glazemaker used for his translation: the discrepancies seem to indicate that his was another copy than the fair copy used by the compositor of the *Opera posthuma*. I will return to this point in the final section of this chapter

My hypothesis is that Spinoza himself had not written out the final parts of the demonstrations fully and systematically, but contented himself with a summary indication – of which the truncated conclusions of propositions 19 and 37 in the Latin text may be remnants. The editors of the *Opera posthuma* and *De nagelate schriften* thereupon followed their own preferences, now leaving the text as they found it, then completing or cancelling the concluding phrases and formulas. All this suggests that the Latin text and the Dutch translation underwent a mutually independent adaptation before going to the press. That should warn us against rash interventions in the Latin text, prompted solely by variant readings in *De nagelate schriften*.

4.6 The marginal glosses

Along the Dutch translations of Spinoza's works, *De nagelate schriften* also offer an abundance of Latin words. The margins are replete with glosses: all philosophical and further technical terms are yoked to their time-honoured Latin equivalents by means of a reference system that marks the Dutch words to be glossed with superior letters. The practice was much in vogue in the period, especially in the Netherlands. Its function was to provide the reader of a text in the vernacular with 'universal' pointers. Dutch was in the process of developing its own standard terminology for scientific and philosophical purposes. The practice of marginal glosses helped in shaping this technical language by elucidating neologisms, and it provided the reader with a frame of reference that was not dependent on the particular choices of an individual translator or author.[1]

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1. Stephanus Axters has collected important material for the development of Dutch Scholastic terminology, and in that context he also regularly calls attention to the practice of the marginal glosses. He cites examples and explicit justifications from 1585 onwards (Axters 1937, pp. 89*, 94*, 96–7*, 110*). A signal contribution to the development of Dutch as a vehicle for scientific communication was made by Simon Stevin: see chapter 16 of E.J. Dijksterhuis's study of Stevin (Dijksterhuis 1943, 298–320), and Van den Branden 1967 [1956], 188–209 (especially 199). On Stevin's marginal glosses see especially Dijksterhuis 1943, 305–16. (The corresponding chapter 13 in the English edition is very heavily reduced, on account of the subject's connectedness with Dutch: Dijksterhuis 1970, 126–9.) Crapulli 1969 (the only monograph on the subject, as far as I know) is a thorough investigation of the marginal glosses in Glazemaker's Dutch translations of Descartes.

Two further remarks on this. (i) It should be noted that the practice, though very popular in the Netherlands, can be met with in other vernaculars as well (see Rener 1989, 107, for German examples). (ii) Marginal terms are not limited to translated texts. Authors of original Dutch works would also supply them, e.g. Stevin or Spiegel (the probable author of an important early

We do not know who supplied these Latin terms in the margin, but I think it unlikely that this should have been the translator. Glazemaker had been engaged for a well-defined task: translating a number of texts. The Latin equivalents seem to have been added after the translations had been completed. Presumably the editor who supplied them was one of the friends who were involved in preparing Spinoza's works for the press (see chapter 1). The mistakes in the marginal terms can give us some idea of how the editor went about his charge. His goal was to furnish the reader with pointers, not to offer a faithful reproduction of the exact Latin words employed by Spinoza. He evidently often recorded a gloss from memory, without incessantly consulting the original Latin manuscripts. This emerges from minor discrepancies, e.g.

(31) *glandula* OP 234.8, 28 : *glans* NS 264[m], 265[e] in the margin.

I am convinced that he occasionally even complied on purpose with the Dutch text rather than with the Latin, so as not to confound the reader. That explains minor variations like the following:

(32) *unus, aut alter infans* (singular) OP 241.8 : *een of twee* [b]*kinderen* (plural) NS 273 : *b Infantes* (plural) NS in the margin.
(33) *Propositione* (singular) OP 244.15 : [d]*Voorstellingen* (plural) NS 277 : *d Propositiones* (plural) NS in the margin.

There are also some instances in which the glossing editor makes a mistake that is not caused by either the Latin text or the Dutch translation, for example:

(34) *affectionum* OP 237.18 : [m]*aandoeningen* NS 269 : *m Actiones* NS 269 in the margin (*actiones* is usually translated as *doeningen*).
(35) *affectio* OP 238.20 : [q]*aandoening* NS 270 : *q Actiones* NS 270 in the margin.

In one case in *Ethica* 5, the marginal gloss can be adduced to argue that a corrupt reading in *De nagelate schriften* is very probably not a mistranslation but a misprint:

(36) *existentiam* OP 252.14 : [l]*wezentheit* NS (the usual translation of *essentia*, as against *wezentlijkheit* for *existentia*) : *l Existentia* NS 286 in the margin.

Let us suppose for a moment that Glazemaker was wrong here and had written *wezentheit*. Then the editor who supplied the marginal terms either disregarded the mistake, in which case he would have put *essentia* in the margin; or, alternatively, he did notice – but then he would not only have supplied the right gloss but also have corrected Glazemaker's error. It is therefore more likely that the lapsus *wezentheit* is to be attributed to the compositor of *De nagelate schriften*.

Dutch grammar, *Twe-spraack vande Nederduitsche Letterkunst* of 1584; on his authorship see Peeters 1990, 40–50).

A general overview of the development of Dutch philosophical language is Krop 1993.

4.7 Conclusion

After this survey of the variant readings in the Dutch translation as compared with the Latin text of *Ethica* 5 in the *Opera posthuma*, what conclusion can we draw? In my opinion the following: that there is not a single place in the fifth part in which the text of the *Opera posthuma* is to be emended on the mere basis of the Dutch translation in *De nagelate schriften*. To be sure, some corrupt passages can be rectified on the basis of the *Opera posthuma* itself, through a comparison with the Latin context – and occasionally such a correction is then also corroborated by the reading in *De nagelate schriften*. I will illustrate this point with two examples:

(37) *vi solâ* OP 242.23 : *in sola* corr. Van Vloten & Land; cf. *in solâ* OP 242.29, *in d'enige* NS

(38) *observavit* OP 245.10 : *observabit* corr. Saisset; cf. *& exercebit* OP 245.11, *zal waarnemen... en oeffenen* NS

If I am right in maintaining that the text of *Ethica* 5 in the *Opera posthuma* is nowhere overridden by that in *De nagelate schriften*, then it follows that Glazemaker did not have at his disposal a *better* manuscript than the one that served as copy to the compositor, nor have access to other, independent sources. This is not to deny that he may have worked from *another* manuscript. Several discrepancies seem to suggest this: see the discussion of the putative variant reading *arte* (p. 134) and the differences in the trimmings of the geometrical order (p. 135).

The comparison of the Latin and Dutch versions of *Ethica* 5 does not warrant the hypothesis that Glazemaker's exemplar was the autograph manuscript of Spinoza – but it does not rule that out, either. As long as we have no evidence that the Dutch translation is based on a better manuscript, though, the hypothesis seems premature.

Glazemaker was a competent and generally reliable translator, whose importance for the spread of modern philosophy in the vernacular has rightly been praised. As a translator, though, he was allowed more licence and made more mistakes than the compositor of the Latin text. His renderings cannot therefore be taken as variant readings without qualification; for *Ethica* part 5, Glazemaker's translation is not an independent source at all.

Chapter 5
Ordo geometricus: shell or kernel?

> Eius [sc. Euclidis] verò sunt duæ præcipuæ laudes: inconcussa dogmatum firmitas libri Elementorum, perfectióque adeò absoluta, vt nullum opus iure huic aliud comparare audeas: quibus fit vt soli hi in arduis quæstionibus videantur posse à falso verum discernere, qui Euclidem habent familiarem.[1] (Hieronymus Cardanus)

> Il n'est pas si aisé qu'on pense, de donner des veritables demonstrations en metaphysique.[2] (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz)

5.1 The Euclidean model

As already signalled in its title, Spinoza's *Ethica* is 'demonstrated in geometrical order' - *ordine geometrico demonstrata*. One glance at the book suffices to see what this implies: the form of its exposition is a monumental copy of the *Elementa geometrica* of Euclid (c. 300 BCE). Starting from a few definitions and axioms, propositions are derived by means of deduction and this continues until the entire philosophical system, from its metaphysical foundations up to an elaborate theory of human bondage and liberation, has been unfolded.

What is the exact correspondence between Spinoza's *Ethica* and Euclid's *Elements*? I extract an itemized description of the Euclidean model from Wolfson's classical commentary of the *Ethica*:

> The geometrical method may be said to consist of the following parts: First, the primary truths which form the premises in the demonstrations are grouped together and placed apart from the demonstrations as the first principles upon which the demonstrations rest, and are divided into definitions, postulates, and axioms or common notions. Second, that which is sought to be demonstrated, that is, the conclusion which is to be established by the demonstration, is summarized apart from the demonstration in the form of a

1. The quotation is from Book 16 of Cardanus's *De subtilitate*, which dates from 1550. It is quoted here from the 1966 reprint of his *Opera omnia*, vol. 3, 607. Translation: 'He [Euclid] is entitled to praise for two merits in particular: the unshakable solidity of the doctrines of his *Elements*, and its perfection, which is so absolute that no other work may rightly be compared with it. Hence it seems as if only those who are familiar with Euclid are able to tell true from false in difficult questions.'

2. Letter to Jean Gallois, September 1677 (AA 3:2, 227.8-9). This part of the letter deals explicitly with Spinoza.

> proposition. Third, the demonstration itself reasons from the known, that is, the first principles, to the unknown, that is, the conclusion. Fourth, supplementary deductions, explanations, and propositions are given in the form of corollaries, scholia, and lemmas.[1]

When speaking of the so-called 'Euclidean' model, it should be noted that this is the result of a long historical process of transmission, reception and interpretation, rather than the conscious creation of Euclid. The captions over the principles – 'definitions', 'postulates', 'axioms' – are interpolations of a later date. The clean-cut, systematic differentiation between them is mainly the work of Proclus Diadochus (fifth century CE). In a commentary on the first book, the latter construed the *Elements* as an axiomatic system, with the three types of principles on the one hand, and propositions (problems, theorems) deduced from them on the other. The commentary had its editio princeps together with the Greek text of Euclid's *Elements* in 1533 and played an important part in the debates on method in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Its account of Euclid's method is in fact an attempt to fuse the practical application of the deductive system of the *Elements* with Aristotelian notions of scientific procedures as set forth in the *Analytica posteriora*. This is also reflected in Proclus' choice of terminology.[2]

The geometrical mode of discourse has turned out to be a rather problematic layout. Herman De Dijn, who devoted a number of important studies to the subject, has observed that virtually every aspect of it is fundamentally disagreed upon among Spinoza students.[3] He does not specify these aspects, but it would seem to me that the disagreements centre on three points in particular. The *first* is the question what the exact scope of the *ordo geometricus* is: does it merely indicate the layout of the *Ethica* (and some other writings), or is the term equivalent to 'method', and if so, what are we to understand by 'method'? The *second* point is a related one: is the geometrical order intimately connected with Spinoza's philosophy, or is it rather its external shape, with little or no direct relevance for the philosophical content? The poet Heinrich Heine claimed that, in order to reach the essence of the philosophy of Spinoza, one would have to break through the hard geometrical appearance – as one must crack the hard shell of the almond to get at its tasty kernel. (This image has suggested to me the title of the present chapter. For a further discussion of Heine's verdict on Spinoza's *ordo geometricus*, see below, p. 143.) The *third* point of contention among the interpreters of Spinozism concerns the origins and originality of the *ordo geometricus*. In which tradition does it fit? Who were his immediate models?

Before providing my own answer to these questions, I will first draw attention to some noticeable verdicts on the *ordo geometricus* (§ 5.2). Then four sections (5.3–5.6) will be devoted to the relationship between form and method. Subsequently, Spinoza's

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1. Wolfson 1983 [1934], vol. 1, 40.
2. See Engfer 1982, 72–8; Schüling 1969, 11–3, 57–9.
3. De Dijn 1986, 55.

models are dealt with (§ 5.7). Section 5.8 is devoted to Spinoza's attitude towards mathematics. After an examination of the rhetorical function of the mathematical style (§ 5.9), I will in the final section (§ 5.10) formulate an answer to the question what exactly it was that Spinoza tried to prove by using the geometrical order.

5.2 Some verdicts on Spinoza's use of the ordo geometricus

This historical digression lays no claim to comprehensive or even representative coverage. Many more quotations could be added. My concern here is not to provide a survey of the reception of the geometrical order as employed by Spinoza, but rather to illustrate the effect it had on the image of Spinoza's philosophy. This image is determined to a considerable extent by one's judgement of the relationship between form and content, shell and kernel (or whatever other metaphors have been employed) of that philosophy. Costante Scarpellini distinguishes three tendencies in the assessment that the *ordo geometricus* has met with in the history of philosophy:

> 1. – Il matematismo spinoziano è un ostacolo sia alla esposizione chiara sia alla apertura della ricerca per la limitatezza della visione che esso impone.
> 2. – Il metodo geometrico è un mezzo espositivo e modello metodologico.
> 3. – Esso è elemento creativo del sistema concettuale stesso.[1]
>
> 1. – Spinoza's mathematism is, by the limitations of view it imposes, an impediment to clear exposition as well as to open research. 2. – The geometrical method is an expository means and a methodological model. 3. – It is a creative element of the conceptual system itself.

I think that all these different verdicts do play a role in the reception of Spinoza's philosophy, but not as neatly demarcated as this tripartition suggests. Moreover, it is worth noting that the first tendency – the cold shoulder – is significantly stronger than the other ones.

It is mainly as an oddity that the Euclidean layout of the *Ethica* has won historical fame. In view of the high esteem in which mathematics has generally been held, this is rather remarkable. Apparently philosophy, by the mere act of donning the classical costume of Euclidean geometrical discourse, does not acquire the incontrovertible and scientific aura of its mathematical model. What philosophy, thus formulated, does share with mathematics is the appearance of inaccessibility. Plato is said to have put a notice over his porch: 'Let no one ignorant of geometry enter'.[2] The geometrical layout of

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1. Scarpellini 1954, 38.
2. The anecdote is too late to have a serious claim to authenticity (Gilbert 1960, 88). The earliest sources for it are sixth-century commentators of Aristotle: Elias, *In Aristotelis Categorias commentaria,* Prooemium (ed. Busse 1900, 118.18–9: ἀγεωμέτρητος μηδεὶς εἰσίτω); Ioannes Philoponus, *In Aristotelis De anima libros commentaria* 1.3 (ed. Hayduck 1897, 117.27: ἀγεωμέτρητος μὴ εἰσίτω).

the *Ethica*, too, put off people. Spinoza was aware of this deterrent effect of the *ordo geometricus*, as the preface to *Ethica*, part 3, testifies:

> *Nam ad illos revertere volo, qui hominum Affectûs, & actiones detestari, vel ridere malunt, quàm intelligere. His sine dubio mirum videbitur, quòd hominum vitia, & ineptias more Geometrico tractare aggrediar, & certâ ratione demonstrare velim ea, quæ rationi repugnare, quæque vana, absurda, & horrenda esse clamitant.*[1]

> [...] for I want now to return to those who prefer to abuse or deride the emotions and actions of men rather than to understand them. They will doubtless find it surprising that I should attempt to treat of the faults and follies of mankind in the geometric manner, and that I should propose to bring logical reasoning to bear on what they proclaim is opposed to reason, and is vain, absurd and horrifying.[2]

Spinoza knew that people found this sort of exposition hard to accept. Henry Oldenburg received a letter from him with geometrically phrased proofs for the existence of God. Oldenburg emerges from his correspondence with Spinoza as an honest and sincere man, not inclined to sarcasm. I take it, therefore, that he did not mean to answer Spinoza tongue in cheek when he wrote back:

> Redditæ mihi sunt perdoctæ tuæ literæ, & magnâ cum voluptate perlectæ. Geometricum tuum probandi morem valdè probo; sed meam simul hebetudinem incuso, quòd, quæ tam accuratè doces, ego haud ità promptè assequar.[3]

> I have received your very learned letter, and read it through with great pleasure. I approve very much of your geometric style of proof, but at the same time I blame my own obtuseness that I do not follow so easily the things you teach so exactly.[4]

This bafflement vis-à-vis the *ordo geometricus* has continued to be an ingredient in the reception of Spinoza's philosophy. In 1703 some German scholars on a visit to the Dutch Republic talked to Jan Rieuwertsz the Younger, the son of Spinoza's publisher, who informed them about an early work by Spinoza, in which we recognize the *Korte verhandeling*. One of these scholars, Gottlieb Stolle, later included this information in his *Kurtze Anleitung zur Historie der Gelahrtheit*:

> Spinosa hat seinen Atheismum in seiner Ethica vorgetragen. Er hatte sie anfangs [...] nach der gemeinen Methode aufgesetzt, in welcher sie auch noch in MSto vorhanden. Nachgehends aber hat er sie more geometrico demonstriret [...]. Diese Methode hat ihn so viel Mühe gekostet, daß er drüber seine Gesundheit ruiniret, und seinen Tod beschleuniget.[5]

The connection postulated by Stolle between Spinoza's method and his illness is entirely fictitious. It is perhaps best interpreted as the commonplace image of the Faustian man of learning ruined by his unremitting desire for knowledge.

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1. G 2, 138.5-11.
2. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 102.
3. G 4, 10.6-9.
4. Spinoza, tr. Curley 1985, 168.
5. Stolle 1718, vol. 2 197, note *h*.

Heinrich Heine had an immoderate reverence for Spinoza, but in the second book of *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland* (first published in 1834) he unequivocally expressed his disdain for the demonstrative mode borrowed from mathematics. I already touched upon this passage in the first section; here it is in full:

> Ich spreche von Benedikt Spinoza.
>
> Ein großer Genius bildet sich durch einen anderen großen Genius, weniger durch Assimilierung als durch Reibung. Ein Diamant schleift den andern. So hat die Philosophie des Descartes keineswegs die des Spinoza hervorgebracht, sondern nur befördert. Daher zunächst finden wir bei dem Schüler die Methode des Meisters; dieses ist ein großer Gewinn. Dann finden wir bei Spinoza, wie bei Descartes, die der Mathematik abgeborgte Beweisführung. Dieses ist ein großes Gebrechen. Die mathematische Form gibt dem Spinoza ein herbes Äußere. Aber dieses ist wie die herbe Schale der Mandel; der Kern ist um so erfreulicher. Bei der Lektüre des Spinoza ergreift uns ein Gefühl wie beim Anblick der großen Natur in ihrer lebendigsten Ruhe. Ein Wald von himmelhohen Gedanken, deren blühende Wipfel in wogender Bewegung sind, während die unerschütterlichen Baumstämme in der ewigen Erde wurzeln. Es ist ein gewisser Hauch in den Schriften des Spinoza, der unerklärlich. Man wird angeweht wie von den Lüften der Zukunft.[1]

The passage quoted is rather characteristic for this work of Heine's, interweaving infatuation, irony and – sometimes – scathing satire. To the metaphors already abundantly present here he later adds another one with the same tenor, when extolling Goethe for the alleged pantheism in his poetry: 'Die Lehre des Spinoza hat sich aus der mathematischen Hülle entpuppt und umflattert uns als Goethesches Lied.'[2] Delightful kernel as against hard shell, the butterfly breaking open the mathematical pupal case: for Heine, the *ordo geometricus* is a straitjacket, a casing in which Spinoza's philosophy is trapped. Only by cracking this shell do we get at the true philosophy. An interesting point in these metaphors is that they nonetheless present the geometrical form as a necessary attribute of this philosophy, just as inevitable as the endocarp for the growth of the drupe and the pupa for the metamorphosis of the butterfly.

The notion of necessity is absent from the imagery employed by Arthur Schopenhauer, in his treatment of Spinoza in 'Fragmente zur Geschichte der Philosophie' (published in 1851, in the first volume of *Parerga und Paralipomena*).[3] Here we find metaphors taken from the spheres of torture and clothing respectively (the first image may have suggested the other):

> Wie viel klarer, folglich besser würde seine sogenannte 'Ethik' ausgefallen sein, wenn er geradezu, wie es ihm zu Sinn war, geredet und die Dinge bei ihrem Namen genannt hätte; und wenn er überhaupt seine Gedanken, nebst ihren Gründen, aufrichtig und naturgemäß dargelegt hätte, statt sie in den spanischen Stiefel der Propositionen, Demonstrationen, Scholien und Korollarien eingeschnürt auftreten zu lassen, in dieser der Geometrie

1. Heine, ed. Pörnbacher 1976, 561–2.
2. Heine, ed. Pörnbacher 1976, 620.
3. On Schopenhauer and Spinoza, see Moreau 1994, 13–6, and the literature mentioned there (p. 15, n. 1).

> abgeborgten Einkleidung, welche statt der Philosophie die Gewißheit jener zu geben, vielmehr alle Bedeutung verliert, sobald nicht die Geometrie mit ihrer Konstruktion der Begriffe selbst darinsteckt; daher es auch hier heißt: 'Cucullus non facit monachum.'[1]

The expression 'in spanischen Stiefeln eingeschnürt' is a reference to Goethe.[2] It also occurs in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, in a comparable context: thought is forced into a horrible straightjacket by a formal system.[3]

Later in the nineteenth century, too, do we find spirited rejections of the geometrical mode of discourse. A locus classicus is Friedrich Nietzsche's verdict on Spinoza in the first chapter of *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (1886), captioned 'On the prejudices of the philosophers'.

> Oder gar jener Hocuspocus von mathematischer Form, mit der Spinoza seine Philosophie [...] wie in Erz panzerte und maskirte, um damit von vornherein den Muth des Angreifenden einzuschüchtern, der auf diese unüberwindliche Jungfrau und Pallas Athene den Blick zu werfen wagen würde: – wie viel eigne Schüchternheit und Angreifbarkeit verräth diese Maskerade eines einsiedlerischen Kranken![4]

In § 348 of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* of 1882, Nietzsche states:

> Ein Jude [...] ist, gemäss dem Geschäftskreis und der Vergangenheit seines Volkes, gerade daran – daß man ihm glaubt – am wenigsten gewöhnt: man sehe sich darauf die jüdischen Gelehrten an, – sie Alle halten grosse Stücke auf die Logik, das heisst auf das *Erzwingen* der Zustimmung durch Gründe; sie wissen, dass sie mit ihr siegen müssen, selbst wo Rassen- und Classen-Widerwille gegen sie vorhanden ist, wo man ihnen ungern glaubt.[5]

Since Nietzsche sketches a general typology of how descent determines one's thought (the section is captioned 'Von der Herkunft der Gelehrten'), Spinoza is certainly implied here, even though he is not explicitly mentioned. The passage has no anti-Semitic thrust: the allegedly Jewish penchant for logic and cogent reasoning is held up as an example to the Germans, 'eine beklagenswerth deraisonnable Rasse'. (Schopenhauer's judgement of Spinoza, incidentally, is indeed marred by a paltry, offensive anti-

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1. Schopenhauer, SW 4, 94. (The phrase 'diese der Geometrie abgeborgten Einkleidung' sounds like a faint echo of Heine: 'die der Mathematik abgeborgte Beweisführung'. Heine's *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland* was widely discussed in the 'forties, but the parallel in the wording may be accidental.)
2. *Faust* I, ll. 1910–3 (SW 6:1, 586): 'Mein teurer Freund, ich rat' euch drum/Zuerst Collegium Logicum./Da wird der Geist euch wohl dressiert,/In spanischen Stiefeln eingeschnürt'. (The reference was brought to my attention by Prof. K.J. Schuhmann.) The boots meant here were instruments of torture (see Grimm vol. 10:2, part 2, 2783, s.v. [1]*Stiefel* B3c: '*als folterwerkzeug seit dem 17. jh. bezeugt, wohl aus der inquisition stammend*').
3. In Goethe this is logic ('Collegium Logicum'); in Schopenhauer's verdict on Spinoza, quoted above, the *ordo geometricus*; and in his discussion of Shakespeare the conventions of the Italian sonnet (Schopenhauer, SW 2, 552: in Shakespeare's *Sonnets* 'kommt der Gedanke viel mehr zu seinem Rechte, als er gekonnt hätte, wenn er in die herkömmlichen spanischen Stiefel hätte eingeschnürt werden müssen.')
4. Nietzsche, *Werke* 6:2, 13.
5. Nietzsche, *Werke* 5:2, 266.

Semitism. Discussing Spinoza's statements on animals, Schopenhauer blames him for his supposedly Jewish arguments, 'so daß dabei uns andere, die wir an reinere und würdigere Lehren gewöhnt sind, der foetor Iudaicus [Knoblaubgeruch] übermannt.'[1]).

The appraisals of the *ordo geometricus* hitherto quoted show that the *Ethica* initially presents itself as an unapproachable and impenetrable text. Here we find ourselves – if another metaphor is permitted – on the glaciers of metaphysical thought. Accordingly, in his classical study *Spinoza en zijn kring* of 1896, K.O. Meinsma describes with a shrug the attempts of the seventeenth-century authorities to combat Spinoza's work by means of bans:

> Zij hadden het gerust kunnen nalaten. De wiskundige betoogtrant der *Ethica* heeft meer menschen van het lezen afgeschrikt, dan alle mogelijke plakkaten bij machte waren te doen.[2]
>
> They might just as well have forborne it. The mathematical style of the *Ethica* deterred more people from reading it than any decree has been able to do.

The French philosopher Henri Bergson has been taken to task by Gueroult for his unhistorical and hostile approach to Spinoza[3] – and rightly so (cf. below, p. 169). Yet Bergson was also fascinated by Spinoza.[4] Both aspects are borne out in his eloquent dismissal of the *ordo geometricus*:

> je connais rien de plus instructif que le contraste entre la forme et le fond d'un livre comme l'*Éthique*: d'un côté ces choses énormes qui s'appellent la Substance, l'Attribut et le Mode, et le formidable attirail des théorèmes avec l'enchevêtrement des définitions, corollaires et scolies, et cette complication de machinerie et cette puissance d'écrasement qui font que le débutant, en présence de l'*Éthique*, est frappé d'admiration et de terreur comme devant un cuirassé du type Dreadnought; – de l'autre, quelque chose de subtil, de très léger et de presque aérien, qui fuit quand on s'en approche, mais qu'on ne peut regarder, même de loin, sans devenir incapable de s'attacher à quoi que ce soit du reste, même à ce qui passe pour capital, même à la distinction entre la Substance et l'Attribut, même à la dualité de la Pensée et de l'Étendue.[5]

Here again, the *Ethica* has inspired an exuberant imagery. There is the recurrent association of Spinoza's philosophy with airiness (compare Heine: 'ein gewisser Hauch', 'Lüfte der Zukunft'). But the strongest image is that of the Dreadnought battleship, which lends the passage a distinctly early twentieth-century flavour. The compound images of war and massive machinery make Nietzsche's armour-clad Athena seem almost cosy by comparison.

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1. Schopenhauer, SW 4, 95 (bracketed gloss added by the editor, Wolfgang Frhr. von Löhneysen). Exactly the same censure is to be found in the second part of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, chapter 50, though with the following qualification: 'Bei dem allen bleibt *Spinoza* ein sehr großer Mann' (SW 2, 828).
2. Meinsma 1980 [1896], 449.
3. Cf. Trotignon 1993, 3–4.
4. Cf. D'Hautefeuille 1960.
5. Bergson 1934 [1911], 142.

I would like to round off this historical digression with some contemporary quotations. One of them offers a striking illustration of the unrelenting aversion brought on by the *ordo geometricus*, even though the source, *The bluffer's guide to philosophy* by Jim Hankinson, is by its very scope and nature not a serious witness. Yet he appositely puts into words a popular attitude towards Spinoza:

> The best line with Spinoza is to balance admiration for the man with a faint sense of disappointment that he should have employed a system so unsuitable to the subject-matter of ethics. Ethics, one may say apothegmatically, is not capable of exhibition in a formal, axiomatised system.[1]

That ethics (and several other areas of philosophy) will not suffer formalization is a traditional sentiment. It is precisely this dominant tradition that Spinoza and kindred thinkers take issue with. The thesis with which Lodewijk Meyer got his doctorate in philosophy in 1660 included a set of twelve propositions (*paradoxa*). In the fourth paradox, Meyer boldly proclaims: '*Physica & Ethica per demonstrationes tradi possunt, & debent*'[2] ('physics and ethics can and should be taught by means of demonstrations'). Some years later his friend Benedict de Spinoza wrote a Euclidean adumbration of Cartesian physics, and embarked on his own *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata*.

In the second quote, taken from a distinguished modern scholar, there is a striking similarity with Heine's imagery of shell and kernel:

> I trust most scholars will agree with me when I say that the geometrical method of Spinoza's *Ethics* does great honour to his acumen and to the precision of his reasoning, but that it constitutes a rather hard and artificial crust which we must penetrate and even crack if we wish to arrive at a real understanding of the substance and coherence of his thought.[3]

The third recent judgement of the *ordo geometricus* that I would like to quote here is from Edwin Curley. In a book bearing the programmatic title *Behind the geometrical method* he wants

> to try to penetrate beneath the surface of the *Ethics* and to uncover the dialogue Spinoza was conducting with his predecessors, a dialogue the geometric presentation served to conceal, and was, perhaps, partly designed to conceal.[4]

> The *Ethics* is a peculiarly difficult work to read, largely because of its axiomatic form. Descartes was right about one thing, at least: metaphysics does not lend itself as readily to that style of presentation as mathematics does. [...] Its central concepts are too abstract, and too difficult to get clear about, for an axiomatic text in metaphysics to be as readily intelligible as Euclid's *Geometry*.[5]

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1. Hankinson 1989, 23.
2. Meyer 1660a, sig. A6^{r}.
3. Kristeller 1984, 4.
4. Curley 1988, XI.
5. Curley 1988, 51.

The notion that the geometrical form is a partly deliberate disguise,[1] hiding from view the presence of the preceding philosophical tradition by its high degree of abstraction and seeming autarky, is not new. Curley owes it to Wolfson, whose interpretation of the *ordo geometricus* is still very influential (perhaps most clearly so in the English-speaking countries).[2] In the present chapter I will argue that such an interpretation, in which the form appears as indifferent, foreign or even hostile to the gist of Spinoza's philosophy, is inadequate, while at the same time retaining the characterization as *form*. In the following section I shall first deal with the notion of form, but I would like to end this selection of verdicts on Spinoza's *ordo geometricus* with a general remark.

Many authors apparently take it for granted that the *Ethica* is difficult of access on account of its Euclidean layout. Yet this is by no means self-evident, for it may be argued that the *Ethica*, on the contrary, has an uncommonly open structure, due to its explicit, step by step exposition. This enables its readers to follow the argument and check the author's proofs as it were in instalments. Thus several modern commentators have turned to the formal aspects of Spinoza's reasoning, and tried to assess its strengths and amend its weaknesses.[3] That this is possible at all is, in my opinion, one of the assets of the *ordo geometricus*.

5.3 Form against method: the divergences

There is a vast amount of literature on the *ordo geometricus*. Scholarly research is by no means limited to Spinoza's use of it: the subject has been extensively examined in

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1. A somewhat analogous argument has been developed by Efraim Shmueli (1980, 213), who maintains that 'the geometrical method served the rebellious Marrano philosopher as a protective device against believers in religious authority, as well as against his own *agon*.' (I presume that the term *agon*, 'struggle', is chosen here for its polysemy as well as for its association with 'agony'.) Elaborating on a theme developed by Leo Strauss, Shmueli sees camouflage and self-restraint as the main functions of the *ordo geometricus* (pp. 208–14). See Strauss 1952, 142–201, for the background. Note, however, that Strauss himself is rather reticent when it comes to the geometrical form of the *Ethica*: his thesis centres around the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* (cf. Strauss 1971, 300–61). For a further discussion of Shmueli's views, see below, p. 160.

2. An indication of the enduring popularity of Wolfson's chapters on the geometrical method is their inclusion in several collections of essays. Thus, part I ('Spinoza's method') of Grene 1973 is heavily dominated by Wolfson's first chapter. The second chapter has been published again in Schewe & Engstler 1990, a volume professing to reflect the present state of Spinoza research. In their preface the editors state that the ensuing article by Manfred Walther has been included as a counterpart, but this only obliquely touches upon the *ordo geometricus*. Wolfson's central thesis, that the Euclidean shape of the *Ethica* is a disguise, accordingly remains unchallenged. Wolfgang Schmidt underestimates the influence of Wolfson, when he writes: 'In der Literatur wird dieser Standpunkt [i.e. Wolfson's] allerdings größtenteils abgelehnt' (Schmidt 1975, 125, n. 114).

3. For example the publications of Friedman (1974; 1976; 1978) and Jarrett (1978).

general terms and with respect to other authors, too.[1] Whatever the multifarious differences between these studies, virtually all seem to agree that the geometrical (or mathematical)[2] order is to be understood as a *method*, rather than as a *form*. The notion is apparently so much in evidence, that one often finds it expressed in the title ('geometrical method', 'metodo geometrico', 'méthode mathématique' etc.). The quotations in the preceding section also illustrate that it is customary to call the *ordo geometricus* Spinoza's *method*.[3] I would suggest here that it is expedient to distinguish between Spinoza's method on the one hand, and the geometrical form he gave to some of his writings on the other, even though – as we shall see presently – the two are interrelated.

Method, as a technical term, has a history of its own in early modern philosophy and science. Although the term is classical, it is only in the Renaissance that it begins to occupy a central position in reflections on the advancement of knowledge. Characteristic of this modern notion of method is that it is thought of as comprehensive, as against the multifarious classical and medieval methods.[4] In his monograph on *Renaissance concepts of method*, Neal Gilbert summarizes the Renaissance view of method as follows:

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1. The fundamental monographs on the *ordo geometricus* at large are those by Arndt (1971), De Angelis (1964b), De Vleeschauwer (1961), Engfer (1982) and Schüling (1969). For the primary sources Engfer and Schüling provide the best bibliographical information. Some further general studies are those by Arndt (1980), Bredvold (1951), De Angelis (1964a), Freudenthal (1980), Staal (1986 and 1988), Tonelli (1959 and 1976). Since most studies of Spinoza' philosophy contain some remarks on what is commonly referred to as his 'geometrical method', a full bibliography is unattainable here. The following selection presents publications that are either dedicated primarily to Spinoza's *ordo geometricus*, or that have exerted a marked influence in its reception: Biasutti (1979, 197–233), Brunschvicg (1923, 260–78), Brunt (1955), Cassirer (1994, vol. 2 [1907], 73–125), Curley (1986 and 1988), De Dijn (1971, 295–395; 1973; 1974; 1975; 1978a; 1978b; 1986), De Lucca (1967), Von Dunin Borkowski (1933, 398–417), Gueroult (1968, 25–37; 1970a; 1974, 467–87), Hubbeling (1967; 1977a; 1977b; 1978; 1980), McKeon (1930), Mark (1975), Rice (1974), Robinet (1980), Savan (1986), Scarpellini (1954), Scholz (1863), Schuhmann (1987), Shmueli (1980), Wolfson (1983 [1934], vol. 1, 3–60). Not primarily concerned with the *ordo geometricus* but valuable for its remarkable treatment (from a mathematician's point of view) of geometrical and formal aspects of the *Ethica* is Parrochia 1993. The geometrical order is discussed in connection with other authors, or with related issues, by Van Bunge (1990), Crapulli (1969), De Dijn (1983), De Vleeschauwer (1932), Hubbeling (1983), Iwanicki (1933), Petry (1980), Prins (1988), Risse (1962; 1970, 14–293 and 582–638), Röd (1970), Schildknecht (1990, 85–122), Schuhmann (1985), Vermij (1991b).

2. The terms are not interchangeable, but in this context they tend to be blurred. See below, p. 173, n. 2.

3. Heine's text constitutes a noticeable exception: he contrasts the *method* that Spinoza borrowed from Descartes with the mathematical *form*. Unfortunately Heine does not specify what he understands by method.

4. Arndt 1971, 15; Biasutti 1979, 201.

> An art is brought into method by being presented in short, easily memorized rules set forth in a clear manner, so that the student may master the art in as short a time as possible. In order to qualify as methodical, the rules of an art require to be disposed in a certain order. Thus method is almost synonymous with art [...], but it is distinguished from it by the fact that it facilitates or speeds up the mastery of the art.[1]

For our subject it is relevant to note the close links between codification of rules, didactic purpose, and textbook layout. While perhaps never completely shedding these didactic undertones, the term method gradually acquires a decidedly heuristic meaning. This development reaches its apogee in the work of Descartes, notably in the programmatic *Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les sciences* of 1637, and in the earlier *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*.[2] In the *Discours*, Descartes presents his project of

> vne Methode, par laquelle il me semble que i'ay moyen d'augmenter par degrez ma connoissance, & de l'esleuer peu a peu au plus haut point, auquel la mediocrité de mon esprit & la courte durée de ma vie luy pourront permettre d'atteindre.[3]

And in *Regula* 4, we find this definition:

> Per methodum autem intelligo regulas certas & faciles, quas quicumque exactè servaverit, nihil vnquam falsum pro vero supponet, & nullo mentis conatu inutiliter consumpto, sed gradatim semper augendo scientiam, perveniet ad veram cognitionem eorum omnium quorum erit capax.[4]
>
> By 'a method' I mean reliable rules which are easy to apply, and such that if one follows them exactly, one will never take what is false to be true or fruitlessly expend one's mental efforts, but will gradually and constantly increase one's knowledge till one arrives at a true understanding of everything within one's capacity.[5]

In the second part of the *Discours*,[6] Descartes gives the four basic rules of his method:

(i) to accept something as true only if its truth is evidently known (a rule commonly referred to by commentators as 'la règle de l'évidence'),

(ii) to divide each difficulty into as many parts as possible ('règle de l'analyse'),

(iii) to ascend in order from knowledge of the simplest to knowledge of the most complex objects ('règle de la synthèse'),[7]

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1. Gilbert 1960, 66.
2. Martial Gueroult rightly insisted that it would be a mistake to think that Descartes's methodological efforts are confined to these texts, and he devoted a monumental methodological commentary to the *Meditationes*, viz. his *Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons* (Gueroult 1953; cf. also Gueroult 1970b).
3. AT 6, 3.
4. AT 10, 371–2.
5. Descartes, tr. Cottingham et al., vol. 2, 16.
6. AT 6, 18-9.
7. For the second and third rule, it should be borne in mind that analysis in this context is not to be confused with geometrical analysis, which will be dealt with shortly. On the different meanings of analysis (and, obliquely, on synthesis, too) see Gilson's commentary (Descartes, ed.

and (iv) to make enumerations as complete and reviews as comprehensive as possible ('règle du dénombrement').

Descartes prudently emphasized that this method was not to be blindly copied: 'Ainsi mon dessein n'est pas d'enseigner icy la Methode que chascun doit suiure pour bien conduire sa raison, mais seulement de faire voir en quelle sorte i'ay tasché de conduire la miene.' Or again: 'Iamais mon dessein ne s'est estendu plus auant que de tascher a reformer mes propres pensées, & de bastir dans vn fons qui est tout a moy.'[1] What makes the Cartesian concept of method revolutionary and ensured its success (and indeed imitation) is not primarily its content, but its heuristic thrust: 'one must go back as far as the Greeks to find a spirit of inquiry so penetrating and so philosophical.'[2] For an understanding of Spinoza's notion of method, we must take into account the crucial Cartesian development of this theme. It is in this climate that Spinoza's conception of method is to be situated. His treatise on method *par excellence* is the early, unfinished *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*. Spinoza there gives the following description of method proper:

> vera Methodus est via, ut ipsa veritas, aut essentiæ objectivæ rerum, aut ideæ (omnia illa idem significant) debito ordine quærantur. [...] Methodus non est ipsum ratiocinari ad intelligendum causas rerum, & multò minùs est τὸ intelligere causas rerum; sed est intelligere, quid sit vera idea, eam à cæteris perceptionibus distinguendo, ejusque naturam investigando, ut inde nostram intelligendi potentiam noscamus, & mentem ità cohibeamus, ut ad illam normam omnia intelligat, quæ sunt intelligenda; tradendo, tanquam auxilia, certas regulas, & etiam faciendo, ne mens inutilibus defatigetur. Unde colligitur, Methodum nihil aliud esse, nisi cognitionem reflexivam, aut ideam ideæ.[3]
>
> the true method is the path whereby truth itself, or the objective essences of things, or ideas (all these mean the same) is to be sought in proper order. [...] method is not reasoning itself which leads to the understanding of the causes of things, and far less is it the understanding of the causes of things. It is the understanding of what is a true idea, distinguishing it from other kinds of perception and examining its nature, so that we may thereby come to know our power of understanding and may so train the mind that it will understand according to that standard all that needs to be understood, laying down definite rules as aids, and also ensuring that the mind does not waste its energy on useless pursuits. From this we may conclude that method is nothing but reflexive knowledge, or the idea of an idea[4].

This metatheoretical notion of method as *cognitio reflexiva* or *idea ideæ* is quite original, but its emphasis on directing the mind in the search for truth and on issuing rules shows that it is also indebted to Descartes. Now the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* unequivocally favours geometry as a model (as the geometrical examples

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Gilson 1976 [1925], 187 ff.).

1. AT 6, pp. 4 and 15.
2. Gilbert 1960, 228.
3. TIE §§ 36–8 (G 2, 15.19–16.1).
4. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 241–2.

elsewhere in the text illustrate). Moreover, it outlines the possibility, or rather the requirement, of presenting a philosophical system deductively, with God as its starting point:

> Quoad ordinem verò, & ut omnes nostræ perceptiones ordinentur, & uniantur, requiritur, ut [...] inquiramus, an detur quoddam ens, & simul quale, quod sit omnium rerum causa, ut ejus essentia objectiva sit etiam causa omnium nostrarum idearum, & tum mens nostra [...] quàm maximè referet Naturam: Nam & ipsius essentiam, & ordinem, & unionem habebit objectivè. Unde possumus videre, apprimè nobis esse necessarium, ut semper à rebus Physicis, sive ab entibus realibus omnes nostras ideas deducamus, progrediendo, quoad ejus fieri potest, secundùm seriem causarum ab uno ente reali ad aliud ens reale [...].[1]

> As to the ordering of all our perceptions and their proper arrangement and unification, it is required that [...] we should ask whether there is a being – and also what kind of being – which is the cause of all things so that its essence represented in thought is also the cause of all our ideas. Then our mind [...] will reproduce Nature as closely as possible; for it will possess in the form of thought the essence, order, and unity of Nature. Hence we can see that it is above all necessary for us always to deduce our ideas from physical things, i.e., from real beings, advancing, as far as we can, in accordance with the chain of causes from one real being to another real being.[2]

Nevertheless, the treatise nowhere underpins the *ordo geometricus* as the proper mode of exposition for this deduction. The *Korte verhandeling* does start from God and thence deduces the rest of the philosophical system.[3] Although this deduction is not carried out *more geometrico*, I think it would be difficult to maintain that the philosophical reasoning of the *Korte verhandeling* fails to meet the standard set in the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*. Spinoza eventually deemed the expository form of the *Ethica* more appropriate for his system. This does not, however, invalidate the argument that at one stage of the development of his thought he experimented with a systematic deduction of his philosophy from God in a non-geometrical fashion.

In fine, the method as set forth in the *Tractatus* leaves room for the *ordo geometricus* in the exposition, but does not in any way dictate or privilege its use to the exclusion of other expository modes. On the level (or 'metalevel') of method, then, the eventual form of the exposition is as yet wholly undecided.

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1. TIE § 99 (G 2, 36.7–17). This is Spinoza's development of the Cartesian theme that human knowledge must have God for its guarantee. The position outlined here adumbrates the celebrated proposition 7 of *Ethica* 2 (G 2, 89.21 ff.): '*Ordo, & connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo, & connexio rerum*', more particularly its corollary: 'quicquid ex infinitâ Dei naturâ sequitur formaliter, id omne ex Dei ideâ eodem ordine, eâdemque connexione sequitur in Deo objectivè.'
2. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 259.
3. For a refutation of the alleged hiatus in the beginning of the text, see Mignini's comment in his 1986 edition of the *Korte verhandeling*, pp. 394 ff.

5.4 Analysis and synthesis

Already in Euclid's days, the concepts analysis and synthesis were employed to denote well-defined and complementary methods in geometry, as their occurrence in book 13 of the *Elements* testifies.[1] It is, however, worth noting that

> the analysis and synthesis of geometry, while never quite lost from sight in the commentaries, do not emerge into the full light of day until the late sixteenth century, when they quickly became the common property of philosophers as well as scientists. Previous to this time they tend to be blurred and lend themselves to identification with all sorts of other kinds of 'analysis' or 'synthesis'.[2]

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the concept of method is determined by the central position of the twin concepts analysis and synthesis.[3] For our purpose it is the Cartesian reception of these notions that is relevant. The *Meditationes* had been published in 1641 together with a number of objections by some reputed scholars and Descartes's replies. Spinoza knew this work well. In the second series of objections Mersenne had urged Descartes to rearrange the conclusion of the *Meditationes* in the Euclidean fashion, *more geometrico*, with the help of some definitions, postulates and axioms.[4] In his response, Descartes complies with this request by adding an appendix, entitled *Rationes Dei existentiam & animæ a corpore distinctionem probantes, more geometrico dispositæ*.[5] The proofs are preceded by an explanation of the 'duplex demonstrandi ratio', namely analysis and synthesis:

> Analysis veram viam ostendit per quam res methodice & tanquam a priori inventa est [...]. Synthesis è contra per viam oppositam & tanquam a posteriori quæsitam (etsi sæpe ipsa probatio sit in hac magis a priori quàm in illâ) clare quidem id quod conclusum est demonstrat, utiturque longâ definitionum, petitionum, axiomatum, theorematum, & problematum serie [...].[6]

> Analysis shows the true way by means of which the thing in question was discovered methodically and as it were *a priori* [...]. Synthesis, by contrast, employs a directly opposite method where the search is, as it were, *a posteriori* (though the proof itself is often more *a priori* than it is in the analytic method). It demonstrates the conclusion clearly and employs a long series of definitions, postulates, axioms, theorems and problems [...].[7]

Here Descartes closely follows the Alexandrian mathematician Pappus.[8] A more extended treatment of these terms along the same lines is to be found in Part 4, chapters 2 and 3, of *La Logique ou l'art de penser* by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre

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1. See the translation by Heath 1956, vol. 3, 442.
2. Gilbert 1960, 34–5.
3. Arndt 1980, 1313.
4. AT 7, 128.
5. AT 7, 160–70.
6. AT 7, 155, 156.
7. Descartes, tr. Cottingham et al., vol. 2, 110, 111.
8. Cf. Engfer 1982, 127–8.

Nicole.[1] Analysis or *resolutio* is reasoning back from effects to causes, or the gradual reduction of complex and obscure propositions to the simplest propositions. Synthesis or *compositio* is the contrary movement: from causes to effects, or from definitions, axioms and the like to conclusions. Arnauld and Nicole illustrate this with a comparison:

> Enfin ces deux méthodes ne different que comme le chemin qu'on fait en montant d'une vallée en une montagne, de celui que l'on fait en descendant de la montagne dans la vallée; ou comme différent les deux manieres dont on se peut servir pour prouver qu'une personne est descendue de S. Louis; dont l'une est de montrer que cette personne a un tel pour pere qui étoit fils d'un tel, & celui-là d'un autre, & ainsi jusqu'à S. Louis : & l'autre, de commencer par S. Louis & montrer qu'il a eu tels enfants, & ces enfants d'autres, en descendant jusqu'à la personne dont il s'agit.[2]

Analysis is the scientific procedure actually applied in practice, and if in geometry its results may afterwards be expounded synthetically, as the Greek geometricians were wont to do, this does not mean that synthesis is valid or even possible in other branches of science or philosophy. For Descartes, analysis is not only the appropriate scientific method of research, but also the 'vera & optima via [...] ad docendum',[3] the genuine and best way of expounding the results.

For Spinoza method, as set forth in the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*, involves both moments. First, there is an analytical move in order to establish the unknown *vera idea* that can serve as our starting point, yardstick and guideline. The most perfect method will start from the idea of a most perfect being.

> [...] hæc debet Methodus præstare: Primò veram ideam à cæteris omnibus perceptionibus distinguere, & mentem à cæteris perceptionibus cohibere. Secundò tradere regulas, ut res incognitæ ad talem normam percipiantur, Tertiò ordinem constituere, ne inutilibus defatigemur. Postquam hanc Methodum novimus, vidimus quartò hanc Methodum perfectissimam futuram, ubi habuerimus ideam Entis perfectissimi. Unde initio illud erit maximè observandum, *ut quantò ociùs ad cognitionem talis Entis perveniamus.*[4]

> To do this correctly, our method must enable us, first, to distinguish a true idea from all other perceptions and to restrain the mind from those other perceptions; second, to lay down rules for perceiving things unknown according to the aforementioned standard; third, to establish an orderly procedure which wil enable us to avoid useless toil. Having discovered this method, we realised, fourthly, that this method would be most perfect when we possessed the idea of a most perfect Being. So at the outset this must be our chief objective, to arrive at the knowledge of such a Being as speedily as possible.[5]

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1. Arnauld & Nicole, ed. Marin 1970, 368–77; cf. Tonelli 1976, 185–6. There is an explicit acknowledgement to Descartes in Arnauld and Nicole's footnote to chapter 2 (p. 368).
2. Arnauld & Nicole, ed. Marin 1970, 374.
3. AT 7, 156.21–2.
4. TIE § 49 (G 2, 18.32–19.5; interpolation from NS left out, emphasis supplied).
5. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 244.

Once the starting point has been found, the movement will rapidly take another direction; in what Spinoza calls the second part of his method,[1] reasoning goes from what is clear and simple to what is obscure and complex, and this is where the synthetic *ordo geometricus* comes in. In order to understand things, says Spinoza in the *Principia philosophiæ*,

> talia principia erunt excogitanda, quæ valdè simplicia, & cognitu facillima sunt, ex quibus, tanquam seminibus quibusdam, & sidera, & terra, & denique omnia, quæ in hoc mundo aspectabili deprehendimus, oriri potuisse demonstremus: quamvis ipsa nunquam sic orta esse probè sciamus. Hoc enim pacto eorum naturam longè meliùs exponemus, quàm si tantùm, qualia jam sunt, describeremus.
>
> [...] nempe quia eâ tantum de causâ semina rebus affingemus, ut earum natura nobis faciliùs innotescat, & Mathematicorum more à clarissimis ad magis obscura, & à simplicissimis ad magis composita ascendamus.[2]

> we shall have to devise such principles as are very simple and very easy to know, from which we may demonstrate how the stars, earth and finally all those things that we find in this visible world, could have arisen, as if from certain seeds – even though we may know very well that they never did arise in that way. For by doing this we shall exhibit their nature far better than if we only described what they now are.
>
> [...] We only ascribe seeds to things fictitiously, in order to get to know their nature more easily, and in the manner of the Mathematicians, to ascend from the clearest things to the more obscure, and from the simplest to the more composite.[3]

Although we must make allowances for the fact that the wording and the conceptual framework here owe much to Descartes's *Principles*, of which it is an adumbration, the passage links up rather neatly with the views propounded in the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*. Summing up, Spinoza's method cannot be reduced to either the analytic or the synthetic procedure. He uses the term to cover both moments, and occasionally, as we shall see, he will also apply it to the one or the other.

The equivalence of geometrical form and synthetic method in Spinoza has been elaborated theoretically by De Dijn. He gives a detailed development of the ideas set forth by Martial Gueroult on the geometrical order.[4] Gueroult has been the foremost opponent of Wolfson's ideas, upholding a close connection between geometrical disposition and the philosophical system of Spinoza. His views have been widely supported, especially in France and Italy. The discussion about the *ordo geometricus* has since been a debate between two currents of thought, one of them following Wolfson's line of interpretation, and the other one Gueroult's. There are different shades of opinion on both sides. Thus Huib Hubbeling in his many publications gradually developed an increasingly qualified version of Wolfson's position. Initially, he

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1. TIE § 91 (G 2, 33.32–34.1): 'Porrò, ut tandem ad secundam partem hujus Methodi perveniamus [...]'.
2. G 1, 226.21-227.4.
3. Spinoza, tr. Curley 1985, 295.
4. Gueroult 1968, 25-37; 1974, 467-87.

designated the geometrical formulation of the *Ethica* as irrelevant; according to him, it is not until we reach the level of method that geometry has a part to play at all.[1] Later he qualifies this position in a discussion with De Dijn: Hubbeling then states that Spinoza in his method foreshadows modern axiomatics, in which one is free in choosing the points of departure. Although he grants that this does not fully apply to Spinoza, Hubbeling does maintain that the latter allows himself some liberty in choosing his definitions and axioms.[2] This implies that the intimate link between philosophy and geometrical mode of discourse, as emphasized by Gueroult and De Dijn, calls for some adjustment. It has often been suggested that Euclidean geometry foreshadows modern axiomatics. I will not enter into this question here, but confine myself to the observation that Spinoza's *ordo geometricus* cannot be labelled axiomatic in the current sense of the word, since his axioms are entirely dependent on the definitions. It is these definitions (rather than the axioms) that form the fountainhead of his Euclidean reasoning.[3]

Already in his doctoral dissertation, De Dijn devoted a sizeable chapter to 'the geometrical method'.[4] According to him, this geometrical method is the true and perfect method of thought for Spinoza, the only one granting us an adequate insight into essences. 'Spinoza's geometrical method of thought' can be summed up as follows:

> De kern van die methode is het begrijpen van essenties van dingen, de afleiding van de eigenschappen van die essenties, en het in relatie brengen van essenties op grond van het verstaan van hun constructie (genese) en van hun eigenschappen. Het begrijpen van de essentie van een ding culmineert in een genetische of constructieve definitie (de term 'constructief' [legt] de nadruk op het construeren van een geheel op basis van constituerende delen; de term 'genetisch' op het ontstaan van iets door een oorzaak [...]).[5]
>
> The core of this method is understanding the essences of things, deducing the properties from those essences and connecting essences on the basis of the insight into their construction (genesis) and properties. Understanding the essence of a thing culminates in a genetic or constructive definition (the term 'constructive' stresses the construction of a whole on the basis of constituent parts; the term 'genetic' the origination of a thing by a cause[...]).

De Dijn introduces a terminological tension, so at least it would seem to me, by stating that the demonstrative layout of Spinoza's first published work, the *Principia philosophiæ*, cannot be termed properly synthetic or geometrical,[6] and that the *Tractatus politicus*, on which Spinoza worked at the end of his life, involves an outspokenly

1. Hubbeling 1964, 33; cf. 130, note a.
2. Hubbeling 1977a.
3. De Dijn 1978a, 33. For Spinoza's doctrine of definitions see in particular TIE §§ 95–7 (G 2, 34.29–36.2) and Ep 9 (G 4, 42–6).
4. De Dijn 1971, 295–395.
5. De Dijn 1978a, 30. ('Spinoza's geometrical method of thought' is the title of De Dijn 1973.)
6. De Dijn 1978a, 35.

geometrical train of thought, even though lacking the outer geometrical form.[1] I have no difficulty accepting De Dijn's point that Spinoza meant his last treatise to be an orderly (or even 'methodical') demonstration, nor do I contest that its political doctrine is tied up with his 'geometrical' account of the passions in the *Ethica*. I do call into question the equation of method and *ordo geometricus*. One of the arguments put forward by De Dijn is that Spinoza himself wrote to a friend that he proceeded 'methodically' in the *Tractatus politicus*.[2] The reference is to Letter 84, the introductory epistle to the *Tractatus politicus*, where we read in the Latin version:

> Impræsentiarum caput *septimum* tracto, in quo omnia præcedentis sexti capitis membra, ordinem benè ordinatæ Monarchiæ concernentia, Methodicè demonstro.[3]
>
> At present I am working on the seventh chapter, in which I demonstrate methodically all the parts of the preceding sixth chapter relating to a well-organized monarchy.

As Fokke Akkerman has shown, though, the Latin is not Spinoza's own, but a translation from the Dutch.[4] This means that *De nagelate schriften* has the authentic reading:

> *Tegenwoordig ben ik met* het zevende *bezich, in 't welk ik alle de Leden van 't voorgaande zeste Hooftdeel, de order van een welgestelde Monarchie betreffende, ordentelijk bewijs.*[5]
>
> At present I am working on the seventh chapter, in which I demonstrate in an orderly fashion all the sections of the preceding sixth chapter relating to a well-organized monarchy.

In the interpretation suggested by De Dijn the identification of *ordo geometricus* and synthetic method comes full circle, reducing the connection with the layout to a coincidence, a merely superficial identity. This, I think, is at odds with what Spinoza himself thought about it. The following remarks may serve to illustrate my point.

5.5 Spinoza's four Euclidean texts

Spinoza employed the geometrical form four times in his works.[6] There are two short annexes: an enclosure to Letter 2 (to Oldenburg, september 1661), and the first of the two appendices to the *Korte verhandeling van God, de mensch en deszelvs welstand*. Later Spinoza offers a geometrical reorganization of parts of Descartes's *Principia philosophiæ*.

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1. De Dijn 1978b, 134.
2. De Dijn 1978a, 127.
3. Ep 84 (G 4, 336.4).
4. Akkerman 1980, 272–3.
5. NS, 302.
6. That is, if we limit ourselves to purely formal criteria. There are of course quite a few other passages in Spinoza's works where the argument has a distinctly mathematical flavour. An interesting borderline case is Ep 34, to Johannes Hudde, consisting solely of a demonstration of the unity of God (G 4, 179–80).

This is already quite a sizeable text: the definitions, axioms, propositions and proofs cover some ninety pages. But the really great application is the geometrical presentation of the *Ethica*, which takes up as many as three hundred pages. I will first delineate the application of the geometrical mode of discourse in these four texts, so disparate in nature and extent.

(i) The enclosure to Letter 2, now lost, can be reconstructed fairly accurately from the ensuing correspondence. This was done for the first time by Giuseppa Saccaro del Buffa Battisti.[1] The enclosure is thought to have consisted of three definitions, four axioms, three propositions and a scholium.

(ii) Spinoza did not publish the *Korte verhandeling*, and its original Latin text has not been preserved. But we do have a seventeenth-century Dutch translation, which modern scholarship alleges to be quite close to the original text. The work is concluded by two appendices, the first one of which is composed of seven axioms, four propositions with their proofs, and a corollary. There is no agreement on the chronology of Spinoza's two oldest geometrically fashioned writings nor on their internal relationship: Saccaro del Buffa Battisti judges the enclosure to Letter 2 to be older than the appendix to the *Korte verhandeling*, contrary to Hubbeling and Mignini.[2]

(iii) In 1663 Spinoza published his *Renati des Cartes Principiorum philosophiæ pars I, & II, more geometrico demonstratæ*. We are well informed about the origins, background and evolution of this work, owing to the Letters 9, 12A, 13 and 15 of Spinoza's correspondence, and to the preface by Lodewijk Meyer that precedes it. When he lived in Rijnsburg in the 'sixties, in the house now fitted out as a Spinoza museum, he instructed a student living in the same house in Cartesian philosophy. He deemed his pupil, Johannes Casearius, too immature to tell him his own ideas. For this tutorial programme, Spinoza reworded the second part (and a fragment of the third part) of Descartes's *Principia* in a geometrical form. When his friends heard about this, they entreated him to rewrite the first part of this text in the same fashion and to publish it. Spinoza complied, since it would offer him an opportunity to test its reception: if the response was favourable, he wanted to commit something of his own philosophy to the printing press.[3] Spinoza's geometrical version of the *Principia philosophiæ* is incomplete: he rewrote only the first two parts and a fragment of part three. In that

1. She recently republished her reconstruction: Saccaro del Buffa Battisti 1990, 117–8. The notes to the Dutch translation of Spinoza's correspondence, too, offer a reconstruction (Spinoza 1977, 435–8). Cf. also Hubbeling 1977b.

2. Saccaro del Buffa Battisti 1990; Hubbeling 1977a; Mignini's commentary to his edition of Spinoza's KV (1986, 773–85).

3. The book was received rather favourably (De Angelis 1964b, 53), and in 1664 a Dutch translation by Pieter Balling followed. After that, Spinoza set to work on a number of other texts. It took some years before Spinoza actually issued another book, this time a belligerent one published anonymously and with a fictitious imprint: the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*.

unfinished form the book was published. It consists of definitions, axioms, propositions with proofs, as well as prefaces (to parts 1 and 3), corollaries, scholia and lemmas.

(iv) The fourth work that Spinoza set forth in the geometrical manner is the undisputed pinnacle of the genre, the *Ethica*. Here the Euclidean model is employed for a structured deduction of an entire philosophical system, ranging from metaphysics to ethics. Originally Spinoza wrote a non-Euclidean exposition of his philosophy: the work that has come down to us in its Dutch translation as the *Korte verhandeling*. Rather early, though, he decided to completely rework the subject matter into what has eventually become the *Ethica*. The *Ethica* differs from the previous text not only in its form, but also in its content and structure. The original triptych God–man–happiness has been expanded to a fivefold treatise on God, the human mind, the passions, human servitude to the passions, and the possibility of human freedom through the power of the intellect. The strong emphasis on the position occupied by human beings in nature as a whole, and the concomitant limitations and opportunities – in short, on the conditions of human happiness – explains why Spinoza came to call the work *Ethica*: ultimately it is all about ethics, a doctrine of human conduct. In addition to the usual elements (definitions, axioms, propositions, corollaries, scholia and so on), the *Ethica* contains further explanatory matter in the form of prefaces and appendices to several parts.

Apart from being geometrically expounded, there is nothing that *all* these four texts have in common. Yet there are several parallels to be drawn. The two earliest of them, the enclosure to Letter 2 and the first appendix to the *Korte verhandeling*, illustrate that Spinoza (like Descartes in the *Secundæ responsiones*) initially employed the *ordo geometricus* exclusively for proofs of God's existence. The enclosure for Oldenburg and Spinoza's adumbration of the *Principia philosophiæ* (originally intended for Casearius) are akin to the extent that both have a strongly didactical or explanatory orienation. We do not have a cue to establish the exact status of the first appendix to the *Korte verhandeling*. Von Dunin Borkowski believes that it does not in fact constitute an appendix to the work, but the beginnings of a first attempt to restructure this treatise geometrically.[1] Subsequently, this project would have been abandoned in favour of an entirely new work, the *Ethica*. Even though this hypothesis must remain speculative for want of evidence, it is clear that in some way or other the first appendix, while closely related to the philosophical positions developed in the *Korte verhandeling*,[2] anticipates the geometrical design of the *Ethica*.

What is striking about the way in which the four texts under consideration present themselves, is that three of them are paraded as being set forth in the geometrical manner. Only in the case of the appendix to the *Korte verhandeling* is such an explicit reference to the *mos* or *ordo geometricus* lacking. The *Principia* and the *Ethica* expose

1. Von Dunin Borkowski 1921, 63.
2. Cf. Mignini 1986, 773–85.

their geometrical character in their subtitles: *more geometrico demonstratae* and *ordine geometrico demonstrata*.[1] That these labels refer to the formal framework of definitions, axioms, propositions and proofs is shown, I think, by the scholium to proposition eighteen of the fourth part. There Spinoza states:

> His paucis humanæ impotentiæ, & inconstantiæ causas, & cur homines rationis præcepta non servent, explicui. Superest jam, ut ostendam, quid id sit, quod ratio nobis præscribit, & quinam affectûs cum rationis humanæ regulis conveniant, quinam contrà iisdem contrarii sint. Sed antequam hæc prolixo nostro Geometrico ordine demonstrare incipiam, lubet ipsa rationis dictamina hic prius breviter ostendere, ut ea, quæ sentio, faciliùs ab unoquoque percipiantur.[2]
>
> I have thus briefly explained the causes of human weakness and inconstancy, and why men do not abide by the precepts of reason. It now remains for me to demonstrate what it is that reason prescribes for us, and which emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which are contrary to them. But before I embark on the task of proving these things in our detailed geometrical order, it would be well first of all to make a brief survey of the dictates of reason, so that my meaning may be more readily grasped by everyone.[3]

And the scholium concludes thus:

> Hæc illa rationis dictamina sunt, quæ hic paucis ostendere proposueram, antequam eadem *prolixiori ordine* demonstrare inciperem.[4]
>
> These are the dictates of reason, which I have decided to set forth in brief at this point before embarking upon their more detailed demonstration.[5]

From Spinoza's own point of view, then, the scholia are asides, standing outside the framework of the geometrical exposition. That exposition is called *prolixus*, long-winded, because in it no steps can be skipped: even the seemingly obvious must be explicitly enunciated.[6]

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1. *Mos* and *ordo* are, in this context, fully interchangeable. In the contents list of the OP (sig. 5*3[r]), for example, the subtitle of the *Ethica* is given as '*More* geometrico demonstrata', as against '*ordine* geometrico demonstrata' on the part-title leaf. For spurious elements in the Latin text of the part-title of the *Ethica*, see my analysis in chapter 1, § 1.4.5. If (as I suppose) the part-title leaf of the NS is more authentic than its Latin counterpart, then *ordine geometrico demonstrata* is not, strictly speaking, 'the' subtitle, though it belongs to the title at large: the equivalent expression occurs at the very end of the Dutch part-title.
2. G 2, 222.10–7.
3. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 163–4.
4. G 2, 223.19–21 (emphasis supplied).
5. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 164.
6. In the prolegomenon to the *Principia philosophiæ*, Spinoza says that the geometrical mode of discourse is prolix due its step by step approach, when he justifies his decision not to reduce Cartesian doubt to the mathematical order. He wants his readers to have an overall view of these matters, as in a picture: 'quæ omnia quidem in ordinem Mathematicum redegissemus, nisi prolixitatem, quæ ad id præstandum requireretur, impedire judicavissimus, quominùs hæc omnia, quæ uno obtutu, tanquam in picturâ, videri debent, debitè intelligerentur' (G 1, 141.13–6). This opposition of gradual, deductive reasoning and general survey is similar to the distinction set

Spinoza also presents the enclosure to Letter 2 explicitly as set forth geometrically:

> Ut autem hæc clarè, & breviter demonstrarem, nihil meliùs potui excogitare, nisi ut ea more Geometrico probata examini tui ingenii subjicerem.[1]
>
> However, in order to povide a clear, concise proof, I can think of no better expedient than to arrange them in geometrical style and to submit them to the bar of your judgment.[2]

Summing up: when qualifying three of his four geometrical texts as 'set forth in the geometrical manner' or 'geometrical order', Spinoza unmistakably has in mind the Euclidean *layout* of these texts.

As a sequel to this survey a few words may be in order about a recurring topic: the dovetailing of geometrical and nongeometrical passages. As I have just pointed out, not all the elements are equal: part of them (first principles, theorems with proofs) make to the demonstrative skeleton, whereas others are supplementary (scholia, prefaces, appendices). Similar distinctions have been proposed by other authors. Efraim Shmueli, for instance, wrote:

> By 'nongeometrical portions,' I mean the passages which are more or less unconstrained by the mathematical form. I refer to the prefaces, appendices, extended notes, and corollaries which belong only in a loose way to the geometrical skeleton of the work.
> [...]
> What strikes me most, whenever I go carefully through the *Ethics*, is the difference between the restrained and detached, although controversial assertions dressed in the geometrical form, and the nongeometrical assertions loaded with harsh rebukes, refutations, ridicule, and scorn.[3]

This is not convincing. For one thing, seventeenth-century polemics were usually pretty sharp; Spinoza was not, I think, uncommonly caustic. For another, the scholia serve not only to attack, but also to clarify, to illustrate, to persuade, to soothe, to encourage. For example:

> Hîc sine dubio Lectores hærebunt, multaque comminiscentur, quæ moram injiciant, & hâc de causâ ipsos rogo, ut lento gradu mecum pergant, nec de his judicium ferant, donec omnia perlegerint.[4]

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forth by Descartes in *Regula* 3 (AT 10, 369–70) between *intuitus* and *deductio*. On the other hand, the two processes are identified by Mersenne in the *Secundæ objectiones*: '*more geometrico* [...], *ut unico velut intuitu lectoris cujuscunque animum expleas*' (AT 7, 128.16–8).

1. G 4, 8.13–5.
2. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 264.
3. Shmueli 1980, 209. The parts of the *Ethica* he considers as 'eminently nongeometric' are: 1ap, 2præf, 2p49s, 3præf, 4præf, 4p25s (but there is no such scholium; presumably 4p35s is meant), 4p36s, 4ap, 5præf, 5p10s, 5p20s, 5p41s.
4. E 2p11s (G 2, 95.8–11).

> At this point our readers will no doubt find themselves in some difficulty and will think of many things that will give them pause. So I ask them to proceed slowly step by step with me, and to postpone judgment until they have read to the end.[1]

But Shmueli is certainly right in calling attention to the enormous effort needed to maintain the Euclidean rigour of the exposition. One sometimes has the impression that the seams of the *ordo geometricus* threaten to come apart, especially in the nongeometrical parts. (This is not to say that the rest of the *Ethica* is detached or uninspired. A full command of the self-imposed formal limitations in a contrapuntal or a dodecaphonic composition will result in a heightened aesthetic achievement; likewise Spinoza manages to express himself through the geometrical order in a masterly, compelling manner.) There is a risk of overemphasizing the difference between the geometrical and nongeometrical components of the *Ethica*. Gilles Deleuze even goes so far as to distinguish two *Ethicas*: he sees the scholia as a reduplication of the arguments set forth in the propositions, composed in a different key and register.[2] It might be objected that, whatever reasons Spinoza had for introducing such passages, they are not redundant in the deduction. Once they have been incorporated in the text, the subsequent reasoning can (and does) draw upon them to produce legitimate demonstrations. If they were basically a reduplication of the properly geometrical elements, they could (and probably would) be left out from the main line of argument. If, as I will argue below, the geometrical discourse of the *Ethica* generally unfolds itself on the level of the second kind of knowledge, *ratio*, the function of the nongeometrical elements may be to address the reader at the level of *imaginatio*. This approach accounts for their centrifugal status, so to speak, without giving up the fundamental unity of the exposition as a whole.

5.6 Form and method: the connections

I have argued so far that the synthetic way in which Spinoza expounds his philosophy in the *Ethica* is not identical or interchangeable with his method, since for him that term covers analysis as well as synthesis. We now turn to the various ways in which form and method are interrelated. I will concentrate on three connections in particular. The first is the oscillating terminology Spinoza himself employs. Secondly there is the question of how the *ordo geometricus* fits in with Spinoza's theory of knowledge. And thirdly I maintain that it is Spinoza's concept of God which enables him to apply the Euclidean layout to his philosophical system as a whole.

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1. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 71.
2. Deleuze 1968, 317.

5.6.1 *Terminology*

Firstly, then, the wavering of Spinoza's terminology. It seems to me that it is the key notion of *ordo*, in particular, which interferes with 'method', since it can denote a very wide range of orderly dispositions or arrangements, varying from a simple orderly enumeration to the law-governed pattern of nature as a whole.[1] The interpenetration of order and method emerges very clearly from the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*. One of the requirements of the true method, so we can read there, is that it establishes an orderly procedure.[2] Again, Spinoza emphasizes that the philosophical method must be developed *debito ordine*, in the required order.[3] Mignini rightly stresses that this *debitus ordo* is not the geometrical mode of discourse.[4] The required order discussed in the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* belongs to the sphere of research and discovery, the 'ars inveniendi'.[5]

The interference of order and method is caused not only by the wide range of the term *ordo*. *Methodus* is not unequivocal either. The word itself occurs only twice in the *Ethica*: in the beginning of the first scholium of theorem forty of the second part,[6] and at the very end of the preface to part 3.[7] In both cases, Spinoza unmistakably means the geometrical form of the exposition. The latter of the two places is especially instructive. Earlier in this preface, Spinoza says that his intention to deal geometrically ('*more Geometrico tractare*') with men's vices and shortcomings, is bound to meet with astonishment. (I have already quoted this passage, p. 142.) The final phrase is a variation on this formula:

> *De Affectuum itaque naturâ, & viribus, ac Mentis in eosdem potentiâ eâdem Methodo agam, quâ in præcedentibus de Deo, & Mente egi, & humanas actiones, atque appetitûs considerabo perinde, ac si Quæstio de lineis, planis, aut de corporibus esset.*[8]

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1. The first sense, orderly enumeration, for example in TTP 15: hammering home the fundamental flaws in the rule laid down by Jehuda Alpakhar for the interpretation of the bible, Spinoza suddenly stops short. The rhetorical effect is powerful. (According to Fokke Akkerman, who kindly brought this passage to my attention, this is the sole instance of an anacoluthon in Spinoza's works.) Spinoza resumes the thread, but the tone is different: 'Sed rem ordine examinemus' (G 3, 183.4). The second sense, pattern of nature, is to be found for example in TIE § 12: 'omnia, quæ fiunt, secundùm æternum ordinem, & secundùm certas Naturæ leges fieri' (G 2, 8.16–7); and twice in § 40: '[mens] ordinem Naturæ intelligit' (G 2, 16.22,24).
2. § 49 (G 2, 19.1).
3. § 36 (G 2, 15.20), § 44 (17.18), § 45 (17.28).
4. In his commentary to his KV-edition (Spinoza 1986, 752).
5. The distinction between discovery and exposition is rhetorical in origin, but it was to play an important role in the early modern debates on method, owing to Ramus and in particular to Francis Bacon – 'der Philosoph der Erfindung', as Kuno Fischer aptly labelled him (Fischer 1875, 144). A recent general survey is Van Peursen's monograph on the 'ars inveniendi' (1993).
6. G 2, 120.17-8.
7. G 2, 138.25.
8. G 2, 138.23–7.

> I shall, then, treat of the nature and strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, by the same method as I have used in treating of God and the mind, and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were an investigation into lines, planes, or bodies.[1]

5.6.2 *Theory of knowledge*

What is the relation between the *ordo geometricus* and the theory of knowledge expounded by Spinoza in the second part of the *Ethica*? In the second scholium of proposition forty,[2] Spinoza distinguishes different ways in which people acquire knowledge, that is: perceive and form general concepts. This can be done 'Ex singularibus, nobis per sensûs mutilatè, confusè, & sine ordine ad intellectum repræsentatis' ('from individual objects presented to us through the senses in a fragmentary (mutilate) and confused manner without any intellectual order'). Spinoza calls this knowledge from casual (i.e. nonsystematic) experience (*experientia vaga*). Impressions can also be gathered 'Ex signis, ex. gr. ex eo, quòd auditis, aut lectis quibusdam verbis rerum recordemur, & earum quasdam ideas formemus similes iis, per quas res imaginamur' ('from symbols. For example, from having heard or read certain words we call things to mind and we form certain ideas of them similar to those through which we imagine things'). Together, these two sorts of knowledge (from casual experience and from reminiscence and imagination) are denoted by Spinoza as *knowledge of the first kind*, alias opinion or imagination (*opinio*, *imaginatio*). Secondly, such knowledge as arises 'ex eo, quòd notiones communes, rerumque proprietatum ideas adæquatas habemus' ('from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things') is called *knowledge of the second kind*, or reason (*ratio*). The characteristic feature of this kind of knowledge is the application of general patterns to individual cases, thus yielding adequate insight (as opposed to knowledge from casual experience). Over and above the two kinds now mentioned, there is a *third kind of knowledge*, called *scientia intuitiva*: 'hoc cognoscendi genus procedit ab adæquatâ ideâ essentiæ formalis quorundam Dei attributorum ad adæquatam cognitionem essentiæ rerum' ('This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things'). This kind of knowledge provides a direct, immediate grasp of essences.

The exact status and the mutual relations of these three kinds of knowledge, as well as their similarities and differences with regard to the theory of knowledge in Spinoza's earlier writings, have occasioned much learned interpretation, which will have to be left aside here.[3] My focus of interest is the status of the *Ethica* itself in this hierarchy.

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1. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 103.
2. G 2, 122. All translations in this paragraph are taken from Shirley, p. 90.
3. Some basic studies of Spinoza's theory of knowledge are those by De Deugd (1966) and Parkinson (1954).

That, too, is a controversial issue. Does the *Ethica* yield knowledge on the level of reason, or do we have knowledge of the third kind here: insight into the essence of things based on adequate knowledge of the attributes of God (which have been dealt with in the second part)? De Dijn thinks the question must remain undecided, owing to the lack of precision with which Spinoza sketched the kinds of knowledge.[1] I agree that the third kind of knowledge in particular remains an elusive and enigmatic element throughout Spinoza's works. If knowledge of the third kind is able to fathom the essence of things adequately, then it is knowledge *sub specie aeternitatis*. In this immediate grasp of things, everything occurs synchronically, since in eternity – as defined by Spinoza – there is no time, no 'when', 'before' or 'after'.[2] Whether such a mode of knowledge is to be termed mystical, depends on one's notion of mysticism.[3] At any rate it would seem to me that this sort of knowledge cannot be communicated as such, for as soon as we want to explain connections to other people, we can only do this in the linear, diachronic mode of exposition inherent in any communication through language. Every exposition takes a lapse of time and is consequently determined by 'when', 'before' and 'after'. This limitation applies whatever the character of the exposition – whether it appeals to experience or images, that is produces knowledge of the first kind,[4] or yields knowledge of the second kind by a rationally developed discourse. Therefore I cannot interpret the *Ethica* otherwise than as belonging to the sphere of *ratio*, knowledge of the second kind. A discourse that moves exclusively within the sphere of *scientia intuitiva* is, I think, a practical impossibility.[5] Yet within the gradually developed discourse there may be moments in which the truth of a proposition is grasped without help of the steps that have led to this insight: in such moments knowledge turns into *scientia intuitiva*.[6] This

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1. De Dijn 1986, 65.
2. E 1p33s2 (G 2, 75.12–3); CM 1.3 (G 1, 243.12).
3. This interpretation has been advanced e.g. by Kolakowski (1987, 213; his definition of mysticism on p. 35). See also Moreau's remarks on the problem of mysticism in Spinoza (Moreau 1994, 288–9).
4. Interestingly, Spinoza did not exclude the possibility that knowledge of the third kind is communicated to others as knowledge of the first kind. This emerges from the passage on Jesus Christ in TTP 4 (G 3, 64–5). For Spinoza's 'christology' see Matheron 1971, where the third kind of knowledge is also dealt with (250–61).
5. Even if it were possible, it would subvert the intentions Spinoza had in writing and distributing the *Ethica*. Cf. Parrochia 1993, 257: 'le mouvement de l'*Ethique* ne peut s'identifier à celui de l'ordre intuitif: mieux, l'ouvrage manquerait son but s'il en était ainsi. Il faut persuader, convertir, par conséquent défaire le mauvais rangements des philosophes et leur en substituer d'autres.'
6. This seems to me to be the gist of Gueroult's interpretation that the *Ethica* yields knowledge of the third kind (Gueroult 1974, 453–60). A much stronger claim has been put forward by McKeon (1930, 183–4), viz. that the *ordo geometricus* as such produces knowledge of the third kind. His arguments fail to convince, since he tends to blur the distinction between *ratio* and *scientia intuitiva*.

interpretation – that Spinoza thought of his *Ethica* as providing knowledge of the second kind, illuminated intermittently, as by flashes of lightning, by an insight of the third kind – is corroborated by the following passage in part five of the *Ethica*:

> Deinde quia nostræ Mentis essentia in solâ cognitione consistit, cujus principium, & fundamentum Deus est [...]: hinc perspicuum nobis fit, quomodò, & quâ ratione Mens nostra secundùm essentiam, & existentiam ex naturâ divinâ sequatur, & continuò à Deo pendeat; quod hîc notare operæ pretium duxi, ut hôc exemplo ostenderem, quantùm rerum singularium cognitio, quam intuitivam, sive tertii generis appellavi [...], polleat, potiorque sit cognitione universali, quam secundi generis esse dixi. Nam quamvis in Primâ Parte generaliter ostenderim, omnia (& consequenter Mentem etiam humanam) à Deo secundùm essentiam, & existentiam pendêre, illa tamen demonstratio, tametsi legitima sit, & extra dubitationis aleam posita, non ità tamen Mentem nostram afficit, quàm quando id ipsum ex ipsâ essentiâ rei cujuscunque singularis, quam à Deo pendêre dicimus, concluditur.[1]
>
> Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge, whose principle and basis is God [...], it follows that we see quite clearly how and in what way our mind, in respect of essence and existence, follows from the divine nature and is continuously dependent on God.
>
> I have thought this worth noting here in order to show by this example the superiority of that knowledge of particular things which I have called 'intuitive' or 'of the third kind,' and its preferability to that abstract knowledge which I have called 'knowledge of the second kind.' For although I demonstrated in a general way in Part I that everything (and consequently the human mind, too) is dependent on God in respect of its essence and of its existence, that proof, although legitimate and exempt from any shadow of doubt, does not so strike the mind as when it is inferred from the essence of each particular thing which we assert to be dependent on God.[2]

This, then, is the second link between the *ordo geometricus* and Spinoza's philosophical method: geometry belongs pre-eminently to the sphere of reason or knowledge of the second kind, which is pivotal in both the acquisition and the communication of knowledge. Still, as Karl Jaspers has acutely pointed out, the geometrical proofs in the *Ethica* are effective only if the third kind of knowledge is permanently present as a guideline:

> Spinoza beweist in der zweiten Erkenntnisgattung [...], das heißt nicht aus Wahrnehmung und Vorstellung, und nicht aus dem anschauenden Wissen der dritten Erkenntnisgattung. Aber nur wenn dieses letztere führend gegenwärtig ist, haben die Beweise einen Sinn. Die Beweise als solche sind mit Gegenständen, Gegensätzen, Widersprüchen beschäftigt. Aber darin vollzieht sich Erinnerung oder Vorbereitung des anschauenden Wissens, die zeitlose die Welt transzendierende Gotteserkenntnis, der Appell an die Motive zur rechten Lebensverfassung.[3]

In the final section of this chapter, I will return to this notion of the knowledge of God as the ultimate warrant of the validity of the *ordo geometricus*. I will now deal

1. E 5p36s (G 2, 303.11–25).
2. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 219.
3. Jaspers 1986, 42.

with a related topic: the proofs for the existence of God as a further link between geometrical order and method.

5.6.3 *Proofs for the existence of God*

As we have noted, Spinoza initially reserved the geometrical mode of exposition for proofs for the existence of God. In this respect he followed Descartes's single application of the *ordo geometricus* (on which see the following section). Such proofs have enjoyed a special status in the history of philosophy, since Anselm of Canterbury first propounded his ontological argument for the existence of God in the *Proslogion* (ca. 1077). Anselm's proof was taken up again by Descartes, and subsequently by Spinoza and Leibniz. It became part and parcel of modern philosophy: discussion of it has continued well into the twentieth century.[1] It should be noted that, apart from the conceptual transformations attending this long historical development, the argument was also affected by a formal metamorphosis. Anselm's formula in the *Proslogion* is: 'credimus te esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit' ('Now we believe that You are something than which nothing greater can be thought').[2] As Wolfgang Röd has pointed out,

> Das Proslogion-Argument hat die Form eines indirekten Beweises (einer Reductio ad absurdum), indem aus der Unhaltbarkeit der Annahme, daß das Unüberbietbare nur im Intellekt sei, gefolgert wird, daß das Gegenteil richtig sein müsse, d.h. das Unüberbietbare ein Sein auch unabhängig vom Intellekt habe.
>
> Diese Schlußform entstand bemerkenswerterweise etwa gleichzeitig in der Metaphysik und in der Mathematik, und diese Parallelität ist nicht zufällig [...]. In beiden Fällen soll das Beweisziel ohne Verwendung empirischer Prämissen erreicht werden.[3]

The early modern period was characterized by a turn towards mathematics, whose most spectacular effect has been the revolution in natural sciences – the tale is told in Dijksterhuis's classic *Mechanisering van het wereldbeeld*.[4] In connection with the natural

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1. The vicissitudes of the Anselmian ontological argument are dealt with, from widely different perspectives, by Henrich 1960; Kopper 1962; Charlesworth 1965, 3–7, 40–6, 54–77; Hick 1972; Röd 1992; Lensink 1992 (who discusses the transformations of the ontological argument; in a longer – unpublished – Dutch version of the same paper, Lensink deals with the seventeenth-century developments of Anselm's argument). For Leibniz's mathematical proofs for God's existence, see also Iwanicki 1933.
2. Both the Latin text and the English translation are taken from Charlesworth's 1965 edition, pp. 116 and 117 respectively. (Charlesworth reproduces the Latin text from the critical edition of Anselm's works by F.S. Schmitt.)
3. Röd 1992, 42.
4. Notably in parts IV and V of his book (Dijksterhuis 1989 [1950], 317–550). The same revolution is analysed from a somewhat different angle in Alexandre Koyré's study *From the closed world to the infinite universe* (1982 [1957]). See also the collection of papers edited by Lino Conti (1992), especially the contribution by Paolo Rossi (pp. 3–19).

sciences, the well-known image employed by Galilei in *Il saggiatore* of 1623 is often referred to:

> La filosofia è scritta in questo grandissimo libro che continuamente ci sta aperto innanzi a gli occhi (io dico l'universo), ma non si può intendere se prima non s'impara a intender la lingua, e conoscer i caratteri, ne' quali è scritto. Egli è scritto in lingua matematica, e i caratteri son triangoli, cerchi, ed altre figure geometriche, senza i quali mezi è impossibile a intenderne umanamente parola; senza questi è un aggirarsi vanamente per un oscuro laberinto.[1]
>
> Philosophy is written in that great book that lies permanently open before our eyes – I mean the universe – but it can be understood only after we have learned to understand the language and the characters in which it is written. It is written in mathematical language, and its characters are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures. Without these means it is impossible, humanly speaking, to understand a word; without them, we wander in vain through an obscure labyrinth.

The radiation of mathematics affected not only the natural sciences, but every intellectual activity that had scientific aspirations – theology included.[2] The proof for the existence of God was evidently considered a suitable case for mathematization, a procedure to which its independance of any empirical prerequisites certainly contributed.[3] Descartes and (in his wake) Spinoza and Leibniz were fascinated by the ontological argument for God's existence and provided geometrically arranged versions of it.[4] In the process, the ontological proof for the existence of God came to occupy a central position: whereas it was one among several possible proofs for Anselm and the scholastics, it became the keystone of the construction of rationalist philosophical systems: it is indispensable for an *a priori* demonstration of the correspondence between thought and reality.[5]

Part one of Spinoza's *Ethica* deals with God. His concept of God serves as the foundation for the subsequent deductive construction of the entire philosophical system.[6] This development rests on two essential steps: the first is the identification

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1. Galilei, *Opere* 6, 232.
2. Cf. Risse 1970, 137–43.
3. The argument was prone to mathematization because of its formal, *a priori* character. Anselm did not present the ontological argument as a formal syllogism, but Charlesworth (1965, 59–65) has pointed out that the premisses were omitted because they were considered to be self-evident.
4. Although Leibniz clearly stated his reservations, e.g. in an untitled notice against the Cartesian proof (PhS 4, 402): 'Et omettant même toute mention de la perfection, on peut dire: *que si l'estre necessaire est possible, il existe*, proposition la plus belle sans doute et la plus importante de la doctrine des modales, parce qu'elle fournit un passage de la puissance à l'acte, et c'est uniquement icy *qu'a posse ad esse valet consequentia.*'
5. For these views I am indebted to Röd's fine monograph on the ontological argument; see Röd 1992, pp. 53–4, 9, 15 respectively.
6. Strictly speaking, of course, the *Ethica* (unlike the *Korte verhandeling*) does not actually begin with God, but with the notion of substance, to be identified with God only in the fourteenth proposition. André Doz (1976, 237–8) has argued that this was done to get through to the

of God with nature as a whole (propositions 14 and 15 of part 1) and the second the perfect coincidence of the order of things and the order of ideas (proposition 7 of part 2). The two arguments are, of course, interwoven: because the one substance – an eternal and infinite being that is called God or nature[1] – can be considered under the attribute of extension and under the attribute of thought, it follows that their order and connection must in both cases be one and the same. Consequently the world both has an orderly arrangement and is in principle knowable. If God is the immanent cause of all things,[2] then the deduction by means of rational thought of the systematic connection of things from God's nature is not a mere conceptual construct, but it reflects the state of affairs in reality.[3] Once again, *ordo* is the keyword. The case is stated most explicitly in the second scholium to theorem ten of the second part of the *Ethica*: there Spinoza states that the correct philosophical order, neglected by previous thinkers, must begin with the nature of God, 'quia tam cognitione, quàm naturâ prior est'.[4]

Seen from this perspective, the application of the *ordo geometricus* finds its ultimate justification in Spinoza's concept of God. The rational, geometrical form matches the systematic arrangement of nature and is thus its appropriate expository mode. This, then, constitutes the third link between form and philosophical method, touching a crucial methodological issue, namely the guarantee that reality can be known. This, too, goes to show that the 'shape' of the *Ethica* cannot be considered an arbitrary, external apparel.

5.7 Spinoza and tradition

A comprehensive and richly documented survey of the vicissitudes of the geometrical order up to the middle of the seventeenth century is to be found in Hermann Schüling's pioneering study of 1969, *Die Geschichte der axiomatischen Methode im 16. und beginnenden 17. Jahrhundert.*[5] Seventeenth-century philosophy since Descartes is characterized by its penchant for mathematics, but this was the outcome of a long-term development. Thus the ground was prepared for the Cartesian position that all knowledge is to be measured against the certainty of mathematics.

(Cartesian) audience.

1. E 4præf.
2. E 1p18.
3. Cf. De Dijn 1973, 759–60.
4. G 2, 93.30-2.
5. In spite of its title, which suggests a restricted scope, the work deals with the 'prehistory' (that is, with Antiquity and the Middle Ages), too: pp. 9–34. With regard to terminology, Schüling remarks (p. 7): 'Die Ausdrücke "axiomatische Methode", "axiomatisch-deduktive Methode", "geometrische Methode" und "mos geometricus" werden im folgenden wechselweise gebraucht.'

Spinoza was not the first who tried to apply the geometrical order to philosophy. Wolfson claims to outline the descent of the *ordo geometricus* by enumerating a host of Greek, scholastic and Jewish philosophers.[1] Speaking of his own historiographical vantage point, Wolfson states: 'As for Spinoza, [...] if we could cut up all the philosophic literature available to him into slips of paper, toss them up into the air, and let them fall back to the ground, then out of these scattered slips of paper we could reconstruct his *Ethics*.'[2] This reduction of Spinoza's philosophy to a jigsaw puzzle (the term is Wolfson's own) of fragmentary classical, scholastic and rabbinic influences has been severely criticized in later Spinoza-research – more particularly in the present-day French reception of Spinoza, which is strongly determined by Martial Gueroult's monumental commentary.[3] The latter had qualified Wolfson's approach as a pitiful venture, 'une gageure affligeante'.[4] This qualification is not altogether fair, since it fails to take into account the extraordinary erudition and depth of Wolfson's study, but then the image of the jigsaw puzzle appears to be an embarrassment even to ardent admirers of his work.[5]

That the *ordo geometricus* had a long tradition before Spinoza is not, as far as I can see, a moot point for commentators. But opinions diverge on the question of how exactly this tradition influenced him, that is: who were his direct examples. Hubbeling distinguishes two currents in the interpetation:

> namelijk zij die menen dat Spinoza deze methode ontleend heeft aan Descartes en dat Spinoza dus wezenlijk Cartesiaan is en zij die menen dat Spinoza zijn geometrische methode aan Euclides en Hobbes heeft ontleend.[6]
>
> viz., those who think that Spinoza derived this method from Descartes and that Spinoza therefore is essentially a Cartesian, and those who think that Spinoza derived his geometrical method from Euclid and Hobbes.

On a general level, Cartesian influence is of course pervasive. Without playing down the originality and unique qualities that are properly Spinoza's, there is no denying that it could not have come about without the Cartesian renewal of philosophy. It is only by totally abstracting Spinoza's philosophy from its historical context that Henri Bergson could arrive at the opposite conclusion:

> C'est, derrière la lourde masse des concepts apparentés au cartésianisme et à l'aristotelisme, l'intuition qui fut celle de Spinoza, intuition qu'aucune formule, si simple soit-elle, ne sera assez simple pour exprimer. [...] Plus nous remontons vers cette intuition originelle, mieux

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1. Wolfson 1983, vol. 1, 38–44.
2. Wolfson 1983, vol. 1, 3.
3. Gueroult 1968; 1974; 1977.
4. Gueroult 1968, 442. Gueroult does, for that matter, acknowledge Spinoza's indebtedness to tradition (Gueroult 1974, 480), but he tends to overemphasize the assumed affinity to Hobbes – erroneously so, as we shall see presently.
5. For example Curley 1988, X–XI.
6. Hubbeling 1978, 19.

> nous comprenons que, si Spinoza avait vécu avant Descartes, il aurait sans doute écrit autre chose que ce qu'il a écrit, mais que, Spinoza vivant et écrivant, nous étions sûrs d'avoir le spinozisme tout de même.[1]

It might be objected that this judgment is inherently meaningless, since it depends on a conditional clause, and a counterfactual one at that. Even if we pass this over, it is hard to see what this pre-Cartesian Spinozism could possibly have amounted to. It could not have had much in common with the philosophy of Spinoza as it has come down to us in history.

Since Cartesian philosophy contributed cardinally to the shaping of Spinoza's thought, then, it seems plausible to search in the same direction when explaining the application of the geometrical model. This track has been pursued by Léon Brunschvicg, in *Les Étapes de la philosophie mathématique* and in his influential study *Spinoza et ses contemporains*, in which the approach to mathematics of the two philosophers is dealt with.[2] According to this scholar, Spinoza and Descartes are basically of the same mind in their view of mathematics. This, however, is not the case. Note the differences in formulation in Descartes and Spinoza: whereas the latter speaks of *more* (or *ordine*) *demonstrata* or *probata*,[3] the former calls his proofs for the existence of God *more geometrico dispositæ*. The difference has been commented upon by H.J. De Vleeschauwer:[4] for Spinoza, the *ordo geometricus* is part of the *methodus inveniendi*, the discovery of truth; for Descartes it is merely a technique to expound what one has found beforehand. The *mos geometricus* of the French philosopher does not prove, it only arranges proofs. Descartes was very reluctant to give his geometrically arranged answer: it was a gesture of benevolence, to oblige Mersenne.

Considering the divergences between Descartes and Spinoza, several scholars[5] have maintained that it was Thomas Hobbes rather than Descartes who served Spinoza as a model in his application of the *ordo geometricus*. It is in particular the *Examinatio et emendatio mathematicæ hodiernæ* of 1660 that is thought to have deeply impressed Spinoza. The assumption was first put forward by Ernst Cassirer[6] and it has been elaborated by other authors afterwards. If we take the date of publication into account, the supposition is certainly appealing: Spinoza's second letter (the one accompanying the geometrical proof of God's existence) dates from 1661, the *Korte verhandeling* probably from the period between the end of 1660 and the beginning of 1662, and the *Principia philosophiæ* were published in 1663. It is pre-eminently in the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* that Cassirer thinks he can discern the influence of Hobbes's

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1. Bergson 1934, 142–3.
2. Brunschvicg 1922, 138–51; Brunschvicg 1923, 260–78.
3. See Akkerman 1992, 105, for a discussion of the semantic range of *demonstrare*, which is often equal to *ostendere*.
4. De Vleeschauwer 1961, 30–1.
5. Among them De Dijn 1973, 714–9; Gueroult 1974, 480–7.
6. Cassirer 1994, vol. 2 [1907], 99, n. 2.

Examinatio.[1] If, however, Mignini is right in ascribing the *Tractatus* to 1657–1658, instead of the received dating 1661, the *Examinatio* cannot have influenced it. The problems do not limit themselves to the admittedly undecided question of precedence. Hobbes's *Examinatio* is not composed *ordine geometrico*, but (as its subtitle indicates) *distributa in sex dialogos*. Accordingly, the work cannot have served as a direct model.[2] The influence from Hobbes is therefore purported to lie in the approach to mathematics, as well as in a number of specific borrowings. Karl Schuhmann, though, has argued convincingly that Spinoza's and Hobbes's view of mathematics collide in all important points, and that the formulas and examples Spinoza is said to have borrowed from Hobbes reach back to a common tradition – insofar as they are not the result of misinterpretations of Hobbes's texts.[3]

Apart from Descartes and Hobbes, a third philosopher has been mentioned as source of inspiration for Spinoza's use of the geometrical form: Arnold Geulincx.[4] Geulincx worked in the University of Leiden in the 1660s – in the very period when Spinoza lived nearby, in Rijnsburg – and published his *Methodus inveniendi argumenta*, which was laid out *ordine et tenore geometrico* in 1663. Geulincx had been inspired by Descartes, too, in his application of this expository mode. There are subsidiary reasons for taking this line of argument seriously: mathematics was a brisk trade in Leiden at the time;[5] and Lodewijk Meyer, who matriculated at the University and is supposed to have belonged to the circle around Geulincx, may have served as an intermediary.[6] More research is needed here.

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1. For a recent restatement of this view, see Bartuschat in his edition of Spinoza 1993, XXIX: 'Mit ziemlicher Sicherheit hat Spinoza den im Titel erscheinenden Terminus "Verbesserung" (emendatio) im Hinblick auf eine 1660, also kurz vor der Abfassung unserer Abhandlung, erschienenen Schrift von Thomas Hobbes gebraucht, die den Titel trägt: "Examinatio et Emendatio Mathematicae hodiernae".' The word *emendatio*, though, was far too common to refer it to a specific source. For illustrations of the use of 'emendatio' and related terms by other authors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Canone & Totaro 1991, 27–8.
2. In this context it might be noted that Spinoza applied the dialogue form, too, viz. in the *Korte verhandeling* (part 1, 'Zamenspreeking' and 'Tweede Zamenspreekinge'; Mignini 1986, 154–66). The genre is, of course, utterly traditional; there is no reason to resort to the assumption that this was in any way influenced by Hobbes's work.
3. Schuhmann 1987.
4. See De Vleeschauwer 1961, 71.
5. Van Maanen 1987, 1–41.
6. Thijssen-Schoute (1989, 381–2), though, challenges this point. Her criticism (pp. 156–62) of De Vleeschauwer's nazi sympathies and the detrimental consequences they had for his interpretation of Geulincx are also worth mentioning.

5.8 Spinoza and mathematics

In the appendix that concludes the first part of the *Ethica*, Spinoza attacks the notion that the world has been equipped for the benefit of mankind. Those who choose to stick to this view are forced to explain away all sorts of misery and distress. This can be done, for example, by arguing that the ways of the gods are inscrutable:

> Unde pro certo statuerunt, Deorum judicia humanum captum longissimè superare: quæ sanè unica fuisset causa, ut veritas humanum genus in æternum lateret; nisi Mathesis, quæ non circa fines, sed tantùm circa figurarum essentias, & proprietates versatur, aliam veritatis normam hominibus ostendisset.[1]
>
> Hence they made it axiomatic that the judgment of the gods is far beyond man's understanding. Indeed, it is for this reason, and this reason only, that truth might have evaded mankind forever had not Mathematics, which is concerned not with ends but only with the essences and properties of figures, revealed to men a different standard of truth.[2]

Another telling illustration of Spinoza's attitude towards mathematics is a famous passage in a letter to Albert Burgh, who was newly converted to Roman Catholicism. Burgh demanded to know how Spinoza knew that his philosophy was the best, and the latter replied:

> Nam ego non præsumo, me optimam invenisse Philosophiam; sed veram me intelligere scio. Quomodò autem id sciam, si roges, respondebo, eodem modo, ac tu scis tres Angulos Trianguli æquales esse duobus rectis, & hoc sufficere negabit nemo, cui sanum est cerebrum, nec spiritûs immundos somniat, qui nobis ideas falsas inspirant veris similes: est enim verum index sui, & falsi.[3]
>
> For I do not assume I have found the best philosophy, but I know that I understand the true philosophy. If you ask me how I know this, I will answer: in the same way that you know the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. That this is satisfactory will not be denied by anyone whose brain is sound, and who does not dream of nasty spirits that give us false ideas which look like true ones; for truth reveals both itself and falsity.

In the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* geometrical reasoning is opposed to mere experience (that is, knowledge of the first kind):

> Ostendimus deinde in Cap. V. Scripturam res eo modo tradere, & docere, quo facillime ab unoquoque percipi possunt; quæ scilicet non ex axiomatibus, & definitionibus res deducit, & concatenat, sed tantum simpliciter dicit, & ad fidem faciendam, solâ experientiâ, miraculis scilicet, & historiis dicta confirmat, quæque etiam stylo, & phrasibus narrantur, quibus maximè plebis animus commoveri potest [...].[4]

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1. G 2, 79.29-34.
2. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1992a, 58.
3. Ep 76 (G 4, 320.3-9).
4. TTP 13 (G 3, 167.10-6). Cf. TTP 2 (G 3, 32.10ff) on *certitudo mathematica* as opposed to *certitudo tantum moralis*.

> Then in chapter 5 we showed that Scripture conveys and teaches its message in a way best suited to the comprehension of all men, not resorting to a chain of deductive reasoning from axioms and definitions, but speaking quite simply. And to induce belief, it narrates past events, such as miracles and histories, to confirm its message, employing such style and mode of expression as is most likely to make a strong impression on men's minds.[1]

In the preface to part 3 of the *Principia philosophiæ* (the passage quoted above, p. 154), Spinoza deals with the *mos mathematicorum*.[2] This comprises both a method of invention and a form of exposition: the best way to *understand* the origin of things dictates at the same time the best way to *expound* their nature. Furthermore, this understanding does not reflect the actual origin of the thing, but it constructs a 'fictitious' one that allows us to fathom the nature of the thing and infer all its properties. Finally we can gather from Spinoza's wording that the *mos mathematicorum* is basically a synthetic procedure, ascending from what is clear to the more obscure parts, and from the simple to the more complicated. That these aspects indeed characterize Spinoza's point of view rather than Descartes's, on whose *Principia philosophiæ* the text is based, can be seen if we compare the two versions. Descartes is keen to disavow any lack of loyalty to the Christian doctrine of creation, while at the same time claiming room for a truly scientific account of natural phenomena. But what if these two types of explanation clash? What if mathematical principles, the only ones that Descartes admits in physics,[3] lead to perfectly sound scientific results, but do injustice to God?[4] Then the philosophical explanation must be considered as a mere hypothesis, an artificial construct of the mind, which may help us to understand the origin of things. Christian faith teaches us how things have come about in reality.[5] And eventually, says Descartes, 'nihil affirmo: sed hæc omnia, tum Ecclesiæ Catholicæ

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1. Spinoza, tr. Shirley 1991, 214.
2. Mathematics is of course not identical with geometry, but Euclidean geometry for a long time was the height of exact mathematical reasoning. This is, for example, aptly put into words in the quotation from the mathematician and physician Hieronymus Cardanus (1501–76) that serves as a motto to this chapter. Cf. Crapulli 1969, 13: 'Gli *Elementi* di Euclide furono il testo classico di matematica più diffuso nel sec. XVI, per la loro stessa natura di trattazione elementare non solo della geometria ma anche dell'aritmetica (libri VII–IX), ossia delle due discipline matematiche fondamentali.' From the perspective of the history of science, though, it is now commonly held that mathematics only began to take off by turning towards algebra, and away from the geometry of Archimedes and Euclid (see, for example, Kline 1972, 391–2). The mathematical revolution already begins in the sixteenth century (Whitrow 1988), but it is not until much later that it is denoted as a turn towards algebra.
3. *Principia philosophiæ* 2, § 64; AT 8:1, 78.
4. PP 3, § 43 (AT 8:1, 99.7–14). Note that in Descartes the expression which Spinoza employs, 'Mathematicorum mos', is absent. Instead we find: 'si nullis principiis utamur nisi evidentissimè perspectis, si nihil nisi per Mathematicas consequentias ex iis deducamus, [...] injuriam Deo facere videremur'.
5. PP 3, §§ 44–5 (AT 8:1, 99–100).

auctoritate, tum prudentiorum judiciis submitto'[1] ('I make no firm pronouncements, but submit all these opinions to the authority of the Catholic Church and the judgement of wiser men'[2]). Spinoza's rendering of this does away with the declarations of loyalty to the Church altogether, but he sees fit to retain the distinction between theoretically constructed explanation and actual process.

Though Spinoza's enthusiasm for mathematics, then, can be sufficiently documented, he never gave an explicit justification for the use of the *ordo geometricus* in his own philosophy. In the absence of such a first-hand account, scholarship has often resorted to a substitute: the preface that Lodewijk Meyer wrote for Spinoza's *Renati Des Cartes Principia philosophiæ* of 1663. We must be attentive to the basic fact that the opinion presented here is Meyer's, and not necessarily Spinoza's, too.[3] Yet Meyer belonged to the group of intimate friends who convinced Spinoza he should publish the text in the first place. He helped the author prepare the copy and edited the internal references in the text. Its publication was the result of their joint efforts, and we may be confident that the preface contains no views strongly objected to by Spinoza.

In the preface, Meyer sets out with a stirring picture of the deplorable state of philosophy, due to its renunciation of the mathematical method:

> *omnia contentionis, atque dissidii plena, &, quod ab uno ratiunculis quibusdam levibus utcunque confirmatum est, mox ab alio confutatum, ac iisdem armis dirutum, atque disjectum: adeò ut immotæ veritatis avida mens, ubi tranquillum studii sui stagnum, quod tutò, & prospero cursu trajicere, ac quo trajecto tandem optato cognitionis portu potiri posset, invenire putârat, in opinionum impetuoso se fluctuantem videat mari, ac tempestatibus contentionum undique circumcinctam, incertitudinumque fluctibus indesinenter, sine ullâ ex iis unquam emergendi spe, jactatam atque abreptam.*[4]
>
> All of their works are full of strife and disagreement, and whatever is corroborated by some slight, insufficient reasoning is soon rebutted by another, and destroyed and torn apart by the same weapons. So the mind, which has longed for an unshakable truth, and thought to find a quiet harbor, where, after a safe and happy journey, it could at last reach the desired haven of knowledge, finds itself tossed about on a violent sea of opinions, surrounded everywhere by storms of dispute, hurled up and dragged down again endlessly by waves of uncertainty, without any hope of ever emerging from them.[5]

And yet, there is a glimmer of hope – if only the mathematical method were applied to philosophy, more particularly to the philosophy founded by Descartes, the brightest star of our age ('*splendidissimum illud sæculi nostri jubar*').[6] It is significant that, in this context, Meyer refers explicitly to Descartes's answers to the second series of

1. PP 4, § 207 (AT 8:1, 329.8–10).
2. Descartes, tr. Cottingham et al., vol. 1, 291 (translation modified).
3. A point rightly insisted upon by Curley 1986.
4. G 1, 128.8–16.
5. Translation taken from: Spinoza, tr. Curley 1985, 225.
6. G 1, 128.25–6.

objections.[1] But he is critical of Descartes, too: the latter failed to give his own works their appropriate form, that is the one applied in Euclid's *Elements* and in other works of geometry. Therefore, his books need refashioning. Meyer admits that he had wanted to do this refashioning himself:

> *Imò ipse, quamvis meæ tenuitatis abundè conscius, ac tanto operi longè impar sim, id ipsum tamen præstare sæpe in animum meum induxi, quin etiam aggressus fui: sed aliæ, quibus sæpissimè distrahor, mihi illud peragendi viam obsepserunt occupationes.*[2]
>
> Indeed, I myself, though quite unequal to so great a task, and fully conscious of my weakness, frequently thought of doing this, and even began it. But other occupations distracted me so often that I was prevented from completing it.[3]

These plans, then, came to nothing. Meyer did however contribute intensively to the shaping of the geometrically arranged works of his friend Benedict de Spinoza: the *Principia philosophiæ* and the *Ethica*. He entertained very high expectations for the *ordo geometricus* – there is, indeed, a touch of fetishism about his enthusiasm. In the preface he depicts the geometrical mode as being in itself a guarantee for philosophical truth. In this, he not only outdoes Descartes and Hobbes,[4] but Spinoza as well.

5.9 Mathematics and rhetoric

If for Spinoza an explicit theoretical underpinning is lacking, we do have his practical application of it in his works. Spinoza went to great lengths in order to produce his *Ethica* entirely according to the Euclidean model, so we may infer that he valued it highly. It must have been much more to him than a whim, and also much more than a mere exchangeable apparel that the work happened to be fitted out with. Heine may have expressed a general feeling of reserve when he qualified the *ordo geometricus* as the

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1. G 2, 129.5–6.
2. G 1, 129.28-31.
3. Translation taken from: Spinoza, tr. Curley 1985, 227.
4. Both in atmosphere and in formulations, Meyer's text is reminiscent of the dedicatory epistle that Thomas Hobbes prefixed to *De cive* in 1642 (LW 2, 137–8). For Hobbes, too, mathematics provided the model for philosophy. There is a well-known anecdote, reported by John Aubrey, about how Hobbes discovered Euclid's *Elements* when he was forty years old – a conversion of the *tolle, lege* type (Aubrey, ed. Dick 1962, 230). Yet he was not exactly an adulator of the geometricians. This emerges from his *De principiis et ratiocinatione geometrarum*, in which (according to the subtitle) it is shown that the writings of the geometers are not less liable to uncertainty and error than those of natural and moral philosophers (Hobbes, OL 4, 385). Nevertheless, the works sets out thus: 'Contra geometras, amice lector, non contra geometriam hæc scribo. Artem ipsam, artium navigandi, ædificandi, pingendi, computandi, et denique (scientiæ omnium nobilissimæ) physicæ matrem, æque ac qui maxime laudibus extollendam censeo.' (Hobbes, OL 4, 389). For an analysis of Hobbes's rather complicated relationship with geometry, see Schuhmann 1985.

hard shell of Spinoza's philosophy, but he failed to appreciate the significance that it had for the philosopher himself and many of his contemporaries.

For a seventeenth-century philosopher, firmly rooted in the rhetorical tradition, the choice of a literary form is not neutral or arbitrary. The same point can be (and indeed has been) made with regard to many authors of many other periods as well;[1] if I single out the seventeenth century, it is only to emphasize the dominant role of rhetoric in the education of the period. Spinoza did not write the *Ethica* in the form of, for example, a didactic poem, a dialogue or a series of meditations. In his own view the subject matter – in which the endless concatenation of all that exists is unfolded in its global coherence – must have required precisely this literary form. Calling the *ordo geometricus* a literary form does not imply that it is not logically connected with the philosophical content. According to Wolfson, the geometrical order was nothing but an exterior literary form, chosen by Spinoza for didactical purposes and for the high prestige mathematics enjoyed.[2] In this interpretation the geometrical form is cut off completely from the contents of Spinoza's philosophy. From the perspective of the rhetorical tradition, though, this opposition of literary form and philosophical content is only apparent.

It may be somewhat surprising that I should call this highly formalized mode of expression a *literary* form. Yet that is how Spinoza and his contemporaries must have felt about it, even if they do not employ the term. A striking aspect of their attitude towards the *ordo geometricus* is that they turn Euclid's *Elements* into a timeless model, ignoring the genesis and the historical fortunes of that text. The Greek title of it is Στοιχεῖα, generally interpreted as 'elements, simplest constituents'.[3] It was not intended as a compendium of all geometrical knowledge, but as an introductory

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1. See the exemplary study of the connection between the contents of philosophical systems and their literary form by Schildknecht (1990). Her book deals with Plato (dialogues), Descartes (monologues), Wolff (textbooks) and Lichtenberg (aphorisms). Literary forms of philosophy and the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric have been dealt with by other scholars: cf. Gabriel & Schildknecht 1990, especially the bibliography, pp. 178–88; McKeon 1987; IJsseling 1975. So far only few studies have been dedicated to rhetorical aspects in Spinoza: Akkerman 1977 (French translation: Akkerman 1989) and Akkerman 1985, Proietti 1991, Zweerman 1993.
2. Wolfson 1983, vol. 1, 32–60, especially 53–7.
3. Heath (Euclid 1956, vol. 1, 114) refers to the explanation of the word by Proclus and calls attention to the fact that στοιχεῖα also means 'letters of the alphabet'. Aristotle deals with στοιχεῖον in *Metaphysics* Δ.3 (1014a–b). For a critique of the received interpretation 'elements', see the stimulating study of Burkert 1959: 'Στοιχεῖα ist der Titel des griechischen Buches, das, vom Neuen Testament abgesehen, wohl am allermeisten studiert, kommentiert, übersetzt und abermals studiert und kommentiert wurde – des Euklid. Über diesen Titel, über den damit gegebenen Begriff hat man sich bisher nicht allzuviel Gedanken gemacht; es scheint selbstverständlich, daß darunter eben die "Elemente", "Anfangsgründe" oder "Elementarsätze der Mathematik" [...] zu verstehen seien' (p. 189). Burkert himself conversely maintains (p. 193): 'Die mathematischen Sätze, die sich gegenseitig zum System ergänzen, logisch aufeinander ausgerichtet sind, das sind στοιχεῖα.'

textbook of elementary mathematics.[1] For that reason, Euclid strictly limited himself in his exposition and refrained from external references, problems to be solved by further research, and informal explanations. Such explanations were indeed added later by others (for example Proclus) in the form of scholia, which scribes subsequently interpolated into the text and which came to be regarded afterwards as belonging to the original work.[2] In this historically transmitted form, the *Elements* came to function as a literary model. This emerges quite clearly in the *Ethica*, in which Spinoza painstakingly copies all the characteristics of Euclid's textbook: he, too, begins not with an introduction but straightaway with the definitions; he likewise only includes internal references, and offers aditional explanations in the form of scholia – thus performing the historical tour de force of being his own scholiast.[3]

5.10 Conclusion, or: Quid erat demonstrandum?

Ever since the publication of the *Opera posthuma* the geometrical order as a philosophical genre is tied up with Spinoza's name, though he did not invent it. When Ludwig Wittgenstein's earliest treatise was to be published in an English translation, there was some discussion about the most appropriate title.[4] Wittgenstein rejected an English title proposed by C.K. Ogden and Bertrand Russell. He preferred the Latin title *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, suggested by G.E. Moore, partly because of its Spinozistic ring. Why precisely the allusion to Spinoza was felt to be important is not clear. The most obvious explanation, it seems to me, is that the association presented itself on account of the decimal layout of Wittgenstein's text. (If that was the intention, we must allow for some licence, for Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus* was not written geometrically.)

In the eighteenth century, Christian Wolff brings the (serious) accusation of Spinozism down on his own head, owing at least in part to his systematic use of a mathematical style.[5] It was notably Wolff's systematics that gave rise to Immanuel Kant's devastating criticism of the mathematical method in philosophy as being pre-

1. At least, according to a plausible hypothesis, which is corroborated by statements from Proclus. But it has also been suggested that originally it was a treatise for trained mathematicians (Kline 1972, 57).
2. Boyer 1968, 115–8.
3. That the Euclidean model can be imitated in different ways is shown by a comparison with other works of the period, for example Isaac Newton's *Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica* of 1687, with the definitions and axioms (or 'laws') preceding the three parts, the division of propositions into theorems and problems, etc. A critical edition of the work (the 1726 version) has been published by Koyré & Cohen 1972.
4. The following remarks are based on the information provided by Von Wright 1971, 34.
5. Tonelli 1972, 343.

eminently dogmatic.[1] Heine's verdict on the use of the *ordo geometricus* by Spinoza is manifestly influenced by this criticism: 'Die mathematische Form jedoch konnte, seit Kant, in der Philosophie nicht mehr aufkommen. Dieser Form hat er in der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" ganz unbarmherzig den Stab gebrochen.'[2] In this concluding section I will not try to defend Spinoza against criticism of this kind. What I want to convey is the intimate connection between his philosophy on the one hand and the form he expressed it in on the other. Rather than remaining caught on the horns of the dilemma whether the *ordo geometricus* is the shell or the kernel of Spinozism, I would characterize it as *the most appropriate literary form for the philosophical system Spinoza develops in the 'Ethica'*. As the application in the *Principia philosophiæ* shows, it is not limited to the system of the *Ethica*; still I would maintain that it is at its most organic there. Certainly Spinoza could have written a nongeometrical version of the *Ethica*, but that would have been a fundamentally different work altogether. As a conclusion, I will try to identify the elements that would have come out differently in such a nongeometrical version. In other words: what exactly was it that the Euclidean model served to prove? In order to answer this question, three aspects deserve closer attention: (i) the cogency of the reasoning, (ii) Spinoza's critique of finalism, and (iii) the foundation of his philosophy.

(i) The reputedly greater cogency of the *ordo geometricus* is an aspect that has attracted much attention in the reception of Spinoza's philosophy. Yet I suspect that it was not of overriding importance to Spinoza himself. In Meyer's preface to the *Renati des Cartes Principia philosophiæ* we find the notion that the geometrical style as such is superior to any other in its argumentative force, and this was in fact a commonplace. The 'locus classicus' for this idea is to be found in Galen: discussing his own works, he relates how he would have fallen victim to Pyrrhonist doubt in his youth, if he had not held on to mathematics.[3] Spinoza may have been susceptible to the general idea, but he certainly did not mean his different works to have unequal demonstrative force. The argumentation of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* and the *Tractatus politicus* is not meant to be less cogent than that of the *Ethica*. I even think

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1. See in particular *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Methodenlehre I.1 (B 740/A 712 – B 766/A 738. *Werke* 4, 612–30). Engfer (1982, 49–67) gives an excellent account of Kants rejection of the mathematical model in philosophy.

2. Heine 1976, 597.

3. *καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς διδασκάλοις, εἰς τὴν τῶν Πυρρωνείων ἀπορίαν ἐνεπεπτώκειν ἂν καὶ αὐτός, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ κατὰ γεωμετρίαν ἀριθμητικήν τε καὶ λογιστικὴν κατεῖχον* (Galenus, *Περὶ τῶν ἰδίων βιβλίων*, cap. XI; Galen, ed. Mueller 1967 [1891], 116). Schüling (1969, 11) maintains: 'Ohne Galen wird die Geschichte der geometrischen Methode in der Neuzeit nicht verständlich. An ihn knüpfen fast alle Methodentheoretiker des 16. und beginnenden 17. Jahrhunderts an, die eine Übertragung des geometrischen Verfahrens auf die nicht-mathematischen Wissenschaften fordern.' It was partly due to Simon Grynaeus, editor of the *editio princeps* of Euclid's *Elements* and of Proclus' comment on Book 1 in 1533, that Galen's influence penetrated in early modern times (Schüling 1969, 35 and 37).

that the superiority of the latter over its predecessor, the *Korte verhandeling*, resides not primarily in the different layout, but in the further elaborated positions. Cogency does not reside in the form, but in the concatenation and coherence of the argument as a whole. The mathematical model always has a part to play in this, but as a kind of *mathesis universalis* in the Cartesian sense:[1] a science that embodies all those elements to which the separate branches of mathematics owe their cogency – irrespective of their different shapes.

We may indeed ask how convincing the *Ethica* has been in history. It was clear from the outset that the work, for all its Euclidean strictness, would never stand a chance of becoming the *Elements* of philosophical education. The main reason, it seems to me, is that the proofs of the propositions are convincing only for those who already subscribed to Spinoza's starting points. The propositions will be valid only for those who can grasp and unconditionally espouse the definitions with which the *Ethica* begins and which contain the seeds of the ensuing system. In this context, it is relevant to return once more to Jaspers's observations on the *ordo geometricus*:

> Daher ist es dem Sinn dieser Philosophie angemessen, daß er als Entfaltung des Grundwissens auftritt durch Herausholen alles dessen, was in den Grundbegriffen als der ursprünglichen Ausdruck der Intuition liegt. Es handelt sich nicht mehr um Entdecken, sondern um Klärung, nicht um Fortschreiten, sondern um wiederholende Vertiefung.[2]

Whoever is not already a convinced Spinozist can simply ignore all the 'cogently' deductive proofs. The layout, then, is not essential for the cogency of the argumentation: a nongeometrical *Ethica* need not have been inferior in this respect.

(ii) Rather more important is Spinoza's critique of finalism. Crucial for his philosophy is the definitive rupture with the Aristotelian notion of final causes and the concomitant central position of man in the universe. As Spinoza persuasively argues in the appendix to *Ethica* 1, the only option that can serve as an alternative to finalism is the mathematical approach. As Karl Löwith appositely formulated it: 'Die mathematische Darstellungsform der Ethik zeigt uns eine andere, höhere Wahrheitsnorm als die gewöhnlich geltende, indem sie die allzumenschliche Frage nach dem Zweck unterläßt.'[3]

(iii) In the *Meditationes*, Descartes starts from methodical doubt in order to arrive at indubitable principles: the existence of the thinking subject, the existence of God, and finally God's properties, which serve as the guarantee that the world can be known. Such a guarantee, however, remains very problematic. Spinoza circumvents the problem: instead of beginning by answering the question whether the world can be known, he sets out immediately with causality and shows its development in subsequent deductive chains of reasoning. If he had chosen a non-Euclidean form –

1. *Regula* 4 (AT 10, 378).
2. Jaspers 1986, 42.
3. Löwith 1967, 219.

which would have been a possibility – then it is precisely at this point, I think, that his philosophy would have been flawed: it would have lacked an explicit theoretical guarantee that the world is causally determined and knowable. The Euclidean form shows this in its practical application: the form does not *provide* the proof, but it *is*, so to speak, the proof itself. This then is, in my opinion, the main function of the *ordo geometricus*: the *foundation* of Spinoza's philosophical system.

A final remark. The importance of Spinoza's application of the geometrical order resides not only in its philosophical implications. As I have argued, literary aspects, too, have a role to play. In the case of the *Ethica* it is also through the sheer power of Spinoza's thinking that his Euclidean monument far surpasses everything achieved in this area before and after him. Form always matters when a philosopher has something important to say.

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Note – Entries are arranged alphabetically according to the main word, leaving prefixes (*de*, *la*, *van*, *von* etc.) out of account. An arrow (→) refers to another entry in this list.

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Index

Note – Entries are arranged alphabetically according to the main word, leaving prefixes (*de, la, van, von* etc.) out of account. An arrow (→) refers to another entry in this list. The name of Benedict de Spinoza has not been included in the index.

Corrigenda & addenda

108, n. 2, line 3, *for* LW *read* OL —— 109, n. 2, *for* LW *read* OL —— 136, n. 1, line 9, *for* Crapulli 1969 *read* Crapulli 1969a —— 148, n. 1, line 12, *for* Mark (1975) *read* Mark (1975a) —— 148, n. 1, line 17, *for* Crapulli (1969) *read* Crapulli (1969b) —— 156, n. 2, *for* De Dijn 1978a *read* De Dijn 1978b —— 173, n. 2, line 4, *for* Crapulli 1969 *read* Crapulli 1969b —— 175, n. 4, line 2, *for* LW *read* OL —— 183, line 10, *insert* 1975. *after* Breugelmans, R. —— 184, line 12, *insert* 1951. *after* Cousin, Jean. —— 185, line 6 from bottom, *insert* 1538. *after* Estienne, Charles. —— 195, top, *insert new entry* (*before* Reinhardt, Curt. 1911): Reinhardt, Curt. 1903. 'Beiträge zur Lebensgeschichte von Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus.' In: *Jahresbericht der Fürsten- und Landesschule St. Afra in Meissen vom Juli 1902 bis Juni 1903* (Meissen: Klinkicht), 1–35.

Samenvatting

Achtergrond

Centraal in het proefschrift staat de tekst van de *Ethica* van Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677). Daarbij gaat het om de overlevering en de vorm van het werk, alsmede om thema's die daarmee samenhangen. De *Ethica* verscheen kort na het overlijden van de auteur in een door zijn vrienden bezorgde bundeling van zijn nagelaten geschriften, de *Opera posthuma*. Directe aanleiding voor het onderzoek waarvan in de dissertatie verslag wordt gedaan is een geplande nieuwe kritische uitgave van Spinoza's volledige werken, met Franse vertalingen. Aan dit project werkt een redactie van Franse, Nederlandse en Italiaanse onderzoekers, de *Groupe de recherches spinozistes*. In dat kader heeft de Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO, toen nog ZWO) mij een plaats als onderzoekmedewerker vergund bij de Vakgroep Grieks en Latijn van de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, om Fokke Akkerman te assisteren bij het maken van een kritische uitgave van de *Ethica*. Daarvoor heb ik een aantal deelonderzoeken verricht, die elk op zichzelf staan, maar waarvan de onderliggende eenheid wordt gevormd door het werk aan de uitgave van de *Ethica*-tekst.

Hoofdstuk 1 · De redactionele geschiedenis van de Opera posthuma

De *Ethica* is door Spinoza zelf voltooid, en in 1675 heeft hij voorbereidingen getroffen voor publikatie ervan. Toen hij vernam dat het gerucht hem al vooruitgesneld was, en dat zijn vermeend atheïstische geschrift op een zeer vijandige ontvangst kon rekenen, besloot hij het manuscript weer op te bergen. Met zijn vrienden sprak hij af dat zij voor uitgave zorg zouden dragen als hij kwam te overlijden. Dezen hebben zich in 1677 snel en op bewonderenswaardige wijze van hun taak gekweten. In een tijdsbestek van tien maanden gaven zij niet alleen de *Ethica* in het licht, maar ook een drietal onvoltooide verhandelingen die zij onder de papieren van de wijsgeer aantroffen (*Tractatus politicus*, *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*, *Compendium grammatices linguæ Hebrææ*) en zijn correspondentie, voor zover relevant geacht voor een goed begrip van zijn werk. Het geheel verscheen onder de titel *B.D.S. Opera posthuma* bij Jan Rieuwertsz in Amsterdam – evenwel zonder vermelding van uitgever of plaats. Tegelijk publiceer-

den zij dezelfde teksten (met uitzondering van de Hebreeuwse grammatica) in een Nederlandse vertaling: *De nagelate schriften van B.D.S.* Van de *Ethica* en de andere verhandelingen in de *Opera posthuma* zijn geen handschriften bewaard; een kritische editie moet zich dus baseren op de gedrukte Latijnse tekst. (Voor de brieven ligt de situatie anders, omdat daarvan in een aantal gevallen wel handschriften zijn overgeleverd.) De status van die Latijnse tekst is, althans voor de *Ethica*, betrekkelijk onproblematisch: Spinoza had immers al voorbereidingen getroffen voor publikatie, en de uitgave in 1677 vond volgens zijn uitdrukkelijke wens en instructies plaats. Niettemin toont de tekst in de *Opera posthuma* sporen van redactionele ingrepen, en in het eerste hoofdstuk probeer ik te reconstrueren wie bij de totstandkoming van de uitgave betrokken waren, wat de aard en omvang van hun bemoeienis met de teksten is geweest, en welke bronnen ons bij dit onderzoek ter beschikking staan.

Een centrale rol in de redactie die Spinoza's wijsgerige nalatenschap bezorgde lijkt te worden ingenomen door Lodewijk Meyer. Zijn betrokkenheid blijkt uit verschillende bronnen, maar het is niet mogelijk de precieze aard van zijn redactionele activiteiten nader te determineren. Het ligt voor de hand dat hij, als vaardig Latinist met aanzienlijke literaire en stilistische talenten, Spinoza's sobere Latijn in voorkomende gevallen heeft gepolijst, maar zekerheid hierover hebben we niet. Wellicht is zijn invloed merkbaar in de systematisering van het complexe stelsel van interne verwijzingen in de *Ethica*, en in de uniforme spelling en accentuering van het Latijn. Ook hier ontbreken echter harde bewijzen. Een tekstelement dat een onmiskenbare redactionele behandeling heeft ondergaan (wellicht door Meyer) is de titelpagina van de *Ethica*. Ik meen te kunnen aantonen dat de Latijnse versie (met daarin onder andere de roemruchte 'ondertitel' *ordine geometrico demonstrata*) het resultaat is van een retorische zucht tot verfraaiing, en dat de titelpagina zoals die in *De nagelate schriften* in Nederlandse vertaling te vinden is Spinoza's oorspronkelijke formulering beter weerspiegelt.

Een figuur wiens mogelijke betrokkenheid bij de verspreiding van afschriften van Spinoza's werken voor het eerst uitvoerig aandacht krijgt is Pieter van Gent. Dat hij aan de redactie van de *Opera posthuma* zou hebben meegewerkt is al bijna een eeuw geleden gepostuleerd, naar aanleiding van de correspondentie tussen Van Gent en Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus. Die interpretatie doorstaat evenwel de toets der kritiek niet. Ik heb kunnen vaststellen dat Van Gent inderdaad delen van Spinoza's werken na diens dood heeft overgeschreven, naar hij zelf zegt op verzoek van G.H. Schuller. Een vergelijking van de autografe brieven die hij aan Christiaan Huygens schreef met een tweetal afschriften van brieven uit Spinoza's nalatenschap toonde aan dat die kopieën door hem zijn vervaardigd. Of hij ook kopieerwerk (en eventueel ook andere werkzaamheden) ten behoeve van de uitgave van de *Opera posthuma* verricht heeft, of dat de redacteuren enkel van zijn al bestaande afschriften gebruik hebben gemaakt, is nog niet met zekerheid te zeggen. Ik heb het vermoeden dat hij de lijst met errata heeft opgesteld.

Deze nieuwe gegevens plaatsen ook de betrokkenheid van Georg Hermann Schuller in een ander perspectief. Diens rol is altijd problematisch geweest, omdat hij enerzijds in zijn correspondentie met Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz blijkt geeft van directe betrokkenheid bij de uitgave, anderzijds een onbetrouwbaar informant lijkt en niet over de capaciteiten beschikte om een dergelijke uitgave te redigeren. Ook de vraag of hij dan wel Lodewijk Meyer de arts was die aan Spinoza's sterfbed stond is in dit verband relevant. (Die laatste kwestie is niet met zekerheid op te lossen, maar het lijkt me niet onwaarschijnlijk dat Schuller de bedoelde arts was.) Mijn hypothese is dat Schuller geen inhoudelijke bijdrage aan de uitgave der nagelaten werken heeft gehad, maar wel een belangrijke rol heeft gespeeld in de besluitvorming: tenslotte heeft men niet alleen de door Spinoza zelf verlangde uitgave van de *Ethica* gerealiseerd, maar eveneens die van de onvoltooide verhandelingen en de correspondentie. De autografe handschriften van die laatste twee categorieën geschriften berustten na Spinoza's dood waarschijnlijk grotendeels bij Schuller, die een beroep op Van Gent heeft gedaan om er afschriften van te maken. Een ander belangrijk punt dat uit de brieven van Schuller aan Leibniz op te maken valt is dat de kopij waarnaar Rieuwertsz in 1677 de *Ethica* heeft uitgegeven niet Spinoza's autograaf is geweest. Hoogst waarschijnlijk heeft de uitgever kunnen beschikken over het afschrift dat Spinoza al in 1675 moet hebben laten vervaardigen, toen hij zelf tot publikatie had willen overgaan.

Voor de volledigheid wordt in hoofdstuk 1 ook nog kort ingegaan op de redactionele betrokkenheid van andere vrienden van de overleden wijsgeer: Johannes Bouwmeester, Jarig Jelles, Jan Rieuwertsz, en op die van de beroepsvertaler Jan Hendriksz Glazemaker.

Hoofdstuk 2 · Aanzetten tot een geschiedenis van de accenttekens in het Neolatijn

Spinoza's *Opera posthuma* wemelen van de accenttekens – een zeer gangbaar verschijnsel in de vele Latijnse boeken die in de zestiende en zeventiende eeuw werden gedrukt. Hoewel die accentueringspraktijk algemene verbreiding kende en sporen heeft nagelaten in de moderne talen (accent grave, aigu, circonflexe), is er tot dusver geen zelfstandig onderzoek naar verricht. Dit hoofdstuk wil een aanzet zijn tot nadere studie van dit fenomeen.

Ik begin met een beschrijving van het diacritische stelsel zoals dat eeuwenlang (ruwweg van de zestiende tot ver in de achttiende eeuw) in Latijnse boeken is gehanteerd. Er waren vier tekens in gebruik: de *accentus gravis* werd gebruikt voor bepaalde groepen indeclinabilia (vooral bijwoorden, maar ook enkele voegwoorden en voorzetsels), de *acutus* voor woorden met een enclitisch achtervoegsel, de *circumflexus* dient om bepaalde naamvallen en samengetrokken vormen te markeren, en het trema (*diaeresis*) om belendende klinkers te scheiden, voor zover die geen tweeklank moesten vormen. Het stelsel kende nogal wat varianten en werd – naar hedendaagse maatstaven

– niet consequent toegepast. De functie ervan was de lezer bij een eerste blik op de tekst al enige oriëntatie te bieden voor het overzien van een Latijnse periode.

De gewoonte om het Latijn van accenttekens te voorzien is geïnspireerd door de accentuering van het Grieks, dat ook overigens in tal van opzichten als modeltaal fungeerde. De toepassing ervan in het Neolatijn vertoont evenwel geheel eigen trekjes, die samenhangen met de eigen aard van de taal, maar ook met een tweetal andere historische invloeden: het Romeinse *apex*-stelsel, waarmee de Romeinen letterverdubbelingen plachten te noteren (speciaal in inscripties), en enkele middeleeuwse conventies.

Een onopgeloste vraag is nog of het Neolatijnse stelsel een creatie is geweest van de vroeg-moderne tijd, of een voortzetting van oudere diacritische systemen. In ieder geval is de introductie van accenttekens in gedrukte teksten een bewuste innovatie geweest, die ik meen te kunnen toeschrijven aan Aldus Manutius.

Na een korte beschouwing over het in onbruik raken van de accenttekens in de spelling van het Latijn eindigt het hoofdstuk met de vaststelling dat de voor tekstbezorgers belangrijke vraag wie de accenttekens in een tekst plaatste, zich niet eenduidig laat beantwoorden. In het algemeen zal de 'huisstijl' van een drukker een grotere invloed hebben gehad dan de voorkeuren van de individuele auteurs.

Hoofdstuk 3 · Lodewijk Meyers catalogus van de hartstochten (1670): tussen Descartes en Spinoza

Tussen het kunstgenootschap *Nil volentibus arduum*, dat betekenis heeft gehad voor de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse letterkunde, en de kring van vrienden en volgelingen rond Spinoza bestonden nauwe contacten. Dit genootschap werkte aan een boek, *Onderwys in de tooneel-poëzy*, dat evenwel nooit naar de zin der auteurs is voltooid en ook niet door henzelf is gepubliceerd. De veertig hoofdstukken zijn geschreven door tien auteurs, waaronder Spinoza's vrienden Johannes Bouwmeester en Lodewijk Meyer – oprichter en spil van het genootschap. Meyer droeg onder andere het hoofdstuk 'Vande Hartstoghten' bij. Interessant hieraan is dat het is geschreven in 1670, maar niettemin al invloeden vertoont van de hartstochtenleer die Spinoza in deel drie van de *Ethica* ontwikkelt. Het algemene kader van Meyers theorie van de passies wordt gevormd door *Les Passions de l'âme* van Descartes. Dit is op zichzelf opmerkelijk, want ondanks de verbreiding van het cartesianisme bleven de opvattingen over de passies in het toneel nog lang onder invloed van Aristoteles staan. Meyer lijkt zich aan die traditie te willen onttrekken: voor hem vormt de nieuwe wijsbegeerte het uitgangspunt. Daarbij ontleent hij niet alleen elementen aan Descartes, maar eveneens aan de – dan alleen nog maar in manuscript circulerende – *Ethica* van Spinoza. Dit gegeven is van belang voor onze kennis van de handschriftelijke geschiedenis van Spinoza's werk.

In dit hoofdstuk geef ik een overzicht van Meyers hartstochtenleer en een analyse van de overeenkomsten en verschillen met de opvattingen van Descartes en Spinoza. Ook de relatie tot Pierre Corneille komt aan bod. Kenmerkend voor Meyer is zijn

eclecticisme en zijn hang tot systematiek: op basis van materiaal dat hij aan verschillende bronnen heeft ontleend, komt hij in een kort bestek tot een stelselmatige en hecht gestructureerde beschrijving van een groot aantal passies die voor het toneel van belang zijn.

Hoofdstuk 4 · De tekst van deel vijf van de Ethica

Een complicerende factor in de overlevering van Spinoza's nagelaten werk is het bestaan, naast de Latijnse editie, van een contemporaine Nederlandse vertaling. Die is in opdracht van de vrienden van de overleden wijsgeer vervaardigd door de professionele vertaler Jan Hendriksz Glazemaker. De divergenties tussen die twee versies hebben aanleiding gegeven tot allerlei hypothesen, onder andere dat Spinoza's *Ethica* verschillende stadia van bewerking heeft gekend, en dat de Nederlandse vertaling zou teruggaan op een Latijns handschrift dat een eerder stadium vertegenwoordigde dan het handschrift dat als kopij heeft gediend voor de Latijnse uitgave in de *Opera posthuma*. In dit hoofdstuk onderwerp ik de twee versies van het vijfde deel van de *Ethica* aan een nauwkeurige vergelijking. De discrepanties worden in vier rubrieken behandeld: vertalersvrijheden, vertaalfouten, varianten in de Euclidische vormgeving van het werk, en tenslotte de Latijnse technische termen die in *De nagelate schriften* als randglossen zijn opgenomen. Het resultaat van de vergelijking is dat de Latijnse tekst van deel vijf, zoals overgeleverd in de *Opera posthuma*, op geen enkele plaats wordt overtroffen door de Nederlandse versie in *De nagelate schriften*.

Hoofdstuk 5 · Ordo geometricus: schil of kern?

De 'geometrische' gedaante van Spinoza's *Ethica* – dat wil zeggen de opbouw naar het voorbeeld van de *Elementen* van Euclides, met definities, axioma's, stellingen, bewijzen – behoort tot de meest omstreden aspecten ervan. Commentatoren staan lijnrecht tegenover elkaar in hun waardering: voor velen is die vormgeving slechts uiterlijke opsmuk die met de inhoud van het werk niets te maken heeft, volgens anderen daarentegen is de *ordo geometricus* ten nauwste met de strekking van het betoog verbonden.

Het hoofdstuk behandelt om te beginnen enige karakteristieke momenten uit de receptiegeschiedenis: hoe hebben latere wijsgeren en commentatoren Spinoza's gebruik van de Euclidische vormgeving beoordeeld? Daarna ga ik in op de vraag naar het verband tussen vormgeving en methode: is het juist om te spreken – zoals vaak gebeurt – van 'de geometrische methode' van Spinoza? Mijn conclusie is dat er weliswaar verbanden zijn aan te wijzen tussen vorm en methode, maar dat ze niet zonder meer met elkaar kunnen worden vereenzelvigd. Vervolgens komen de bronnen van de *ordo geometricus* aan de orde: wie waren Spinoza's directe voorbeelden voor het toepassen van een geometrische bewijstrant op een wijsgerig betoog? Tenslotte probeer ik de

functie van deze vorm van filosoferen te bepalen. Die is niet zozeer gelegen in de veronderstelde grotere bewijskracht, zoals vaak wordt gedacht, maar ligt op het retorische vlak. Retorica is daarbij geen kwestie van aankleding, maar een bewuste keuze voor die vormgeving die optimaal aansluit bij de te behandelen stof en het beoogde publiek. De geometrische (of zogenoemde 'synthetische') betoogtrant is voor Spinoza een krachtig wapen in zijn bestrijding van het denken in termen van doeloorzaken, en het vooroordeel dat de mens het middelpunt van het universum zou vormen. Belangrijker nog is dat de *ordo geometricus* Spinoza in staat stelt zijn wijsgerige stelsel direct met de leer van de unieke goddelijke substantie te laten beginnen en van daaruit te ontwikkelen. Daarmee ontdoet hij zich van een zwakke schakel in de redenering van Descartes, die – om het bestaan en de kenbaarheid van de wereld te funderen – eerst een goddelijke garantie voor de deugdelijkheid van het menselijk kennen nodig heeft. Aldus beschouwd is de *ordo geometricus* weliswaar een vorm, zelfs een literaire, retorische vorm, maar dan wel een die ten innigste met de centrale thematiek van Spinoza's wijsbegeerte is verbonden. Bij een filosoof die echt wat te zeggen heeft is de vorm altijd van belang.

Quaestiones Infinitae

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